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The literature has struggled to explain why the global financial crisis (GFC) of 
2008-09, has failed to translate into major change to the neoliberal model of 
capitalism. Arguably, this is due to the literature’s narrow conception of 
corporate power exerting itself through direct and purposive intervention in 
the policymaking process—the ’top-down’ view of institutional change. The 
answer may lie in a broader understanding of corporate influence, 
incorporating the role of firm practices in shaping the law—the ‘bottom-up’ 
perspective. Despite mounting consensus on the mechanisms of such change, 
our wider understanding of it is still limited. In order to explore the role of 
bottom-up change in times of major crisis, we need to explore its firm-level 
antecedents and contextualize the dynamics of bottom-up change processes, 
i.e. how it is mediated by public discourse and crisis situations. Building on 
actor-centered institutionalism and incorporating aspects of constructivist and 
sociological institutionalism, this study contributes to this endeavor by 
examining a set of interrelated relationships, conceptualized as constituting a 
triangle between public discourse, corporate practice, and the law. The 
comparative, mixed-methods research design combines macro-level analysis 
of legal and regulatory change, micro-level analysis of changes in corporate 
practice, and change in public discourse in three institutional spheres (finance 
& accounting, corporate governance, labor relations) across four countries 
(Switzerland, Germany, United Kingdom, United States) over a 19-year 
period (1995-2013). While bottom-up change may be limited in scope under 
‘normal’ circumstances, it is found to take on a central role during major 
crises. Direct and purposive channels of corporate influence on legal change 
become less effective in such circumstances, but the indirect channels of 
bottom-up change appear to open up and enable the perpetuation of 
corporate power throughout such events. 
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One of the defining socio-economic phenomena of our time, the global 
financial crisis (GFC) of 2008-09 has sparked a wave of research into its causes 
and effects, as well as proposals on restoring economic growth, stability, and 
avoiding the next global economic meltdown. Despite all this attention, 
however, the extent of reforms enacted in the wake of the crisis has been 
limited. The most immediate governmental responses to the GFC were 
concerned with economic ‘fire-fighting’ to save financial and industrial 
corporations deemed ‘too big to fail,’ reduce the fallout from the financial 
crisis onto other parts of the economy, and to “save the market from itself” 
(Gamble 2009, p.97). Governments approached these challenges in different 
ways, following a variety of ideological stances. The US approach of stimulus 
spending combined with quantitative easing followed a two-pronged fiscal 
and monetary approach, while the British government pursued a more 
monetarist approach. Such immediate emergency measures need to be 
conceptually separated, however, from permanent regulatory changes, 
intended to fix the perceived underlying issues that caused the crisis and place 
the economy on a steady footing in the long-term. Empirical evidence of 
changes in financial market regulation after the crisis suggests that 
governments enacted emergency legislation to stave off a deepening of the 
crisis, but produced few substantial reforms towards long-term change and 
reigning in of financial markets (Mayntz 2012). 
In light of this, the literature has asked why the crisis, despite its magnitude, 
failed to translate into major changes to the neoliberal model of capitalism 
(Mayntz 2012; Schmidt & Thatcher 2013). A common refrain in this literature 
is that corporations have been underestimated as vastly powerful forces in 
modern capitalism, pointing to flaws in classic neo-liberal accounts that see 
markets as the dominant force. To use Crouch’s (2011) conception, the size 
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of modern corporations has shifted the balance of power between markets, 
the state, and corporations towards the latter, giving them vast influence on 
the polity and on setting the rules of the marketplace. Despite pointing to the 
crisis as accentuating the “series of comfortable accommodations” (Crouch 
2011) between corporations, markets, and the state, this literature ultimately 
struggles to explain why more radical change failed to materialize. While 
there is agreement that corporations obstruct deeper change, the literature 
does not pin down exactly how they may exert influence during crises, 
especially in a time the literature predicts their influence should wane. After 
all, the GFC and ensuing political salience should have weakened the power 
of businesses to influence policymaking (Culpepper 2011) and created a 
window of opportunity for policymakers emboldened by public outrage and 
demand for change to enact radical reforms and tip the balance back in favor 
of other forces. 
Although the above literature is moving in the right direction by emphasizing 
the role and power of corporations in explaining the stagnancy of modern 
capitalist models, it is constrained by its narrow conception of corporate 
power exerting itself primarily through purposive intervention in the 
policymaking process. Indeed, it is indicative of a wider limitation of the 
institutional change literature. While current approaches, such as actor-
centered institutionalism (Scharpf 1997; Mayntz & Scharpf 1995), place the 
role of corporations in the front and center, they largely do so within the 
context of party and interest group politics as the origin of institutional 
change, influenced to some extent by direct intervention of business interests. 
This can be termed a ‘top-down’ view of institutional change. Increasingly, 
however, the literature is recognizing that those most affected by an institution 
hold a considerable degree of power to shape formal rules that goes beyond 
accepting or rejecting policymaker-decreed change and intervention in the 
policymaking process.  
In this view, which will be called the ‘bottom-up’ perspective here, changes in 
corporate practice can become legitimated by lawmakers and ultimately 
institutionalized. The basis for corporate practices influencing formal 
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institutions are “the ‘gaps’ or ‘soft spots’ between the rule and its interpretation 
or the rule and its enforcement” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010a, p.14). On an 
individual level, exploiting these gaps hardly is powerful enough to cause 
institutional change. However, once a few powerful actors start acting in 
similar ways and gather critical mass, they can trigger change in their own 
institutional field, potentially even spreading into connected fields through a 
number of mechanisms that have been conceptualized and empirically tested 
(Mahoney & Thelen 2010a). This study proposes that it is here, in the role of 
corporate practices influencing legal change, where we may find an 
explanation for how corporations exert their influence in times of crisis and 
control the throttle of institutional change, but that we need to conceptually 
broaden this type of change. 
This literature is usually referred to as the ‘incremental’ or ‘gradual’ 
institutional change literature and associated primarily with the work of 
Kathleen Thelen, Wolfgang Streeck, and James Mahoney (Streeck & Thelen 
2005b; Mahoney & Thelen 2010b). It makes the case that piecemeal 
adjustments to institutions resulting from actors pushing at the boundaries of 
existing rules may be marginal at any one point in time, but can amount to 
transformative change over longer periods. While this is important step 
forward in the literature by breaking free from the older ‘punctuated 
equilibrium’ view of long periods of stability interrupted only rarely by bursts 
of ‘radical’ institutional change (Krasner 1984), it is also conceptually limiting: 
if we consider institutional change in terms of magnitude and pace, the 
question arises what type of change the ‘incremental’ label implies. As the 
aforementioned authors argue that incremental change may, over time, 
accumulate to become transformative, the magnitude of such change may 
thus be very similar to ‘radical’ change over a long time frame, but would be 
limited over a shorter period. The pace of change, on the other hand, is always 
viewed as limited in the incremental perspective by the marginal nature of 
adjustments arising from actors exploiting the ‘gaps’ between rules and their 
interpretation or enforcement. Hence, the 'incremental change' idea seems to 
imply that the leeway left by laws for 'deviant' behavior is naturally small—a 
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strong assumption to make. Indeed, certain laws may actually allow for a large 
number of very deviant behaviors, especially where law and regulation failed 
to anticipate new developments such as financial product innovation that 
allows banks to side-step existing rules. The ‘incremental change’ literature’s  
conception is a result its explicit focus on periods of institutional ‘stability,’ 
when the pace and magnitude of change brought about this way may indeed 
be limited in the short term. In times of crisis—the focus of this study—
however, the magnitude and pace of such change may be much greater. As 
will be argued in full in the literature review, times of crisis could be highly 
conducive to institutional change arising from corporate actors pushing at the 
boundaries of existing rules, both by acting as a trigger for such change and 
by institutions being more ‘pliable’ under such circumstances. Consequently, 
despite the incremental change literature forming an important starting point 
for this study, the concepts to be developed here need to be delineated from 
the assumptions and constraints implicit in the ‘incremental change’ label. 
This study will thus use the term ‘bottom-up’ change to refer to institutional 
change arising from shifting patterns of behavior among corporate actors, 
regardless of the pace and magnitude of change resulting from it. 
In order to explore to what extent bottom-up change plays a role in shaping 
institutional change during times of crisis, we need to strengthen our 
understanding of bottom-up processes of change more generally. Despite 
building consensus on mechanisms, the literature has so far not addressed 
some important aspects of bottom-up change that are of particular relevance 
for exploring its role during times of crisis. For one, existing models do not 
consider where change originates or why it occurs in the first place. As Vivien 
Schmidt (2012, p.709) puts it, these models deserve praise for conceptualizing 
mechanisms of institutional change, but while “this literature may help to 
describe change, it does not explain it, since to explain change, they would 
need to make reference to what actors think and say that leads to change.” In 
other words, we know little about the antecedents of bottom-up change, 
necessitating a deeper focus on what drives change in corporate behavior. 
Secondly, existing models of bottom-up change are not sensitive to context, 
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i.e. they do not consider the conditions under which bottom-up change may 
be more or less likely to take place. Consequently, we need to open up the 
firm level to the same analytical scrutiny as the policymaker level, if we are to 
take the role of corporate actors seriously and expand our understanding of 
how they shape their institutional environment beyond direct engagement in 
the policymaking process. 
The overarching goal of this study is thus to further our understanding of 
bottom-up change, defined as change in formal institutions arising from or 
being shaped by corporate practices, and in particular explore the antecedents 
of such change and the circumstances under which it is more or less likely to 
occur. While the overall approach taken here builds on actor-centered 
institutionalism through its focus on corporate actors and their practices, it 
also draws on aspects of constructivist and sociological institutionalism to 
explain firm-level patterns of behavior and change as the antecedents of 
bottom-up change, particularly in times of severe crisis. Constructivist 
institutionalist approaches (Blyth 2002; Hay 2004; Schmidt 2010) offer a 
starting point for exploring how corporate practices change in reaction to 
public discourse and pressure, while processes of mimetic isomorphism 
(Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Scott 1995; Westphal & 
Zajac 2001), as established in the sociological institutionalism literature, may 
explain how crisis and uncertainty lead to widespread change in firm practices 
and the formation of ‘critical mass’ that may ultimately translate into legal or 
regulatory change. On the question of the circumstances in which corporate 
practices may have more or less influence on legal change, the role of political 
salience will be the starting point, as it has been shown to influence the extent 
of power business holds in top-down types of change (Culpepper 2011).  
The approach taken here borrows from several institutionalist traditions. This 
study defines institutional change as legal or regulatory change, placing the 
focus firmly on formal institutions only. Corporate practices are considered as 
an impetus or driver of legal/regulatory change through the various 
mechanisms of bottom-up change, i.e. reinterpretation, defection, 
displacement, and preemption, which will be discussed fully in chapter 2.4.2.2 
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below. These mechanisms rely on widespread adoption of deviant behavior 
in order to affect formal institutions, which in turn requires an understanding 
of how such ‘critical mass’ in changed corporate behavior builds. It is here, 
where this study draws on the insights of sociological institutionalism, as it 
offers just that in its conception of mimetic isomorphism. However, while 
corporate practices and their influence on legal and regulatory rules are the 
main subject of enquiry, they are not seen to constitute institutions in and of 
themselves for the purposes of this study. This is notably different from the 
established view in sociological institutionalism, where practices that become 
norms are seen as institutions as well. In other words, while this study leans 
on sociological institutionalism’s insights on how corporate behaviors spread 
and convergence in order to explain the antecedents of bottom-up change, it 
remains focused on formal institutions only. 
Applying the insights of constructivist institutionalism and political salience-
based models of institutional change to bottom-up change, we find a 
triangular relationship of institutional change emerging between the 
cornerstones of public discourse, corporate practices, and the law. 
Culpepper’s aforementioned work addresses two sides of this triangle—the 
relationships between public discourse and the law, and some aspects of the 
relationship between corporations and the law, albeit only in terms of direct 
engagement in the policymaking processes. To further our understanding of 
bottom-up change, this study focuses on the lesser explored aspects of this 
triangle:  
(1) the relationship between public discourse and corporate practices, as 
changing discourse may drive changes in corporate behavior;  
(2) the cornerstone of corporate practices to explore how change gains 
‘critical mass’ and establishes new norms of firm behavior; and  
(3) the relationship between corporate practices and the law, in terms of 
how widespread changes in corporate behavior may translate into 
changes in formal institutions.  
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In focusing on these three relationships, this study seeks to establish the role 
of corporate practices and associated bottom-up processes more firmly in the 
institutional change literature. By extension, this could provide an explanation 
for how corporate power perpetuates itself even in major crises, when the 
existing literature would predict corporate power to decline. 
The overarching methodological approach taken is a narrative account 
comparing and contrasting macro-level change of laws and regulations, 
micro-level change of corporate practices, and associated public discourse in 
three institutional spheres (finance & accounting, corporate governance, labor 
relations) across four countries (Switzerland, Germany, United Kingdom, 
United States) over a 19-year time frame (1995 to 2013). This timespan 
captures not only non-crisis years before and after the GFC, but also the dot-
com boom and bust and the Enron scandal, which present additional crisis 
observation periods for the study. To justify the choice of the institutional 
spheres analyzed here, the former two spheres are tightly interconnected and 
have taken blame as causal factors in creating the GFC (Gamble 2009; 
Mayntz 2012). Bank capitalization, corporate risk-taking behavior, and 
executive compensation are some of the issues that have risen in political 
salience during and after the crisis, creating incentives for policymakers to 
target these areas for reform. Labor and industrial relations are not only 
tightly connected with finance and corporate governance (Gospel & 
Pendleton 2003), it is also an area that bears potential for conflict during times 
of crisis, when companies are under pressure to reduce costs and shed 
workers. The main institutional focus area is corporate governance, due to its 
crucial role in allocation of responsibility and resources within the firm 
(Gourevitch & Shinn 2005). The selection of countries begins with the 
expectation of institutional change as an actor-centered process to be 
mediated by the institutional environment, and to thus differ between liberal 
and non-liberal economies. Building on ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (Hall & 
Soskice 2001), but employing Höpner’s (2007) finer grained distinction of two 
dimensions of non-liberalism, coordination and organization, the four 
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countries chosen each occupy one quadrant of this 2-by-2 matrix, as will be 
discussed fully in the methodology chapter. 
The time period selected covers the years 1995 through 2013, thus including 
not only the GFC of 2008-09, but also the more cyclical dot-com crash of 
2001. This longer time frame allows to observe processes of change in two 
major crises and also includes the growth period of the mid-2000s as a 
comparison to the crisis periods. The post-GFC years are 2010 to 2013. 
Arguably, this is a rather short post-crisis period to study, however, with high 
political salience a generally fleeting phenomenon and public and corporate 
mood returning to ‘business as usual,’ seeds for change, so they exist, will 
largely have been sown in the four post-GFC years. 
Each of the three relationships of interest along the ‘triangle of institutional 
change’ requires a different approach, based on the research questions being 
asked, specificity of prior expectations, and type of data used. The central 
point of reference are corporate practices, which are measured quantitatively 
using 40 variables across the three aforementioned institutional spheres for a 
sample of the circa 130 largest publicly listed companies in each of the four 
countries. To estimate the relationship between these measures of corporate 
practice and public discourse, measured as newspaper coverage of related 
issues, a panel regression analysis approach is used. Testing for processes of 
mimetic isomorphism shifting firm practices in times of crisis is accomplished 
using analysis of variance (ANOVA). Finally, the relationship between firm-
level change in practices and legal or regulatory change is analyzed using a 
qualitative, narrative-based approach as is common in comparative political 
economy. 
The thesis is structured as follows:  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature beginning with the neo-institutional 
foundations underpinning in this study, before discussing conceptions of the 
relationship between actors and institutions. Then, the state-of-the-art of the 
institutional change literature is discussed, pointing out shortcomings in our 
understanding of bottom-up change. Finally, the literature review introduces 
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the ‘triangle of institutional change’ as a conceptual framework for this study, 
drawing on various strands of related literatures to formulate propositions to 
guide analysis.  
Chapter 3 discusses the methodological approach taken, introducing the firm-
level measures and dataset, as well as specific methods used to analyze the 
three relationships of interest. The following three empirical chapters each 
discuss one of the focus areas of this study, beginning with the antecedents of 
bottom-up change.  
Chapter 4 analyzes the relationship between corporate practice and public 
discourse and reports the panel regression results in order to establish to what 
extent and in what regard companies tend to react to public discourse and 
pressure.  
Chapter 5 turns to firm-level processes of change driven by mimetic 
isomorphism in times of crisis, reporting the ANOVA results to analyze the 
extent to which such processes may shift firm behavior and thus produce 
‘supply’ of bottom-up change.  
Chapter 6 focuses on the relationship between corporate practice and legal or 
regulatory change, incorporating the findings from the previous chapters on 
the antecedents of bottom-up change. This chapter analyzes the conditions 
under which bottom-up change is more or less likely to take place.  
Chapter 7 pulls the empirical findings together to reconstitute the ‘triangle of 
institutional change’, discussing implications for the literature and whether 
bottom-up change offers an explanation for perpetuation of corporate power 
in times of crisis.  
Chapter 8 concludes, discussing contributions to the literature, limitations of 
the study, and avenues for future research. 
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2 Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
The fundamental claim of institutionalist approaches, that human behavior is 
conditioned by their institutional environment, has found application across 
a number of fields concerned with explaining certain aspects or outcomes of 
actors’ behavior. From its beginnings in economics, political science and 
sociology, ‘new institutionalism’ has come a long way towards embracing the 
conception of actors and institutions as mutually constitutive of one another. 
Alongside this development, models of institutional change have matured as 
well. Traditional models of change focused on outcomes rather than 
processes, relying on shock events to explain radical change or historic 
contingency to explain stability. More recent approaches, however, 
emphasize gradual, over time transformative change, shifting the focus on 
process rather than outcome. State-of-the-art models of institutional change 
are therefore process-oriented and actor-centered, taking all relevant actors 
into account, including those most affected by an institution—corporations, 
in case of finance and accounting, corporate governance, and labor relations 
institutions. 
Despite these advances, our understanding of how different actors interact 
with their institutional environment, what drives change from different 
sources, and when some issues may take primacy over others, is still limited 
by an overtly politics-focused, ‘top-down’ approach to institutional change. As 
a result, political actors are much better understood than corporate actors, 
which are often only considered in terms of how they influence policymakers 
through lobbying, interest groups or framing of the public debate, mostly 
ignoring the role of corporate behavior outside direct influence on the 
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policymaking process. A growing literature on ‘bottom-up’ change, however, 
contends that corporate practices play an important role in processes of 
institutional change by shifting interpretations of the law and what constitutes 
acceptable compliance, or derailing regulatory efforts through non-
compliance. While mechanisms of bottom-up change have been theorized 
and some instances of it empirically demonstrated, a range of questions on 
how corporate practices are related to institutional change are yet to be 
explored. 
For one, we need a fuller understanding of the antecedents of bottom-up 
change, i.e. the drivers of change in corporate practice, which then translates 
into bottom-up change. There are several promising points of departure on 
this issue, most importantly around how ‘critical mass’ builds on the firm-level 
and to what extent corporate practices are shaped by public discourse. We 
also need to know more about the circumstances under which bottom-up 
change is likely to occur—just as the power of firms to influence policymaking 
varies with a range of factors including an issue’s political salience, the 
company’s institutional environment and the country’s political system, we 
should also expect bottom-up change to be bound by circumstance. If we are 
to take the role of corporations in institutional change processes seriously, as 
state-of-the-art actor-centered institutionalism urges (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995; 
Scharpf 1997; Jackson 2010), these issues need addressing by opening up the 
firm level to the same scrutiny as the policymaker level. 
In order to do this and develop a research approach, we consider the literature 
in the context of the issue of bottom-up change and firms, and utilize this to 
form this thesis’ research questions and formulate expectations. To shape this, 
this literature review first outlines the development of ‘new institutionalism’, 
pointing out the different assumptions and understandings underlying the 
three branches of neo-institutionalism that have a lasting impact on current 
approaches. It then focuses on the relationship between actors and 
institutions, tracing the path from unidirectional to interdependent 
approaches and actor-centered institutionalism as state-of-the-art. 
Subsequently, the literature on institutional change is examined, highlighting 
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the overt focus on institutional change as a politics-driven game and the 
shortcomings of our understanding of bottom-up change. The penultimate 
section explores the role of corporate actors in more detail, pointing to the 
centrality of their behavior for bottom-up conceptions of change. Finally, the 
‘triangle of institutional change’ is introduced as a conceptual framework that 
guides this study’s efforts to deepen our understanding of bottom-up change. 
2.2 New Institutionalism 
New institutionalism can be understood as a revival or update of the ‘old’ or 
‘classical’ institutionalism of Thorstein Veblen, Max Weber, and John 
Commons. These early approaches focused on formal institutions of the state 
and the bureaucracy, which were seen to create a set of rules so inevitable as 
to constrain individuals in an ‘iron cage’ (Weber 2002), or, more appropriately 
translated from Weber’s original German metaphor, a ‘shell as hard as steel’ 
(Baehr 2001). The ‘behavioral revolution’ of the post-war era (see Simon 
1985) rejected this line of thought and focused on the behavior of individuals 
rather than their institutional surroundings. As a counter-reaction to the overt 
spotlight on individual behavior, which often downplayed or ignored 
structural constraints, scholars across disciplines sought to “elucidate the role 
that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes” 
(Hall & R. C. R. Taylor 1996). The result of this renewed emphasis on 
institutional factors was three major schools of thought under the ‘new 
institutionalism’ or ‘neo-institutionalism’ umbrella term, each with distinct 
analytical approaches: historical institutionalism (HI), rational choice 
institutionalism (RCI), and sociological institutionalism (SI). While each 
approach will be discussed in more detail, it is useful to first gain an overview 
of the commonalities and differences between the three types of new 
institutionalism. 
Neo-institutionalism seeks to explain socio-economic outcomes, which it 
contends are a result of the choices made by a variety of actors—the state, 
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organizations and individuals—within the constraints imposed by their 
institutional environment. Actors’ choices are therefore the proximate cause 
of outcomes, while institutions are a remote cause. All three strands of new 
institutionalism grant actors choice in their decision-making, but to varying 
extent and levels of awareness of institutional constraints. Institutions are 
generally seen as formal and informal rules and rule-like norms and 
expectations, which structure behavior and thereby reduce uncertainty and 
risk in interactions between actors. Despite these broad similarities, there are 
distinct differences between RCI, HI and SCI in terms of their conception of 
institutions—on what level they constrain actors and why actors comply—as 
well as their conception of actors—what their interests are and whether they 
are rule-makers or rule-takers. 
The emphases on different aspects or types of institutions can be illustrated by 
the three institutional pillars, regulative, normative, and cognitive, first 
formulated by Powell and DiMaggio (1991). The regulative pillar has been 
the focal point in rational-choice theory based approaches and refers to the 
formal constraining, behavior-controlling element of institutions. Rule-
making, supervision of compliance, and enforcement of adherence through 
sanctions are therefore essential elements of this pillar. The credible threat of 
sanctions affects actors’ cost-benefit analysis and makes obeying the rules the 
rational course of action (Scott 1995). The normative pillar emphasizes the 
“prescriptive, evaluative, and obligatory dimension” of rules (Scott 1995, 
p.37). Normative aspects of institutions enable and constrain social behavior 
by defining rights and responsibilities, as well as acceptable and expected 
behavior in certain circumstances. Behavior in this regard is the result of 
purposive action based on a ‘logic of appropriateness,’ i.e. what they perceive 
to be appropriate action in a given situation (March & Olsen 1989). In other 
words, “actors conform not because it serves their individual interests, 
narrowly defined, but because it is expected of them; they are obliged to do 
so” (Scott 1995, p.39). The cognitive pillar, associated in particular with 
sociological approaches to new institutionalism, emphasizes the “collection of 
internalized symbolic representations of the world” (Scott 1995, p.40). 
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Cognitive aspects of institutions guide the behavior of actors by establishing 
taken-for-granted ways of doing things, which seem so natural to actors that 
they cannot even conceive of other choices. While this reduces the level of 
agency actors possess compared to the other institutional pillars, they do 
retain some free choice within those unconscious constraints. Actors interests 
are hereby seen as socially constructed and therefore context-dependent, 
resulting in some situations where individualistic goals take primacy over 
collective goals, and vice versa. 
Each institutional pillar is associated with a basis for gaining legitimacy, which 
actors are assumed to seek in order to avoid the cost of deviant behavior. For 
the regulative pillar, legitimacy is created by adhering to rules and regulations, 
i.e. staying within the confines of the law. The normative pillar emphasizes “a 
deeper, moral base for assessing legitimacy,” which includes internalized as 
well as externalized rewards for compliance (Scott 1995, p.47). In the 
cognitive pillar, legitimacy arises from cognitive consistency, i.e. adopting an 
orthodox practice that allows the actor to blend in with others (Scott 1995). 
Three classes of actors are generally distinguished in new institutionalism: the 
state, organizations and individuals, with the state constraining the latter two, 
and organizations constraining individuals who are part of them. 
Corporations, as organizations, should therefore not be seen as single 
coherent entities, but as as coalitions of groups including management, 
employees, shareholders, suppliers, (Cyert & March 1992). While 
management set overarching goals, implementation occurs at various levels 
throughout the organization, where divergent interests may come to the fore 
and require bargaining. Actions taken by the firm are thus the result of the 
‘dominant coalition’ within the company (Cyert & March 1992). 
Unlike sociological strands of new institutionalism, which “see all of these 
actors as embedded in something outside (culture and networks of social 
relations, variously), […] [rational choice institutionalism] strips away those 
outside influences, and relies on the interplay among individuals, 
organizations, and states to explain institutions and behavior” (Ingram & Clay 
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2000, p.528). The different ontological assumptions supporting the three 
pillars determine their conception of the agency of actors. On one end of the 
spectrum, the regulative pillar is based on a social realist ontology, which 
assumes that actors are making rational decisions based on innate interests, 
motivated and bound by incentives and constraints within a ‘real’ 
environment that is part of the natural world. At the other end of the 
spectrum, cognitive theorists posit that “individuals do not discover the world 
and its ways, but collectively invent them. Such invention is not random and 
arbitrary, but itself arises out of and is informed and constrained by existing 
social arrangements and beliefs” (Scott 1995, p.50). The normative pillar finds 
itself in the middle of the spectrum.  
2.2.1 Rational Choice Institutionalism 
The foundations of rational choice institutionalism were laid in economics by 
Coase (1937; 1960), and built upon most significantly by Williamson (1975; 
1981; 1985) and North (1981; 1986; 1990), but has also found application in 
political science (Shepsle 2006). The core contention of this perspective are 
rational actors, who seek to maximize their goals according to known and 
ordered interests, but who are bound in their rationality by “cognitive limits, 
incomplete information, and difficulties in monitoring and enforcing 
agreements” (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p.3). The purpose of institutions in 
RCI is to reduce uncertainty in economic exchanges by limiting actors’ leeway 
for opportunistic behavior, thereby reducing transaction costs. While there 
are some differences in the conception of transaction costs, they are generally 
seen to arise from opportunistic behavior, the acquisition and processing of 
information, and the costs of maintaining a system of property rights 
(Williamson 1981; North 1984). Due to the literature’s focus on economic 
exchanges, the state is generally not given an important role. North (1990), 
however, recognizes that the state may play a crucial role in setting and 
enforcing property rights, acting as a third party for enforcing contracts. 
Enforcement mechanisms are an integral part of RCI, as their effectiveness 
determines the cost of violations and therefore the likelihood of transgressions. 
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Some parts of RCI take a functionalist view, in the sense that they see 
institutional arrangements as optimal outcomes, with competitive forces 
having replaced inefficient older arrangements (Williamson 1985). Others 
recognize the historic trajectories of institutions, limiting the choices available 
to actors while still serving the purpose of reducing uncertainty “by 
establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human 
interaction” (North 1990, p.6). The nature of institutions as largely efficient 
creations of boundedly-rational actors is one of the core contentions of RCI. 
Still one of the most widely-used definitions of institutions, North (North 1990, 
pp.3-4) defines them as “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, 
the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” and “define 
and limit the set of choices of individuals.” North considers both formal and 
informal institutions, the former in the form of laws and regulations, the latter 
in norms and conventions. Rather than simply distinguishing between formal 
and informal institutions, Ingram and Clay (2000, p.530) offer “a more fine-
grained categorization based on two dimensions, who makes the rules (the 
state or some other, private entity) and how are they made and enforced (in 
centralized or decentralized fashion).” 
In acknowledgement of the shortcomings of RCI, Ingram and Clay (2000) call 
for a deeper integration with sociological insights. They argue that this may 
provide a better explanation of how preferences are formed through societal 
processes, and explore the interdependencies between different types of 
institutions. However, North argues that rational choice theory, as a basis for 
institutional theory, is “essential because a logically consistent, potentially 
testable set of hypotheses must be built on a theory of human behavior” 
(North 1990). In other words, North argues that institutions, as human 
creations, must be based on an understanding of human behavior. Conceding 
the inadequacy of some of the assumptions underlying rational choice theory, 
North hints at the role of past choices and social constructs in conditioning 
behavior. Past choices manifest themselves in the status quo of the institutional 
configuration, which firms rely on to make profits. He thus deems radical 
change based on firm action unlikely as they would destroy their own source 
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of income. Social constructs are considered only in the form of norms, which 
are seen to constrain behavior along with formal rules. 
In North’s model, institutional change is mainly a result of “changes in rules, 
in informal constraints, and in kinds and effectiveness of enforcement” (North 
1990, p.6). In this sense, North also lays the groundwork for interdependent 
approaches, by describing the interaction between institutions and 
organizations. Institutions define opportunities and constraints that 
organizations take advantage of. Organizations are reliant on the continued 
existence of the institutions they use. As organizations evolve over time they 
may perceive that “they could do better by altering the existing institutional 
framework at some margin” (North 1990, p.8). The changes they seek to bring 
can be suboptimal due to their cognitive limitations and incomplete 
information. Ultimately, institutional change in North’s (1990) model is a 
deliberate strategy pursued by actors to increase productivity, but may also 
bring with it unintended consequences that can be detrimental to that goal. 
For the purposes of this study, an RCI-based approach is ill-suited. While its 
central tenet of boundedly-rational, purposive action may be congruent with 
conceptions of institutional change arising from and resulting from bargaining 
in the political arena, it is at odds with this study’s emphasis on the role of 
corporate behavior. Despite the aforementioned ‘wiggle room’ afforded to 
organizations in RCI, their ability to shape their institutional environment in 
any meaningful way is significantly constrained by the notion of actors 
pursuing continuity in order to maintain their sources of income. To be sure, 
RCI may offer insights into actors’ behavior under ‘normal’ circumstances, 
but it reaches its limits when it comes to explaining corporate behavior in 
times of major crisis. As will be discussed later in more detail, crises are 
situations of intense uncertainty which may even confuse actors over what 
their interests actually are (Blyth 2002). Hence, behavior in such 
circumstances cannot be understood on a basis of rationality and forestalls 
deeper examination of firm-level processes of change based on normative or 
cognitive aspects of behavior. 
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2.2.2 Historical Institutionalism 
Historical institutionalism is a branch of new institutionalism emphasizing 
historical contingency and path dependency. The approach is closely 
associated with scholars of comparative politics, including Suzanne Berger, 
Peter Hall, Peter Katzenstein, and Theda Skocpol. An important contribution 
is Steinmo and Thelen’s (1992), who synthesized previous applications of the 
perspective to present a coherent model of historical institutionalism. A 
product of political scientists building upon RCI, historical institutionalism is 
primarily concerned with the question how institutional environments 
mediate political processes.  
One of the early key contributors to this literature, Shepsle (1986) sought to 
explain stability in political systems, which previous explanations based on 
atomistic views of action (political outcomes as an aggregate result of rational 
individuals’ decision-making, without regard for social context) could not 
accommodate. Most early contributors to this field have emphasized the 
structures of the political system, including the “distribution of agenda-setting 
powers, the sequence in which proposals must be made, and the allocation of 
veto rights” (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, pp.5-6), as an important factor in 
explaining institutional resilience (Shepsle 1986; Shepsle & Weingast 1987). 
“The structure of political rules is fairly resilient to the ebbs and flows of the 
agendas of politicians, and the rules can easily live on when the original 
support for them wanes. As a result, legislative rules are seen as robust, 
resistant in the short run to political pressures, and in the long run, 
systematically constraining the options decision makers are free to pursue” 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p.6). This reflexivity, whereby actors are active 
creators of their institutional environments, but at the same time bound by 
their past choices, is at the heart of HI. 
Historical institutionalism considers both formal and informal institutions, 
which, following Hall (1986, p.19), are defined as “the formal rules, 
compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the 
relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy.” 
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Thelen and Steinmo (1992) note that some ambiguity surrounds the question 
precisely what institutions should be included in this definition, the consensus 
being that “rules of electoral competition, the structure of party systems, the 
relations among various branches of government, and the structure and 
organization of economic actors like trade unions” are included, while there 
is debate over whether norms should be included. The institutional setting is 
seen to “shape the goals political actors pursue and the way they structure 
power relations among them, privileging some and putting others at a 
disadvantage” (Thelen & Steinmo 1992, p.2).  
As in other neo-institutional approaches, historical institutionalism does not 
argue that institutions determine outcomes, but rather that they constrain and 
structure them. The ‘relational character’ of institutions (Hall 1986), 
structuring political interactions, is of central importance hereby. A good 
example for this type of institutions are veto points, i.e. “points in the policy 
process where the mobilization of opposition can thwart policy innovation” 
(Thelen & Steinmo 1992, p.7). In sum, the core characteristics of historical 
institutionalism are “the emphasis on intermediate institutions that shape 
political strategies, the ways institutions structure relations of power among 
contending groups in society, and especially the focus on the process of politics 
and policy-making within given institutional parameters” (Thelen & Steinmo 
1992, p.7). 
Unlike rational choice institutionalism, which sees actors as rational, self-
interest maximizing players, historical institutionalism recognizes the 
cognitive aspect of institutions, establishing taken-for-granted ways of doing 
things that actors follow without questioning, even if it is not necessarily in 
their self-interest. This difference also illustrates a central point of divergence 
between RCI and HI—preference formation. The former approach sees it as 
a non-issue by assuming that actors maximize their self-interest, which is 
deduced from the situation at hand; the historical approach, however, sees 
preferences and goals as shaped by the institutional context. In other words, 
“for historical institutionalists, institutions ’structure’ individuals’ preferences, 
whereas for rationalists, the preferences of individuals ‘structure’ institutions” 
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(Blyth 2002, p.19). As Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p.9) argue, this one of the 
main strengths of HI, as “broad assumptions about ‘self-interested behavior’ 
are empty. […] We need a historically based analysis to tell us what they are 
trying to maximize and why they emphasize certain goals over others.” 
Historical institutionalism’s hallmark features—the focus on historical 
contingency and path dependency—are rooted in the recognition that past 
choices influence the choices available to actors in the present and future. 
Thelen and Steinmo (1992, p.22) argue that empirical work using the HI 
approach has shown that “broad policy paths can follow from institutional 
choices,” as “the existence of certain institutional structures shapes subsequent 
policy battles.” This view implies that the outcomes of policy struggles will 
continue to work in the interest of the winners, perhaps even after they have 
left power. Thus, the institutions created by actors also constrain them in the 
long run, or in other words, demonstrate “humans both as agents and subjects 
of historical change” (Thelen & Steinmo 1992, p.27). 
Four distinct sources of institutional dynamism can be distinguished in 
historical institutionalism. The first source is latent institutions becoming more 
important due to changes in socioeconomic or political context. Second, 
institutions being used to new ends not originally envisioned due to 
socioeconomic or political changes. The third source of dynamism are 
exogenous changes leading to new goals and strategies adopted by actors. 
Lastly, dynamism can result from actors adjusting to institutional changes 
caused by dramatic events (‘punctuated equilibrium’) or more incremental 
“strategic maneuvering within institutional constraints” (Thelen & Steinmo 
1992, p.17). This makes HI the perhaps most reflexive of the three neo-
institutionalist approaches, as actors are neither largely rule-makers as in RCI, 
nor often unwitting rule-takers as in SI, but creators of their institutional 
environments constrained by circumstances resulting from their past makings. 
The reflexivity of HI, affording actors leeway in changing their institutional 
environment while still being constrained by it, combined with a broader 
conception of the sources of institutional change, makes this approach a more 
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suitable starting point for this study. However, two issues with traditional 
forms of HI remain. First, by not separating structure and agency more 
clearly, the approach risks falling into a circular logic: if institutions constrain 
the behavior of actors, which in turn shape institutions, how can change truly 
deviate from the ‘path’? A promising approach to solving this problem is 
actor-centered institutionalism, which builds on HI but separates structure 
and agency more clearly, and is discussed fully later. The second issue 
concerns the neglect of non-purposive aspects of behavior. For this study, 
however, they should be considered for their ability to explain how behavior 
spreads among actors and how they react to situations of uncertainty, such as 
major crises. Sociological Institutionalism focuses on these aspects of 
behavior. 
2.2.3 Sociological Institutionalism 
Unlike RCI, which regards institutions as “the products of human design, the 
outcomes of purposive actions by instrumentally oriented individuals” 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p.8), neo-institutionalism in the sociological 
tradition largely rejects this notion of free choice. Instead, norms and 
expectations shape what responses actors deem as appropriate, and which 
choices they even conceive of. Sociological institutionalism goes beyond 
economic and politic rules to also consider any behavior which becomes rule-
like and taken-for-granted:  
“The constant and repetitive quality of much organized life is 
explicable not simply by reference to individual, maximizing 
actors but rather by a view that locates the persistence of 
practices in both their taken-for-granted quality and their 
reproduction in structures that are to some extent self-
sustaining” (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p.9). 
An early and highly influential contribution to sociological institutionalism is 
Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) study of ‘formal organizations’ and how they 
internalize their highly institutionalized environments. Previous explanations 
of the question why organizations formalize their structures in similar ways 
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relied heavily on Weberian bureaucracies in assuming that rationalized 
formal structures represent the most effective way of coordination and control 
of activities. A crucial implication of this assumption is that day-to-day 
activities within the organization follow this formal organization, however, in 
practice, this link is not always seen. Building on research showing a gap 
between formal organization and practice, Meyer and Rowan seek alternative 
explanations why organizations adopt formalized structures. They argue that 
the “rules, understandings, and meanings attached to institutionalized social 
structures” (Meyer & Rowan 1977, p.343) have been neglected as explanatory 
variables in the process of formalization of structures, but should be taken 
seriously, as “the elements of rationalized formal structure are deeply 
ingrained in, and reflect, widespread understandings of social reality.” 
Institutionalization in the organizational context can be defined as “(a) a rule-
like, social fact quality of an organized pattern of action (exterior), and (b) an 
embedding in formal structures, such as formal aspects of organizations that 
are not tied to particular actors or situations (nonpersonal/objective)” (Zucker 
1987, p.444). 
Organizations are driven to internalize institutionalized forms of organization 
as a way to signal compliance and increase their legitimacy. However, these 
institutionalized forms of organization are not necessarily efficient in the 
circumstances of the organization, leading to potentially conflicting 
pressures—the normative pressure to comply with institutionalized rules and 
organizational forms to gain legitimacy, and the pressure to increase efficiency 
as a result of the underlying assumption of utility-maximizing rationality. Due 
to this conflict, “organizations that reflect institutional rules tend to buffer 
their formal structures from the uncertainties of technical activities by 
becoming loosely coupled, building gaps between their formal structures and 
actual work activities” (Meyer & Rowan 1977, p.341). These loosely coupled 
organizations may produce internal inefficiencies, but by adhering “to the 
larger rationalities of the wider structure, they may maximize long-run 
effectiveness” (Meyer & Rowan 1977, p.360). This room for maneuver 
between the self-interest of micro-efficiencies and the normative pressures to 
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adhere to larger, societal goals has been and continues to be a central point of 
debate in the institutionalist literature. While large swaths of the literature 
assume actors to be rational utility-maximizing creatures, who can only be 
compelled to place societal goals above their own through the superior power 
of the state (Höpner 2007), there is evidence of firms doing so on their own 
terms without force (Etienne & Schnyder 2014). 
The impact of Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) work goes beyond the concept of 
‘loosely coupled organizations;’ by theorizing the normative aspects of 
institutions they also created a line of enquiry on institutions as taken-for-
granted practices that become self-sustaining by creating legitimate practices 
actors tend to follow. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) pick up on this line of 
research, theorizing more explicitly the types and predictors of organizational 
isomorphism by focusing on the maturity of a field or industry. They argue 
that organizational fields emerge and become institutionalized through a 
process of “structuration,” whereby organizations interact more with each 
other, define structures between them, and acknowledge that they are part of 
a common endeavor.  
After the establishment of an organizational field, a number of isomorphic 
forces emerge, compelling firms to become more like each other. Early in an 
organizational field’s development, new structures are adopted in a quest for 
higher performance; yet, over time, these structures gain a symbolic element 
that goes beyond the technical rationale for efficiency, and become a tool for 
gaining legitimacy as a member of the field (Meyer & Rowan 1977). 
“Strategies that are rational for individual organizations may not be rational 
if adopted by large numbers. Yet the very fact that they are normatively 
sanctioned increases the likelihood of their adoption” (DiMaggio & Powell 
1991, p.65). At a later stage of a field’s development, some “older, larger 
organizations reach a point where they can dominate their environments 
rather than adjust to them” (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p.66). This would 
suggest that large, established firms have considerable power in shaping 
legitimate organizational forms and practices in their field, which are then 
adopted by smaller firms or new entrants. 
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DiMaggio and Powell (1991) identify three types of isomorphism: coercive, 
mimetic, and normative isomorphism (also, respectively: regulative, cognitive, 
normative). “Coercive isomorphism results from both formal and informal 
pressures exerted on organizations by other organizations upon which they 
are dependent and by cultural expectations within the society within which 
organizations function” (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p.67). Direct pressure may 
come from the state in form of laws and regulation, or through relationships 
of authority between firms. Mimetic isomorphism results from uncertainty, 
for instance “when goals are ambiguous, or when the environment creates 
symbolic uncertainty, organizations may model themselves on other 
organizations” (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p.69). It can be intentional, as is 
often the case with firms implementing innovations in production systems or 
HRM to signal that they are at the ‘cutting edge’, or unintentional, through 
workers diffusing practices when they change employers. Normative 
isomorphism is generated through professionalization, i.e. “the collective 
struggle of members of an occupation to define the conditions and methods 
of their work, […] and to establish a cognitive base and legitimation for their 
occupational autonomy” (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, p.70). Crucial bodies for 
creating such professional norms are educational institutions, professional 
bodies and trade associations. 
A number of firm-level predictors of isomorphism are hypothesized 
(DiMaggio & Powell 1991). Organizations will become more like each other 
where they depend on each other; for example, firms which are more 
dependent upon their suppliers will mimic them. The more uncertain the 
connection between means and ends, or the more ambiguous a firm’s goals, 
the more firms will imitate successful organizations in their field. Where 
academic or professional qualifications are crucial for success, the more firms 
participate in trade associations and adapt to other organizational forms in 
their field. Field-level predictors include the resource dependence of a field on 
a small number of sources, and the proximity of the field to the state. 
Isomorphic change will be faster if few alternative organizational forms are 
conceivable or perceived, and if technologies or goals are ambiguous. Finally, 
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fields will become more homogenous the greater professionalization and 
structuration (DiMaggio & Powell 1991). 
Isomorphic processes are often unconscious, almost automatic responses by 
organizations reflecting ‘the way things are done.’ Even where firms 
knowingly and willingly adopt practices to gain legitimacy, it is often seen as 
inevitable. Hence, actors are largely rule-takers in SI; only some powerful, 
large organizations are able to break from these constraints and can establish 
new accepted forms of organization, which may spread to other organizations 
and become institutionalized. Incorporating aspects of SI in this study is thus 
a promising approach to understanding how practices spread on the firm 
level, and how corporations are likely to respond to the uncertainty created 
by situations of crisis—by imitating each other’s behavior. 
2.3 Actors and Institutions 
As the previous section has outlined, the three strands of new institutionalism 
make different claims on the direction of causality between institutions and 
the behavior of actors. In the early formulations of neo-institutionalist theory, 
the relationship between actors and institutions is seen as largely 
unidirectional. Rational choice and game-theory approaches see institutions 
as a strategic choice of actors or an optimal outcome of an economic game. 
The institutional environment is therefore the result of deliberate creation by 
rule-making actors, who can change institutions freely if circumstances 
change and render previous arrangements sub-optimal. Sociological 
institutionalism, on the other hand, rejects the idea of actors having a free 
choice in creating institutions and instead sees them as principally rule takers 
who are unknowingly constrained by taken-for-granted rules, norms and 
expectations of appropriate behavior. Historical institutionalism takes a 
middle of the road stance, emphasizing both the active role of actors in 
creating institutions, but also cognitive aspects of institutions and the 
constraining power of past choices.  
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As these approaches have matured over the last two decades, they have shed 
some of their more extreme positions and moved towards an understanding 
of actors and institutions as mutually interdependent, with causality running 
both ways. However, the legacy of unidirectional conceptions of the 
relationship between actors and institutions is still present, if only implicitly, 
in fairly recent and widely-used parts of the literature. 
2.3.1 The Legacy of Unidirectional Approaches 
The conception of actors as rule-takers is the implicit basis for some influential 
frameworks concerned with the relationship between economic actors, the 
institutional environment, and economic outcomes. One example is the ‘Law 
and Finance’ literature associated with LaPorta et al (1998; 1999), which 
promises to explain outcomes through observable criteria on the macro level, 
i.e. common or civil law systems. However, this focus on explaining outcomes 
comes at the expense of studying processes, resulting in overly static models 
incapable of explaining change, particularly the incremental kind resulting 
from inherent agents of change. While the parsimony offered by such 
approaches is appealing and reveals clearly some important causal 
relationships, they also tend towards determinism, denying actors a role as 
rule-makers.  
The ‘comparative capitalism’ literature, most widely represented by Peter 
Hall and David Soskice’s (2001) ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC), also has an 
‘actors as rule-takers’ bias. This is perhaps most obvious in this literature’s 
core contention that by comparing national business systems, with their 
formal rules and informal norms, we can explain firm-level choices and 
outcomes. The implication, thereby, being that firm behavior is strongly 
conditioned, or in other words constrained and enabled, by national 
institutions. VoC uses the national level of analysis to evaluate how firms, 
which are deemed the most important economic actors, establish relationships 
with all parties they interact with, such as workers, clients, suppliers and 
governments, in order to form their core competencies. Building these 
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relationships presents challenges to firms, however, as a firm’s “success 
depends substantially on its ability to coordinate effectively with a wide range 
of actors” (Hall & Soskice 2001, p.6). Institutions, in turn, influence their 
success.  
Following North (1990), Hall and Soskice (2001, p.9) define institutions as “a 
set of rules, formal or informal, that actors generally follow.” The most 
important institutions for comparative analysis are those conditioning 
strategic interaction between economic actors, such as “institutions providing 
capacities for the exchange of information, monitoring, and the sanctioning 
of defections relevant to cooperative behavior among firms and other actors” 
(Hall & Soskice 2001, p.10). The focus on economic exchanges and the choice 
of North’s definition of institutions appears to indicate an affinity for RCI, 
however, there are crucial differences between RCI and VoC. How 
institutions change, and whether they change in reaction to deliberate choices 
of actors, is addressed only on the margins, but it is implicitly evident that 
VoC does not see actors as free-reigning masters of their institutional 
environment the way RCI would. Institutional change in VoC is mainly 
described as resulting from external shock events, as incremental change is 
constrained through cultural norms and the concept of institutional 
complementarities. 
Hall and Soskice (2001, p.6) identify five spheres “in which firms must develop 
relationships to resolve coordination problems.” These five spheres are: 
(1) industrial relations, which refers to wage bargaining, working 
conditions and labor representation;  
(2) vocational training and education, including how firms access skilled 
labor and whether workers acquire general or specific skills;  
(3) corporate governance, which is concerned with how firms secure 
finance and how investors ensure returns on investments;  




(5) employees, which is primarily concerned with how the firm ensures 
the cooperation of its workforce.  
While not considered an institutional sphere in its own right, culture is seen 
to play an important role. “Many actors learn to follow a set of informal rules 
by virtue of experience with a familiar set of actors and the shared 
understandings that accumulate from this experience constitute something 
like a common culture” (Hall & Soskice 2001, p.13). Culture is therefore a 
determining factor in what actions actors perceive as available options in 
responding to a coordination problem, highlighting the limited agency VoC 
ascribes actors. 
VoC conceives of these institutional spheres not as separate entities, but as 
complementary in the sense that the presence of one institution increases the 
returns or the efficiency of another. The concept of institutional 
complementarities, particularly those between different institutional spheres, 
“suggests that nations with a particular type of coordination in one sphere of 
the economy should tend to develop complementary practices in other 
spheres as well” (Hall & Soskice 2001, p.18). Institutional complementarities 
cause firms to exhibit similar approaches to resolving coordination issues 
across all institutional spheres by using one of two basic ways to coordinate; 
contractual relations and strategic coordination. Economies where firms rely 
primarily on the former are termed liberal market economies (LME), while 
economies whose firms mainly use the latter are called coordinated market 
economies (CME). Hall and Soskice (2001, p.8) argue that LMEs and CMEs 
are not exclusive types of economies, but merely “constitute ideal types at the 
poles of a spectrum along which many nations can be arrayed.” In other 
words, hybrid systems are possible and exist, but are seen as suboptimal 
because they cannot fully take advantage of institutional complementarities. 
Another implication of the concept of complementarities is that they inhibit 
piecemeal change in institutions, as changes in one sphere would trigger 




The core contentions of VoC have been subject to empirical analysis. Hall 
and Gingerich (2004; Hall & Gingerich 2009) find strong evidence suggesting 
that “the varieties of capitalism literature has identified important differences 
among political economies” (Hall & Gingerich 2004, p.37). The authors also 
empirically confirm the concept of institutional complementarities (Hall & 
Gingerich 2009, p.480). While its core contentions have largely been 
empirically confirmed, VoC has been criticized for a number of issues. One 
of the main critiques has been regarding VoC’s relatively static analysis that 
does not include a comprehensive theory of institutional change (Deeg & 
Jackson 2007). Rather, due to their rigid concept of institutional 
complementarity, they downplay incremental change and subscribe to a 
punctuated equilibrium view. Criticizing VoC along similar lines, Streeck and 
Thelen (2005a, p.5) write, “While providing a compelling account of observed 
institutional resiliency, the theory is much less suited to understanding 
contemporary changes.” 
Crouch (2009) criticizes VoC for sacrificing accuracy for parsimony. He 
argues that both the LME and CME typologies suffer from serious 
shortcomings; the former by being effectively defined ex post by the 
institutional features of the US, the latter by masking up serious differences 
within the wide range of countries it is applied to. The solution proposed by 
Crouch (2009) is that “empirical cases must be studied, not to determine to 
which (singular) of a number of theoretical types they should each be 
allocated, but to determine which (plural) of these types are to be found within 
them, in roughly what proportions, and with what change over time.” Crouch 
concedes that such an approach is less parsimonious, but allows to take change 
within countries and systems into account, which VoC struggles with. 
Other critiques of VoC have shown the shortcomings of its rather simplistic 
and deterministic argument on how the institutional arrangements of LMEs 
and CMEs lead to different sets of comparative advantages, which manifest 
themselves in radical innovation in LMEs and incremental innovation in 
CMEs. If this is accurate, Crouch (2009, p.80) points out, it would lead to the 
eventual demise of the CME model:  
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“However, those [comparative advantages] of the CME form 
are located solely in minor adaptations within traditional and 
declining industries, while LMEs have assigned to them all 
future-oriented industries and services sectors. In the end 
therefore this is a neo-institutionalism that fully accepts the 
logic of neoclassicism set out above: in the long run all 
institutions other than the pure market fail to cope with the 
future.”  
The implication that a CME-country like Germany is incapable of radical 
innovation is not only hard to square with historic evidence (Crouch 2009), 
but the empirical evidence brought forward by Hall and Soskice (2001) in 
support of the argument has been shown to be flawed (M. Z. Taylor 2009).  
Varieties of Capitalism has, without doubt, many achievements worth 
pointing out, including the parsimonious elegance of its argument, the 
uncovering of coordination as a crucial dimension in the interaction between 
actors and, by extension, explaining differences between national institutional 
systems. However, there are also significant drawbacks to the approach, many 
of which can be traced to its implicit actors-as-rule-takers view. By neglecting 
the role actors play in changing their institutional environment, VoC locks 
itself into a static analysis focused on outcomes rather than processes. The 
VoC approach would thus benefit from a richer conception of actor-
institution interactions that considers the role of actors more fully in shaping 
their institutional environment. Despite these issues, VoC’s insights on the 
interaction between actors needs to be considered in this study, as it may 
inform differences in the way corporate behavior changes in reaction to 
pressures—an issue picked up again later. 
2.3.2 Interdependent Approaches 
As the previous section has argued, unidirectional views of the relationship 
between actors and institutions—actors as rule-takers or rule-makers—are 
incomplete and would benefit from integrating insights from one another. 
The literature in economics, political sciences and sociology has come to 
acknowledge this, leading to a forming consensus that actors and institutions 
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are mutually constitutive of each other. A useful definition for such an 
interdependent approach comes from Gregory Jackson (2010, p.65), who 
writes, “a constitutive approach conceptualizes actors and institutions as being 
mutually interdependent and reflexively intertwined with one another.” 
In economics, Masahiko Aoki’s (1988) work on institutionalization of 
corporate organization laid the foundation for a game-theoretic approach 
which “has now developed into an integrated framework for understanding 
how institutions constrain actors and how actors reproduce and change 
institutional environments” (Jackson 2010, p.66). In Aoki’s model, actors 
continuously reproduce institutions, yet they see them as exogenous factors 
they have to take into account when making choices. Longer term, institutions 
cease to be exogenous factors and become rather more pliable and subject to 
change. 
Political science contributed to the creation of a mutually interdependent 
conception of actors and institutions. Historical institutionalism, the most 
reflexive of the three neo-institutionalist approaches, has its roots in 
comparative political sciences and likely owes its reflexivity to having been 
focused on processes from the outset, rather than the more outcome-oriented 
beginnings of RCI and SI. As rational-choice based models, HI sees 
institutions as the intentional creation of actors, but rejects both the notion of 
free choice and of predetermined goals and interests. Instead, HI recognizes 
the cognitive aspect of institutions, similarly to SI, and the path dependency 
created by historic choices as factors constraining the choices actors available 
to actors. In other words, HI sees actors as the creators of their institutional 
environments, as well as the subjects of their current and past creations 
(Steinmo et al. 1992).  
Yet, the circular logic of this argument is problematic, as it raises the questions 
how actors may deviate from a path if their interests and choices are 
conditioned by their past actions. Hence, HI is better suited to explain stability 
rather than change. More recent HI approaches have attempted to solve this 
problem through the role of ideas—understandings and perceptions of the 
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world—in delegitimizing established practices and in filtering which new 
practices are deemed appropriate replacements and may thus become 
institutionalized (Campbell 2002). These newer versions of HI are also more 
agency-oriented, seeing institutional change as the result of deliberate political 
strategies of institutionally-situated actors (Bell 2011; Campbell 2004). 
In comparative law, Milhaupt and Pistor (2008) develop a reflexive model of 
actors and institutions, encompassing legal institutions and market-oriented 
economic institutions. In contrast to the Law & Finance literature, they do not 
think of economic outcomes as a function of legal rules and appropriate 
enforcement. Instead, they conceive of the relationship between actors and 
institutions as “rolling,” i.e. dynamic and reacting to each other through 
human and institutional mediation. In their model, market change occurring 
as a result of an event, such as a demand shift or a financial crisis, raises 
questions and uncertainties. Legal actors (legislators, bureaucracy, judiciary) 
respond to this through new laws, codes of conduct, or court decisions. 
Markets adapt to the new framework and “push at the margins of the new 
legal order” (Milhaupt & Pistor 2008, p.28).  
Organization studies, which is concerned with ‘organizational embeddedness’ 
in the institutional environment, has closely followed the sociological strand 
of new institutionalism. An early and highly influential contribution, focusing 
on processes of institutionalization—the internalization of institutionalized 
forms of organization and practice—comes from Christine Oliver (1991). 
Starting from the assumption that firms are interest-seeking actors with active 
agency, Oliver seeks to model the strategies organizations employ in reaction 
to institutional pressures arising from other actors, including the state, interest 
groups, and professional bodies, as well as public opinion. Assumed to be 
seeking stability and legitimacy, organizations often conform with institutional 
rules through “the reproduction or imitation of organizational structures, 
activities, and routines” (Oliver 1991, p.149). However, such ‘blind 
conformance’ is only predicted “when their ‘social fact’ quality renders them 
the only conceivable, ‘obvious,’ or ‘natural’ way to conduct an organizational 
activity” (Oliver 1991, p.148), otherwise, actors pursue more active strategies 
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in response to institutional pressures. Such responses include firms defying 
pressures by ignoring norms, challenging rules and attacking the source of 
pressure, as well as their efforts to manipulate pressures through co-optation, 
influence and controlling tactics. 
While Oliver’s earlier model (1991) conceptualized the role of corporations 
primarily as reactive to institutional pressures, her follow-on work (1992) 
explores the notion of ‘deinstitutionalization’, i.e. why companies move away 
from previously common and entrenched practices. She argues that 
deinstitutionalization of firm practices results from three types of pressures 
emanating from both within the firm as well as from its environment. The 
first, political pressure, includes performance crises, conflicting interests, 
increasing pressure to innovate, and changing external dependencies. Second, 
functional pressure encompasses changing economic utility, increasing 
technical specificity, heightened competition for resources, and emerging 
events and data. Social pressure, the third category, refers to increasing social 
fragmentation, decreasing historical continuity, changes in institutional rules 
and values, and structural disaggregation (Oliver 1992).  
One of the main contributions of Oliver’s (1992) model of organizational 
change is to illuminate the ‘black box’ of firm agency by theorizing the reasons 
for which organizations may break free from institutional pressures and 
conventions. In this way, Oliver’s contribution was at the forefront of paving 
the way towards seeing firms not as mere rule-takers, whose practices are 
derived from their institutional environments, but as having scope to 
implement change leading to the dismantling of previously institutionalized 
organizational structures and practices—a necessary antecedent of asking 
how these changes on the firm level may lead to larger institutional changes. 
2.3.3 Actor-centered Institutionalism 
A central and recurring theme across all neo-institutional approaches is the 
balance of structure and agency, i.e. to what extent political, economic, or 
organizational processes and outcomes are determined by the institutional 
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structure actors are embedded in, and to what extent actors have the ability 
to act independently from these constraints. A promising attempt at solving 
the problem of structure versus agency is ‘actor-centered institutionalism’ 
(Mayntz & Scharpf 1995). This approach describes institutions as a context 
for the interaction of actors, shaping their choices, perceptions and goals 
without determining them. Hence, “actors retain scope for choice within 
constraints or even alter those constraints by strategic or interpretative acts” 
(Jackson 2010, p.70).  
The foundations of actor-centered institutionalism are in political science, and 
hence the historical branch of neo institutionalism, which focuses on processes 
rather than outcomes and recognizes structure (political system) as well as 
rules (institutions). The rule-making process is shaped not only by political 
structures, but also dominant interests of actors, which are in turn shaped by 
their institutional context. Thus, the approach regards institutions both as 
explanatory variables and as something to be explained; they do not 
determine outcomes, but are a constraining and enabling context (Mayntz & 
Scharpf 1995, p.43). 
Actor-centered institutionalism emphasizes all actors that are relevant to a 
certain field of regulation or policy, so rather than only looking at state actors, 
it takes both state and economic actors (corporations) into account. Within 
this framework, the definition of institutions is limited to the coercive, 
regulatory aspects. Indeed, Mayntz and Scharpf (1995) criticize approaches 
that widen their scope to normative and cognitive elements for leaving almost 
no level of agency to the actors: 
“Such a [wide] conceptualization may be useful for 
sociological theories interested in (average) behavior of 
individuals. For explaining processes of control and self-
organization at the macro-level of societal sectors, however, a 
tighter institutional understanding is more appropriate. This 
allows seeing actors’ behavior as an independent variable and, 
consequently, analyzing situations of significantly changed 
patterns of action despite fundamentally unchanged 
institutional contexts” (Mayntz & Scharpf 1995). 
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Actor-centered institutionalism thus seeks to integrate structure and agency in 
an effort to move beyond the debate over which takes precedence. The 
deliberate actions of actors are thereby seen as a proximate cause, while the 
institutional context is seen as a remote cause. Actors are bound by coercive 
institutions and the enforcement of sanctions, but they retain considerable 
scope for free decision-making. Similarly, structure establishes some 
institutionalized connections and relations between actors, but leaves room 
for informal or even illegal interaction. 
While actor-centered institutionalism represents an important step towards 
developing a mutually interdependent conception of actors and institutions 
that integrates structure and agency, some questions remain. The approach 
requires further theorizing of how interests are formed beyond simply being 
shaped by institutional context. Also, by restricting itself to regulative aspects 
of institutions, the approach ignores some of the important contributions 
made by the historic and sociological strands of institutionalism—which are 
of particular interest on the firm-level—such as isomorphic processes to 
reduce uncertainty and gain legitimacy, or the normative pressures on firms 
to act in appropriate ways that arise from public pressure and other sources. 
In other words, if we are to take the role of corporate actors seriously, we 
should not ignore such firm-level processes, as they are important antecedents 
of bottom-up processes of change. 
In summary, new institutionalism has come a long way from its beginnings of 
unidirectional accounts of actors and institutions by developing an 
interdependent, reflexive conception of their relationship. However, there is 
still a proclivity in the field of comparative institutional analysis to explain 
outcomes through national institutional arrangements, hence seeing actors as 
mere subjects of rules and downplaying dynamism and change. Actor-
centered approaches represent a promising path forward, if we are to “see 
institutionalization as dynamic and actor-centered social process, recognizing 
the duality of structure and agency, as well as the material and cognitive 
aspects of institutions,” as Jackson (2010, p.66) calls for. Shifting the focus to 
actors and seeing them as institutionally-situated also enables us to move 
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beyond the focus on political struggles as the main sources and determinants 
of institutional change, towards a more nuanced understanding of 
institutional change that opens up the firm level to the same scrutiny as the 
policymaking level. 
2.4 Conceptions of Institutional Change 
Theories of institutional change are necessarily closely related to how one 
conceives of institutions and their relationship to economic and political 
actors. While the institutionalist literature was traditionally more concerned 
with explaining the status quo of institutional arrangements than explaining 
how systems change, the three major strands of new institutionalism each have 
their own conception of what enables and constrains change, thus creating 
different starting points for the debate on institutional change. The central 
claims of these approaches—the role of history in constraining today’s 
choices, the assumption of rational, utility maximizing actors with fixed 
preferences, or the normative influence of societal rules or expectations—are 
still subject to debate, although current approaches seek to draw from and 
reconcile them.  
This section outlines the development of the literature’s approach to 
understanding institutional change from early ‘punctuated equilibrium’ 
models, the legacy of which is still felt in the current literature, through to 
incrementalist models that emphasize endogenous sources of change, and to 
current reflexive approaches that seek to integrate different modes and 
sources of change. The section ends by discussing where our current 
understanding of bottom-up change stands, and where further research is 
needed. 
2.4.1 Punctuated Equilibria and Their Legacy 
When ‘the state’ received renewed attention as an analytical subject in the 
1970s and 1980s, it brought with it a wave of research that investigated how 
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political and social structures and the relationship between the state and its 
environment change over time. As Stephen Krasner (1984) discusses, the 
dominant conception at the time was one of clearly demarked times of 
institutional change and of institutional stasis. The causal factors that explain 
the origin and development of institutional structures were seen to be distinct 
from the causal factors that explain institutional stability over time.  
“New structures originate during periods of crisis. They may 
be imposed through conquest or be implanted by a particular 
fragment of the existing social structure. But once institutions 
are in place they can assume a life of their own, extracting 
societal resources, socializing individuals, and even altering the 
basic nature of civil society itself” (Krasner 1984, p.240). 
Borrowing a term from evolutionary theory, Krasner refers to this concept of 
institutional change as a ‘punctuated equilibrium.’ The punctuated 
equilibrium view of institutional change tends to come in concert with a view 
of strong path dependence in institutional development. 
“It is not possible in human affairs to start de novo with every 
change in wants, needs, and power capabilities. Past choices 
preclude certain strategies or make them very costly. 
Institutions generated by functional demands of the past can 
perpetuate themselves into a future whose functional 
imperatives are radically different” (Krasner 1984, p.240).  
In sum, the key aspects of the punctuated equilibrium view are the distinction 
between long times of institutional stability and self-perpetuation, punctuated 
only rarely by short bursts of institutional change. As a result, the punctuated 
equilibrium model focuses on external shock events to explain change, as only 
events of great magnitude are able to break path dependency by stressing 
institutional structures to the point of breaking, triggering institutional 
reevaluation and replacement. 
North (2005, p.51), who quips that the term ‘path dependence’ has been 
“used, misused, and abused,” proposes a more comprehensive definition of 
the term, in which “the institutions that have accumulated give rise to 
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organizations whose survival depends on the perpetuation of those institutions 
and which hence will devote resources to preventing any alteration that 
threatens their survival.” In other words, North places a great deal of power 
on organizations, presumably both private and public, to whom significant 
deviations from ‘the path’ would be risky and costly.  
While this may be a plausible scenario for some instances of change, it raises 
some questions. For one, companies may well be supportive of liberalization 
that gives businesses more leeway in pursuing strategies of their choice, or 
allows them to opt-out of costly coordinating institutions such as collective 
bargaining arrangements or union representation. Indeed, companies in 
highly coordinated institutional systems have been shown to be supportive of 
liberalization and thus of significant change to their institutional environment 
(Kinderman 2014). There is also evidence of organizations pursuing a course 
of reform in one area that actively undermines stated goals of keeping with 
established institutions in another, such as the case Callaghan and Höpner 
(2012) discuss on trade unions pushing for financialization despite it 
undermining industrial relations. This indicates that we cannot jump to 
conclusions regarding whether firms are aware of institutional benefits, their 
interests or whether their actions necessarily make rational sense. Firms may 
thus support or inhibit change in unexpected ways, casting doubt on the 
assertion that firms are the main drivers of path dependence and road blocks 
to change.  
While the punctuated equilibrium view has undoubtedly generated insights 
into processes of institutional change initiated by external shock events, it has 
been criticized for a number of reasons. First, its black-and-white view of times 
of change versus times stasis cannot account for incremental change: “The 
path dependence that results typically makes change incremental. […] But 
change is continually occurring (although the rate will depend on the degree 
of competition among organizations and their entrepreneurs) as 
entrepreneurs enact policies to improve their competitive position” (North 
2005, pp.2-3).  
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Second, the focus on exogenous shocks downplays the power of endogenous 
agents of change. A crucial contribution to addressing this issue comes from 
Baumgartner and Jones (1993), who develop a model that, while still 
dichotomous between periods of stability and change, consider endogenous 
sources of change. Stability, therein, is based on powerful elites creating policy 
monopolies undergirded by powerful ideas. Drawing on the agenda-setting 
model of the political process, Baumgartner and Jones argue that 
groundbreaking new ideas can destabilize policy monopolies over time. “As 
disadvantaged policy entrepreneurs are successful in convincing others that 
their view of an issue is more accurate than the views of their opponents, they 
may achieve rapid success in altering public policy arrangements, even if these 
arrangements have been in place for decades” (Baumgartner & B. D. Jones 
1993, p.4). Baumgartner and Jones’ model hence takes endogenous sources of 
change into account, which can trigger radical change once a ‘tipping point’ 
is reached—a crucial step towards a reflexive understanding of institutional 
change. 
Third, the punctuated equilibrium perspective has been criticized for being 
deterministic. Blyth (2002) argues that punctuated equilibrium models fall flat 
as they follow a post hoc, ergo propter hoc logic. “Unfortunately, that which comes 
after does not explain that which comes before, unless one can specify the 
causal links between the former and latter objects” (Blyth 2002, p.8). 
Punctuated equilibrium models see the type of institutional change resulting 
from shock events as determined by the exogenous event, as if there was only 
one possible outcome.  
“Theoretically, no exogenous factor can in and of itself explain 
the specific forms that institutional change takes. While the 
destabilization of existing institutions can be exogenously 
driven, moving from such a position to a new stable 
institutional order must be seen as an endogenous process. 
Specifically, how agents redesign and rebuild institutional 
orders, and the conditions under which these activities take 
place, need to be analyzed” (Blyth 2002, p.8).  
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In other words, an exogenous shock is neither a guarantee for radical 
institutional change, nor can it predict the outcomes of the institutional 
rebuilding process it triggers. 
The punctuated equilibrium perspective has been widely adopted, explicitly 
or implicitly, with its legacy still felt across the literature. Varieties of 
Capitalism (VoC) is one of these cases. Hall and Soskice (2001) justify their 
position through their model of institutional complementarities, whereby 
“two institutions can be said to be complementary if the presence (or 
efficiency) of one increases the returns from (or efficiency of) the other” (Hall 
& Soskice 2001, p.17). Based on this definition, Hall and Soskice predict not 
only the persistence of LME and CME models, but also high institutional 
cohesion and homogeneity, as institutional features incompatible with other 
institutions would reduce the efficiency of the overall system. Hence, VoC sees 
incremental change and resulting hybrid-systems as suboptimal, emphasizing 
radical change after shock events, when multiple institutional logics can be 
changed in accord to create a new coherent whole. Hall and Thelen (2009) 
develop a more nuanced model of change within the VoC framework, 
allowing for endogenous change based on institutional contestation through 
defection, reinterpretation and reform. This effort to work a model of 
incremental change into the previously radical change-dominated VoC 
framework is representative of an overall shift in the literature towards 
recognizing and theorizing incremental change in response to endogenous 
agents of change. 
2.4.2 Corporate Actors in Institutional Change 
Processes 
The move away from a pure punctuated equilibrium perspective opens up the 
possibility of endogenous forces gradually changing institutions. However, this 
raises the question what exactly those endogenous forces are that can effect 
institutional change. While there is little doubt that policymakers are formally 
endowed with the power to create, change and abolish formal institutions in 
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the form of law, regulations and policies, there is less consensus on the role of 
other actors in institutional change processes.  
2.4.2.1 Top-Down Change 
One line of thought, which can be termed the ‘top-down’ view, holds that 
party politics and interest group alliances, e.g. between investors and 
managers, are the main impetus for change. Hereby, policymakers are seen 
to produce formal institutional changes, which are then implemented in 
practice on the firm level. In other words, formal change precedes informal 
change. Amable and Palombarini’s (2009) ‘neorealist’ model of institutional 
change, for instance, is based on political power and alliances. They predict 
institutional change if and when it meets the interests of political leadership. 
This conception is reminiscent of the traditional model of self-interested 
political actors, who want to guarantee their political survival and reelection. 
In a similar vein, Cioffi (2010) conceives of corporate governance reforms as 
a political game between political parties and interest groups. Corporate 
interests play a somewhat larger role here than in Amable and Palombarini’s 
model, but their influence is said to have waned with rising political salience 
of corporate governance over the past decade as a result of a series of 
corporate scandals. Because firms squandered their influence over 
policymaking, they are only seen as background noise in Cioffi’s politics-
centered approach. “The primacy of politics in corporate governance reform 
should come as no surprise. The corporation, by definition, is a creation of 
the law; law, in turn, is a product of politics” (Cioffi 2010, p.7). 
The literature recognizes three main ways for corporate actors to influence 
the policymaking process: lobbying, private interest committees and press 
framing (Culpepper 2011). Lobbying draws its power not from the money that 
is involved, but from the expertise of managers that politicians could only 
contest at great commitment and expense—and they have no incentive to do 
so as long the issue is not of particular public importance. Private interest 
committees are tasked by governments to issue reports on likely implications 
of proposed policy changes such as the Cadbury Report in the UK which led 
Literature Review 
51 
to the creation of what is now called the UK Corporate Governance Code. 
Often these committees are established with the intent purpose of protecting 
business interests or harnessing what has been deemed ‘best practice’ and to 
turn it into law. Culpepper points out that these committees are “a way for 
managerial interests to appear to relent to calls for greater regulation without 
transferring such regulation to an unpredictable forum like a legislature. 
Instead, a private interest body can move at its own speed, delivering its 
findings at a moment when the temporary rise in public salience has 
dissipated” (Culpepper 2011, p.9). The third method is press framing, which 
refers to managers exploiting their superior expertise to highlight certain 
aspects of an issue. This allows them to steer media reporting and, 
consequently, to align public opinion with their own interests. Overall, firms 
have a number of tools available allowing them to engage in the policymaking 
process, through more direct means such as lobbying or interest group 
committees, but also indirect means aimed at influencing the behavior of 
policymakers through shifting public opinion in their favor. However, firms 
do not necessarily have to engage in the political game to bring about change, 
by making use of bottom-up methods of change. 
2.4.2.2 Bottom-Up Change 
Proponents of the ‘bottom-up’ perspective contend that the ones most affected 
by an institution hold a considerable degree of power that goes beyond 
accepting or rejecting policymaker-decreed change. How firms may have the 
power to change institutions through their practices alone is fairly 
straightforward when it comes to informal institutional arrangements. 
Culpepper (2011) points to the example of French firms own undoing of 
takeover protections during the 1990s, when firms created institutional 
change by eroding ownership concentration and cross-shareholdings. 
Culpepper highlights that the low-salience nature of some issues is the cause 
of informal institutions’ continued existence, as lawmakers show deference to 
managers’ expertise. When salience rises though, managers would oppose any 
government intervention into privately regulated issues (Culpepper 2011). 
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However, even when firms themselves are the guardians of such informal 
institutionalized arrangements, change does not necessarily come easily. 
Normative pressures make deviant behavior not only costly, but also frowned 
upon by their peers. 
The basis for corporate practices influencing formal institutions are “the ‘gaps’ 
or ‘soft spots’ between the rule and its interpretation or the rule and its 
enforcement” (Mahoney & Thelen 2010a, p.14). On an individual level, 
exploiting these gaps is not likely to be powerful enough to cause institutional 
change. Once a few powerful actors start acting in similar ways and gather 
critical mass, however, they can trigger change in their own institutional field 
and possibly even connected fields (Mahoney & Thelen 2010a, p.30). In other 
words, the real impact of a piece of legislation is not fully determined by its 
text, but by its organizational interpretation. Organizational interpretations 
of formal rules, once they reach ‘critical mass’ within a field, become 
institutionalized among firms and eventually recognized by courts as 
legitimate ways of compliance. However, the new interpretation does not 
necessarily have to spread widely, but can come from a small number of 
influential firms with strategies quite different from the rest of the field (Funk 
& Hirschman 2012). This process, often termed ‘endogenous legal change,’ 
has the power to shift the meaning and impact of legislation over time based 
solely on firm practices, i.e. without intention to produce legal change. 
Edelman (2011, p.890) describes the process as “everyday organizational 
practices, routines, and structures subtly influence legal thinking, legal 
categories, and legal logic.” For the purposes of this study, bottom-up change 
is defined as this type of change, i.e. corporate practices influencing law or 
regulations. 
Corporate practices can be understood as the outcome of decision-making 
and bargaining between a ‘coalition of groups’ within the corporation, 
including management, employees, shareholders, suppliers, etc. (Cyert & 
March 1992). While those in charge of companies—management—set 
overarching goals, implementation occurs at various levels throughout the 
organization, where divergent interests may come to the fore and require 
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bargaining. While mapping the behavior of each of these internal groups is 
impossible within the scope of this study, it is important to keep in mind that 
companies are not unified singular entities. Consequently, corporations’ 
actions results from the ‘dominant coalition’ within companies, which 
includes management and possibly other powerful groups within the 
company. Management, especially of the large publicly listed firms studied 
here, are of course part of a corporate élite—the term ‘bottom-up change’ 
thus does not refer to change arising from the ‘bottom’ of society, but rather 
as arising from those affected by a law rather than those formally in charge of 
making the law. 
While the gap between rules on paper and their interpretation and conversion 
into practice forms the basis of bottom-up approaches, it is not without 
criticism. Amable and Palombarini (2009, p.126) see it as a “confusion 
between rules and practices,” which, they argue, “leads to the overestimation 
of the importance of the interpretation made by firms in the process of 
institutional change” and the neglect of the unilateral power of the state. 
Indeed, this critique is quite similar to Actor-Centered Institutionalism’s 
rejection of normative and cognitive aspects of institutions (Mayntz & Scharpf 
1995; Scharpf 1997), as discussed earlier. While there can be little doubt that 
policymakers are formally endowed with the power to create, change and 
abolish formal institutions in the form of law, regulations and policies, a black-
and-white view of rules and practices is hardly as clear-cut in reality. For one, 
it neglects rule-like practices as embodiments of informal institutions—ways 
of doing things not mandated by law or regulation, but often subject to 
consequences when not being followed. An example could be cross-
shareholding systems that make access to financing from the banks at the 
center of the network much more difficult if firms leave the network. Secondly, 
as Culpepper (2005, p.178) argues, rules are not relevant for their own sake, 
but for the way they systematically shape behavior. While without doubt an 
important debate and issue in broadening our understanding of institutional 
change to include a stronger focus on corporate behavior, the issue is 
sidestepped for the purposes of this study by focusing only on formal 
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institutional change effected or influenced by corporate practices. To be sure, 
normative and cognitive aspects of behavior are important aspects in this 
study in terms of explaining how practices change in reaction to crises and 
public discourse, and how they spread among firms. However, whether and 
to what extent corporate practices constitute institutions in their own right is 
not considered here. 
The literature differentiates four mechanisms of bottom-up change: 
reinterpretation, defection, displacement, and preemption. With mounting 
consensus on these mechanisms conceptually and empirical evidence 
demonstrating them in practice, they are not the focus of this study but 
nevertheless worthy of brief discussion in the interest of completeness.  
Reinterpretation of the law, or ‘conversion’ in Streeck and Thelen’s (2005a) 
terminology, is hinged upon firms exploiting ambiguities in the law to 
interpret it in a favorable way, or pursuing a judicial strategy where they 
expect a decision in their favor, thus creating new legal precedent (Funk & 
Hirschman 2012). Interpretations and expectations of the law become even 
more important when new ambiguous legislation is passed. In such situations, 
firms look towards each other in search of best practice in complying with the 
new law: “These field-wide efforts to reduce environmental uncertainty lead 
organizations to develop common signals of compliance - such as formal 
policies and procedures - even when they are not legally mandated" (Funk & 
Hirschman 2012, p.5). 
Defection refers to large-scale deviance, or several powerful firms ignoring a 
rule or regulation, which may contribute to an institution’s exhaustion 
(Streeck & Thelen 2005a). Over time, the rule might cease to be enforced or 
taken off the books entirely. It is usually assumed that firms prefer stable 
institutional environments, which would counter the idea that firms 
intentionally destabilize legal institutions they have learned to deal with. Funk 
and Hirschman (2012) argue that firms are willing to cause destabilization 
when it promises to further their interests or when another related field is 
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already destabilized. These 'cascades of change' are thus more likely the 
tighter the connection between two fields. 
Displacement refers to ‘dormant’ institutional forms, i.e. “possibilities of 
action that institutions neither prescribe nor eliminate,” replacing the 
dominant form (Streeck & Thelen 2005a, p.20). These secondary logics of 
action may come from exogenous sources in form of imported institutional 
forms, or from reactivating “suppressed historical alternatives” (Streeck & 
Thelen 2005a), which could be a return to more prudent approaches after an 
event like the GFC. Finally, displacement can result from innovating around 
the law, taking advantage of policy drift (Streeck & Thelen 2005a), for 
example to design new financial investment products not covered by existing 
legislation. 
Preemption is not so much a method for changing formal institutions as it as 
a way of inhibiting the formation thereof through self-regulation on the firm 
level. Issues may be kept outside of formal regulation entirely through setting 
up industry-wide sets of rules along with professional bodies that can enforce 
those rules and sanction transgressions (Culpepper 2011). An example for 
such ‘self-policing’ would be the Institute of Chartered Accountants in 
England and Wales (ICAEW), which has the right to first address its members’ 
lapses, before they are conferred to the governmental accounting disciplinary 
board. 
Empirical evidence for bottom-up change is fairly new and sometimes limited 
to specific cases, but nonetheless convincing and deserving of close attention. 
Schnyder (2010) points to evidence of cases where firm practices change 
before legal changes were made to reflect them (Coffee 2001; Cheffins 2000), 
as well as firm practices defying legal changes (Culpepper 2005; Culpepper 
2007). In some cases, firms may even adopt practices symbolically, but subvert 
them substantively, in order to respond to institutional pressures and signal 
compliance to other actors (Börsch 2007). Westphal and Zajac’s (2001) work 
on this phenomenon, termed corporate decoupling, shows that the signaling 
function of symbolic practices works even when actual practices differ. This is 
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an important finding, as it highlights that the publicly projected practices of 
corporations can influence other actors—investors, peers or even 
policymakers—regardless of whether they represent actual corporate 
practices. 
Reinforcing Culpepper’s (2007) criticism that the interaction of firm-level 
changes of practice and legal changes are ill-understood, Schnyder (2010) 
closely examines the role of firm practices in corporate governance reforms in 
Switzerland, finding that “as an increasing number of companies introduced 
more investor-friendly corporate governance practices, their opposition to the 
legal reform became meaningless and reform became possible” (Schnyder 
2010, p.592). An important takeaway from this is that Switzerland’s 
consensual polity influenced the directionality of change. With large coalitions 
necessary to implement reforms, the support, or at least non-resistance, of 
business was necessary for institutional change to take place. Hence, this case 
is not only important evidence for bottom-up change, but also highlights the 
need to deepen our understanding of such processes of change—what drives 
them and how they are bound by the structure of the institutional 
environment and political system. 
In summary, the literature is increasingly focused on the role of corporate 
actors in institutional change processes and has made significant strides in 
conceptualizing the various mechanisms of bottom-up change. Yet, despite 
these advances, the models of endogenous or bottom-up institutional change 
elaborated by Streeck and Thelen (2005a), Mahoney and Thelen (2010a), and 
Funk and Hirschman (2012) are still limited in some ways. For one, they are 
not sensitive to context, i.e. they do not consider the conditions under which 
bottom-up change may be more or less effective. This is crucial, however, if 
we seek to understand the role such change may play in times of crisis. Perhaps 
even more importantly, existing models do not consider where change 
originates or why it occurs in the first place. As Vivien Schmidt (2012, p.709) 
details, these models deserve praise for conceptualizing mechanisms of 
institutional change, but while “this literature may help to describe change, it 
does not explain it, since to explain change, they would need to make 
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reference to what actors think and say that leads to change.” We therefore 
need to open up the firm level to the same analytical scrutiny as the 
policymaker level.  
The following section considers these issues in more detail, drawing on the 
existing literature and insights from top-down change to formulate 
propositions on the drivers of bottom-up change and the conditions under 
which it may be more or less effective. 
2.5 The Behavior of Corporate Actors 
A starting point for deepening our understanding of bottom-up change is the 
behavior of corporate actors, as it underlies this types of institutional change. 
Different literatures conceive of the driving forces behind actors’ behavior in 
distinct, but often related ways. While political science places the focus usually 
on preferences and ideas, sociological and critical studies have shown the 
important role of discourse in enabling and constraining the behavior of 
corporate actors. This section will discuss these concepts, how they are related, 
and why they are important for the purposes of this study—forming a 
theoretical starting point for the empirical investigation in chapter 4. 
2.5.1 Preferences 
The literature generally sees actors’ behavior as driven by their preferences. 
As Katznelson and Weingast (2005, p.2) argue, “preferences are foundational 
for any theory that relies on agency. We know too little about preferences, 
where they come from or how they are generated.” Without understanding 
what it is actors want and why they want it, we cannot begin to understand 
and predict their actions in a model that affords them a level of agency, i.e. 
freewill in decision-making. Hence, Katznelson and Weingast (2005, p.7) offer 
a definition that focuses on tendencies to act in a certain way rather than an 
inevitable outcome: “Preferences signify propensities to behave in 
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determinate circumstances by people who discriminate among alternatives 
they judge either absolutely or relatively.”  
The key question with regards to preferences is how they are formed. The 
literature distinguishes between three approaches to understanding 
preference formation:  
(1) assertive theory, i.e. actors have a set of preferences determined by the 
theory;  
(2) preferences as a result of historical development;  
(3) social processes, interaction with institutions lead actors to adopt 
certain preferences.  
Each approach has versions with more or less determinism, i.e. to what extent 
actors have free choice (Katznelson & Weingast 2005).  
These different conceptions can be mapped to the three main varieties of neo-
institutionalism. In rational-choice institutionalism, actors’ preferences are 
understood to be pre-determined and amount to little more than self-
interested utility-maximizing. The other two approaches see preferences as 
shaped by the institutional environment in more (HI) or less conscious (SI) 
ways. Consequently, “for historical institutionalists, institutions ‘structure’ 
individuals’ preferences, whereas for rationalists, the preferences of 
individuals ‘structure’ institutions” (Blyth 2002, p.19). This notion of purely 
rational actors, however, is problematic: “The rationality assumption is not 
wrong, but such acceptance forecloses a deeper understanding of the decision-
making process in confronting the complex world we have created” (2005, 
p.5). As a result, modern rational-choice institutionalist models (cf North 
2005) reject purely rational notions in favor of boundedly rational choice-
within-constraints understandings of actors’ behavior. Consensus has thus 
formed around institutions as shaping and constraining preferences. 
Examining managerial preferences in specific, Culpepper (2011) argues that 
they are a result of the strength of workplace labor representation, i.e. works 
councils. In systems where works councils have strong veto power over 
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organizational change, such as Germany and the Netherlands, they limit 
management’s ability to execute swift organizational change. Such change, 
however, would be a requirement of catering to shareholder pressure. Due to 
the advantages of strong works councils and the high costs of abandoning 
them, managerial preferences in those systems are to defend the status quo 
and oppose legislative change facilitating the creation of a market for 
corporate control (Culpepper 2011). However, this view of the source of 
managerial preferences is not uncontested. Schnyder (2012b) makes the case 
that the means of insider control is an important determinant of managers’ 
preferences. This is based on the widely accepted idea that managers’ primary 
interest is to keep control over their business and will thus oppose threats to 
their autonomy. Schnyder finds that the extent to which insider power is based 
on legal control enhancing mechanisms is connected to their preferences: 
Where managers derive their autonomy largely from legal devices, they will 
be opposed to reforms threatening their power; where their power is rooted 
in informal institutions, they tend to be more open to corporate governance 
liberalization (Schnyder 2012b).  
Despite the advances in the literature in moving from preordained preferences 
towards seeing them as shaped by the institutional environment, some 
important questions remain. For one, these explanations follow a circular 
logic, whereby institutions shape preferences that in turn informing actors’ 
behavior, which then shapes institutions. This logic is perfectly suited for 
institutionalist accounts focused on path dependency and incremental change, 
but is incapable of explaining radical change that deviates from the historic 
path. Secondly, and relatedly, these explanations are difficult to square with 
the previously discussed evidence of bottom-up change, whereby corporate 
actors were found to actively seek to change their institutional environment 
away from the status quo. These problems have triggered the search for an 
extraneous variable that can explain changes in preferences and ultimately 




Constructivist institutionalism (cf Blyth 2002; Hay 2004; Schmidt 2010) links 
preferences to ideas, the former being derived from the latter. Ideas can be 
thought of as basic conceptions of how, for instance, the economy or the 
political system, works and how they should work. Preferences or interests—
used here interchangeably—are formed based on these ideas and the goals 
the firm wants to realize. Indeed, the literature is increasingly utilizing the 
constructivist approach in order to gain a better understanding of the 
behavior of actors: “The ‘reality’ of a political-economic system is never 
known to anyone, but humans do construct elaborate beliefs about the nature 
of that ‘reality’—beliefs that are both a positive model of the way the system 
works and a normative model of how it should work” (North 2005, p.2). 
Incorporating ideas therefore offers an extraneous variable that mediates the 
mutually constitutive relationship between actors and institutions as the basis 
of actor’s behavior.  
A key question, then, is how ideas change. The constructivist institutionalism 
literature primarily points to major crisis events as triggers for ideational 
change. “If interests are a function of beliefs and desires, and if agents are 
confused about their desires - for example, in situations of high uncertainty - 
then logically agents’ interests must be unstable too” (Blyth 2002, p.30). Blyth 
conceives of crises as situations of ‘Knightian’ uncertainty, “that is, situations 
regarded by contemporary agents as unique events where the agents are 
unsure as to what their interests actually are, let alone how to realize them” 
(Blyth 2002, p.9). Consequently, agents’ interests are not a given, but 
something to be explained. Also, the very nature of what an economic crisis 
actually is cannot be presumed. “Agents must argue over, diagnose, 
proselytize, and impose on others their notion of what a crisis actually is before 
collective action to resolve the uncertainty facing them can take any 
meaningful institutional form” (Blyth 2002, p.9).  
Ideas, then, take on a central role by allowing actors to diagnose a crisis, 
assessing how the crisis came to be, and how it can be resolved. “The diagnosis 
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of a situation as a ‘crisis’ by a particular set of ideas is a construction that 
makes the uncertainty that agents perceive explicable, manageable, and 
indeed, actionable” (Blyth 2002, p.10). This means that ideas contain value 
statements, e.g. what source of economic growth is the most important, as well 
as the trade-offs associated with them, giving actors both a ‘scientific’ 
understanding of how things work and a ‘normative’ understanding of how 
they should work. Consequently, “if agents’ interests in such situations [of 
Knightian uncertainty] can be defined only in terms of their ideas about their 
interests, then the outcomes that such situations produce will also be a 
function of those ideas” (Blyth 2002, p.33). This follows Hahn & Solow’s 
(1997) line of reasoning: “The way the economy actually does work can 
depend on the way agents believe the economy to work.” In other words, 
when ideas change, the foundation of actors’ behavior changes as well, as they 
may have different preferences and seek out new goals. 
Criticism of the constructivist approach has centered largely around the level 
of agency. In his critique of the constructivist approach, Bell (2011, p.888) 
wonders whether “the new constructivist institutionalism [is] ‘institutionalist’ 
in any significant sense.” He argues that “the constructivists in question have 
a somewhat confused understanding of constructivism, excessively privilege 
agency, and lose sight of the significance of institutional and wider structural 
variables, which inevitably shape agency and institutional change processes” 
(Bell 2011, p.884). While there is scope for the argument that we need a better 
understanding of the mechanisms of how ideas, interests and institutions 
interact, Bell’s criticism that “according to Blyth, the mechanisms of crisis and 
uncertainty largely serve to erase existing institutional conditions” (Bell 2011, 
p.887) is difficult to sustain. Blyth does not make the case that crises present 
an institutional tabula rasa, but rather that they lead to a reevaluation of 
institutional arrangements because of the uncertainty of the crisis situation 
and the perceived institutional failure.  
Reevaluations are based on ideas of how the economy works, the perceived 
causes of the crisis, and understandings of what needs to be done to remedy 
the situation. By definition, a reevaluation cannot start from a clean slate - it 
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is always informed by existing institutions. Rather than understanding Blyth’s 
argument as ‘institutional erasure’ in times of crisis, as Bell (2011) does, we 
could think of crises as a trigger that allows institutional change beyond the 
constraints of usual path dependence. When institutional failure and 
uncertainty call the previous modus operandi and the associated ideas into 
question, actors may question previously accepted ways of doing things and 
become subject to changed expectations of their behavior, weakening the 
cognitive and normative constraints of previous institutional arrangements.  
2.5.3 Public Discourse 
Integrating the role of ideas in our conception of bottom-up institutional 
change therefore holds tremendous promise, as they represent an extraneous 
variable that can explain why corporate actors may or may not seek to change 
their institutional environment. The difficulty of doing so, however, is that 
ideas are deep-seated beliefs that may not have a public expression, making 
them difficult to measure. The basic premise of constructivist 
institutionalism—that ideas and institutions are socially constructed—offers a 
solution to this problem, however. An important avenue for processes of social 
construction is public discourse, which both reflects and influences ideas. 
Indeed, some parts of the literature have integrated the role of public 
discourse in institutional change process, through ‘political salience.’  
Well established in political science, the concept of political salience states that 
not all issues are of equal presence in the public mind; issues will rise and fall 
based on crises, scandals, or other events. As a consequence, political actors 
prioritize issues that are salient, usually operationalized in terms of volume of 
public discourse, in order to meet public demands for action and, ultimately, 
increase their chances of reelection (Schattschneider 1960; M. A. Smith 2000; 
B. D. Jones & Baumgartner 2005). In other words, when saliency is high, it 
can act as a “stimulus for action by key players, driving the search for solutions 
to problems, though not determining outcomes” (Gospel & Edwards 2012).  
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Culpepper (2011) presents a model of institutional change that takes this 
concept into account, arguing that power will shift between party politics and 
interest groups, and managerial interests, depending on an issue’s political 
salience. Culpepper shows that in areas of low political salience, such as 
regulation on corporate control, firms heavily influence policy due to “their 
superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators” (Culpepper 2011). 
This allows “managerial groups, which both understand the issues of 
corporate control and care about them a great deal, to wield disproportionate 
political influence” (Culpepper 2011, p.8). While Culpepper’s model shows 
the role of public discourse in institutional change processes very effectively, 
it does so from a top-down view of change only, conceiving of institutional 
change as a purely political game that allows corporate actors influence in the 
right circumstances. 
2.6 The Triangle of Institutional Change 
Applying the insights of constructivist institutionalism and political salience-
based models of institutional change to bottom-up change, a triangle emerges 
between the cornerstones of public discourse, corporate practices, and the 
law. The triangle serves as the conceptual framework of this study, showing 
how the various elements examined here are related and where the 
relationships of interest lie. Institutional change in the triangle is equated with 
legal change, which may of course arise from a large number of sources not 
mapped on this triangle—these have been omitted in the triangle for clarity 





Figure 1: The Triangle of Institutional Change 
Culpepper’s aforementioned work addresses two sides of this triangle—the 
relationships between public discourse and the law, and some aspects of the 
relationship between corporations and the law, albeit only in terms of direct 
engagement in the policymaking processes. To further our understanding of 
bottom-up change, the three relationships along this triangle of main concern 
are:  
(1) the relationship between public discourse, operationalized as political 
salience, and corporate practices, as changing discourse may drive 
changes in corporate behavior; and 
(2) as an intermediary step, the cornerstone of corporate practices 
deserves particular attention, as it is here that change needs to gain 
‘critical mass’ in order to affect institutions; and 
(3) the relationship between corporate practices and the law, as 









regulatory change—equated here to institutional change—through 
mechanisms of bottom-up change.  
Each of these three relationships is explored in more detail in the following 
sections, drawing on various parts of the literature to form propositions on 
how we may expect these relationships to be structured. 
2.6.1 Public Discourse and Corporate Practice 
As is apparent from the previously discussed literature, the link between public 
discourse and corporate practices has not been an area of intense focus in the 
institutional change literature. However, the literature offers some points of 
departure:  
(1) around the role of corporate practices as signaling devices; and  
(2) around the institutional mediation of external pressures. 
The literature has shown that corporations sometimes adopt practices 
symbolically, but subvert them substantively, in order to respond to 
institutional pressures and signal compliance to other actors (Börsch 2007). 
This phenomenon, termed corporate decoupling, points to the signaling 
power of symbolic corporate practices even when actual practices differ 
(Westphal & Zajac 1994; Westphal & Zajac 2001). This is an important 
finding, as it highlights that the publicly projected practices of corporations 
can influence other actors—investors, peers, policymakers, or the public—
regardless of whether they represent actual corporate behavior. The basis for 
this line of thought is Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) concept of the ‘loosely 
coupled organization.’ Organizations are driven to internalize 
institutionalized forms of organization as a way to signal compliance and 
increase their legitimacy. However, these forms of organization are not 
necessarily efficient for every company, leading to potentially conflicting 
pressures—the normative pressure to comply with institutionalized rules and 
organizational forms to gain legitimacy, and the pressure to increase efficiency 
as a result of the underlying assumption of utility-maximizing rationality. Due 
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to this conflict, “organizations that reflect institutional rules tend to buffer 
their formal structures from the uncertainties of technical activities by 
becoming loosely coupled, building gaps between their formal structures and 
actual work activities” (Meyer & Rowan 1977, p.341). These loosely coupled 
organizations may produce internal inefficiencies, but by adhering “to the 
larger rationalities of the wider structure, they may maximize long-run 
effectiveness” (Meyer & Rowan 1977, p.360). 
Applying this argument to the relationship between public discourse and 
corporate practices, we can form some expectations. First, it offers a basic 
rationale for companies to yield to public debate. While the law defines 
absolute boundaries for what constitutes compliance and legitimate behavior, 
acceptable behavior within those boundaries is socially constructed. As a 
public expression of ideas, discourse reflects changing perceptions of what 
constitutes acceptable compliance and legitimate behavior. Crises may act as 
a trigger for public debate, for instance by raising questions on bank 
capitalization or risk-taking, or it may shift the nature of public discourse. For 
example, high CEO pay was legal before the GFC and remained legal after 
the crisis, but public debate shifted high executive pay from an obscure issue 
to something deemed excessive and inappropriate. Public discourse has many 
facets, including media coverage, public sentiment, or more focused 
interventions such as NGO campaigns. For the purposes of this study, it is 
conceptualized more narrowly as media coverage in form of newspaper 
articles, following Culpepper (2011). Consequently, increasing public 
criticism of a behavior or negative discussion of an issue is seen to pressure 
corporations to reduce the associated controversial practice. We may thus 
expect companies to be generally reactive to public discourse and adjust their 
behavior in order to signal continued compliance and legitimacy. As will be 
discussed more fully below, major changes in discourse and in what is 
perceived as appropriate behavior could therefore lead to shifts in corporate 
practice among companies particularly exposed to and pressured by public 
discourse, which could initiate processes of mimetic isomorphism among firms 
that may establish new norms of behavior. However, the extent of such 
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reactiveness is likely mediated by the ability of companies to decouple their 
practices on the issue in question. 
Arguably, the ability to decouple practices is related to an issue’s operational 
embeddedness within the firm, which can be conceptualized as the extent to 
which an issue structures the company’s relationships with its stakeholders and 
thus influences its strategic and operational capabilities. This conception 
draws on the literature on the ‘dynamic capabilities’ of corporations (Teece et 
al. 1997; Dosi et al. 2001; Whitley 2007), which can be defined as “the firm’s 
ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external competences 
to address rapidly changing environments. Dynamic capabilities thus reflect 
an organization’s ability to achieve new and innovative forms of competitive 
advantage” (Teece et al. 1997, p.516). In essence, dynamic capabilities are 
thus concerned with a company’s ability to harness its relationships with 
financiers, owners, suppliers, employees, and other stakeholder groups to 
adapt to changing circumstances and realize new opportunities. 
Consequently, practices that structure these relationships can be seen as 
deeply strategically or operationally embedded—such as providing 
shareholder value in order to secure continued access to capital and finance 
new projects, or reliance on short-term or zero-hour contracts in order to gain 
staffing flexibility and react to changes in demand. 
On such deeply embedded issues, companies are unlikely to find behavioral 
signals that would satisfy public pressure without also having to fundamentally 
change their strategy and risking to alienate groups they rely on for their 
strategic or operational capabilities. In other words, issues that are deeply 
operationally embedded are unlikely to change with shifts in public discourse. 
On the other hand, issues that are less embedded, such as board composition 
or executive pay, are more likely to be affected by public discourse as they 
allow companies to signal compliance with public expectations without 
affecting their strategic or operational capabilities.  
Of the issue areas considered here, we could consider risk-taking behavior, 
ownership structure, shareholder orientation, and labor relations as deeply 
Literature Review 
68 
embedded issues. The first three issues are central to the company’s 
relationship with investors and thus determine future access to capital, while 
the latter issue area is related the company’s ability to recruit and retain 
appropriately skilled staff and maintain employment flexibility. 
Accountability and transparency, board composition, executive pay could be 
seen as less embedded, as these issues have strong external signaling power 
but more limited impact on the company’s stakeholder relationships and thus 
strategic or operational capability. To be sure, this classification of issues as 
more or less embedded is an oversimplification; an issue’s actual operational 
embeddedness can be expected to vary on a company-by-company basis. For 
instance, retail companies may depend heavily on employment flexibility in 
order to adjust to seasonal shifts in demand, while concerns over short-term 
labor flexibility may be of little concern to investment banks. Such fine-
grained assessment of embeddedness is beyond the scope of this study, 
however.  
Proposition A-1: Higher levels of public discourse are more likely to lead to corporations 
reducing associated controversial practices the less operationally embedded these practices are. 
If we see firms as institutionally embedded (Aguilera & Jackson 2003; Jacoby 
2004), we should also expect the institutional environment to mediate the 
impact of public discourse on corporate practices. The literature on the 
convergence of national business systems shows how uniform external 
pressures on corporations lead to different outcomes depending on the 
institutional setup of the country the firm operates in. “[T]here is substantial 
variation among countries in the meaning of various work practices 
depending on the institutional context and history. We also observe 
substantial diversity even within firms (or plants) that are following a particular 
pattern of work practices” (Katz & Darbishire 2002, p.13). Goyer (2002) also 
finds that despite firms being subject to very similar pressures of institutional 
investors originating in Anglo-Saxon countries, firm-level reactions tend to 
vary. Goyer attributes this to the constraining element of existing institutions, 
arguing that firms’ choices are informed and delimited by national 
institutional contexts. “In other words, national institutions mediate the 
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impact of external stimuli but the presence of institutional complementarity 
does not inhibit adjustment” (Goyer 2002, p.23). Hence, even global trends 
and events, such as the GFC and associated rise in public discourse on similar 
issues across different countries, the implementation and effects of those 
patterns have to be understood in the context of their national institutional 
environment. 
A useful starting point for forming more detailed expectations is Varieties of 
Capitalism (Hall & Soskice 2001) and its central dimension of coordination. 
Firm-level mechanisms of coordination provide institutionalized avenues for 
stakeholders to influence corporate behavior. Board-level codetermination 
and works councils, for instance, allow employees to voice their concerns and 
work out compromises with management. Blockholder ownership structures 
and network reputational monitoring, to use a further example, are means for 
insider owners to wield enhanced control over management. In other words, 
these well-institutionalized ways for corporations to take the demands of the 
‘affected public’ into account should result in public discourse being less likely 
to impact corporate behavior. We may thus expect companies in CMEs to 
display less reactivity to public discourse than their counterparts in LMEs, 
where the lack of coordinating institutions means that firms have to rely on 
public channels, i.e. public discourse, to meet expectations of affected parties. 
Proposition A-2: Higher levels of public discourse are more likely to lead to corporations 
reducing associated controversial practices in LME countries. 
Taken together, we may expect public discourse to exert some influence over 
corporate practices, but this is likely to be mediated by the operational 
embeddedness of the issue in question and the institutional environment. 
Given the lack of in-depth research on the relationship between public 
discourse and firm practices in the institutional change literature, these 
propositions remain fairly broad. An exploratory element to analyzing this 
relationship will therefore be required.  
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2.6.2 Firm-Level Processes of Change 
If, as the previous section has proposed, rising public debate indeed leads to 
shifts in corporate practices, we also need to ask how such firm-level shifts may 
coalesce into new norms of behavior. This section, which can be situated in 
the ‘corporate practice’ cornerstone of the ‘triangle’ of institutional change, 
examines how spikes in public discourse during or following major shock 
events such as economic crises or corporate scandals may lead to establishing 
new behavioral norms amongst corporate actors—which is an important 
precursor for bottom-up institutional change. 
Institutions are generally understood to be devices reducing uncertainty in 
economic exchanges by limiting actors’ leeway for opportunistic behavior, 
thereby reducing transaction costs (North 1984; North 1990; Williamson 
1981). Firms thus have an incentive to work towards maintaining those 
institutional arrangements, both to reduce the chances of opportunistic 
behavior of others, but also because they benefit from exploiting the status 
quo of the institutional set-up for their own gain. While historic institutionalist 
approaches reject this purely rational choice-based explanation of why actors 
seek to maintain the institutional status quo, they arrive at similar conclusions 
by emphasizing institutional path dependence. As noted, both older 
punctuated equilibrium models of institutional change and more recent 
incrementalist approaches point to major shock events as being able to break 
these institutional and path dependence constraints. The key question for 
furthering our understanding of bottom-up change, then, is how such events 
impact corporate behavior and whether they may trigger bottom-up change. 
In times of severe crisis, institutions may lose their uncertainty-reducing 
properties. For one, institutions that are seen as instrumental in causing the 
crisis may lose support from the public, policymakers, or even the firms 
affected. With mounting normative pressure to reevaluate and change the 
institutions, actors may start to defect from them, turning the institutions from 
uncertainty reducing into uncertainty-causing devices. In the case of the GFC, 
this applies primarily to informal rather than formal institutions—systemic, 
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irresponsible risk-taking behavior of financial firms received a larger share of 
blame for causing the crisis than regulatory failure. Consequently, certain 
institutionalized practices and the companies mainly associated with them 
become discredited and a source of uncertainty, prompting other 
corporations to defect. In the first instance, this is likely to lead to a splintering 
of practices, as the defecting companies pursue various alternatives to the 
previously engrained practice. 
Proposition B-1: Institutions and practices discredited due to crisis become a source of 
uncertainty, initially leading to larger variation of practices. 
Times of severe crisis can be understood as situations of severe uncertainty 
(Blyth 2002, p.9). Hence, crises spread a ‘great confusion’ of sorts, leaving 
actors without their usual compass directing them on what behaviors are 
appropriate or even in their interest. One important way firms regain their 
footing is through following the lead of large, successful companies—role 
models that are seen as ‘best practice’ examples of how to cope with the crisis 
and the uncertainty surrounding it. What constitutes ‘best practice’ may not 
be immediately clear, but could crystallize over time or in reaction to 
regulatory proposals or public discourse.  
Called mimetic isomorphism, this process tends to occur for its uncertainty-
reducing properties: “Individuals and organizations deal with uncertainty by 
imitating the ways of others whom we use as models. The underlying logic is 
often one of orthodoxy: We seek to behave in conventional ways, in ways that 
will not cause us to stand out or be noticed as different. Also involved are 
status processes. We attempt to imitate others whom we regard as superior, as 
more successful” (Scott 1995, p.45). Westphal and Zajac (2001) discuss 
evidence showing such behavior in the face of institutional uncertainty among 
firms with network ties to each other. Organizational isomorphism is of course 
not limited to situations of crisis but occurs for different reasons in a number 
of forms. Organization studies has shed light on the question why firms often 
exhibit similar behavior despite the large variety of institutional contexts and 
possible behaviors, with explanations generally focusing on legitimacy, 
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reduction of uncertainty and taken-for-granted practices (Meyer & Rowan 
1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1991). The variation of corporate practices after a 
severe crisis can therefore be expected to show a pattern of initial spread and 
increased heterogeneity, followed by convergence on the practices of a small 
number of new role models. 
Proposition B-2: Once new role models emerge, corporations start to mimic their behavior in 
order to blend in with perceived best practice. This leads to a convergence of corporate 
practices. 
Patterns of mimetic isomorphism are likely to be related to 
internationalization processes, both through MNCs as conduits of mimetic 
isomorphism and through determining which national business model is 
considered best practice. Dominance effects establish an international 
hierarchy of economies, whereby “those in dominant positions have 
frequently evolved methods of organising production or the division of labour 
which have invited emulation and interest” (C. Smith & Meiksins 1995, 
p.256). Smith and Meiksins argue that such borrowing of what is perceived to 
be ‘best practice’ is intensified with increasing global economic integration. 
This implies that the effect is stronger in highly internationalized sectors, such 
as the financial sector, than in more nationally-bound sectors such as 
manufacturing. 
Proposition B-3: Mimetic isomorphism is stronger in highly internationalized sectors, such 
as the financial industry. 
An important vehicle for the diffusion of the best practice of the time are 
MNCs, who transplant their home practices to host countries, albeit with 
some local ‘flavor’ to make them compatible with local legal and normative 
requirements. Dominance effects “create pressures to diffuse best practice, but 
competition between dominant countries means there is never a single model 
of this, and uneven development ensures that there is a turnover in practices” 
(C. Smith & Meiksins 1995, pp.258-259). Dominance effects exist at all times, 
but severe crises may create a new hierarchy of economies. As some 
economies suffer more than others, the previously dominant model may 
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become discredited and replaced by an economic model that fared better 
throughout the crisis. Since the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing global 
economic downturn, Germany has often been heralded as a new role model, 
having performed better than most other advanced capitalist economies. 
Some governments such as the British, have voiced their aspirations to 
become more Germanic, i.e. export-led economies with strong apprenticeship 
and training systems (Volkery 2013; Groom 2013). This perhaps signals that 
the German economy and by extension the practices of German firms have 
climbed the hierarchy to replace the Anglo-Saxon style of capitalism as the 
role model. A crisis can ‘dethrone’ the clear dominator, but a new single best 
model may not immediately emerge. In this case, the ideological affinity actors 
have towards one or the other contender, sectoral differences, and general 
ambiguity may lead to increased heterogeneity of practices. The following 
propositions can therefore be made regarding international influences on 
patterns of mimetism: 
Proposition B-4: Crises may establish a new hierarchy of dominant economies, creating new 
role models both in terms of economic policy and associated corporate practices. 
We can identify three types of mimetic isomorphism: within-group mimetism, 
outside-of-group mimetism, and cross-border mimetism. The first type, 
within-group mimetism, is similar to Abrahamson’s (1991) fad perspective, 
referring to companies copying the behavior of their immediate peers. 
Explanations of this behavior have focused on gaining legitimacy by adhering 
to emergent norms (DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Meyer & Rowan 1977) or on 
economic interests by avoiding the risk that competitors might gain a 
competitive advantage through an innovation (Abrahamson 1991). 
Reputation-based explanations, whereby firms imitate others with better 
reputations than their own (DiMaggio & Powell 1991) have also been 
advanced for political actors, showing that policy diffusion in the US spreads 
after highly-reputed states implement a new policy (J. L. Walker 1969). As 
mimetic isomorphism occurs for legitimacy, status or reputational reasons at 
all times and therefore reduces heterogeneity of firm behavior within a peer 
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group, changes in firm behavior induced by within-group mimetism are likely 
incremental. 
Proposition B-5: Changes in firm behavior induced by within-group mimetism are likely 
incremental, as firms within the same group are already relatively similar. 
Outside-of-group (or between-group) mimetism corresponds to 
Abrahamson’s (1991) fashion perspective, whereby fashion-setting 
organizations such as consulting firms, business schools or business mass 
media promote certain administrative technologies as part of their business. 
Organizations adopt their recommendations because of the trust they inspire, 
the knowledge they exude, and the reach they have. The practices promoted 
by these opinion-leaders are not necessarily efficiency-enhancing, but serve an 
innovation-signaling purpose that tends to lead to rejection over time as they 
lose their innovative edge. Consultancies, business media, business 
associations and other opinion-leaders provide guidance and advice on how 
to react to a crisis or scandal or how to ensure compliance with legislation that 
may be under particularly close scrutiny after said event. It is in the business 
interest of consultancies, advisory bodies and the specialist media to sell advice 
that is far enough from common wisdom to be perceived as a ‘product’ or 
‘solution,’ yet not too unorthodox as to be perceived as unfeasible or to attract 
unwanted regulatory scrutiny. However, as the advice given is the product 
sold to businesses and thus generally not made public, this data is next to 
impossible to acquire. For the purposes of this study, outside-of-group 
mimetism is thus conceptualized and operationalized as mimetic isomorphism 
between sectors, i.e. between the financial and industrial sectors. During the 
GFC, financial firms have become under increasing scrutiny and their 
practices associated with excessive risk-taking, which could conceivably lead 
to financial firms imitating the behavior of industrial companies. As financial 
and industrial firms are likely to differ in some of their practices, this type of 
mimetism bears a larger potential for shifting firm practices in a radical way 
than within-group mimetism. 
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Proposition B-6: Outside-of-group mimetism has the potential to shift firm practices in a 
more radical way than within-group mimetism. 
With increasing global integration of business and trade, mimetic processes 
are not limited to the nation-level. MNCs may not have any domestic peers, 
making it likely that they orient themselves towards their international peers 
and international opinion-leaders. If the crisis triggers a reshuffling of the 
hierarchy of economies, new political and corporate role models may emerge 
and become a template for governments and firms further down the hierarchy 
to imitate. Where firms import practices through cross-border mimetism, 
friction with home-country institutions can be expected. Practices imported 
from other institutional contexts may be very different from domestic norms, 
but to what extent they may run afoul of domestic rules will depend on the 
home-country’s regulatory system. The UK’s ‘comply or explain’ approach 
to corporate governance regulation, for instance, is much more permissible to 
deviant behavior than other, more prescriptive systems. The potentially large 
difference in the institutional systems of the role model and imitator makes 
cross-border mimetism rare, as institutional ‘distance’ is often seen as a barrier 
to mimetism, but also giving it the largest potential for radically changing firm 
practices. A further contributing factor to the potency of cross-border 
mimetism is the institutional disconnectedness of MNCs that results from their 
global orientation placing them beyond the reach of any single government. 
In exceptional circumstances, Hage and Mote (2008, p.313) argue, 
institutionally disconnected organizations have “the capacity to transform 
[their] institutional environment with discontinuous changes in normative 
patterns or institutional rules.” The three types of mimetic isomorphism and 
their relative power to change corporate practices can be summarized 
through the following propositions: 
Proposition B-7: Cross-border mimetism has the largest potential for radically changing firm 
practices. 
In summary, processes of mimetic isomorphism are important and powerful 
mechanisms that spread change in corporate practices. Crises, scandals, and 
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the associated public discourse that comes with such major events may 
discredit previous norms, leading to uncertainty about how to signal 
compliance and legitimacy under those new circumstances. Once large and 
influential companies adopt new practices, others are likely to follow those 
leaders in order to blend in and reduce the uncertainty emanating from the 
crisis or scandal. Mimetic isomorphism therefore enables widespread change 
in corporate practice and may coalesce into new norms. Such ’critical mass’ 
is an important condition for bottom-up change to occur. 
2.6.3 Corporate Practice and Legal Change 
If public discourse and mimetic isomorphism are drivers of widespread 
changes in corporate practices, the question arises how this impacts the 
institutional environment. As discussed previously, the literature has theorized 
several mechanisms for how changes in corporate practice can affect formal 
institutions and has produced some empirical evidence for such instances of 
change. This bottom-up relationship is situated in the ‘triangle’ of institutional 
change as the arrow pointing from corporate practices to legal/regulatory 
change.  
We can conceptualize different modes of influence running in this direction: 
corporate practices may cause change, pre-empt change, or shape the content 
of change. In the first case, corporate behavior is the impetus for legal or 
regulatory change, i.e. firm-level change precedes legal-level change. Hereby, 
lawmakers or regulators react to shifts in the behavior of firms, either to 
formally make new norms acceptable forms of compliance or to restrict 
behavior seen as undesirable. The second case is similar to the first in that 
corporate-level adjustments also take place first; however, here they lead to 
the abandonment of mooted or planned legal or regulatory change. This may 
occur if lawmakers or regulators see firm-level change as sufficient and deem 
formal legal change unnecessary. In the third case, firm-level and legal-level 
change co-evolve, with corporate shifts in practice changing the content of 
legal or regulatory changes in progress. Here, changes in corporate behavior 
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may convince lawmakers or regulators to adapt aspects of planned changes, 
whether to the advantage or disadvantage of businesses. 
While we are able to conceptualize different modes of influence running from 
the firm level to the legal level, the literature has not considered some 
important questions on bottom-up change that are of particular relevance for 
a time period that includes a major financial crisis as an event of uncertainty 
and potential trigger for corporate-level change:  
(1) How does political salience and public discourse affect bottom-up 
change?  
(2) How does the nature of severe crises impact bottom-up change?  
(3) How does the structure of the political system mediate bottom-up 
change?  
Fundamentally, these three issues are concerned with the conditions under 
which bottom-up change is more or less likely to occur. While all three 
questions have received considerable attention in top-down conceptions of 
change, they remain ill-understood for bottom-up change. This section draws 
on insights from top-down change and other parts of the literature to 
formulate propositions. 
The concept of political salience has been integrated into some conceptions 
of institutional change to great effect, showing how power shifts between 
corporate actors and policymakers based on issue salience. Culpepper’s 
(Culpepper 2011) work, briefly discussed earlier, has been at the forefront of 
this development. He argues that party politics and interest group coalition-
driven perspectives of legal change are flawed as they “treat corporate control 
like any other high-profile battle in democracies, where public opinion and 
legislative votes are the most valuable currencies” (Culpepper 2011, p.3). For 
issues that are not in the public conscience, however, pressure for change is 




Culpepper distinguishes two dimensions that determine how powerful 
managers are in influencing the policymaking process on a given issue. The 
first is political salience, which is measured as the volume of public debate 
taking place on a certain issue. The more salient an issue, the more politicians 
start paying attention to public opinion and business interests lose power. An 
issue can become salient through a crisis (e.g. Enron, financial crisis) or 
mobilization through a political entrepreneur (e.g. Ralph Nader). As the 
media starts to pick an issue up, the public becomes aware of it and forms an 
opinion, leaving politicians little room for maneuver if they want to be 
reelected (Culpepper 2011).  
The second, closely related dimension is issue complexity. The higher an 
issue’s complexity (e.g. corporate governance technicalities such as takeover 
defenses), the harder it is for the media and the public to engage with and 
understand it, thus giving managers the role of undisputed experts on the 
matter. Consequently, low salience and high complexity are an “ideal 
combination of circumstances for managerial groups, which both understand 
the issues of corporate control and care about them a great deal, to wield 
disproportionate political influence” (Culpepper 2011, p.8). However, when 
salience flares up, for example during a hostile takeover attempt being 
reported in the news, high complexity is only a shield for managerial interests 
as long as salience is fleeting, so media and politicians have no incentive to 
become thoroughly informed on the issue, and is not a result of perceived 
managerial incompetence, as in the case of the Enron debacle or the financial 
crisis (Culpepper 2011). While this model shows how the power of corporate 
interests to influence the policymaking process falls with rising political 
salience, it does not consider the role of bottom-up change. However, some 
propositions can be made. 
It stands to reason that a similar relationship exists for bottom-up change. As 
the previously elaborated mechanisms of bottom-up change—
reinterpretation, defection, displacement, and preemption—require implied 
or explicit consent of regulators, courts or policymakers in order to make the 
changed behavior an accepted form of compliance, political salience is likely 
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to play a role here too. When salience is low, regulators and policymakers may 
not pay much attention to shifts in how rules are interpreted on the firm level, 
and how corporate behavior vis-a-vis those rules is changing. As a result, 
changed practices could become established and institutionalized, making it 
more likely that they become formally accepted as compliant with the rules. 
Corporate scandals, public outrage, or other events that increase issue 
salience, however, could lead to increased scrutiny of corporate practices and 
a clamp-down on deviant behavior. Generally, we may therefore expect the 
power of bottom-up change to decline as salience rises. 
Proposition C-1: Higher issue salience reduces the ability of bottom-up mechanisms to change 
formal institutions. 
The dynamics may be different, however, under specific circumstances—
times of severe crisis. Crises may offer a conducive environment for bottom-
up change for two main reasons. First, processes of crisis-induced mimetic 
isomorphism can greatly accelerate the formation of ‘critical mass’ on the 
firm-level, shifting corporate behavior from previous norms to new ways of 
doing things. Especially where such mimetism occurs outside of the peer 
group or even internationally, it may change firm practices in significant ways, 
increasing the possibility that corporate practices push at the boundaries of 
the law. In other words, major crises may increase the ‘supply’ of bottom-up 
change. 
Proposition C-2: Severe crises increase the ‘supply’ of bottom-up change as they trigger change 
in corporate practices and accelerate the formation of new norms of behavior. 
Second, crises could increase the likelihood of corporate practices changing 
formal institutions. As Blyth (2002) argues, major crises are socially 
constructed, both in terms of perceived causes and perceived solutions. 
Hence, issues deemed to be directly linked to causing or solving the crisis rise 
in public discourse and political salience. Governments will prioritize the most 
salient issues on their agenda, which are likely to be emergency 
countermeasures to the crisis, crowding out other matters of lower priority 
(Kingdon 1995). For lower salience issues, this may open a window of 
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opportunity to establish new forms of compliance ‘under the radar,’ i.e. while 
governments are occupied with other problems. In such cases, crises may 
make bottom-up change less visible and increase its chances of success. Even 
for higher salience issues, however, where regulators or policymakers are 
more likely to observe changes in corporate behavior, crises may work in favor 
of bottom-up change. As corporations converge on new best practice, they 
can make a credible case to lawmakers that lessons have been learned and no 
deep reforms are needed. Policymakers, whose agendas are dominated by 
macro-economic concerns rather than the specifics of, say, corporate 
governance legislation, can then point to those corporations as examples of 
effective self-regulation. Whether this works will depend on other actors, 
mainly policymakers and opinion leaders, seeing the changes in corporate 
behavior as desirable and sufficient. Policymakers, especially those of a pro-
business disposition, may be willing to accept such ‘self-regulation’ in lieu of 
formal regulation, freeing their agendas at a time of competing priorities 
(Mayer 2013). As a result of these factors, crises may enhance the influence of 
corporations through bottom-up processes of change—unlike in the political 
arena, where crises tend to lower the power of corporate actors (Culpepper 
2011). 
Proposition C-3: In times of severe crisis, bottom-up change may be more likely to lead to 
legal change than in non-crisis situations, regardless of issue salience. 
The impact of bottom-up change on formal institutions may also be enhanced 
in times of severe crisis due to institutional ‘softening.’ Institutional strength 
can be seen as comprising of two dimensions—enforcement and stability 
(Levitsky & Murillo 2009). Highly developed nations typically feature high 
enforcement and high stability, but crises can chip away at both. Weak 
enforcement of rules can result from ‘window dressing,’ i.e. law or regulation 
enacted primarily to appeal to others without intention of enforcing it 
(Levitsky & Murillo 2009). Policymakers engage in ‘symbolic policymaking’ as 
a way of signaling to the public that the government is doing what is morally 
right, e.g. by clamping down on excessive risk-taking, while at the same time 
putting business interests at ease by implementing weak monitoring and 
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enforcement mechanisms (Suárez 2014). Weak enforcement may also be a 
result of governments lacking the power to enforce even if they wanted to. 
The reach of the state might be lower in some sectors than in others—highly 
internationalized and ‘footloose’ sectors such as finance, or highly complex 
sectors such as investment banking, for example. Finally, when actors perceive 
rules as unfair, they are more inclined to not comply with them, making 
effective monitoring and enforcement costly and in turn rule violations more 
likely. Lawmakers, who may well be inclined to crack down on the perceived 
causes of an economic crisis, thus risk higher violation rates if firms do not 
perceive the new rules as fair.  
Institutional instability may also result from a number of sources. Time is one 
of those factors and highly relevant to situations of crisis. Levitsky and Murillo 
(2009, p.123) argue that “the pace of institutional design may affect stability,” 
as quickly-designed ‘emergency legislation’ does not give actors enough time 
to calculate its potential impact and how it affects their interests, increasing 
resistance to the new rules. Institutions imported from abroad may also be 
weakened, either on the policy level or the corporate practice level, due to 
poor fit with the domestic institutional context. Just as corporations seek to 
reduce uncertainty through imitating best practice of their peers, 
policymakers may also adopt what they perceive as the best way of handling 
the crisis. Adopting perceived ‘best practice’ solutions from other countries 
could boost confidence among businesses, investors and consumers, regardless 
of how fitting the rules may be to the domestic context. These imported 
policies may have the desired signaling effect, but are also liable to being 
exposed as ill-suited to the domestic context. Whether institutions are 
weakened by poor enforcement or instability, Levitsky and Murillo (2009) 
argue that it makes them more vulnerable to change. In advanced 
democracies, this cannot be expected to lead to institutional breakdown and 
replacement, but it may have a large enough effect to enhance the power of 
bottom-up methods of change by making formal institutions more malleable 
in times of crisis. Taken together, the following propositions regarding how 
crises affect bottom-up change can be made. 
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Proposition C-4: Institutional softening may enhance the impact of bottom-up modes of 
change in times of crisis. 
In addition to the factors discussed so far, bottom-up change is also likely to 
be mediated by structural features of the political system, which formally 
defines some aspects of the relationship between different actors and their 
power relations. We can distinguish three main types of political systems: 
majoritarian democracies, consensus democracies, and presidential systems 
(Leijphart 1999). In the broadest terms, a majoritarian (or Westminster) 
system of democracy, as in the UK, features a powerful, usually single political 
party in power, which can quickly enact legal changes due to the fusion of 
executive and legislative powers. This makes British policymakers very 
powerful vis-à-vis other actors. A consensus-type democracy, as in Germany, 
is designed to represent as many people as possible, resulting in coalition 
governments, which have to compromise in order to pass legislation through 
the federal, bicameral system. The division between Bund (federal 
government) and Länder (state governments) further dilutes power and 
increases the need for compromise in the German system. Hence, 
policymakers are subject to intervention from a number of sources before 
legislation passes—at so-called ‘veto points’ (Immergut 1990; Immergut 2008; 
Tsebelis 2000; Tsebelis 1995). A presidential system, as in the US, has features 
of both systems, but is potentially even more open to disruption in the 
policymaking process, as there are more ‘policy entrepreneurs,’ weak party 
control, and strong separation of powers. An important concept of the 
American political system is the idea of ‘checks and balances’ or the separation 
of powers between the three branches of government (Congress, President, 
Courts) and the mechanisms designed to allow each branch to check the 
powers of the others. For example, Congress can impeach the President; the 
President can veto a bill passed by Congress; and the Courts can declare laws 
or government actions unconstitutional (Wilson et al. 2010). 
Milhaupt and Pistor’s (2008) framework on the relationship between legal 
systems and institutional change is a useful starting point in forming 
expectations on how the structure of the political system is likely to affect 
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bottom-up change. It incorporates four dimensions: organization, functions, 
the political economy for law production and enforcement, and the demand 
for law. In terms of organization, they differentiate between centralized and 
decentralized systems; the former with law-making in the legislative or 
executive branches and central enforcement, the latter with law-making 
extending to multiple, including private, agents. They describe four functions 
of legal systems: allocation and protection of property rights, coordinating 
actors to bargain over outcomes, signaling to induce behavioral change, and 
credibility enhancing to increase the efficiency of government policy. The 
former two functions are described as the most important distinguishing 
factors. One may dominate and can vary between areas of law, but both 
usually coexist. Centralized systems tend to be coordinating, decentralized 
systems tend to exert more protection of property rights. The third dimension, 
the political economy for law production and enforcement, differentiates 
systems based on the contestability of law, i.e. to what extent law is subject to 
a process of creative destruction via private, social and government actors, as 
opposed to pure governmental, unilateral action. Centralized systems tend to 
favor governmental actors, while decentralized systems tend to favor self-
organized groups and individuals. The demand for law, the last dimension in 
their framework, changes according to the previous three dimensions and as 
socio-economic conditions of actors change (Milhaupt & Pistor 2008). 
Drawing on this approach, we can differentiate between two main forms of 
organization of the political system: centralized and decentralized (Milhaupt 
& Pistor 2008). Germany is considered a typical case of a highly centralized 
system, while the US is a prime example of a decentralized system. 
Switzerland and the UK are somewhat more mixed cases. The UK is best 
classified as a centralized system, allowing a government holding a majority 
in the lower house (House of Commons) relatively unencumbered power over 
the law-making process given the weak role of the upper house (House of 
Lords) and the rubber-stamping process of Royal assent. Switzerland is best 
described as a decentralized system, as a fairly devolved federal republic and 
strong elements of direct democracy. We may expect decentralized systems to 
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be more receptive to bottom-up change. In such systems, power is less 
concentrated and policymaking more open to actors outside central 
government. As a result, policymaking is more open to disruption from a 
variety of actors, increasing the chances that some actors recognize firm-level 
change as sufficient self-regulation or as an acceptable form of compliance. 
Furthermore, the more complex and disruption-prone policymaking process 
in decentralized systems is also likely to soak up more governmental resources, 
hence exacerbating the previously discussed resource and agenda-setting 
constraints that may increase the efficacy of bottom-up change. 
Proposition C-5: Higher decentralization of the political system increases the efficacy of 
bottom-up change. 
To summarize, the ability of bottom-up mechanisms to change formal 
institutions may depend on a number of factors. First, increasing political 
salience is likely to reduce the power of bottom-up change—as it does for the 
power of corporate interests in top-down change. Second, however, major 
crises may change the dynamics of bottom-up change in a number of ways 
that make its occurrence more likely. Crises not only increase the ‘supply’ of 
bottom-up change, but also mitigate the effect of political salience, allowing 
corporations to establish new forms of compliance ‘under the radar’ and 
changes in practice being seen as effective self-regulation. Institutional 
softening in times of crisis may further increase the power of bottom-up 
change. Finally, the structure of the political system can be expected to 
influence bottom-up change, with more decentralized systems being more 
receptive to such change. 
2.7 Summary 
The literature is increasingly focused on the role of corporate actors in 
institutional change processes and has made significant strides in 
conceptualizing the various mechanisms of bottom-up change. Yet, despite 
these advances, existing models of endogenous or bottom-up institutional 
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change are still limited in some ways. For one, they are not sensitive to context, 
i.e. they do not consider the conditions under which bottom-up change may 
be more or less effective. Perhaps even more importantly, existing models do 
not consider where change originates or why it occurs in the first place, as 
they do not open up firm-level processes of change to the same scrutiny as the 
policymaking-level. 
A deeper focus on the firm level requires a better understanding of the 
behavior of corporate actors. To this end, the literature is increasingly picking 
up the constructivist approach. Incorporating the role of ideas offers an 
extraneous variable that mediates the mutually constitutive relationship 
between actors and institutions as the basis of actor’s behavior, offering a 
mechanism to break path dependency and normative constraints. The 
difficulty in doing so, however, is that ideas are deep-seated beliefs that may 
not have a public expression, making them difficult to measure. The basic 
premise of constructivist institutionalism—that ideas and institutions are 
socially constructed—offers a solution to this problem, however. An 
important avenue for processes of social construction is public discourse, 
which both reflects and influences ideas. Indeed, some parts of the literature 
have integrated the role of public discourse in institutional change process, 
through the concept of political salience—a measure of the volume of public 
discourse. Culpepper’s (2011) model of institutional change shows that power 
shifts between party politics and interest groups on the one hand, and 
managerial interests on the other, depending on an issue’s political salience. 
While this model shows the role of public discourse in institutional change 
processes very effectively, it does so from a top-down view of change only, 
conceiving of institutional change as a purely political game that allows 
corporate actors influence in the right circumstances. 
Applying the insights of constructivist institutionalism and political salience-
based models of institutional change to bottom-up change, a triangle emerges 
between the cornerstones of public discourse, corporate practices, and the 
law. Culpepper’s aforementioned work addresses two sides of this triangle—
the relationships between public discourse and the law, and some aspects of 
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the relationship between corporations and the law, albeit only in terms of 
direct engagement in the policymaking processes. To further our 
understanding of bottom-up change, this study focuses on the lesser explored 
aspects of this triangle:  
(1) the relationship between public discourse and corporate practices, as 
changing discourse may drive changes in corporate behavior;  
(2) the cornerstone of corporate practices to explore how change gains 
‘critical mass’ and establishes new norms of firm behavior; and  
(3) the relationship between corporate practices and the law, in terms of 
how widespread changes in corporate behavior may translate into 
changes in formal institutions.  
In terms of the first relationship, we may expect public discourse to exert some 
influence over corporate practices, but this is likely to be mediated by the 
operational embeddedness of the issue in question and the institutional 
environment. Given the lack of in-depth research on the relationship between 
public discourse and firm practices in the institutional change literature, an 
exploratory element to analyzing this relationship will be required. 
On the firm level, we may expect processes of mimetic isomorphism to be 
important and powerful mechanisms that spread change in corporate 
practices. Crises, scandals, and the associated public discourse that comes with 
such major events may discredit previous norms, leading to uncertainty about 
how to signal compliance and legitimacy under those new circumstances. 
Once large and influential companies adopt new practices, others are likely to 
follow those leaders in order to blend in and reduce the uncertainty emanating 
from the crisis or scandal. Mimetic isomorphism therefore enables widespread 
change in corporate practice and may coalesce into new norms. Such ’critical 
mass’ is an important condition for bottom-up change to occur. 
The relationship between corporate practice and legal change is concerned 
with the conditions under which bottom-up mechanisms may be more or less 
likely to change formal institutions. Several factors are identified from the 
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literature. First, increasing political salience is likely to reduce the power of 
bottom-up change—as it does for the power of corporate interests in top-
down change. Second, however, major crises may change the dynamics of 
bottom-up change in a number of ways that make it more likely to take place. 
Crises not only increase the ‘supply’ of bottom-up change, but also mitigate 
the effect of political salience, allowing corporations to establish new forms of 
compliance ‘under the radar’ and changes in practice being seen as effective 
self-regulation. Institutional softening in times of crisis may further increase 
the power of bottom-up change. Finally, the structure of the political system 
can be expected to influence bottom-up change, with more decentralized 





The approach to assessing institutional change taken in this study combines 
macro-level analysis of legal and regulatory change, micro-level analysis of 
changing corporate practices, and change in public discourse in three 
institutional spheres (finance & accounting, corporate governance, labor & 
industrial relations) across four countries (Switzerland, Germany, United 
Kingdom, United States) over a 19-year time frame (1995 to 2013). The 
approach to data analysis taken here is exploratory in nature, necessitated by 
the lack of existing in-depth research on many of the relationships examined 
in this study. This chapter discusses and justifies the choice of countries, 
institutional spheres and time period, and the methods employed to analyze 
the different relationships of interest. 
Institutional change as an actor-centered process is mediated by the 
institutional environment, and can be thus be expected to differ between 
liberal and non-liberal economies. Liberal market economies (LMEs) are 
typically weaker regulated, giving firms more freedom to implement a wider 
range of strategies. The institutional setting in coordinated market economies 
(CMEs) tends to be more restraining and consensus-oriented, reducing scope 
for firms to deviate from legal rules or societal norms. However, Varieties of 
Capitalism’s (Hall & Soskice 2001) distinction between liberal and 
coordinated market economies is overly simplistic and overlooks important 
differences for the purposes of this study. As argued in the literature review, 
we may expect the institutional environment to mediate bottom-up processes 
of change at two points in particular: First, it may influence the extent to 
which public discourse affects corporate practices. It was argued that firms in 
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CMEs would use mostly private institutionalized channels of coordination to 
react to demands and concerns of stakeholder groups, while firms in LMEs 
would rely more heavily on public debate to ‘do what’s right’ and expected of 
them. For this differentiation, the VoC framework is therefore useful. Second, 
however, we also expect the organization of the political system to matter, 
with decentralized systems possibly being more receptive to bottom-up 
change than centralized systems. As discussed in chapter 2.6.3 above, power 
is less concentrated in decentralized systems, making policymaking more open 
to actors outside central government. This makes the policymaking process 
more open to disruption from a variety of actors, increasing the likelihood that 
firm-level change becomes recognized as sufficient self-regulation or as an 
acceptable form of compliance. The more complex and disruption-prone 
policymaking process in decentralized systems is also likely to soak up more 
governmental resources, exacerbating resource and agenda-setting 
constraints that may further increase the impact of bottom-up change. 
Organization of the political system is not considered by the VoC model, but 
relevant for this study by allowing us to form expectations on the receptiveness 
of various systems to bottom-up modes of institutional change. 
Höpner’s (2007) framework brings both dimensions together, by 
distinguishing between two forms of non-liberalism: coordination and 
organization. The former corresponds closely to VoC’s conception of 
coordination, referring to actors solving collective action problems to 
maximize their own profits. It is operationalized as the presence or absence of 
a corporatist tradition, i.e. national peak interest groups, which are consulted 
by the government and which negotiate comprehensive and binding tripartite 
agreements. Organization refers to firms being more or less forced to take 
objectives beyond the immediate corporate level into account and being 
constrained by institutionalized collective interests. This is operationalized as 
the strength of the central government, which can enforce societal goals, such 
as board-level codetermination, upon firms. In other words, in systems with 
low organization, corporate actors are mostly free to pursue their own self-
interests and those alone, while countries with higher organization delimit this 
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to some extent in order to realize the interests of other stakeholder groups or 
societal goals. Although Höpner uses organization for different ends than it is 
used in this study, it is conceptually very similar: in both cases it is about the 
degree of centralization of the political system—in Höpner’s case for the 
ability to enforce societal goals upon firms, in this study for its receptiveness 
to bottom-up change. The four countries, Germany, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom and the United States of America, selected for this study are 
reflected in the dimensions of coordination and organization and can be 








Centralized Political System 
United Kingdom Germany 
Low Organization 
Decentralized Political System 
United States Switzerland 
Table 1: Selection of Countries by Coordination and Organization 
Three institutional spheres are analyzed in this study: finance & accounting, 
corporate governance, and labor & industrial relations. The former two 
spheres are tightly interconnected and have taken blame as causal factors in 
creating the GFC. Bank capitalization, corporate risk-taking behavior, and 
executive compensation are some of the issues that have risen in political 
salience during and after the crisis, creating incentives for policymakers to 
target these areas for reform. Firms have incentives for changing their 
practices too, for example to reduce their exposure to volatile stock markets, 
adjust to the recession, or avoid public scrutiny. While corporate assessment 
of the reasons and remedies for the crisis may be very different from that of 
policymakers, it is still reasonable to expect some adjustment in finance and 
corporate governance practices, if only to react to changed economic 
circumstances. The main institutional focus area of this study is corporate 
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governance, due to its crucial role in allocation of responsibility and resources 
within the firm:  
“Corporate governance is about power and responsibility. It is 
the structure of power within each firm that determines who 
allocates money: who gets the cash flow, who allocates jobs, 
who decides on research and development, on mergers and 
acquisitions, on hiring and firing CEOs, on subcontracting to 
suppliers, on distributing dividends or buying back shares or 
investing in new equipment. Corporate governance is also 
about accountability: who takes the blame for corruption, 
misuse of funds, or poor performance” (Gourevitch & Shinn 
2005, p.2). 
Labor and industrial relations are not only tightly connected with finance and 
corporate governance, it is also an area that bears potential for conflict during 
times of crisis, when companies are under pressure to reduce costs and shed 
workers. Gospel and Pendleton (2003) link features of finance and corporate 
governance institutions to labor management outcomes, highlighting the 
connections between the spheres. On the finance and corporate governance 
side, they consider three characteristics to be most important in shaping labor 
management practices:  
(1) sources and types of finance, i.e. retained earnings, debt, and equity;  
(2) the objectives of finance providers, which vary between short-term 
gains and long-term strategic investments depending on the identity of 
finance providers; and  
(3) intervention rights and practices, i.e. whether finance providers wield 
influence through voice or exit.  
These finance and corporate governance characteristics influence labor 
management in four main ways. First, shareholder value orientation tends to 
reduce job security and career progression, particularly in economic 
downturns as a means of protecting profitability. Relational-insider systems 
and the presence of large shareholders are associated with lower elasticity of 
employment levels in relation to output changes, thus increasing job security. 
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Second, long-term relationships between providers and finance and firms in 
relational-insider systems allow the development of diversified quality 
production, leading to higher skill levels. Third, market-based systems tend to 
have more antagonistic relations, with more worker hold-up activity, as 
workers do not gain benefits from offering long-term cooperation. Fourth, 
financiers’ pressure for short-term gains results in rising importance and value 
of stock option plans for executives. CEO to average pay is an indicator for 
this (Gospel & Pendleton 2003) This is a useful framework for anticipating 
how finance and corporate governance changes may impact labor relations. 
The time period selected covers the years 1995 through 2013, thus including 
not only the GFC, but also the more cyclical dot-com bubble and ensuing 
early 2000s recession. The dot-com crash affected the US more than 
European countries; the US was in recession between March and November 
2001 (National Bureau of Economic Research 2012), while Germany and 
Switzerland saw quarterly GDP contraction between mid-2002 and mid-2003 
(OECD 2012). The UK avoided recession during this period. The second 
major event in the time period covered is the GFC, with the crisis years 
defined as 2008 and 2009, when all four countries experienced negative 
quarterly GDP growth (OECD 2012). Consequently, the post-crisis years are 
2010 to 2013. Arguably, this is a rather short post-crisis period to study. 
However, with high political salience a generally fleeting phenomenon and 
public and corporate mood returning to ‘business as usual,’ seeds for change, 
if they exist, will largely have been sown in the four post-GFC years. 
The overarching method of enquiry is a narrative account comparing and 
contrasting changes in the three levels of analysis: corporate practice, law and 
regulation, and public discourse. Along the ‘triangle of institutional change’ 
sketched out in the literature review, three relationships these dimensions are 
examined:  
(1) corporate practice and public discourse; 
(2) firm-level processes of change; and  
(3) corporate practice and legal change.  
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Each of these three relationships requires a different approach, based on the 
research questions being asked, specificity of prior expectations, and type of 
data used. The central point of reference for each of the three relationships of 
interest are corporate practices, which are measured quantitatively for a 
sample of the largest 130-odd publicly listed companies in each of the four 
countries. To estimate the relationship between these measures of corporate 
practice and public discourse, measured as newspaper coverage of related 
issues, a panel regression analysis approach is used. Testing for processes of 
mimetic isomorphism shifting firm practices in times of crisis is accomplished 
using analysis of variance (ANOVA). Finally, the relationship between firm-
level change in practices and legal or regulatory change is analyzed using a 
qualitative, narrative-based approach as is common in comparative political 
economy. In summary, this study employs an eclectic approach towards its 
overarching goal to deepen our understanding of bottom-up change 
processes, following Langley’s (1999, p.708) advice that “we should not have 
to be shy about mobilizing both inductive (data-driven) approaches and 
deductive (theory-driven) approaches iteratively or simultaneously as 
inspiration guides us.” 
Due to their relevance to each of the three relationships of interest, this 
chapter will first discuss how corporate practices are measured. Then, the 
specific techniques used to estimate each of the three relationships of 
interest—corporate practice and public discourse, firm-level processes of 
change driven by mimetic isomorphism, and corporate practice and legal 
change—will be discussed. 
3.2 Measures of Corporate Practice 
Corporate practices are measured through a series of quantitative indicators 
across the three institutional spheres of finance & accounting, corporate 
governance, and labor relations. The measures in the finance & accounting 
sphere are concerned with risk-taking behavior, with some measures related 
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to the Basel II and III accords and hence only applicable to banks, while 
others are more general indicators of risk-taking, such as debt-equity ratio and 
financial leverage. This sphere also includes two measures of accountability 
and transparency. Measures of corporate governance can be subdivided into 
four themes: ownership structure, shareholder orientation, board of directors, 
and executive pay. Labor relations are measured through employment level, 
average pay, and labor disputes. 
3.2.1 Sample Composition 
The sample is a balanced panel consisting of the roughly 130 largest listed 
companies by market capitalization in each of the four countries, including 
financial and non-financial firms. A panel rather than repeated cross-section 
time series was chosen in order to track companies over time, especially 
throughout the crisis. While this approach introduces a survivor bias—both 
by necessity and by database limitations—it is not consequential, given the 
need to observe pre- and post-crisis. Rather than defining the panel 
composition a priori, the panel was constructed by querying Thomson One 
Banker for the largest 150 publicly traded firms in 1995, 2003 and 2012, and 
including all companies that are in the list in at least two of the three years. 
This results in a panel of about 100 non-financial and 30 financial firms per 
country, however there is some variation in panel size and composition across 




Figure 2: Sample Composition by Country and Sector 
The ratio of financial to non-financial firms in the panel is about 1 to 4, which 
is roughly in line with the ratio of GDP contributed by the financial sector to 
GDP contributed by the non-financial sector in three of the four countries. In 
Switzerland, 75% of GDP in 2012 was contributed by non-financials and 10% 
by financial corporations, which is a ratio of about 1 to 7 (Swiss Federal 
Statistical Office 2015). Similarly, in the UK non-financials generated 52% of 
GDP, while financials generated 8% of GDP, which is also a ratio of about 1 
to 7 (Office for National Statistics 2013 Table A). The US has the largest 
financial sector in relation to the non-financial sector—here, 67% of GDP in 
2012 was generated by non-financial firms and 20% by financial firms, which 
is a ratio of about 1 to 3 (U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 2014 Table 5). 
Germany’s financial sector is the smallest of the four countries, with 82% of 
GDP in 2012 generated by non-financial firms and 4% by financial firms, 
resulting in a ratio of 1 to 20 (Statistisches Bundesamt 2014). Hence, the 
German panel overstates the importance of financial firms for the economy 
as a whole. However, keeping in mind that the German panel composition 
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also came about ‘naturally’ through the aforementioned process, it reflects the 
more finance-heavy orientation of Germany’s largest corporations compared 
to the more manufacturing-centered Mittelstand.  
3.2.2 Data Sources 
The main data sources for the firm-level measures are a number of major 
finance and accounting databases: Bureau van Dijk’s OSIRIS, Thomson 
Reuters Datastream, Thomson Reuters Eikon, and the corporate 
governance-focused BoardEx, along with other more specialist sources as 
listed for each variable below. Given the differences in coverage between these 
databases, data from different sources is combined to increase completeness 
of the dataset. This raises questions, however, over the compatibility of 
company financial data from different sources and whether the resulting 
combined dataset is reliable. 
Comparing coverage and content of six major financial databases, including 
Datastream, Worldscope, and Thomson Financial, Alves et al (2007) find 
most issues can be avoided by using matched samples—which is the case in 
this study. For matched samples, they find no differences between delivery 
platforms, i.e. Worldscope data downloaded from Thomson One Banker or 
Datastream is consistent, however, they do find some between the underlying 
databases, specifically between Worldscope and Extel. These differences are 
attributed to Worldscope’s method of standardizing their data to compensate 
for different accounting standards, while Extel and Datastream Company 
Accounts Archive report data ‘as-is,’ i.e. as reported in local accounting 
standards. Lara et al (2006) draw very similar conclusions, finding that 
differences between finance and accounting databases disappear almost 
entirely when using matched samples. 
For this study, a number of measures were taken to mitigate potential issues 
around data reliability. First, the sample constituents were defined at the 
outset and data collected for these specific companies. Potential issues arising 
from unmatched samples therefore are mitigated through this method. 
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Second, reliance on Worldscope data is reduced as far as possible in order to 
use primarily as-is reported data. Third, ratios, percentages and other 
variables requiring calculations were made using data from a single source as 
far as possible. Finally, random samples of data were cross-checked with 
annual reports in order to ascertain the accuracy of data obtained from the 
financial databases. 
3.2.3 Firm-Level Measures 
A total of 25 variables are used to measure corporate practices across the three 
institutional spheres of finance and accounting, corporate governance, and 
labor relations. The measures chosen are generally related to major legal or 
regulatory changes, behaviors associated with contributing to the GFC, or are 
practices with high signaling value of ‘good’ corporate behavior. To large 
extent, the variables draw on the literature’s approach to measuring leverage 
(Welch 2010; Welch 2011), shareholder orientation (Hall & Gingerich 2004; 
Hall & Gingerich 2009), and corporate governance (Höpner 2003; Schnyder 
2012a). Some measures are more novel in their use for this purpose, such as 
the Basel Accord-related measures of bank capitalization. The following table 
gives an overview of all firm-level measures, as well as the public discourse 











Finance & Accounting Risk-taking behavior 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
banks only 
S01, S02 
Finance & Accounting Risk-taking behavior 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio 
banks only 
S01, S02 
Finance & Accounting Risk-taking behavior 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 
banks only 
S01, S02 
Finance & Accounting Risk-taking behavior 1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio S01, S02 
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Finance & Accounting Risk-taking behavior 1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio S01, S02 
Finance & Accounting Risk-taking behavior 1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage S01, S02 
Finance & Accounting Accountability & 
Transparency 
1.4.0 Auditor Change 
dummy variable 
S03, S03Alt 
Corporate Governance Shareholder Orien-
tation 
2.3.0 Shareholder Rights (1S1V) 
dummy variable 
S08 
Corporate Governance Shareholder Orien-
tation 




Corporate Governance Shareholder Orien-
tation 




Corporate Governance Shareholder Orien-
tation 




Corporate Governance Shareholder Orien-
tation 




Corporate Governance Shareholder Orien-
tation 




Corporate Governance Shareholder Orien-
tation 




Corporate Governance Board of Directors 2.5.0 Board Size 
number of board members 
S10, S11 
Corporate Governance Board of Directors 2.5.1 CEO on Board 
dummy variable 
S10, S11 
Corporate Governance Board of Directors 2.5.2 CEO-Chairman Combined Role 
dummy variable 
S10, S11 
Corporate Governance Board of Directors 2.5.3 Non-Executive Directors 
percentage 
S10, S11 
Corporate Governance Board of Directors 2.5.4 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
percentage 
S10, S11 
Corporate Governance Board of Directors 2.5.5 Female Directors 
percentage 
S10, S11 
Corporate Governance Executive Pay 2.6.0 Total Executive Pay 
th USD 
S09, S12 





Corporate Governance Executive Pay 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio S09, S12 
Labor Relations Employment & Pay 3.1.0 Employment Level 
number of employees 
S09, S13 
Labor Relations Employment & Pay 3.2.0 Average Wage 
th USD 
S09, S13 
Table 2: Measures of Corporate Practice 
 
3.2.3.1 Finance & Accounting 
The institutional sphere of finance and accounting encompasses two sub-issue 
areas: risk-taking behavior, and accountability and transparency. 
3.2.3.1.1 Risk-Taking Behavior 
1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
Tier 1 common equity is the highest quality capital banks hold, which in this 
measure is placed in relation to the bank’s risk exposure. A higher ratio 
indicates a lower risk of not being able to absorb losses. As the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision explains, “it is critical that banks’ risk 
exposures are backed by a high quality capital base. The crisis demonstrated 
that credit losses and write-downs come out of retained earnings, which is part 
of banks’ tangible common equity base” (2011, p.2). Risk exposure is 
expressed by risk weighing the bank’s assets. As banks receive deposits from 
customers, they make decisions on how to invest them. If they hold it as cash, 
it receives a 0% risk weighting; if they loan it out to customers, it can be risk-
weighted at up to 100% of face value. Thus, the riskier their investments, the 
higher the risk-weighted assets figure, pushing the tier 1 capital ratio down. 
Consequently, banks either need to hold more tier 1 capital, or reduce the 
riskiness of their assets in order to increase their tier 1 capital ratio.  
Tier 1 capital ratio is one of the key measures in the Basel III accord, setting 
the minimum at 6.0%. This measure has a phase-in period of three years, 
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requiring 4.5% from 2013, 5.5% from 2014, and the full 6.0% from 2015. By 
comparison, Basel I and II required a minimum of 4% on this measure. While 
the regulatory minimums have risen over the years, real-world tier 1 
capitalization tends to be much higher still, with investors often requiring 1.5 
to 2 times the regulatory minimum, i.e. 9.0% to 12.0% at the current level. 
1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio therefore has two important roles, first as a clear 
regulatory target that may produce anticipatory effects on the firm level, and 
second as an important signaling mechanism to regulators and investors. 
1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio is calculated as (common equity tier 1 + additional tier 1 
capital) / risk-weighted assets, in line with the Basel Committee’s definition (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2011, p.15). Data for this variable comes 
from OSIRIS, Datastream, and company annual reports. 
 
1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio 
A wider measure of bank capitalization than 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio, this 
variable also includes tier 2 capital, a supplementary type of capital that is also 
an important part of a bank’s capital base. As in the previous measure, assets 
are risk-weighted and a higher value indicates lower risk. 
The regulatory requirement for banks is 8.0% under Basel III, which is 
unchanged from the Basel II rules (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2006). Hence, this measure does not carry regulatory pressure around the 
GFC, but banks may still seek to increase their total capital ratio as a 
preemptive measure or signal to regulators and investors. Data sources are 
OSIRIS, Datastream, and company annual reports. 
1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio is calculated as (tier 1 capital + tier 2 capital) / risk-weighted 






1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 
An important new measure in the Basel III accord, 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 
is a similar bank capitalization measure to 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio, but uses a 
different denominator—here, assets are not risk-weighted. Higher values 
indicate lower risk. 
Basel III mandates a minimum of 3.0%, but sets higher requirements for 
systemically important banks. As part of the US implementation of the Basel 
accords, the US Federal Reserve mandates 6.0% for 8 systemically important 
banks, as announced in July 2013. This is a new measure currently 
implemented on a trial basis until full implementation in 2018. We may thus 
expect some anticipatory effects on the firm level as banks begin to adjust in 
advance of the implementation date. 
1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio is calculated as tier 1 capital / average total consolidated 
assets, in line with the Basel III rules (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2011, p.61). Data sources are OSIRIS, Datastream, and annual reports. 
 
1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio 
Shareholder equity ratio is a more general way of calculating leverage that is 
applicable not only to banks, but any company. In the context of banks, it 
benefits from much better data availability than the more recent and narrow 
Basel III-related measures. It is also one of the standard ratios reported by US 
banks, highlighting the broad acceptance and utility of this measure. The 
shareholder equity ratio expresses what percentage of total assets shareholders 
would have a residual claim on in the event of a liquidation of the company, 
as assets would first be used to serve claims from creditors, then from 
shareholders. A higher value thus indicates lower risk for investors. 
Regulatory capitalization requirements use the more specific measures 
described previously, making 1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio not a direct 
regulatory target. However, with its simplicity and ubiquity, it is nevertheless 
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a useful measure of corporate capitalization that may show overall trends in 
corporate risk-taking behavior. 
1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio is calculated as shareholder equity / total assets. Data 
sources are OSIRIS and Datastream. 
 
1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio 
The financial debt-equity ratio measures financing preferences, i.e. debt vs. 
equity. In a crisis situation, however, both sources of financing may dry up, so 
in those circumstances it may not reflect choice as much as availability. The 
variable usually takes values between 0 and 1, with higher values indicating 
higher reliance on debt, which is associated with higher risk. Values above 1 
are possible, but indicate that the company has higher financial debt than it 
has equity, which is a red flag that it could be at risk of not being able to service 
its debt.  
Following Welch’s (2011) approach, 1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio is 
calculated as financial debt / (financial debt + equity). The exact definition of the 
items used in the calculation varies by sector due to different accounting 
methods. For industrials, financial debt is calculated as the sum of OSIRIS 
items ‘Loans’ and ‘Long Term Debt’. OSIRIS item ‘Other’, which is in the 
current liabilities section of the balance sheet, is assumed not to contain 
financial debt items. However, it may well do so in form of derivatives, leases, 
etc., but there is no way of knowing based on the databases’ publicly available 
information. Hence, the narrower definition above, which is known to only 
contain financial debt items, is used, rather than a broader definition that may 
include other non-financial debt items as well. OSIRIS variable ‘Shareholders 
Funds’ is used for equity. For banks, financial debt is the sum of OSIRIS items 
‘Deposits & Short Term Funding’ and ‘Other interest bearing liabilities’. For 
insurance companies, the financial debt-to-capital ratio could not be 





1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage 
This variable, which is also known as total liabilities-to-assets ratio, is closely 
related to the previous measure, both conceptually and mathematically. The 
enumerator in 1.2.1 is financial debt, which is part of total liabilities, the 
enumerator in 1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage. Hence, 1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage has 
a wider definition and treats financial and non-financial liabilities alike. It 
would therefore falsely indicate increased reliance on debt when a company’s 
liabilities increase for other reasons, such as maximizing working capital 
through paying their suppliers later. This would be particularly likely in a crisis 
situation, when companies may experience a cash flow crunch. Despite this 
shortcoming, the straightforward calculation of this measure results in much 
better data availability and better comparability across accounting standards 
and sectors. Values of 1.2.2 usually range between 0 and 1, with higher values 
indicating higher reliance on debt and thus higher risk. Values above 1 are 
possible, but imply that the company has negative net worth and is technically 
insolvent. 
1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage is calculated as total liabilities / total assets, following 
Welch’s approach (2011). Data comes from OSIRIS. 
 
3.2.3.1.2 Accountability & Transparency 
1.4.0 Auditor Change 
This indicator variable shows when companies change their auditor. Large 
companies often have long-standing business relationships with their auditors, 
sometimes lasting decades. These relationships have been described as ‘too 
cozy’ and potentially harming the objectivity and thoroughness of audits, 
leading some to blame auditing firms for failing to foresee the bank failures of 
the GFC.  
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The relationship between corporations and their auditors became a target for 
regulatory action fairly soon after the GFC. The EU first announced its 
intention to enforce auditor rotation in late 2011 in order to improve audit 
quality (Barker & A. Jones 2011). These early proposals also threatened a 
break-up of the big four auditing firms, which was later dropped. They should 
therefore be seen as a very strong signal for corporate change. In late 2013, 
the EU’s regulation efforts became more concrete, requiring auditor rotation 
after 10 years. If put out to tender, the client may choose the same auditor for 
a further 10 years, hence allowing a total of 20 years with the same auditor 
(Fleming 2013). The reforms have to be ratified still and are not expected to 
come into effect before 2016. With regulation a virtual certainty, some firms 
may have already started changing their behavior in anticipation (Fleming & 
A. Smith 2014), perhaps to signal their prudence and accountability to 
investors and regulators, making 1.4.0 Auditor Change a good measure of 
anticipatory and preemptive firm-level change. 
1.4.0 Auditor Change takes the value 1 in years when companies change their 
auditing firm, and 0 in years when they do not. Data for this variable is from 
Thomson Reuters Eikon, but was recoded to take historic mergers and 
renaming of audit firms into account. For instance, a company having 
Coopers & Lybrand as their auditor in one year, and PricewaterhouseCoopers 
in the next was not coded as an auditor change.  
 
3.2.3.2 Corporate Governance 
The measures of corporate governance practices are divided into three sub-
issue areas: shareholder orientation, the board of directors, and executive pay. 
3.2.3.2.1 Shareholder Orientation 
2.3.0 Shareholder Rights (1S1V) 
A measure for shareholder rights, this dummy variable indicates whether the 
company has a unitary share structure or uses any control enhancing 
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mechanisms that distort control and cash flow rights. 
Shareholder rights are a recurring corporate governance issue, with 
companies under increasing pressure to abandon dual class share structures. 
Deviations from the ‘one-share-one-vote’ principle (1S1V) are mostly used to 
give insiders, such as founding families or local governments, control rights 
disproportionately higher than their cash flow rights. Such distortions are 
more common in continental Europe, but companies there are also moving 
towards 1S1V. Cuomo (2013) shows that higher legal protection of minority 
shareholders is associated with lower use of control enhancing mechanisms on 
the firm level and in turn more dispersed ownership. 
2.3.0 Shareholder Rights (1S1V) is coded as 1 if there is only a single share type 
present, and 0 if there is any type of voting right distortion such as preference 
shares or different types of common stock. This is notably different from some 
definitions of dual class share structures, which would only consider 
distortions among common stock and would hence not see preference shares 
as a deviation from 1S1V. Data for this variables comes from Datastream for 
2002-2013, Faccio & Lang (2002) for European companies in 1996, and 
Gompers et al (2010) for American companies in 1995-2006. To fill gaps in 
the data, additional data was collected from annual reports. 
 
2.4.1 - 2.4.7 Net Value Added Distribution 
Variable 2.4.1 measures net value added (NVA) generated by corporations, 
with subsequent variables (2.4.2 - 2.4.7) measuring its distribution among 
various stakeholder groups (shareholders, creditors, employees, state, 
company).  
NVA distribution shows the relative importance of those stakeholders within 
the company and how those priorities change over time. Crucially, it can also 
reveal who bears the brunt of economic downturns and who gains during 
upturns. NVA distribution likely varies between sectors due to labor intensity 
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and other requirements, but should reveal both national differences and 
changes over time. 
The method used to calculate 2.4.1 Net Value Added broadly follows Beyer and 
Hassel’s (2002) and De Jong’s (De Jong 1997) approach, albeit with some 
simplifications to allow better comparability across countries. 
For industrials, NVA is calculated as: 
Revenue 
+ Financial Revenue 
- Material Costs (or Cost of Goods Sold + Salaries Expense) 
- Depreciation, Depletion and Amortization Expense 
= Net Value Added 
For banks, it is calculated as: 
Net Interest Income 
+  Other Income 
+ Total Interest Expense 
+ Salaries & Benefits  
- Overheads 
= Net Value Added 
For insurance companies, absent any detailed income statement items, it is 
approximated using ‘pre-tax profit’. 
NVA distribution is then calculated by dividing the income statement items 
associated with each stakeholder group by NVA, to obtain the percentages of 
NVA paid to the various groups: 
2.4.2 NVA to Shareholders: cash dividends paid 
2.4.3 NVA to Employees: total wage bill (includes executives) 
2.4.5 NVA to the State: taxes paid 
2.4.6 NVA to Creditors: interest paid 
2.4.7 NVA to the Company: residual category 
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As US firms are not required to disclose their wage bill, methodological 
adaptations had to be made for US firms. The wage bill was substituted for 
the profit and loss account line item ‘selling, general and administrative costs;’ 
besides salaries, this figure also includes other costs such as utility bills, rent, 
building upkeep, and thus overestimates returns to employees. Data for NVA 
calculation and its distribution among stakeholders is from OSIRIS and 
Datastream. 
 
3.2.3.2.2 Board of Directors 
2.5.0 Board Size 
This variable measures board size as the total number of board members. In 
countries with mandatory (Germany) or optional (Switzerland) two-tier board 
structure the number refers to the total number of directors on both tiers, i.e. 
supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and executive board (Vorstand). 
With increasing pressure on corporations to provide ‘good’ corporate 
governance, board composition is also under increasing investor and public 
scrutiny. One facet of this is board size, with studies generally finding a board 
with around 10 members to be the most effective and conducive size to high 
performance (Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Eversheds LLP 2013). In most cases, this 
translates into reductions of board size for in order to signal good corporate 
governance practices. 
Data for variable 2.5.0 is from BoardEx for 2002 - 2012, Datastream, and 
Stock Exchange Yearbooks via the Law & Agency dataset (Schnyder & Kern 
2015). 
 
2.5.1 CEO on Board 
This dummy variable indicates whether the CEO is a board member (in any 
role). It is coded as 1 if the CEO is a board member, 0 if not. In Germany, 
the two-tier board system forces a strict separation of managerial and 
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supervisory functions, i.e. the CEO (Vorstandsvorsitzender) is not permitted 
to be on the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). 2.5.1 is thus a structural 0 for 
Germany. 
Having the CEO on the board could compromise the board’s function to 
provide impartial oversight or shift the balance towards managerial interests. 
Companies that want to show strong independent oversight may thus choose 
not to have the CEO on the board. 
Data for variable 2.5.1 is from BoardEx for 2002 - 2012, Datastream, and 
Stock Exchange Yearbooks via the Law & Agency dataset (Schnyder & Kern 
2015). 
 
2.5.2 CEO-Chairman Combined Role 
This dummy variable indicates whether the same individual serves 
concurrently as CEO and Chairman of the board. Coded as 1 if the same 
individual fills the CEO and Chairman roles, 0 if not. 
The same individual serving as CEO and Chairman creates potential for 
conflicts of interest and compromises the board’s independence. Separating 
the roles is a way for firms to signal stronger independent oversight. Despite 
the high incidence of combined CEO and Chairman roles in the US, 
corporations are increasingly separating the roles there as pressure to provide 
good corporate governance increases. 
Data for variable 2.5.2 is from BoardEx for 2002 - 2012, Datastream, and 
Stock Exchange Yearbooks via the Law & Agency dataset (Schnyder & Kern 
2015). 
 
2.5.3 Non-Executive Directors 
This variable measures the share of non-executive directors (NEDs) on the 
board of directors in percentage. 
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Non-executive directors perform no managerial roles in the company and are 
also not otherwise employed by the company, giving them a more impartial 
supervisory function than the executive directors serving on the board. While 
not a particularly novel issue in corporate governance, there is still an upward 
trend towards a higher share of non-executive directors in most companies. 
Although a higher share of NEDs is generally seen as providing ‘better’ 
corporate governance, there is a balance to be struck between impartial 
oversight provided by NEDs and the in-depth knowledge of the company 
provided by executive directors, as the UK Corporate Governance Code 
emphasizes (Linklaters LLP 2010). In the German two-tier board system, the 
supervisory board is fully non-executive by law, hence 2.5.3 measures the size 
of supervisory board as a percentage of the combined size of both the 
executive and supervisory board there. 
Data for variable 2.5.3 is from BoardEx for 2002 - 2012, Datastream, and 
Stock Exchange Yearbooks via the Law & Agency dataset (Schnyder & Kern 
2015). 
 
2.5.4 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
This variable measures the share of independent non-executive directors on 
the board of directors in percentage. 
While NEDs are directors not concurrently employed by the company while 
they serve as a director, independent NEDs are usually defined as never 
having been in an employment relationship with the company, not being 
related to a company executive, and not having worked for a key supplier or 
customer. For practical reasons, it is only defined as not having had an 
employment relationship for variable 2.5.4.  
Independent NEDs are seen to provide impartial oversight, free from conflicts 
of interest, overly friendly relationships with management, or vested interests. 
For companies that struggled during a crisis due to excessive risk-taking, 
increasing their share of independent NEDs could be an effective way to 
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improve oversight and signal improved practices to investors and regulators. 
For these reasons and as a fairly recent issue in corporate governance, 
independent NEDs have also become a regulatory target. The 2010 revision 
of the UK Corporate Governance Code, for instance, specifies that at least 
half of the board (and each committee) should consist of independent 
directors, excluding the chairman. It also emphasizes, however, that “the 
board and its committees should include an appropriate balance of skills, 
experience, independence and knowledge of the company” (Linklaters LLP 
2010). In other words, a fully independent board would lack the in-depth 
knowledge of the firm required to provide effective supervision. A higher share 
of independent NEDs is thus generally seen as better, but only up to a point. 
Data for variable 2.5.4 is from BoardEx for 2002 - 2012, and Datastream. 
 
2.5.5 Female Directors 
This variable measures the percentage of board members who are female. 
As a key signal and measure of board diversity, companies are increasingly 
promoting women to the board of directors. Women on the board have been 
part of the post-GFC discourse on how to reduce excessive risk-taking, with 
more gender-balanced boards seen as making ‘better’ and less risky decisions 
(Davies 2011). This issue is therefore included here as a current facet of the 
corporate governance debate, and for its ability to act as a best practice signal 
to stakeholders. Although none of the four countries in this study have set 
minimum quotas the way Norway has (Bertrand et al. 2014), regulators have 
set their sights on board diversity and are trying to enforce stronger 
commitment to diversity through public disclosure and scrutiny. In the UK, 
the 2012 revision of the Corporate Governance Code requires more extensive 
disclosures on board diversity, including diversity targets and measures set by 
the companies (Financial Reporting Council 2012). 




3.2.3.2.3 Executive Pay 
2.6.0 Total Executive Pay 
This variable measures total compensation paid to senior executives, 
including salaries, benefits, and bonuses. 
Executive pay is one of the most contentious issues in corporate governance 
in recent years, pitting strong public sentiment fueled by the GFC against 
managerial self-interest. While not necessarily deemed to have contributed to 
the crisis, excessive executive pay was publicly perceived as improper and 
unethical in a period of bank bailouts and mass layoffs. Furthermore, investors 
may see excessive pay in such circumstances as out of line with share price 
performance and hence poor shareholder value. It is therefore reasonable to 
expect some adjustment in executive pay in times of crisis, whether due to 
shareholder pressure or fear of public outrage. 
Despite considerable public debate on the issue, regulators in the four 
countries have chosen not to implement caps on executive pay, but rather give 
shareholders more power to influence pay practices. Non-binding votes on 
executive pay (“say on pay”) have been mandatory in the UK since 2002 
(Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002). These votes became 
binding in October 2013 (Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013; The 
Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2013). Henceforth, companies are required to 
produce a director’s remuneration policy that needs to be AGM-approved 
every three years. In the US, non-binding votes became mandatory in 2010 
(Dodd-Frank Act).  
Data for variable 2.6.0 is from BoardEx for 2002 - 2012, and Datastream. 
 
2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay 
This variable measures the value of the largest pay package paid to any single 
executive, including salary, benefits, and bonuses. 
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While similar, this measure should offer an interesting comparison to 2.6.0 
Total Executive Pay. The single highest-paid executive, usually the CEO or 
Chairman, may be more susceptible to public and investor pressure on pay 
than the overall executive team due to their visibility. In other words, 
corporate-level adjustments to public pressure or signaling effects may 
manifest themselves on 2.6.1 rather than 2.6.0.  
Data for variable 2.6.1 is from BoardEx for 2002 - 2012, and Datastream. 
 
2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio 
Placing executive pay in industry and company context, this variable 
measures CEO pay as a multiple of average employee pay. Hall and 
Gingerich (2004, p.20) also use the CEO pay ratio as a proxy measure for 
CEO power, arguing that a more powerful CEO can and will extract higher 
rents than a less powerful one. 
While executive pay caps as a multiple of employee pay were mooted in 
places, they were quickly struck down. The perhaps most high-profile case 
was in Switzerland, where a referendum on a proposed CEO pay cap of 12 
times the lowest employee salary was rejected by two-thirds of voters 
(Gemperli 2013). Instead, regulators across Europe and the US focused on 
“say on pay” rules with varying binding power, as discussed for variable 2.6.0.  
 
3.2.3.3 Labor Relations 
Labor relations practices are captured in terms of employment and pay. 
 
3.1.0 Employment Level 
This variable measures employment as the total number of employees, 
including part-time workers on a full-time equivalent basis. 
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As a large expense category in many companies, the wage bill is often a target 
for cuts during economic downturns. As wage cuts are unfeasible and 
unpopular, companies prefer layoffs. These can be expected to be deeper and 
more immediate in the US and UK, where hiring and firing legislation is more 
lenient, and shallower and more delayed in CH and DE, where these rules 
tend to be stricter. Furthermore, government-funded part-time working 
arrangements (Kurzarbeit) in Germany also enabled companies to forgo 
layoffs during the recession. 
Data sources for 3.1.0 are OSIRIS and Datastream. 
 
3.2.0 Average Wage 
This variable measures average employee pay, on a full-time equivalent basis, 
excluding executive pay. 
Together with the previous variable, this measure indicates shifts in the firm’s 
employment structure. If average wages increase after a reduction in the 
employment level, it is likely that a disproportionate share of low-wage 
workers was laid off, and vice versa. When comparing to executive pay, 3.2.0 
also shows to what extent executives and employees gain and lose during 
economic ups and downs. Kubo (2003) shows that executive and employee 
pay are closely linked together, yet mostly independent from firm 
performance in the Japanese case, while executive pay in the UK is linked to 
firm performance, but not average employee pay. 
Data sources for 3.2.0 are OSIRIS and Datastream. 
3.3 Estimating the Three Relationships of 
Interest 
This study focuses on the three lesser explored relationships on the ‘triangle 
of institutional change’ sketched out previously:  
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(1) the relationship between public discourse and corporate practices, as 
changing discourse may drive changes in corporate behavior; 
(2) the cornerstone of corporate practices to explore how change gains 
‘critical mass’ and establishes new norms of firm behavior; and 
(3) the relationship between corporate practices and the law, in terms of 
how widespread changes in corporate behavior may translate into 
changes in formal institutions.  
3.3.1 Corporate Practice and Public Discourse 
The institutional change literature has struggled with measuring the 
antecedents of change, i.e. the preferences or interests that are generally 
understood to lead policymakers, corporations, and other economic actors to 
change their behavior and consequently their institutional environment. 
Consensus has formed around institutions as shaping and constraining 
preferences, which in turn shape institutions. This inescapably cyclical logic 
has triggered the search for an extraneous variable that can explain changes 
in preferences and ultimately institutions. Constructivist approaches (Blyth 
2002; Schmidt 2010; Hay 2004) argue that ideas are this lynchpin. Here, 
preferences are linked to ideas, the former being derived from the latter. Ideas 
can be thought of as basic conceptions of how, for instance, the economy or 
the political system work and how they should work. Preferences are formed 
based on these ideas and the goals the firm wants to realize. Ideas are less 
internalized than preferences, and formed much more through public 
discourse, making discourse a useful proxy measure for underlying ideas as 
public antecedents of institutional change. 
The role of public discourse in institutional change processes has received 
some attention in ‘top-down’ conceptions of change, whereby formal 
institutions are created and changed in the party political arena and then 
mostly followed by corporate actors. Culpepper (2011) shows that in top-down 
processes, the power of businesses in influencing policymaking declines as 
political salience of an issue rises. Political salience is a widely-used measure 
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of public discourse in political science and political economy that quantifies 
the level of exposure an issue receives in the mass media, the underlying 
assumption being that policymakers are more likely to act upon issues that 
receive high levels of exposure than those that are more obscure.  
While there has been much less focus on public discourse in ‘bottom-up’ 
processes of change that affect institutions through corporate practices, we 
may expect public discourse to also play an important role here—as a driver 
of change in corporate practice and thus antecedent of bottom-up change. As 
this link has not been an area of intense focus in the institutional change 
literature, an inductive, data-driven approach will be pursued here to explore 
the following: 
(1) the extent to which corporate practice is related to public discourse 
depending on the issue; and 
(2) how this relationship is institutionally mediated.  
The literature offered some points of departure to form expectations on both 
issues, as discussed in the literature review. 
In order to address these questions, panel regression analysis will be used to 
estimate the relationship between public discourse and corporate practice. 
The next section discusses how public discourse is measured, before the 
following section discusses the panel regression methods employed. 
3.3.1.1 Political Salience as a Measure of Public Discourse 
Public discourse is measured through issue salience, following the approach 
of Culpepper (2011), Jones and Baumgartner (2005) and Smith (2000), which 
measures the number of articles found in national newspapers for a given set 
of keywords. While political salience is a fairly coarse measure of public 
discourse—it only captures the level of discourse, not the content or context 
of what is being discussed—this methodology of using media coverage has 
been found to be more robust and appropriate for measuring salience 
amongst elites, such as policymakers and managers, than using public opinion 
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polls (Epstein & Segal 2000). It stands to reason that most newspaper articles 
report what is considered newsworthy and thus out of the ordinary, making it 
likely that most coverage is negative in nature. For example, there is little 
reason to report on a corporation’s executive pay practices unless the 
remuneration package is deemed extraordinary, which most likely means that 
it was unusually high. However, there may well be gradations to negativity 
and public outrage, or indeed cases of positive coverage. In other words, the 
tone of public discourse may well change on an issue and it would be 
reasonable to think that it influences whether and in what way discourse 
affects corporate practice. While measuring the tone of public discourse is 
beyond the scope of this study due to the extensive manual data collection 
required, future research could build on the content analysis approach of 
Tetlock (2007) and Tetlock et al (2008). This involves full-text articles to be 
analyzed for the occurrence of positive or negative words using dictionaries 
created for this purpose by Loughran & McDonald (2011). Such analysis 
could add further granularity to the discourse measure used here. 
A total of 10 discourse measures are used in this study, capturing discourse 
related to the three institutional spheres and various sub-issues. The discourse 
measures are constructed to broadly correspond to the measures of corporate 
practice used, but are kept mostly unrelated to specific legislation in order to 
capture the various facets of discourse within an issue area over time. The 
table listing all firm-level variables in the previous section denotes which 
discourse measures are associated with which corporate practice measures. 
Each discourse measure is essentially a unique search string of keywords 
associated with the issue area. Relevant keywords are defined through an 
inductive, iterative process. This process starts with common terms used for 
the issue areas in question, retrieving and reading articles to make sure that 
the most appropriate and common keywords are being used. Country-specific 
differences in language are taken into consideration, e.g. “Managergehälter” 
in Germany and “Managersalär” in Switzerland. The following two tables list 




Search ID Issue Area Search String (Factiva, English) 
S01 Banking Regulation ((bank* OR financial) /N3/ (regulat* OR rules OR supervis*)) OR 
Basel II OR Basel III 
S02 Risk-Taking Behavior (bank* OR compan* OR firm*) /N10/ (risk taking OR risk-taking OR 
capital ratio) 
S03 Auditor Change ((big four OR auditor OR accounting firm OR accountancy firm OR 
audit company OR audit firm OR auditing company OR auditing firm) 
/N10/ (change OR quality OR rotation OR reliab* OR independen* 
OR accountab* OR responsib*)) 
S03Alt Big Four Accounting Firms ((big four /N3/ (accountancy OR accounting OR auditing OR audit)) 
OR PWC OR pricewaterhouse cooper OR pricewaterhouse-cooper OR 
deloitte* OR ernst % young OR EY OR E&Y OR KPMG) 
S08 Shareholder Rights (shareholder /N3/ rights OR protection) OR shareholder spring OR 
(activis* /N3/ shareholder) 
S09 Income Inequality ((income OR wage OR social) /N3/ (inequality OR equality OR 
distribution OR gap OR injustice)) OR stakeholder orientation 
S10 Corporate Governance corporate governance OR ((corporate OR company) /N3/ 
stewardship) 
S11 Board of Directors (board of directors OR company board OR (board /N3/ (divers* OR 
wom?n OR female)) OR supervisory director* OR non-executive 
director* OR independent director*) NOT (paid notic$ OR obituar$ OR 
death$) 
S12 Executive Pay ((CEO OR executive) /N3/ (pay OR compensation OR remuneration 
OR salar* OR bonus*)) OR say on pay OR say-on-pay OR 
(shareholder* vot* /N5/ (pay OR remuneration OR compensation)) 
S13 Layoffs layoff? OR job cut* OR (job* /N3/ (cut OR cuts)) OR (hiring /N3/ 
firing) OR (hire /N3/ fire) OR reduncancies 




Search ID Issue Area Search String (Factiva, German) 
S01 Banking Regulation ((bank* OR finanz*) /N3/ (regulier* OR regel* OR aufsicht)) OR 
Basel II OR Basel III 
S02 Risk-Taking Behavior (bank* OR firm* OR unternehmen) /N10/ (risikobereitschaft OR 
risikomanagement OR eigenkapital* OR kapitalisierung) 
S03 Auditor Change ((revisor OR revisionsstelle OR wirtschaftsprüf* OR big four OR big 4) 
/N10/ (ausschreibung OR wechsel OR austausch OR verantwortung 
OR unabhängigkeit OR rotation)) 
S03Alt Big Four Accounting Firms ((big four /N3/ (revisor OR revisionsstelle OR wirtschaftsprüf*)) OR 
PWC OR pricewaterhouse cooper OR pricewaterhouse-cooper OR 
deloitte* OR ernst % young OR EY OR E&Y OR KPMG) 
S08 Shareholder Rights aktionärsrechte OR rechte von aktionären OR aktionärsaktivisten OR 
aktionärsschutz OR anlegerschutz OR aktionärsdemokratie 
S09 Income Inequality soziale ungleichheit OR einkommensungleichkeit OR 
einkommensverteilung OR verteilung von einkommen OR lohnschere 
OR einkommensschere OR ((einkommen OR lohn OR löhne) /N3/ 
(ungleich* OR verteilung OR schere OR unterschied*)) 
S10 Corporate Governance corporate governance 
S11 Board of Directors aufsichtsrat* OR verwaltungsrat* OR frauenquote OR (frau* /N3/ 
(aufsichtsrat* OR verwaltungsrat*)) 
S12 Executive Pay managergehälter OR managersalär OR spitzengehälter OR 
spitzenlöhne OR say on pay OR say-on-pay OR ((gehälter OR salär OR 
vergütung) /N5/ (manager* OR spitzenmanager* OR topmanager* 
OR CEO OR geschäftsführe* OR geschäftsleit* OR firmenchef* OR 
generaldirektor*)) 
S13 Layoffs stellenabbau OR (baut /N5/ stellen ab) OR personalabbau OR (baut 
/N5/ personal ab) OR massenentlassung* OR werksschließung* 
Table 4: Public Discourse Measures (German Search Terms) 
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The search is conducted using one center-left and one center-right national 
quality newspaper in each country, in yearly intervals between 1995 and 
2013, following Culpepper’s (2011) approach to measuring salience. 
Circulation numbers and reputation as a ‘paper of record’ were the most 
important selection criteria, however data coverage and availability also had 
to be taken into account. The newspapers chosen for the US are The New York 
Times and The Wall Street Journal (Culpepper 2011), for the UK The Guardian 
and The Times (see Kriesi 2008), for Germany Süddeutsche Zeitung and Die Welt 
(see Eilders 2002), and for Switzerland Der Tages-Anzeiger and Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung (see Kriesi 2008). 
Two databases are used to collect data: Nexis and Factiva. While using the 
same database for all searches would be preferable for consistency, neither of 
the two has sufficient coverage across all four countries and the required 
newspapers for this to be feasible. However, the search strings were adapted 
to each database’s syntax to yield the closest possible results (NB: the tables 
above show the Factiva search strings only as this was the main database used. 
Nexis search strings differ only in syntax, not content.). The search was 
restricted to headline and body, i.e. excluding the tag sections that often trail 
articles and include terms not actually used in the article. Duplicates were 
removed by each database on moderate similarity. For each search, the 
number of articles found is expressed as a percentage of all articles published, 
to allow comparisons across issues and countries. 
The public discourse measure does not provide firm-level data, which is 
problematic as discourse is unlikely to affect all companies to the same extent. 
Arguably, companies that find themselves in the public spotlight more 
frequently are more susceptible to public discourse, aiming to avoid negative 
coverage. Hence, the public discourse measure is combined with a measure 
of discourse exposure, measured as the percentage of articles published in the 
same newspapers mentioning the company in question. Exposure-adjusted 
public discourse is calculated as follows: 
Exposure-adjusted discourse = issue salience * (1 + (discourse exposure * 10)) 
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While all companies are arguably exposed to salient issues by default, the 
more a company is in the media spotlight, the higher the pressure and 
exposure. The exposure adjustment thus adjusts the salience measure 
upwards, but not downwards. 
As a point of reference for the salience levels of the rather ‘niche’ issues 
examined here, four benchmark measures of issues more relevant to the 
general public were taken. Two political issues were included, one more 
cyclical (presidential election) and one more controversial 
(refugees/immigration), along with two more unique, disaster or scandal-type 
issues (the 9/11 terror attacks, and the Enron scandal). 
 
Figure 3: Salience Benchmarks 
The results show peak salience levels of 4-5% for highly current, disaster or 
scandal-related issues (9/11, Enron), while controversial, but recurring issues 
(refugees/immigration) are in the 2-3% range. The cyclical, political issue of 
presidential elections only exceeds 1% in election years and remains otherwise 
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‘high salience.’ However, issue salience also needs to be assessed within an 
issue, not only between issues—an issue such as corporate risk-taking may 
never approach salience levels of political ‘hot-button’ issues such as 
immigration, but to affected parties, a doubling of salience from, say, 0.2% to 
0.4% may still be perceived as a marked increase. We should therefore not 
rule out that variation within such lower salience issues could still influence 
corporate behavior. 
3.3.1.2 Panel Regression Analysis 
Fixed effect and, where appropriate, random effect panel regression models 
are used to estimate the relationship between public discourse and corporate 
practices. For each country, the firm-level variables discussed previously are 
regressed on the public discourse measures associated with them, as listed 
previously in the section of corporate practice measures. About 24 panel 
regressions are run for each country—the precise number of regressions per 
country varies due to legal constraints, such as mandatory CEO-Chairman 
separation in Germany, that make some variables ‘structural zeros’ in certain 
cases. Taken together, this results in a total of 94 regression models.  
For all regressions, the discourse measures are lagged by one year in order to 
mitigate the problem of directionality—a significant relationship between the 
unlagged public discourse measures and the firm-level measures would not 
provide evidence of the direction, i.e. newspapers could be reporting on 
corporate practice. With increasingly short news-cycles, one year is deemed 
an appropriate lag time to ensure that any statistically significant relationships 
found are most likely to indicate corporate practice following discourse, rather 
than the other way around.  
Given the 19-year time period covered as well as the presence of two major 
crises within this period—the dot-com crash and the GFC—require to control 
for these events and other year-specific characteristics. Year dummies are used 
for this purpose. Additional controls were included for firm performance using 
return on assets (ROA) and firm size using market capitalization. 
Methodology 
122 
Implausible outliers were removed across the dataset, including ownership 
figures below 0% and above 100%, or ratios that would be indicative of the 
company being insolvent—sometimes these figures can be technically 
accurate, but are often the result of accounting techniques used to account for 
historic losses and not reflective of actual practice. Firm-level variables 2.6.2 
CEO Pay Ratio and 3.2.0 Average Wage were winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percentile levels due to outliers at the extreme ends of the spectrum, following 
the approach of Hellerstein (2008) and Leone et al (2014). 
3.3.1.2.1 Tests 
A series of tests were carried out on the dataset to ensure it meets the 
assumptions of the panel regression models, most importantly for cross-
sectional dependence and unit roots. 
Cross-sectional dependence (CSD) in panel data models is an increasingly 
recognized issue that usually results from common shocks and unobserved 
factors. This is fueled by increasingly interconnected economic, financial, and 
political systems that contribute to similar responses to common shocks (De 
Hoyos & Sarafidis 2006). A recent and widely used test is Pesaran’s (2004) 
cross-sectional dependence test, implemented in Stata as a pre-test by 
Eberhardt’s xtcd program (Eberhardt 2011), and as post-estimation test in the 
xtcsd program (De Hoyos & Sarafidis 2006). Although Pesaran’s (2004) test is 
technically suitable for unbalanced panels and missing values, the not 
randomly-missing nature of missing values in this study’s dataset results in the 
test not running in most cases. However, in all cases where it does run, it 
rejects the null hypothesis of cross-section independence, indicating the need 
to control for CSD in testing for unit roots (stationarity) and the regression 
analysis. 
Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) approach is commonly used to correct the 
standard errors in fixed and random effect panel models when CSD is present. 
This is implemented in Stata by Hoechle’s (2007) xtscc program. A major 
constraint of using Driscoll and Kraay standard errors, however, is the 
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inability to include year dummies in the model. For this reason, the approach 
to controlling for CSD taken in this study is not to use Driscoll and Kraay 
standard errors, but to rely on year dummies, which also control for CSD by 
removing the common impact a specific year has. 
Another important test is for the presence of unit roots, i.e. whether the data 
is stationary. Stationarity is an important assumption of panel regression 
methods, as non-stationary data can easily lead to spurious regression results. 
For this study, Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and the Fisher-type (Choi 2001) 
tests are used for their ability to work on panels that are not strongly balanced 
and, in the Fisher-type case, that have gaps. Both are executed using Stata’s 
xtunitroot command. While these first-generation unit root tests are well-
established, they have only limited capacity to deal with CSD through the 
demean option, which was enabled due to the presence of CSD. 
Lewandowski’s (2006) implementation of a second-generation Im-Pesaran-
Shin test in the pescadf program is better able to account for CSD and therefore 
the preferred method.  
All of the above unit-root tests have the null hypothesis of all panels containing 
a unit root (data in non-stationary); rejection of the null implies that at least a 
fraction of the panels is stationary, although some (but not all) may not be. 
The test does not indicate this fraction or which panels do or do not have unit 
roots. All three test allow to set the lag length of the underlying Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. For the Fisher-type test and second generation Im-
Pesaran-Shin test lag length was set to p=1 and p=2, for the first generation 
Im-Peseran-Shin test the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) was used to 
determine the optimal lag length (pmax=5).  
Not all unit root test could be performed for each variable/country, as the 
tests have only limited capacity to deal with missing values. The IPS test is the 
least flexible in this regard and could therefore only be performed for the most 
complete variables—the discourse measures. As the most flexible test, the 
Fisher-type test was performed for almost all variables/countries. A variable 
was judged stationary where the majority of test outcomes rejected the null 
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hypothesis of all panels containing a unit root (p<0.05). In cases where half of 
the tests suggest stationarity and the other non-stationarity, the latter was 
presumed. Variables found to be non-stationary were used in first difference 
in the regression models. 
Data was not tested for heteroskedasticity, i.e. error terms that do not have 
constant variance. In practice, most data is heteroskedastic and using robust 
standard errors solves the issue without having negative effects in case some 
error terms were constant, i.e. homoskedastic (Stock & Watson 2011). 
3.3.1.2.2 Choice of Model 
Fixed effects models (FE) account for time-invariant unique characteristics of 
panel constituents, i.e. the inherent but unmeasured unique characteristics of 
the firms. It thus allows to control for omitted variable bias and possible 
correlation of these omitted variables with those in the model, making it 
particularly suitable for this study: “Substantively, fixed-effects models are 
designed to study the causes of changes within [an entity]” (Kohler & Kreuter 
2005, p.245). FE models assume correlation between a panel constituent’s 
error term and the predictor (IV) variables and control for this bias by 
removing the effect of those time-invariant unique characteristics of the panel 
constituent (firm in this case). However, it also assumes that those unique 
characteristics are not correlated with the error terms of others. Thus, if error 
terms are correlated, FE is inappropriate and random effects (RE) should be 
used. 
To test for correlation of the error terms and thus help decide between FE 
and RE, a Hausman test is used. The RE model assumes that variation across 
the panel constituents is random and not correlated with the IVs, but to 
influence the DV. The Hausman test has the null hypothesis that the unique 
error terms are not correlated with the IVs, in which case RE would be a more 
efficient and appropriate model. In other words, if the Hausman result is 
statistically significant (p<0.05) we reject the null and the FE model is 
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preferred. Whether FE or RE was chosen is denoted for each regression model 
in the results table. 
3.3.2 Firm-Level Processes of Change and Mimetic 
Isomorphism 
The second empirical focus area is firm-level processes of change, specifically 
in terms of how processes of mimetic isomorphism translate triggers, such as 
major crises and public discourse, into changes in corporate behavior that 
may coalesce into new norms. The literature suggests that crises spread a 
‘great confusion’ of sorts, leaving actors without their usual compass directing 
them on what behaviors are appropriate or even in their interest (Blyth 2002). 
One important way firms regain their footing is through following the lead of 
large, successful companies—role models that are seen as ‘best practice’ 
examples of how to cope with the crisis and the uncertainty surrounding it. 
This process—mimetic isomorphism—reduces uncertainty among actors by 
blending in with others, especially those seen as superior (Scott 1995). While 
companies have been shown to imitate each other’s behavior for legitimacy, 
reduction of uncertainty and taken-for-granted practices even in ‘normal’ 
circumstances (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Westphal & 
Zajac 2001), major crises are likely to accelerate the process due to the 
heightened levels of uncertainty and pressure to change behaviors made 
untenable or undesirable through the crisis. 
Formation of such ’critical mass’ is an important precursor for bottom-up 
change to occur, as it depends on some large and powerful firms or a large 
number of firms to change their behavior, pushing at the boundaries of the 
law and establishing new forms of compliance. Even where these changes in 
practice do not push at the boundaries of the law, but represent a significant 
shift in average behavior within legal boundaries, it could act as an important 
signal towards policymakers and regulators that companies are reacting to a 
crisis and are ‘righting the wrongs.’ The literature review outlined three areas 
of interest with regards to firm-level processes of mimetic isomorphism:  
Methodology 
126 
(1) where and how mimetic isomorphism occurs, i.e. whether it leads to 
initial spread of behavior and subsequent convergence; 
(2) how sectoral differences affect mimetic isomorphism, i.e. whether 
highly internationalized sectors are more likely to exhibit such 
behavior; and  
(3) whether different types of mimetic isomorphism are associated with 
different modes of change in firm practices. 
3.3.2.1 Analysis of Variance 
While many studies of isomorphic processes among organizations use the 
proportion of prior adopters (prior probability) in the organizational field as 
the measure of mimetic isomorphism (Mizruchi & Fein 1999; Han 1994), this 
method is best suited for categorical data, such as whether a certain practice 
has been adopted or not. The measures of corporate practice used in this study 
are mostly continuous, necessitating a different approach. Analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) is therefore used here, building on Kostova and Roth’s (2002) use 
of ANOVA to compare the similarity of institutional systems and Cuomo et 
al’s (2013) use of t-tests to analyze for significant differences in firm behavior 
across time. 
An extension of the t-test, ANOVA compares means within groups with 
means between groups (Field 2013). It is thus used to evaluate whether groups 
become more similar during crisis situations, as would be expected if there is 
mimetic isomorphism at play. If ANOVA produces significant result, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the samples (groups) are drawn from the same 
population or that the differences between the samples are due to chance 
alone. Hence, when p<0.05, we conclude that the groups exhibit significantly 
different practices (Tharenou et al. 2007, p.211). ANOVAs assume that the 
groups being compared come from independent samples that are normally 
distributed with the same variance (Tharenou et al. 2007), however it is also 
a “robust statistical technique, and stands up well to violations of these 
assumptions most of the time” (Dewberry 2004, p.139). To be safe though, 
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Levene’s robust test of homogeneity of variance was performed. Aside from 
the significance tests mentioned above, ANOVAs also produce an F-test. This 
is the ratio of between-group mean square and within-group mean square 
(F=betweengroup/withingroup), therefore the closer F is to 1, the closer to 
each other are the groups (Agresti & Finlay 2009, p.500). Changes in F 
therefore indicate whether groups are becoming more or less similar. This 
forms the basis for interpreting the ANOVA results—groups ceasing to be 
statistically significantly different, or F-test values dropping significantly and 
coming close to 1 is evidence for convergence between the practices of the 
groups compared.  
There are limitations to this approach. For one, convergence between groups 
may not be driven by mimetic isomorphism, but could occur for a number of 
reasons, such as economic circumstances delimiting choice or regulatory 
pressure. In the latter case, the results would be indicative of coercive rather 
than mimetic isomorphism. This is not necessarily a problem, however, as 
such behavior still conforms to patterns we are looking for here: widespread 
change in firm-level behavior in times of major crisis, which may ultimately 
influence legal and regulatory change. Results therefore require careful 
interpretation for alternative explanations; generally, however, convergence 
in times of severe crisis and on a highly salient issue is interpreted as indicating 
mimetic isomorphism. Short of the impossible task of asking companies why 
they change their behavior and whether they consciously imitated their peers’ 
practice, this is arguably an innovative approach to make most of publicly 
available data.  
ANOVAs are performed for each of the firm practice variables discussed 
previously and for each year, to identify patterns across issue areas and time. 
As argued in the literature review, we may expect mimetic isomorphism to 
occur on three levels:  
(1) Within groups, i.e. between small and large firms within the same 
sector. To create these groups, the sample of companies was split in 
half into the smallest and largest 50% of firms by market capitalization 
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in that year, separately for each country, year, and financial and non-
financial firms. This results in eight series of ANOVAs, one for 
financial firms, one for industrial firms in each country.  
(2) Between groups, i.e. between financial and non-financial firms. Four 
series of ANOVAs are run to test for this level of mimetism, one for 
each country.  
(3) International-level mimetic isomorphism between the four countries. 
A single series of ANOVAs tests for this level of mimetism. 
3.3.3 Corporate Practice and Legal Change 
Despite the literature’s increasing recognition of bottom-up change and 
fleshing out of the mechanisms of such change, it has not fully considered 
some important questions on bottom-up change that are of particular 
relevance for a time period that includes two major crises as events of 
uncertainty and potential triggers for corporate-level change:  
(1) How does political salience and public discourse affect bottom-up 
change?  
(2) How does the nature of severe crises impact bottom-up change?  
(3) How does the structure of the political system mediate bottom-up 
change?  
Fundamentally, these three issues are concerned with the conditions under 
which bottom-up change is more or less likely to affect the law. To answer 
these questions, a qualitative, narrative-based approach as is common in 
comparative political economy will be employed, comparing the quantitative 
firm-level data and evidence from the first two empirical chapters on the 
antecedents of bottom-up change to legal and regulatory change. The analysis 
will be based mainly on timing of changes, their directionality, and discussion 
of plausible and likely relationships to find cases of bottom-up change and 
compare them to instances where firm practices had no discernible impact on 
legal change.  
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Timing is used to establish a sequence of events. When there is change on the 
legal and firm practice levels, timing gives a first indication of whether firm 
behavior likely adapted to legal change, or whether legal change may reflect 
a change in firm practices. In other words, timing is an indicator of whether 
change in a certain domain likely occurred top-down or bottom-up. Change 
may, of course, occur on one level only or not at all. The following matrix 
(Schnyder 2012a) summarizes these different possibilities of change on the 
legal and firm levels: 
 
 
 Legal Rules 




Co-evolution or causation 
(compliance or legislation) 
Company-made








Table 5: Types of Change on Legal and Firm Level 
The approach to identifying policy areas to be examined begins with the three 
institutional spheres of finance and accounting, corporate governance, and 
labor relations. The former two spheres are tightly interconnected and have 
taken blame as causal factors in creating the GFC (Gamble 2009; Mayntz 
2012). Bank capitalization, corporate risk-taking behavior, and executive 
compensation are some of the issues that have risen in political salience during 
and after the crisis, creating incentives for policymakers to target these areas 
for reform. Labor and industrial relations are not only tightly connected with 
finance and corporate governance (Gospel & Pendleton 2003), it is also an 
area that bears potential for conflict during times of crisis, when companies 
are under pressure to reduce costs and shed workers. The main focus area is 
corporate governance, due to its crucial role in allocation of responsibility and 
resources within the firm (Gourevitch & Shinn 2005). 
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More specifically, the laws and regulations of interest are those related to the 
institutional sub-issues and measures of corporate practice discussed earlier. 
In terms of risk-taking behavior (variables 1.1.1 - 1.2.2), the Basel Accords, 
separation of retail and investment banking, and other financial market 
reforms are considered. For accountability and transparency (1.4.0), audit 
rotation rules are taken into account. Shareholder orientation (2.3.0 - 2.4.7) is 
linked to voting right distortions and shareholder rights related to proxy voting 
and director nomination and election. Rules on board composition, including 
separation of CEO and Chairman and share of non-executive and 
independent directors, and board diversity relating to quotas for women on 
boards, form the link to firm-level measures on the board of directors (2.5.0 - 
2.5.5). Regarding executive pay (2.6.0 - 2.6.2), ‘say on pay’ rules are taken into 
account. Measures of employment and pay (3.1.0, 3.2.0) are linked to hiring 
and firing rules, regulation of non-traditional forms of employment, such as 
part-time, fixed-term, and zero-hour contracts, and minimum wage 
legislation. 
While the above regulatory issues are the main focus, the net is cast rather 
widely and openly, as functional equivalents of institutions and differently 
unfolding public discourse may lead to different issues becoming targets for 
reform in different countries. While ‘say on pay’, for instance, is a common 
area of policy change across all four countries in the study, other issues are 
more unique to specific countries. The separation of investment and retail 
banking is one such example—it was only mooted in the UK and ultimately 
implemented as ‘ring-fencing,’ while the US made some much more limited 
attempts at containing cross-contamination. The specific issues discussed for 
each country therefore vary slightly. 
Within the above issue areas, federal/national-level laws, regulation set by 
financial market or other industry regulators, and de-facto binding stock 
exchange listing rules are considered. For the three European countries, 
related EU law and regulation is also taken into account. Major policy 
proposals are included in the analysis, even in cases where they do not amount 
to any actual legal changes. Proposals can be important signaling devices, 
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indicating policymakers’ intention to legislate a certain issue and possibly 
compelling firms to change their behavior—as long as the regulatory threat is 
credible, actual change may not be necessary (Milhaupt & Pistor 2008). 
The most important data source for legal and regulatory change are the 
existing academic literature on institutional change, which discusses major 
reforms and its implications. National legislative databases, guides on new 
legislation and regulation published by law firms, and newspaper articles are 
consulted to fill gaps in the coverage in the academic literature. The 
‘leximetrics’ database (Armour et al. 2009; Siems & Deakin 2010) also serves 
as a source for major reforms on shareholder protection and labor protection. 
3.4 Summary and Organization of Empirical 
Chapters 
The mixed methods approach taken in this study aims at investigating the 
‘triangle’ of institutional change, the corner points of which are corporate 
practice, public discourse, and legal change. While previous research has 
investigated the role of public discourse (operationalized as political salience) 
in top-down processes of institutional change, its role in bottom-up processes 
of change has been mostly ignored. Hence, three relationships of interest are 
analyzed here:  
(1) changes in corporate behavior and processes of mimetic isomorphism;  
(2) the relationship between public discourse and corporate practice; and  
(3) the relationship between corporate practice and legal change. 
Corporate practices are therefore the focal point of this study. They are 
measured using quantitative indicators across three institutional spheres 
(finance & accounting, corporate governance, labor & industrial relations) in 
four countries (Switzerland, Germany, United Kingdom, United States) over 
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a 19-year time frame (1995 to 2013). The legal and public discourse 
dimensions reflect the same issue areas, countries, and time frame. 
While the overarching method used for this study is a narrative-based analysis 
incorporating quantitative elements, investigating each of the three 
relationships of interest requires mentioned above requires different methods. 
Generally, the approach to data analysis taken here is exploratory in nature, 
necessitated by the lack of existing in-depth research on many of the 
relationships examined in this study. The relationship between public 
discourse, which is operationalized as political salience and hence draws on 
discourse analysis methods, and corporate behavior is estimated using panel 
data regressions. Changes in corporate practice and whether there are 
processes of mimetic isomorphism at play is analyzed using ANOVAs as well 
as descriptive statistics. Finally, the narrative-based analysis of the relationship 
between corporate practice and legal change draws on timing of changes, 
their directionality, and discussion of plausible and likely relationships. 
The three empirical chapters follow the same structure. The first empirical 
chapter investigates the relationship between political salience and corporate 
practice. The second empirical chapter investigates whether crises trigger 
processes of mimetic isomorphism and to what extent they shift firm behavior. 
In the third empirical chapter, the focus is on the relationship between 
corporate practice and legal or regulatory change. The discussion chapter will 
bring these different relationships together to complete the ‘triangle’ of 
institutional change. 
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4 Corporate Practice and Public 
Discourse 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the relationship between public discourse and 
corporate practice. Public discourse is a readily accessible expression of 
underlying ideas, which are inherently difficult to capture. Analyzing 
discourse around the GFC shows how the crisis is constructed, i.e. to what 
extent it is perceived as related to issues such as banking regulation, risk-taking 
behavior of companies, or corporate governance more generally. The dot-
com crash and associated Enron scandal, for instance, was clearly constructed 
as a crisis of corporate governance and failure of auditing, triggering debate 
on corporate social responsibility. The GFC, on the other hand, was perceived 
as a failure of banking-regulation, excessive risk-taking and executive pay, but 
raised little concern over the role of auditors or corporate governance at large. 
How events like the GFC are constructed through public discourse becomes 
very important if we accept that firms do not operate isolated from such public 
debate, but are exposed to it and at least to some extent reactive to it. In other 
words, public discourse can be an impetus for change in corporate behavior, 
making it a crucial first step in the bottom-up institutional change process. 
Although the link between public discourse and corporate practices has not 
been an area of intense focus in the institutional change literature, it offered 
some points of departure:  
(1) around the role of corporate practices as signaling devices; and 
(2) around the institutional mediation of external pressures. 
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The literature has shown that corporations sometimes adopt practices 
symbolically, but subvert them substantively, in order to respond to 
institutional pressures and signal compliance to other actors (Börsch 2007). 
This phenomenon, termed corporate decoupling, points to the signaling 
power of symbolic corporate practices even when actual practices differ 
(Westphal & Zajac 1994; Westphal & Zajac 2001). Publicly projected 
practices of corporations can thus influence other actors—investors, peers, 
policymakers, or the public—regardless of whether they represent actual 
corporate behavior. This is based on the concept of the ‘loosely coupled 
organization’ (Meyer & Rowan 1977) and offers a basic rationale for 
companies to yield to public debate. While the law defines absolute 
boundaries for what constitutes compliance and legitimate behavior, 
acceptable behavior within those boundaries is socially constructed. As a 
public expression of ideas, discourse reflects changing perceptions of what 
constitutes acceptable compliance and legitimate behavior. We may thus 
expect companies to be generally reactive to public discourse and adjust their 
behavior in order to signal continued compliance and legitimacy. 
We expect the extent to which companies yield to public debate and pressure 
to be mediated by the ability of companies to decouple their practices on the 
issue in question. As argued in the literature review, we may expect the ability 
to decouple practices to be related to an issue’s strategic or operational 
embeddedness within the firm, which can be conceptualized as the extent to 
which an issue structures the company’s relationships with its stakeholders and 
thus influences its strategic and operational capabilities. This conception 
draws on the literature on the ‘dynamic capabilities’ of corporations (Teece et 
al. 1997; Dosi et al. 2001; Whitley 2007). In essence, dynamic capabilities are 
thus concerned with a company’s ability to harness its relationships with 
financiers, owners, suppliers, employees, and other stakeholder groups to 
adapt to changing circumstances and realize new opportunities. 
Consequently, practices that structure these relationships can be seen as 
deeply strategically or operationally embedded—such as providing 
shareholder value in order to secure continued access to capital and finance 
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new projects, or reliance on short-term or zero-hour contracts in order to gain 
staffing flexibility and react to changes in demand. 
Of the issue areas considered here, risk-taking behavior, shareholder 
orientation, and labor relations can be described as deeply embedded issues. 
The first two issues are central to the company’s relationship with investors 
and thus determine future access to capital, while the latter issue area is related 
the company’s ability to recruit and retain appropriately skilled staff and 
maintain employment flexibility. Accountability and transparency, board 
composition, executive pay could be seen as less embedded, as these issues 
have strong external signaling power but more limited impact on the 
company’s stakeholder relationships and thus strategic or operational 
capability.  
Proposition A-1: Higher levels of public discourse are more likely to lead to corporations 
reducing associated controversial practices the less operationally embedded these practices are. 
If we see firms as institutionally embedded (Aguilera & Jackson 2003; Jacoby 
2004), we should also expect the institutional environment to mediate the 
impact of public discourse on corporate practices. We expect higher levels of 
institutionalized coordination to result in public discourse being less likely to 
impact corporate behavior, as firm-level mechanisms of coordination provide 
institutionalized avenues for stakeholders to influence corporate behavior. 
Board-level codetermination and works councils, for instance, allow 
employees to voice their concerns and work out compromises with 
management. Blockholder ownership structures and network reputational 
monitoring, to use a further example, are means for insider owners to wield 
enhanced control over management. In other words, these well-
institutionalized ways for corporations to take the demands of the ‘affected 
public’ into account are alternatives to reacting to public discourse. Drawing 
on Hall and Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of Capitalism framework, we thus 
expect companies in CMEs to display less reactivity to public discourse than 
their counterparts in LMEs, where we expect the lack of coordinating 
institutions to result in firms being more likely to react to public discourse to 
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do what is expected of them. To be sure, stakeholder pressure in CMEs should 
still result in shifts in corporate practice—and the changes in firm-level 
behavior of German firms suggest that they probably do—but the non-public 
expression and enforcement of those demands means that they are not 
captured by the methods adopted in this study. 
Proposition A-2: Higher levels of public discourse are more likely to lead to corporations 
reducing associated controversial practices in LME countries. 
Taken together, we may expect public discourse to exert some influence over 
corporate practices, but this is likely to be mediated by the operational 
embeddedness of the issue in question and the institutional environment. 
Given the lack of in-depth research on the relationship between public 
discourse and firm practices in the institutional change literature, these 
propositions remain fairly broad and a data-driven, inductive approach is 
employed.  
Panel regression analysis is the primary method used to estimate the 
relationship between public discourse and corporate practice. Public 
discourse is measured through issue salience, following the approach of 
Culpepper (2011), Jones and Baumgartner (2005) and Smith (2000), which 
measures the number of articles found in national newspapers for a given set 
of keywords. The terms ‘public discourse,’ ‘salience,’ and ‘press coverage’ are 
thus used interchangeably. Issue salience is unlikely to affect companies 
uniformly, given that some companies find themselves in the public spotlight 
more than others and thus subject to higher pressure. To take this into 
account, salience is interacted with the media exposure of each company. 
Fixed effect and, where appropriate, random effect panel regression models 
are used to analyze the relationship between discourse and practice across a 
number of issues. Discourse data is lagged by one year in order to mitigate the 
problem of directionality. With increasingly short news-cycles, one year is 
deemed an appropriate lag time to ensure that any statistically significant 
relationships found are most likely to indicate corporate practice following 
discourse, rather than the other way around. 
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Propositions A-1 and A-2 are operationalized by regressing public discourse 
measures S01-S13 on each of the corporate practice measures they are 
associated with (as indicated in Table 2: Measures of Corporate Practice). 
Generally, we expect corporate practices to move towards more prudent or 
‘better’ practices as public discourse and hence pressure increase on the issue. 
The discussion of each firm-level measure of corporate practice in the 
methodology chapter indicates what constitutes ‘better’ practice on each 
variable. In summary, however, we expect to find a positive relationship 
between public discourse and risk-taking measures 1.1.1–1.2.0.1 (where 
higher values indicate lower risk) and a negative relationship between 
discourse and risk-taking variable 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 (where lower values indicate 
lower risk). In other words, we expect banks to increase capitalization and 
firms more generally to reduce leverage in face of higher public debate on 
associated issues (S01, S02). For accountability & transparency measure 1.4.0 
we expect a positive relationship, i.e. that firms change auditors more 
frequently in reaction to discourse on related issues (S03, S03Alt). Expectations 
for shareholder value orientation are more complex. On measure 2.3.0 we 
expect to find a positive relationship, which would indicate firms moving 
towards ‘one share one vote’ when public discourse on shareholder rights 
(S08) or corporate governance (S10)  increases. In terms of the distribution of 
net value added (NVA) among various stakeholders (2.4.2-2.4.7), we expect to 
find positive relationships between discourse on S08 and S09 and the share of 
NVA paid to shareholders (2.4.2) and (2.4.6), but negative relationships 
between the same discourse measures and NVA paid to employees (2.4.3), the 
state (2.4.5), and the company (2.4.7). To put it differently, we expect firms to 
give preferential treatment to shareholders and creditors (through higher 
leverage) when the rights of shareholders and corporate governance gain 
salience in public debate, which would come at the cost of distributing less 
NVA to the other groups. We expect to find the opposite directionality of 
effect for each NVA recipient when discourse on income inequality (S09) 
increases. Regarding the board of directors, we expect to find negative 
relationships between discourse (S10 Corporate Governance and S11 Board of 
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Directors) and 2.5.0-2.5.2, and positive relationships between the same 
discourse measures and 2.5.3-2.5.5. This would indicate that firms move 
towards what is generally seen as ‘better’ board governance when discourse 
increases. On the issue of executive pay we expect a negative relationship 
between rising discourse on the issue (S09, S12) and the measures of executive 
pay used (2.6.0-2.6.2), which would indicate that firms reduce executive pay 
in reaction to public outrage over executive remuneration. Finally, on 
employment and pay the expectation is to find a positive relationship between 
public debate (S09, S13) and employment level (3.1.0) and average wage 
(3.2.0). This would suggest that corporations increase employment and 
worker pay when faced with rising public debate on inequality and job losses. 
In order to sustain proposition A-1, we would expect to find statistically 
significant relationships in the directions indicated above for the deeply 
operationally embedded issues of risk-taking behavior, shareholder 
orientation, and labor relations, but not for the remaining, less embedded 
issues. To support proposition A-2, we would expect to find statistically 
significant relationships in the directionality specified in the LME countries 
included here (the US and UK), but much fewer statistically significant results 
for the CME countries (Germany and Switzerland). 
4.2 Results 
About 24 panel regression models were run for each country—the precise 
number of regressions per country varies due to legal constraints such as 
mandatory CEO-Chairman separation in Germany—resulting in a total of 
94 regression models. As these are too numerous to report and discuss on a 
model-by-model basis, the regression results are summarized for each 
institutional sphere and sub-issue, but only discussed in detail where 
statistically significant results were found. A table containing the full 
regression results is included in the appendix. The results can be broken down 
as follows: 




Nr. of regression 
models  
Nr. of significant 
models  
Nr. of significant 
models with 
significant effects 
CH  24 19  4 
DE  22  18  1 
UK  24  21  6 
US  24  19  10 
Table 6: Overview of Panel Regression Results 
The results suggest a limited relationship between public discourse and 
corporate practice in the coordinated countries of Germany and Switzerland, 
where few regression models find statistically significant effects of issue 
salience on corporate practice. A larger effect is evident in the liberal 
economies, where the UK shows six models with statistically significant 
relationships between discourse and corporate practice and particularly in the 
case of the US where 10 regression models find such relationships. From this 
high-level overview alone, the results appear to support proposition A-2, 
suggesting that firms in LMEs are more likely to adjust their practices in 
reaction to public discourse than their peers in CMEs. To explore this point 
in more detail and examine the evidence from the perspective of proposition 
A-1, results for each institutional sphere and associated sub-issues are 
discussed in turn. 
4.2.1 Finance & Accounting 
Businesses’ finance and accounting practices are evaluated in two issue areas: 
risk-taking behavior and accountability & transparency. The former is 
examined through six measures of capitalization and leverage; the latter using 
the measure of auditor. Overall, the results suggest that public discourse 
influences the risk-taking behavior of banks, but in most cases not companies 
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more generally. The accounting and transparency measure included here also 
does not appear to be influenced by public discourse. 
4.2.1.1 Risk-Taking Behavior 
For banks, risk-taking behavior is measured through three capital ratios 
related to the Basel Accords (1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio, 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio, 
and 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio), while all companies are measured on three 
commonly-used leverage ratios (1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio, 1.2.1 Financial 
Debt-Equity Ratio, and 1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage). All firm-level measures were 
regressed on the first two public discourse measures, S01 Banking Regulation and 
S02 Risk-Taking. The former measures discourse related to banking or 
financial regulation as well as the Basel accords, the latter is a broader measure 
of discourse on corporate risk taking.  
 


























1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
CH DE UK US
S01 Banking Regulation
Corporate Practice and Public Discourse 
141 
Discourse on banking regulation (S01) is at relatively low levels of salience for 
the decade of 1995-2006, hovering around 0.25% press coverage in the three 
European countries. In the US, the issue is slightly more salient, starting at 
0.50% in 1995 and reaching about 0.75% in the mid-2000s. Discourse 
increases significantly during the financial crisis, especially in the US where it 
peaks at 3.00% in 2010, but also in Europe where it grows more slowly and 
at lower levels, reaching 0.50%-0.75% in 2010. Discourse continues at this 
level post-crisis in Europe, but falls to just below 2.00% in the US from 2011. 
Banking regulation thus only becomes a very highly salient issue in the US, 
where the GFC and post-crisis levels of salience are comparable to the 
refugee/immigration benchmark issue (see methodology). In Europe the ‘high 
salience’ threshold of 1% is not exceeded at any time, but discourse in the UK 
comes close at the height of the GFC. The issue is therefore best described as 
moderately salient in Europe around the crisis. 
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Although a broader measure conceptually, S02 Risk-Taking Behavior has lower 
levels of press coverage than S01 throughout the entire time period covered. 
Until 2007, there is virtually no discourse on bank or corporate risk-taking in 
the two LMEs and only very low levels in the two CMEs. A distinct uptick in 
discourse is evident around the GFC in all four countries and more 
pronounced in the CMEs and the US than in the UK. The post-crisis years 
show discourse levels roughly halfway between pre-crisis and peak-crisis 
levels. Overall though, risk-taking behavior is a fairly low salience issue, only 
approaching moderate levels of salience in Switzerland and Germany around 
the GFC, comparable to presidential elections in non-election years. 
Comparing the salience measures with each other suggests that the publicly 
perceived issue in the US and UK is banking regulation (S01) in particular, 
with overall risk-taking (S02) as a secondary issue. In the two coordinated 
countries risk-taking behavior and banking regulation are issues of fairly 
similar salience. 
Corporate practice measures 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio and 1.1.2 Total Capital 
Ratio display a strikingly similar pattern to S02. In Germany and Switzerland, 
salience precedes major increases on both measures, implying higher 
capitalization and thus lower risk. In US they are very closely matched, with 
both dimensions peaking in 2009. The UK shows lowest overall salience and 
lowest salience peak during the crisis, despite British banks also being the least 
well-capitalized. However, the UK is also the only country where a significant 
increase in bank capitalization occurs far before a salience peak, and indeed 
before the crisis (increasing between 2006 and 2007 from 8.25% to 12.54%). 
One way of interpreting this is that UK banks were more proactive in 
adjusting their capitalization upwards as they were aware of their 
comparatively low levels of capitalization, while their Swiss and German 
counterparts did not perceive their capital ratios to be inadequate and 
adjusted more reactively. 
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Figure 7: 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio 
For Switzerland, models 1 and 2 find statistically significant relationships 
between discourse and bank capitalization (p<0.01). Increases in discourse on 
banking regulation (S01) are associated with lower tier 1 capitalization of 
banks (1.1.1) and lower total capitalization (1.1.2), while increases in discourse 
on risk-taking (S02) are associated with higher capitalization on both 
measures. One caveat of models 1 and 2 is the inability to include year 
dummies in the regressions, as the small number of observations (banks only) 
would produce unreliable F-test and p statistics with the inclusion of year 
dummies. This applies to all country-specific models that include banks only 
and is noted in the regression results tables.  
As a higher capital ratio indicates better ability to absorb unexpected losses, 
these results suggest that discourse on banking regulation and the Basel 
accords increases risk taking among Swiss banks, while more general discourse 
on the risk-taking behavior of banks and corporations leads to more prudent 
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surprising. One way of interpreting this result could be that discourse specific 
to banking regulation is not seen as a threat by Swiss banks due to their 
comparatively higher levels of capitalization, leading banks to take higher risks 
in order to exploit the associated larger profit potential before legislation 
reduces this leeway and associated profits. Discourse on risk-taking on the 
other hand may lead to more prudent practices among Swiss banks in order 
to protect their reputation as safe havens for international investment 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2014; The Economist 2010)—a public perception of 
reckless risk-taking would be counterproductive to that goal. On measures of 
leverage for all Swiss companies (models 4 to 6) no statistically significant 
relationships between discourse and corporate risk-taking behavior were 
found. 
In the German case none of the risk-taking models (1 to 6) produce statistically 
significant coefficients, despite most models being statistically significant. This 
indicates that neither German banks’ capitalization nor German companies’ 
risk-taking behavior at large are influenced by public discourse. German 
banks are generally well-capitalized, usually only second to Swiss banks, as 
measured by 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio and 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio. In that 
sense, it might not be surprising that German banks may feel little pressure to 
adapt to public debate on banking regulation and risk-taking, and perhaps 
also have less reputational risk compared to Swiss banks. However, German 
companies find themselves at the riskier end of the spectrum in terms of 
leverage, as measured by 1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio and 1.2.2 Balance Sheet 
Leverage—at least from a shareholder perspective. This is reflective of the 
German institutional propensity towards long-term debt-based rather than 
equity-based financing and thus not comparable to the riskier short-term 
loans more common in other countries. Consequently, German companies 
are unlikely to see their levels of leverage as particularly risky, giving them 
little reason to react to public debate on the issue. 
It may also be indicative of a less shareholder-value orientated approach 
among German companies—1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio is a measure of the 
percentage of total assets that shareholders would have a residual claim on in 
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the event of a liquidation of the company, as assets would first be used to serve 
claims from creditors, then from shareholders. A higher figure thus indicates 
lower risk for investors. Throughout the entire time period Germany ranks 
lowest on this measure, with an average leverage ratio of 31.22 compared to 
38.08 average for the other three countries. Although we could expect the 
riskiest country—from the shareholder perspective—to show some reaction 
to discourse on risk-taking, it does not seem to affect German companies’ 
behavior in this regard. The implication may be that providing safer 
investment for shareholders is not a priority for German companies, possibly 
because the limited dependence on stock market financing makes shareholder 
value a secondary objective. 
For the UK, all six regression models are statistically significant at the 1% 
level and two find statistically significant relationships between the IVs and 
DVs. Models 1 and 3 show that increasing growth in discourse on banking 
regulation (S01) is associated with higher tier 1 capitalization (1.1.1) and 
higher leverage ratio (1.2.0), while increasing growth in discourse on risk-
taking (S02) is associated with lower leverage in British banks (1.2.0) (all 
p<0.05 or better). Hence, British banks appear to increase their capitalization 
when discourse on banking regulation rises, which is in the expected 
directionality, but decrease it when discourse on risk-taking increases, which 
is the opposite directionality of Swiss banks’ behavior and indeed our 
expectations. 
While finding Swiss and British banks to be reactive to public discourse in 
terms of their capitalization is generally unexpected, based on proposition A-
1 and the embeddedness of risk-taking behavior, the difference in the 
directionality of the relationship also warrants attention. One explanation for 
this difference could be that the UK and Switzerland find themselves at 
opposite ends of the bank capitalization spectrum, as measured by 1.1.1 Tier 
1 Capital Ratio (banks) and 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio (banks). On both measures, 
Swiss banks are the highest capitalized (18.61 and 21.45, respectively) and 
British banks the lowest (9.90 and 14.47, respectively). The polarization on 
1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio is less extreme, but also shows Swiss banks to be 
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capitalized above the four-country average, while British banks are below. In 
Switzerland, discourse on banking regulation or the Basel accords (S01) may 
highlight how well-capitalized Swiss banks are relative to the requirements 
and their international counterparts, consequently allowing Swiss banks to 
relax their capitalization somewhat in order to reap higher profits. Discourse 
on risk-taking (S02), on the other hand, is toxic to the reputation of Swiss 
banks, as discussed earlier. In the British case, however, discourse on banking 
regulation and the Basel rules (S01) may well highlight the opposite—the 
relatively weak capitalization of UK banks—and hence prompt an upwards 
adjustment to signal proactivity or compliance. As the reputation of British 
banks is not as hinged upon being perceived as a ‘safe haven’ as their Swiss 
counterparts, they are not pressured to yield to public discourse on risk-taking 
(S02) and are free to follow industry trends towards higher risk-taking.  
For the US, all six regression models are statistically significant (p<0.01), but 
a rather different picture emerges than in the other countries. As in Germany, 
public discourse does not appear to affect the risk-taking behavior of banks 
(models 1 to 3), but unlike all other countries there is a statistically significant 
relationship between discourse and the risk-taking behavior of American 
companies at large. Models 4 and 5 indicate that the leveraging of US 
companies becomes riskier as discourse on risk-taking (S02) increases: higher 
growth in discourse is associated with lower growth in 1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity 
Ratio (lower values indicate higher risk) and higher growth in 1.2.1. Financial 
Debt-Equity Ratio (higher values indicate higher risk). This is a surprising 
finding not only because proposition A-1 predicted firms to be unlikely to 
adjust to discourse on risk-taking, but also because the opposite effect would 
be more intuitive—after all, US companies rely heavily on equity-based 
financing and a perception of excessive riskiness might hinder access to 
capital. One way to square this could be that investors in US companies 
actually prefer risk over prudence, as it promises higher short-term returns. In 
other words, moving along with increasing risk-taking among US companies 
may actually be a form of shareholder value and continued access to capital 
in the country’s short-term orientated investment environment. This could be 
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a plausible explanation in light of the literature’s support for the notion that 
ownership impacts corporate behavior, as firms need to cater to the demands 
of their investors (Gospel & Pendleton 2003). 
More generally, the results appear to contradict proposition A-1, which 
expected firms to be less reactive to public discourse on deeply embedded 
issues. We defined risk-taking behavior as strategically and operationally 
embedded, given its role in structuring the firm’s relationship to investors and 
shareholders, and thus future access to capital. Finding Swiss and British 
banks, as well as American companies to be reactive to public discourse is 
therefore unexpected and raises the possibility that risk-taking behavior was 
either misclassified as deeply embedded, or that proposition A-1 is flawed—a 
point to be explored more fully in the discussion. In terms of country patterns, 
two models found evidence for public discourse shaping risk-taking of firms in 
CMEs, while four models did so for LMEs, thus lending support for 
proposition A-2. 
4.2.1.2 Accountability & Transparency 
Accountability and transparency was measured by variable 1.4.0 Auditor 
Change, an indicator variable of whether the company changed its auditor in 
a given year. It was regressed on two discourse measures; S03, which captures 
discourse related to auditor change, audit quality, and audit rotation, and 
S03Alt, a more general measure capturing discourse related to the ‘big four’ 
accounting firms. 
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Figure 8: S03 Auditor Change 
As a rather specific measure, S03 Auditor Change unsurprisingly shows very low 
levels of press coverage. In the three European countries, press coverage stays 
fairly stable throughout the period and remains well below 0.05%—with the 
only exception of an uptick in the UK in 2002. In the US, levels are higher 
overall, but are mostly driven by a significant spike in discourse in 2002, 
driven most likely by the Enron crisis and ensuing introduction, passage, and 
discussion of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. The GFC does not appear to have 
caused a similar upswing in discourse on this measure, but slight increase can 
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Figure 9: S03Alt Big Four Accounting Firms 
A more general measure, S03Alt Big Four Accounting Firms displays higher levels 
of press coverage compared to S03. Around the time of the Enron crisis, the 
issue reaches high salience levels above 1%, comparable to presidential 
elections in an election year. Overall, there is a strong similarity to the 
previous measure in terms of country and time patterns—the pronounced 
Enron/Sarbanes-Oxley uptick in 2002 in the US, lower European levels of 
discourse, and rather limited increases in discourse around the GFC. One 
difference worth noting, though, is that the UK is much closer to the US on 
this measure than to Germany and Switzerland. In fact, discourse in the UK 
overtakes that in the US from 2008 onwards and comes close to the 1% 
threshold we consider highly salient. 
The only model for this sub-issue (1.4.0 Auditor Change) is statistically significant 
for all countries other than the US, but fails to find statistically significant 
relationships between public discourse and firm practices in all cases. This 
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more generally (S03Alt) does not affect whether companies change their 
auditor or not. Given that mandatory audit rotation rules have been mooted 
for years in the US and were recently implemented in the EU, and that we 
deemed accountability and transparency to not be deeply embedded, this 
result runs counter to our expectations and fails to support A-1. 
4.2.2 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance is subdivided into three issue areas: shareholder 
orientation, board of directors, and executive pay. Shareholder orientation is 
assessed in terms of voting right distortions and distribution of net value added 
(NVA) to various stakeholder groups. The board of directors is measured in 
terms of size, separation of functions, and composition. Finally, executive pay 
is measured in absolute terms and as a ratio of average employee pay. 
4.2.2.1 Shareholder Orientation 
Shareholder value orientation is measured in terms of overall shareholder-
friendliness of the company’s share structure (2.3.0 Shareholder Rights) as well as 
the relative importance of various stakeholder groups as measured by the 
distribution of net value added (2.4.2 - 2.4.7). Variable 2.3.0 indicates whether 
the ‘one-share-one-vote’ principle (1S1V) applies to the company’s share 
structure. Voting right distortions are signs of low shareholder value 
orientation, as they generally allow insiders such as founding families to retain 
control disproportionately higher than their holdings. Net value added (NVA) 
distribution is measured in terms of the percentage of NVA paid to five 
stakeholder groups: shareholders in form of cash dividends (2.4.2), employees 
in form of salaries and benefits (2.4.3), the state in form of taxes (2.4.5), 
creditors in form of interest (2.4.6), and the company in form of retained 
earnings (2.4.7). 
Three measures of public discourse are used in this sub-issue. The first 
captures discourse related to shareholder rights, minority shareholder 
protection, and activist shareholders (S08), the second is concerned with 
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income inequality and stakeholder orientation (S09), and the third is about 
corporate governance in general (S10). 
 
Shareholder rights (S08) is a low-salience issue, with press coverage remaining 
below 0.25% throughout the time period. The issue is most salient in the US, 
but closely followed by Germany in the first half of the 2000s. In the UK and 
Switzerland, shareholder rights are very much a non-issue. In all countries 
except Germany, the measure shows an increase in salience beginning in 2011 
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Figure 10: S09 Income Inequality 
Up until the GFC, income inequality (S09) is also a low-profile issue, with 
press coverage under 0.20% and declining from the mid-1990s until the mid-
2000s. Although the four countries are fairly close together up to that point, 
the issue is more salient in the US and UK than in Switzerland and Germany 
throughout the period. The GFC is an obvious turning point for discourse on 
the issue in the US, where press coverage increases from about 0.17% in 2009 
to 0.45% in 2013. It is worth noting, though, that 2012 was a presidential 
election year in the country, with income inequality a frequently discussed 
Democratic Party platform item, which may have driven press coverage. 
While this increase brings the issue close to the salience levels associated with 
presidential elections in non-election years, it remains at much lower levels 
than other political and societal issues, such as refugees and immigration. In 
the other three countries, discourse also increases towards the end of the 
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Figure 11: S10 Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance (S10) is a more salient issue than the previous two. The 
year 2001 marks the issue’s rise from relative obscurity in the late 1990s, when 
press coverage was mostly below 0.20%, into higher salience territory. This is 
unsurprisingly most pronounced in the US, where the Enron scandal and 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act brought corporate governance into a more mainstream 
spotlight, but also cast waves in Europe, where the issue also become 
significantly more salient during the mid-2000s. The issue exceeds the 1% 
high salience threshold only in the US at the peak of the Enron scandal 
though, before trailing off again in the late 2000s, without discernible impact 
of the GFC on corporate governance discourse. This is rather surprising given 
that the GFC can, at least partly, be attributed to excessive risk-taking, which 
in turn can be attributed to failures of corporate governance. Public discourse, 
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In terms of overall shareholder value orientation, as measured by the presence 
of a one-share-one-vote share structure (2.3.0), the regression models are not 
statistically significant in all four cases. 
Distribution of NVA, measuring the relative prioritization of stakeholder 
groups, appears to be related to issue salience in some cases in Switzerland, 
the UK and the US, but not in Germany. All five NVA distribution models 
are statistically significant for Switzerland (p<0.01), however discourse is only 
related to growth in the percentage of NVA paid to the state (2.4.5). Increasing 
salience of shareholder rights (S08) is associated with higher growth in the 
share of NVA going to the state (p<0.05), while increasing salience of income 
inequality (S09) is associated with lower growth of the share going to the state 
(p<0.01). These results run counter to what we expected, evading obvious 
interpretation and indeed requiring caution due to model 11’s low R^2 of 
2.63%. One possible interpretation could be that increasing discourse on 
income inequality is reflective of increasing stratification of salaries within 
Swiss companies, consequently lowering Swiss companies’ payroll tax bills 
and other non-wage labor costs if average pay is decreased. However, data for 
3.2.0 Average Wage shows an overall upwards trend of average wages paid by 
Swiss companies despite some periods of declining pay, making this 
interpretation tenuous.  
In the German case four of five models are statistically significant (p<0.01), 
but none reveal significant relationships between discourse and NVA 
distribution, suggesting that the relative prioritization of various stakeholder 
groups is not related to salience of the issues considered here. 
For the UK, all five models are statistically significant (p<0.01), of which two 
find significant relationships between discourse and NVA distribution. 
Increasing growth in salience of shareholder rights (S08) is linked to a higher 
growth in the share of NVA going to employees (2.4.3), while increasing 
growth in discourse on income inequality (S09) has the opposite effect (p<0.05 
and p<0.01, respectively)—both effects run opposite to what we expected 
based on the assumption that firms would generally yield to public discourse 
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and decrease controversial practices. Although there is no obvious 
interpretation for the former relationship, the latter could indicate that British 
companies either disregard increasing discourse on income inequality, or that 
they see no choice but to follow larger trends in order to remain cost 
competitive by keeping wage costs low. Average wages paid by British 
companies, as measured by 3.2.0, support this interpretation—the UK ranks 
lowest on this measure for the first decade in the time period covered and 
remains low for the second decade. Model 13 shows a statistically significant 
negative relationship (p<0.05) between growth in shareholder rights-related 
discourse (S08) and the share of NVA retained by the company (2.4.7). This 
is in line with our expectations and may indicate that increasing salience of 
shareholder rights translates into firm-level pressure to distribute NVA rather 
than retain it, presumably with preference given to shareholders. However, 
caution is required given that model 9 does not show a statistically significant 
relationship between S08 Shareholder Rights and 2.4.2 Percentage of NVA to 
Shareholders. 
Four of five models are statistically significant for the US (p<0.01), all of which 
find significant relationships between issue salience and distribution of NVA. 
Increasing discourse on shareholder rights (S08) is linked to lower growth in 
the share of NVA paid to shareholders (2.4.2), higher share of NVA paid to 
employees (2.4.3), increased growth in the share of NVA going to the state 
(2.4.5), and lower growth in the share of NVA paid to creditors (2.4.6) (all 
p<0.05 or better). In all four cases the observed directionality of effect is 
opposite to that expected a priori. Interpretation of these results is difficult 
without more nuanced understanding of the content of public discourse on 
shareholder rights and may indeed show the limits of the methodology 
employed here. The more general discourse measure on corporate 
governance (S10) is associated with higher growth in 2.4.2 Percentage of NVA to 
Shareholders and higher growth in 2.4.6 Percentage of NVA to Creditors (both 
p<0.05), which is the directionality we expected to find. In other words, when 
corporate governance increases in salience, companies give shareholders 
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preferential treatment and pay a larger share of NVA to creditors, potentially 
reflecting higher leverage and thus interest payments.  
Excluding the findings related to the US, the results support proposition A-1, 
as very few relationships between discourse and firm practice were found on 
the deeply embedded issue of shareholder value orientation. The US results 
muddle the picture, however, as several statistically significant relationships 
were found there. A possible interpretation could center on the country’s 
widely dispersed ownership patterns, as indicated by the high proportion of 
shares in free float and very low ownership concentration. This could make it 
necessary for American firms to react to public discourse even on this deeply 
embedded issue in order to cater to shareholder demands and expectations of 
possible future investors. If this interpretation is correct, it would also highlight 
the institutional mediation of the relationship between discourse and practice, 
as suggested by proposition A-2. The latter is also supported by the higher 
incidence of statistically significant relationships found in the LMEs. 
4.2.2.2 Board of Directors 
Six variables are used in this sub-issue to measure various characteristics of 
board size, separation of roles, and composition. Variable 2.5.0 measures 
board size as total number of directors. In countries with mandatory 
(Germany) or optional (Switzerland) two-tier board structure the number 
refers to the total number of directors on both tiers, i.e. supervisory board 
(Aufsichtsrat) and executive board (Vorstand). Involvement of the CEO on 
the board is measured by indicator variable 2.5.1 CEO on Board and indicator 
variable 2.5.2 CEO-Chairman Combined Role, both of which are structural zeroes 
in Germany. Hence, these two DVs cannot be used in that country for the 
regression analysis. Board composition is measured in terms of the percentage 
of non-executive directors (2.5.3), percentage of independent non-executive 
directors (2.5.4), and percentage of female directors (2.5.5). In two-tier board 
systems, 2.5.3 relates the size of the supervisory board to the total number of 
directors across both boards. 
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The firm-level measures are regressed on two public discourse variables: S10 
Corporate Governance and S11 Board of Directors. The former was also used in the 
previous sub-issue and discussed there; the latter captures discourse related to 
company boards generally as well as more specific related issues, such as 
female directors or independent directors. 
 
Figure 12: S11 Board of Directors 
Discourse on the board of directors (S11) is at high levels throughout the 
period in Germany and Switzerland, with press coverage generally between 
2.0% and 3.5%—comparable to salient political issues such as the refugees 
and immigration. In the US and UK salience levels are lower at around 
0.75% and thus below our 1%-threshold for high salience. The large 
difference in salience between the two groups is likely to reflect linguistic or 
stylistic differences in reporting, as mentioning a director’s role in German-
language newspaper articles tends to include the search terms used here, even 
if the article may not be concerned with company boards as such. No solution 
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relevant articles. The two groups should therefore not be directly compared 
in terms of salience, but still enable analysis across time. All four countries 
experience increased salience in S11 in the early to mid-2000s, possibly related 
to the marked increase in salience of corporate governance generally (S10), 
which is in turn related to the Enron scandal, Sarbanes-Oxley, and wider 
debate around improving oversight and accountability. There is no obvious 
salience increase around the GFC in any of the four countries. 
In the Swiss case, four models are statistically significant (all p<0.01), however 
three of the four find no significant relationships between salience and 
corporate behavior. The exception is model 17, which, in line with our 
expectations of directionality, finds a positive relationship between the 
salience of discourse on the board of directors (S11) and the percentage of 
non-executive directors (2.5.3) (p<0.01). First, this may indicate that Swiss 
companies shift to a two-tier board system when salience of company boards 
(S11) increases—although a unitary board with management and supervision 
responsibilities is the default in Switzerland, medium to large companies tend 
to ‘delegate’ management to a separate management board, hence splitting 
the functions akin to a German-style two-tier board structure (Gericke et al. 
2014). Second, it could indicate that companies with a two-tier board increase 
the size of the supervisory board in relation to the management board. 
In Germany, mandatory two-tier boards make the separation of CEO and 
Chairman roles compulsory and hence variables 2.5.1 CEO on Board and 2.5.2 
CEO-Chairman Combined Role structural zeroes. The remaining four regression 
models are all statistically significant (all p<0.01), but none find significant 
relationships between the discourse measures used and board characteristics, 
suggesting that German firms do not adjust their board composition in 
reaction to discourse on the issue. 
For the UK, four models are statistically significant at the 5% level, two of 
which find significant connections between salience and practice. Model 17 
shows a negative relationship between the salience of corporate governance 
(S10) and 2.5.3 Percentage of Non-Executive Directors, as well as a positive 
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relationship between discourse on the board of directors (S11) and 2.5.3 (both 
p<0.01). In other words, British companies appear to appoint fewer NEDs 
when salience around corporate governance at large rises, while the narrower 
discourse on the board of directors appears to be related to an increasing share 
of NEDs. Given that a higher share of NEDs is generally seen as beneficial to 
the board’s supervisory duties, which led to our expectation of discourse on 
either measure being positively related to 2.5.3, the results raise a question as 
to why only discourse on boards specifically may pressure companies to 
increase their share of NEDs, while general discourse on corporate 
governance does not. Model 19 also finds significant relationships between 
salience and practice, in this case increasing salience of corporate governance 
(S10) is associated with increasing growth in the share of female directors 
(2.5.5), while increasing salience of the board specifically (S11) is linked to 
lower growth in the percentage of female directors (both p<0.05). Compared 
to the aforementioned model, the directionality is therefore flipped. This 
could be explained by NEDs as a somewhat older corporate governance issue 
that showed higher growth in the early 2000s but has slowed more recently, 
while women on boards are a more recent issue that shows accelerated growth 
in the post-GFC era (see Figure 29: 2.5.3 Non-Executive Directors and Figure 
31: 2.5.5 Female Directors). To put it differently, NEDs may have peaked as 
a signal of good corporate governance before the beginning of the period 
covered, while female directors are a current signal of board diversity and 
good governance. 
Four models are statistically significant for the US (p<0.05 or better), with one 
showing a significant relationship between salience and firm behavior. Model 
18 suggests that increasing salience of S10 Corporate Governance is linked to a 
decrease in 2.5.4 Percentage of Independent Non-Executive Directors, while increasing 
salience of S11 Board of Directors is associated with a higher share of 
independent NEDs (both p<0.05). Given that we expected to find positive 
relationships between discourse and variable 2.5.4, a similar explanation as 
with the share of female directors in the UK could be plausible here. Most 
increases in the share of independent NEDs occurred at the beginning of the 
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period covered here and started to flatten from around 2003 onwards, 
suggesting that the early 2000s were the tail end of independent NEDs’ role 
as a signal of cutting-edge boardroom governance (see Figure 30: 2.5.4 
Independent Non-Executive Directors). 
Taken together, some links between discourse and practice were found in 
three of the four countries, providing some support for proposition A-1 on this 
less embedded issue. However, the results are not unequivocal, as there are 
few points of commonality across countries. Most statistically significant 
relationships found were unique to specific countries, which is surprising as 
we could have reasonably expected some issues to transcend national borders, 
such as female directors or the share of independent NEDs. Instead, these 
results suggest that corporate governance remains rather country-specific, 
which is also borne out by the patterns observed in the firm-level data. 
Although there are similar trends across all four countries—increasingly 
higher shares of NEDs, independent NEDs, and female directors—
institutional differences bring issues to the fore at different times in different 
places or make them entirely moot, such as the trend towards separation of 
CEO and Chairman roles in the US that is mandated by law in Germany. 
Combined with most significant relationships found in LMEs on this issue, we 
can support A-2 and the notion that institutions mediate the influence of 
discourse on practice. 
4.2.2.3 Executive Pay 
Executive Pay is measured using three variables. 2.6.0 Total Executive Pay is the 
sum of executive director pay as disclosed by the company, usually the total 
remuneration of C-suite executives. 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay measures 
the single highest executive pay package in the company, which may be the 
CEO, Chairman, or any other C-suite executive. 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio 
expresses CEO pay as a multiple of average employee pay in the company. 
Two discourse measures are used in this sub-issue. S09 Income Equality captures 
discourse related to the widening gap between rich and poor and represents a 
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social dimension of discourse that may affect corporate pay practices. The 
second measure (S12) is concerned with discourse on executive pay generally 
as well as shareholder votes on executive pay, also referred to as ‘say on pay.’ 
As S09 is used in previous sub-issues, the data is described there. 
 
Figure 13: S12 Executive Pay 
Executive pay (S12) is a low-salience issue for the first five-odd years in the 
time period covered here, but the early 2000s represent a turning point that 
bring the issue much more to fore, albeit remaining below the 1% threshold 
for high salience throughout the period. This happens first in the US with a 
significant jump in salience in 2002, a year later and to lesser extent in the 
UK, and again one year after in Germany. In the US, this can be linked 
primarily to the astonishing levels of CEO pay during the dot-com boom, 
which are also reflected in all executive pay measures used here. The ensuing 
dot-com bust, major accounting scandals and Sarbanes-Oxley legislation that 
banned heretofore abused executive loans and introduced ‘clawback’ 
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Although executive pay levels in the other three countries were not as extreme 
as in the US at the time, the issue was debated there too, albeit at lower levels. 
While salience faded again in the mid-2000s in Europe, the issue remained 
pertinent in the US. The GFC increased salience significantly once more in 
all four countries, bringing it close to the 1% threshold in the US. 
In all four countries the vast majority of executive pay-related regression 
models are statistically significant (all p<0.01), but discourse appears to 
influence executive pay practices in few and country-specific ways. For the 
US, model 22 suggests that increasing discourse on executive pay (S12) is 
associated with a lower CEO pay ratio (2.6.2) (p<0.05), in line with our 
expectations of directionality. No statistically significant coefficients were 
found for British firms, indicating that rising levels of executive pay there are 
still immune to public pressure. In Switzerland and Germany, firms were 
found to be reactive not to explicit discourse on executive pay (S12), but a 
more social dimension of discourse on income inequality (S09). The Swiss 
results are only statistically significant at the 10% level and thus tenuous, but 
suggest that increasing discourse on the issue (S09) is associated with a lower 
CEO pay ratio (2.6.2). In Germany, model 19 finds higher growth in discourse 
(S09) to be linked to lower growth in 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay (p<0.05). 
American firms are thus the only ones showing reactivity to public discourse 
and pressure on executive pay directly, lowering pay at least on one measure 
when discourse rises. This could be related to the country’s vastly higher 
executive pay levels, exposing them more directly to public pressure and 
outrage. Companies in the continental European countries appear to lower 
executive pay when discourse on income inequality rises, suggesting reactivity 
to broader social concerns. These findings provide support for A-1, with firms 
in most countries appearing to yield to public discourse explicitly or implicitly 
related to the executive pay—in line with expectations on this less embedded 
and highly signal-heavy issue. British firms’ apparent reluctance to adjust 
executive remuneration in response to public debate could be rooted in the 
country’s ‘say on pay’ rules, which have given shareholders the right to non-
binding votes on executive pay since 2002—much sooner than elsewhere. 
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While executive pay undoubtedly has a public-facing element, as outrage over 
excessive pay during the GFC has demonstrated, it is plausible that this 
institutionalized channel for shareholders to voice their concerns over pay has 
removed the need or inclination among management to yield to wider public 
debate. Although the results for this sub-issue do not support A-2, as more 
instances of reaction to discourse were found in CMEs than in LMEs, the 
British case highlights the likely institutional boundedness of the relationship 
between discourse and practice—albeit not in the way anticipated. 
4.2.3 Labor Relations 
The issues considered in the institutional sphere of labor relations are 
employment and pay. 3.1.0 Employment Level captures the total number of 
employees, while 3.2.0 is a measure of average employee pay. 
For this institutional sphere, two discourse measures are used. As for previous 
issue areas, S09 Income Inequality captures a social dimension of discourse and 
was discussed more fully previously. The second measure, S13 Layoffs, 
captures debate around job cuts, redundancies, and hiring and firing. 
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Figure 14: S13 Layoffs 
Compared to most other discourse measures used in this study, S13 Layoffs is 
at fairly high levels of salience throughout the period, presumably because 
mass redundancies are high-impact events that receive extensive press 
coverage. The issue remains above the 1% threshold for ‘high salience’ 
throughout the period in the US, but just below it in the European countries. 
Although most pronounced in the US, all countries show two spikes in 
salience; the first in 2001, the second in 2009. The latter is clearly related to 
the GFC and the mass layoffs that came with the economic downturn, while 
the former is likely the result of a confluence of factors. The dotcom-bust and 
ensuing recession are clear driving forces in the US, but it is also most likely 
related to the M&A wave of the time and redundancies that came with it 
(Daimler-Chrysler being a prominent example), as well as the 9/11 attacks 
that significantly affected the airline industry and prompted mass layoffs at 
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layoffs for the US, with 2.5 million workers losing their jobs that year (Cascio 
2015). 
In Switzerland and Germany, both regression models are statistically 
significant (all p<0.01), but do not reveal significant links between discourse 
and practice. In the UK and US, however, the results do find such 
relationships.  
In the UK, both models are statistically significant (p<0.01). Model 23 shows 
that increasing salience of layoffs (S13) is associated with lower growth in 3.1.0 
Employment Level (p<0.05), which is the opposite directionality we expected. 
While this may simply point to coevolution of discourse and practice, it might 
also indicate an element of normalization, whereby increasing salience of 
layoffs highlights to corporations the increasing occurrence and perceived 
benefits of downsizing, making layoffs or hiring freezes in their own company 
more acceptable and perhaps attractive. Although there are no relationships 
between discourse and 3.2.0 Average Wage at the conventional 5% significance 
cutoff, increasing discourse on layoffs (S13) is associated with increasing 
growth in average pay at the 10% level. While tenuous, this might indicate 
that in times of mass layoffs average pay rises as a result of redundancies being 
made more heavily among lower-paid workers. 
Results for the US show a different pattern than the UK. Here, both models 
are also statistically significant (p<0.01), but increasing discourse is associated 
with higher employment and pay. As model 23 indicates, increasing growth 
in discourse on income inequality (S09) and increasing discourse on layoffs 
(S13) are both linked to higher employment levels (3.1.0) (both p<0.05). 
Similarly, model 24 finds a positive relationship between salience of income 
inequality (S09) and growth in 3.2.0 Average Wage (p<0.05). These results are 
in line with what we expected on these measures and suggest that public 
pressure on social issues or reporting on mass redundancies is linked to higher 
employment and pay in the US. However, they are diametrically opposed to 
what we found for the UK, as discussed above. 
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How can those two very different dynamics be reconciled? One explanation 
could be that US companies are sensitive to public opinion and pressure as ill 
repute could lower sales and consequently shareholder returns, while those in 
the UK see rising salience as legitimation for engaging in similar practices as 
their peers, in this case layoffs. This would also be congruent with the UK’s 
more shareholder-friendly company law regime, as mass layoffs may well 
increase short-term profitability and could hence be seen as improving 
shareholder value. In both cases, firms would thus adjust their behavior to 
public discourse in idiosyncratic, institutionally-bound ways. 
While finding evidence of firm behavior being linked to public discourse in 
terms of employment and pay is at odds with proposition A-1 due to the deeply 
embedded nature of this issue, the country patterns found support A-2. 
4.3 Summary 
Finance and accounting shows some areas of connection between discourse 
and practice. Banks appear to be reactive to discourse on risk-taking and 
banking regulation, but in different directions depending on the 
circumstances. Swiss banks are well capitalized and therefore not threatened 
by tighter regulation, but dependent on a low-risk perception and hence 
reactive to such discourse. British banks are typically much less well-
capitalized and therefore more reactive to regulatory discourse, potentially to 
show proactive behavior and avert tighter regulation. German and US banks’ 
behavior is unrelated to discourse, possibly due to the middle-of-the-road 
capitalization of their banks. However, American companies appear to 
become more risk-taking when associated discourse increases, possibly 
because moving along with increasing risk-taking among US companies may 
actually be a form of shareholder value and continued access to capital in the 
country’s short-term orientated investment environment.  
In terms of accounting and transparency, the results suggest that companies 
do not adjust to salience on the issue. Given that we expected some 
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adjustments to public pressure to be the case here, given the signaling power 
of proactive auditor change and the less embedded nature of the issue, it is 
possible that the measures used here do not capture it or that associated 
proposition A-1 is incorrect—a point to be taken up in the discussion. 
Shareholder value orientation is generally not related to discourse, although 
there are some exceptions, mostly for the US, where increasing discourse on 
corporate governance may lead companies to give shareholders preferential 
treatment and pay a larger share of NVA to creditors, potentially reflecting 
higher leverage and thus interest payments. 
Board characteristics appear to be reactive to discourse on some measures, 
possibly due to the highly visible nature and signaling power of board 
composition. Corporate governance appears to remain a rather country-
specific issue, which is also borne out by the patterns observed in the firm-
level data. Although there are similar trends across all four countries—
increasingly higher shares of NEDs, independent NEDs, and female 
directors—institutional differences bring issues to the fore at different times in 
different places or make them entirely moot. 
In terms of executive pay, the results found evidence of decreased pay in 
reaction to public discourse, albeit in country-specific ways that suggest direct 
pressure to have more sway in liberal economies and wider social concerns to 
influence pay in coordinated economies.  
Labor relations practices are not strongly related to discourse, particularly in 
Switzerland and Germany. In the UK and US, however, some links between 
discourse and practice exist that suggest a pattern of normalization of 
downsizing in the UK consistent with providing shareholder value and 
sensitivity to public perception in the US for similar reasons. 
Taken together, it is apparent that discourse and practice are related in some 
cases, but not on all issues or indeed in all countries. Broadly, the results 
support proposition A-1 and the notion of strategic or operational 
embeddedness of issues moderating the impact of public discourse on 
corporate practice. The issue areas found to be more reactive to discourse 
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tend to be those that are less embedded, but of high visibility and signaling 
power to the public and investors, such as board governance and executive 
pay. Issues that appear less connected to discourse—such as risk-taking 
behavior of companies generally, shareholder value orientation, or labor 
relations—are more deeply operationally embedded. However, some 
deviations from expectations were also found, including banks adjusting bank 
capitalization in line with discourse, and the absence of reactivity on 
accountability and transparency measures. These issues will be explored 
further in the discussion. 
Country-level patterns provided strong support for proposition A-2, with the 
majority of statistically significant relationships between discourse and 
practice found in the LMEs. In the US and UK combined, 16 models found 
such relationships, while only 5 are evident in Switzerland and Germany. 
These high-level patterns as well as several specific cases elaborated in this 
chapter suggest that the relationship between discourse and practice is 
institutionally mediated, with firms in CMEs relying more extensively on 
institutionalized channels to coordinate with their stakeholders, while those in 
LMEs have to use public channels to meet expectations of affected parties. 
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5 Firm-Level Processes of Change 
5.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter has shown that companies are only generally reactive 
to public discourse on a limited range of issues, primarily those less 
strategically or operationally embedded, and more so in LMEs than in CMEs, 
due to the absence of institutionalized channels of coordination in the former 
type. In times of severe crisis, however, the dynamics of this relationship 
between discourse and practice are likely to be quite different. Crises, 
scandals, and the public discourse that comes with such major events may 
discredit previous norms of behavior, leading to uncertainty about how 
corporations can signal compliance and legitimacy under those new 
circumstances (Blyth 2002). Processes of mimetic isomorphism—usually 
smaller firms imitating larger and more successful peers—reduce this 
uncertainty by allowing them to blend in and show compliance with new ‘best 
practice’ (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Scott 1995; 
Westphal & Zajac 2001). 
These processes of mimetism occur at all times, but are accelerated by major 
crises, as crises may lead to defection from previous norms and are 
characterized by uncertainty—increasing the likelihood that companies 
imitate each other’s behavior. Hence, mimetic isomorphism can be an 
important and powerful mechanism that translates triggers (crises and public 
discourse) into change in corporate practices that may coalesce into new 
norms. Such ‘critical mass’ is an important condition for bottom-up change 
to occur, as it depends on a few large and powerful firms or many smaller 
firms to change their behavior, pushing at the boundaries of the law and 
establishing new forms of compliance. Even where these changes in practice 
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do not push at the boundaries of the law, but represent a significant shift in 
‘average’ behavior within legal boundaries, these actions could signal to 
policymakers and regulators that companies are reacting to a crisis and are 
‘righting the wrongs’ which caused the crisis or scandal to occur. 
Based on the literature, three areas for discussion were identified with regards 
to firm-level processes of mimetic isomorphism:  
(1) where and how mimetic isomorphism occurs, i.e. whether it leads to 
initial spread of behavior and subsequent convergence; 
(2)  how sectoral differences affect mimetic isomorphism, i.e. whether 
highly internationalized sectors are more likely to exhibit such 
behavior; and  
(3) whether different types of mimetic isomorphism are associated with 
different modes of change in firm practices.  
With regard to the first discussion point, the literature suggests that crises 
spread a ‘great confusion’ of sorts, leaving actors without their usual compass 
directing them on what behaviors are appropriate or even in their interest 
(Blyth 2002). Through the direct impact of the crisis on corporate practices, 
as well as the confusion over appropriate behavior, we therefore expect firm 
behavior on issues rising in public discourse during the crisis to show a pattern 
of initial spread and increased heterogeneity. Once new role models emerge 
and firms start to imitate each other’s behavior in order to reduce uncertainty, 
we expect to find convergence of practices on these new ‘best practices’ and 
greater homogeneity. 
Proposition B-1: Institutions and practices discredited due to crisis become a source of 
uncertainty, initially leading to larger variation of practices. 
Proposition B-2: Once new role models emerge, corporations start to mimic their behavior in 
order to blend in with perceived best practice. This leads to a convergence of corporate 
practices. 
Regarding the second discussion on sectoral differences, the literature 
indicates that ‘dominance effects’ (C. Smith & Meiksins 1995) will be seen, 
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whereby imitation of dominant economies and associated best practices 
among MNCs is intensified with increasing global economic integration. 
Mimetic isomorphism in reaction to a crisis should thus be more likely in 
highly internationalized sectors, leading us to expect the highly 
internationalized financial sector to exhibit more pronounced patterns of 
mimetic isomorphism than the more domestically bound non-financial firms. 
While dominance effects exist at all times, severe crises may create a new 
hierarchy of economies. As some economies suffer more than others, the 
previously dominant model may become discredited and replaced by an 
economic model that fared better throughout the crisis—in practical terms we 
may expect the German model to replace the Anglo-Saxon model as the 
former fared better through the crisis and became described as a role model 
once again after the GFC (Groom 2013; Volkery 2013). 
Proposition B-3: Mimetic isomorphism is stronger in highly internationalized sectors, such 
as the financial industry. 
Proposition B-4: Crises may establish a new hierarchy of dominant economies, creating new 
role models both in terms of economic policy and associated corporate practices. 
Finally, regarding the third discussion point, three types of mimetic 
isomorphism are conceptualized along with expectations for their effects on 
firm practices. Within-group mimetism, whereby companies copy the 
behavior of their immediate peers, is similar to Abrahamson’s (1991) 
innovation and reputation-based fad perspective. We expect this type of 
mimetism to primarily lead to convergence of firm behavior without shifting 
average practice significantly. Drawing on Abrahamson’s (1991) fashion 
perspective, outside-of-group (or between-group) mimetism is operationalized 
as mimetic isomorphism between sectors, i.e. between the financial and 
industrial sectors. As financial and industrial firms are likely to differ in some 
of their practices, this type of mimetism can be expected to bear a larger 
potential for shifting firm practices in a substantial way than within-group 
mimetism, for instance by leading to a step change in the pace of previous 
trends. International-level mimetism, whereby companies copy the behavior 
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of global peers, are expected to be rare, but able to shift firm practices most 
radically, for example by reversing the directionality of previous trends. 
Proposition B-5: Changes in firm behavior induced by within-group mimetism are likely 
incremental, as firms within the same group are already relatively similar. 
Proposition B-6: Outside-of-group mimetism has the potential to shift firm practices in a 
more radical way than within-group mimetism. 
Proposition B-7: Cross-border mimetism has the largest potential for radically changing firm 
practices. 
The methodological approach to analyzing firm-level change for evidence of 
mimetic isomorphism is based on the use of analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
While this differs from many studies of isomorphic processes among 
organizations, which use the proportion of prior adopters (prior probability) 
in the organizational field as the measure of mimetic isomorphism (Mizruchi 
& Fein 1999; Han 1994), the continuous variables used in this study to 
measure of corporate practice require a different approach. The use of 
ANOVA for the purpose of testing for mimetic isomorphism builds on 
Kostova and Roth’s (2002) use of ANOVA to compare the similarity of 
institutional systems and Cuomo et al’s (2013) use of t-tests to analyze for 
significant differences in firm behavior across time. 
An extension of the t-test, ANOVA compares means within groups with 
means between groups (Field 2013). It is thus used to evaluate whether groups 
become more similar during crisis situations, as would be expected if there is 
mimetic isomorphism at play. If ANOVA produces significant result, we 
reject the null hypothesis that the samples (groups) are drawn from the same 
population or that the differences between the samples are due to chance 
alone. Hence, when p<0.05, we conclude that the groups exhibit significantly 
different practices (Tharenou et al. 2007, p.211). Aside from the significance 
test, ANOVAs also produce an F-test. This is the ratio of between-group mean 
square and within-group mean square (F=betweengroup/withingroup), 
therefore the closer F is to 1, the closer to each other are the groups (Agresti 
& Finlay 2009, p.500). Changes in F therefore indicate whether groups are 
Firm-Level Processes of Change 
174 
becoming more or less similar. This forms the basis for interpreting the 
ANOVA results—groups ceasing to be statistically significantly different, or 
F-test values dropping significantly and coming close to 1 is evidence for 
convergence between the practices of the groups compared.  
There are limitations to this approach which bear discussing. Convergence 
between groups may not be driven by mimetic isomorphism, but could occur 
for a number of reasons, such as economic circumstances delimiting choice or 
regulatory pressure. In the latter case, the results would be indicative of 
coercive rather than mimetic isomorphism. This is not necessarily a problem, 
however, as such behavior still conforms to the patterns we are looking for 
here—widespread change in firm-level behavior in times of major crisis, 
which may ultimately influence legal and regulatory change. Results, 
therefore, require careful interpretation for alternative explanations, however, 
generally convergence in times of severe crisis and on a highly salient issue is 
interpreted as indicating mimetic isomorphism. While a focused case study 
would be capable of asking a small number of specific companies as to why 
they have chosen to change their behavior, and whether they consciously 
imitated their peers’ practices, the scale required for statistical analysis within 
this study and its focus on macro patterns makes this an impossible task. For 
establishing the macro pattern of firm behavior the use of ANOVAs 
represents arguably an innovative approach to make most of publicly 
available data.  
ANOVAs are performed for each of the firm practice variables discussed 
previously and for each year, to identify patterns across issue areas and time. 
As argued in the literature review, we may expect mimetic isomorphism to 
occur on three levels:  
(1) Within groups, i.e. between small and large firms within the same 
sector. To create these groups, the sample of companies was split in 
half into the smallest and largest 50% of firms by market capitalization 
in that year, separately for each country, year, and financial and non-
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financial firms. This results in eight series of ANOVAs, one for 
financial firms, one for industrial firms in each country.  
(2) Between groups, i.e. between financial and non-financial firms. Four 
series of ANOVAs are run to test for this level of mimetism, one for 
each country.  
(3) International-level mimetic isomorphism between the four countries. 
A single series of ANOVAs tests for this level of mimetism. 
As argued at the outset of this chapter, we are interested in the combination 
of uncertainty and public discourse/political salience as a driver of mimetic 
isomorphism. While ANOVAs were run for all firm-level variables as a 
robustness test (full results tables are in the appendix), the focus in this chapter 
is on issues that are highly salient during the two major crises within the time 
period covered—the dot-com crash of the early 2000s and the global financial 
crisis (GFC) of the late 2000s. While the dot-com crash was more pronounced 
in the US than in Europe, it had knock-on effects there, too. The US was in 
recession between March and November 2001 (National Bureau of Economic 
Research 2012), while Germany and Switzerland saw quarterly GDP 
contraction between mid-2002 and mid-2003 (OECD 2012). The UK 
avoided recession during this period, but we may still expect some effects there 
too due to interconnected markets and public debate. The dot-com crash is 
therefore a more ‘blurry’ event than the GFC, with less synchronized and 
uniform impact on the four countries. For the GFC, the crisis years can be 
defined more easily as 2008 and 2009, when all four countries experienced 
negative quarterly GDP growth (OECD 2012). 
The political salience measures introduced in the previous chapter show how 
the two crises are constructed in public discourse. The early 2000s are a period 
of intense debate on corporate governance generally (S10) and issues 
associated with it (S09 Shareholder Rights, S11 Board of Directors), as well as the 
‘big four’ accounting firms (S03Alt) and auditor change (S03). The GFC, on 
the other hand, primarily sparked discourse on the regulation of banks (S01), 
corporate risk-taking behavior (S02), executive pay (S12), and income 
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inequality (S09). These differences are not surprising—after all, the dot-com 
bubble and the series of high-profile corporate failures at the time were mainly 
results of fraud, audit failure, and ultimately corporate governance issues, 
while the GFC can be attributed to excessive risk-taking and poor oversight 
of the financial sector—this highlights the different ways in which the two 
events are constructed, what corporate behaviors have been discredited, and 
where we may expect change in corporate practice and mimetic isomorphism. 
The issue areas to be discussed in this chapter are therefore bank 
capitalization and risk-taking behavior, as well as executive pay—the two issue 
areas most associated with the GFC—and corporate governance and 
auditing, which are highly salient issues during the dot-com crash. Given their 
lower salience across both crisis periods, labor relations and some aspects of 
corporate governance (shareholder orientation) are not discussed in this 
chapter. The structure of this chapter follows the three salient issue areas, with 
ANOVA results presented and analyzed along the propositions outlined 
above. 
In order to sustain propositions B-1 and B-2, we would expect the ANOVA 
result tables to show a pattern of higher dispersion, i.e. higher F-test values 
and groups becoming statistically significantly different, in immediate reaction 
to a crisis or shock event, followed by convergence as indicated by falling F-
test values and groups ceasing to be statistically significantly different. Support 
for proposition B-3 will take the form of a higher incidence of patterns 
congruent with B-1 and B-2 (or at least B-2) in the financial firm sample 
compared to the non-financial firm sample. Analysis for B-4 will combine 
ANOVA results and trajectory of national averages of the firm-level measures; 
in order to substantiate B-4 we would expect to find convergence in the 
ANOVA results and aggregate firm-level data showing that firms move 
towards a different role model than before the crisis/event in question. 
Propositions B-5 to B-7 similarly draw on comparing ANOVA results with 
patterns shown in the national aggregates of the firm-level data. To support 
these propositions, we would expect to find larger shifts in average firm 
behavior to coincide with evidence for higher-order types of mimetism, i.e. 
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convergence between countries to be associated with larger changes in firm-
level practices than convergence between financial and non-financial firms, 
which would in turn be associated with larger shifts in corporate practice than 
convergence between firms within the same sector. 
5.2 Results 
5.2.1 Bank Capitalization and Risk-Taking Behavior 
Bank Capitalization 
The three measures of bank capitalization (1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio, 1.1.2 Total 
Capital Ratio, and 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio) show quite similar patterns of 
change during the GFC. Banks in Germany, the UK and US adjusted their 
capitalization upwards during the crisis, thereby reducing their risk exposure. 
Interestingly, British banks made the largest upward adjustment from 2006 to 
2007—a year earlier than their German and American peers—indicating that 
they either anticipated the crisis better or felt a more urgent need for 
adjustment given their comparatively low capitalization levels before the 
crisis. On 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio, UK banks increased capitalization from 
around 8% in 2006 to 12.5% in 2007, before further slight upward 
adjustments at the end of the observed period. American banks made a larger 
jump from about 8.5% in 2007 to 17.5% the year after, but adjusted slightly 
downwards in the post-GFC years. German banks increased core 
capitalization more gradually beginning from 10% in 2007 to almost 20% at 
the end of the period. 
Firm-Level Processes of Change 
178 
 
Figure 15: 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio 
The broader capitalization measure 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio shows very similar 
patterns. Swiss banks show no adjustment on core capital (1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio) and slight reduction in total capital (1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio) compared 
to average pre-crisis levels. As Swiss banks had much higher capitalization 
levels than their counterparts in the other three countries before the GFC, 
particularly on tier 1 capital, they may have seen no reason for making 
adjustments. In other words, banks in the other three nations converged on 
Swiss levels of capitalization, resulting in less international variation in the 
post-GFC years. To be sure, these trends are very likely also connected to 
regulatory changes as part of the Basel Accords. Such links between firm-level 
patterns of change and legal or regulatory change will be established and 
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Figure 16: 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio 
Comparing the above patterns with 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio, which is similar 
to 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio but does not use risk-weighted assets, reveals the 
risk composition of banks in the four countries. German banks hold little 
capital in non-risk weighted terms (1.2.0) but rank highly when taking risk into 
account (1.1.1), indicating risk-averse investments compared to their foreign 
peers. American and British banks, on the other hand, appear to show more 
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Figure 17: 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio 
From these trends alone, convergence on 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio beginning 
with the GFC is evident, pointing to banks taking similar approaches to their 
risk portfolio. Measure 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio also shows convergence of firm 
practices during the crisis, but appears short-lived. No distinct convergence 
patterns show on 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio. To what extent do these trends 
correspond with the ANOVA results and are hence likely driven by mimetic 
isomorphism?  
The within-group ANOVA results for Swiss financial firms’ tier 1 leverage 
ratio (1.2.0) show an average F-test value of 0.150 for the pre-crisis period 
(2000-2007), indicating that the difference between capitalization of small and 
large Swiss banks differed to some extent, but not enough to become 
statistically significant at the 5% level. In 2008, the F-test value jumps to 3.458 
(p<0.10), showing spread of practices making the groups significantly different 
at the 10% level. From 2009 onwards, the average F-test value is 0.912, 
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initial spread (proposition B-1) and subsequent convergence of practices (B-
2).  
A similar pattern is evident in the within-group ANOVA results for German 
financial companies, where 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio shows high dispersion of 
practices in the crisis years (F-test average for 2007-2009 is 5.365, p<0.10), 
followed by more similar practices in the post-crisis years (F-test average for 
2010-2013 is 1.041). However, in the German case the spread of practices 
actually starts before the onset of the GFC, with practices being statistically 
significantly different between small and large financials in 2004, 2005, and 
2007 (p<0.05). Hence, the spread of behavior during the GFC could be due 
to the crisis, but may also be related to the previous spread of behavior. 
Indeed, the latter interpretation may be more plausible with the early 2000s 
as a period of increasing bifurcation of the German banking sector, as large 
banks shifted away from the traditional Hausbank-model towards investment 
banking, while smaller banks retained those practices (Jackson & Sorge 2012). 
On the other measures of bank capitalization, 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio and 
1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio, German and Swiss banks’ practices contract and 
expand frequently, showing no clear patterns in support or against the 
propositions.  
For the UK, missing data prevents full analysis of within-group mimetism 
among banks, but available data suggests a very heterogeneous British 
banking sector, with small and large financials being statistically significantly 
different (p<0.05) on all measures of capitalization and risk-taking in the vast 
majority of years. This heterogeneity makes interpretation of the ANOVA 
results difficult, but there is nonetheless an indicator of firm-level adjustment 
during the GFC: measure 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio has a much higher F-test 
value in 2009 (216.3) than two preceding (average F=146.5) or following years 
(average F=96.7). In 2012, differences in tier 1 leverage between small and 
large British banks even cease to be statistically significant (F=1.877). These 
results for the UK require cautious interpretation, but available data does 
suggest a pattern consistent with B-1 and B-2. 
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The results for the US offer the perhaps clearest support for propositions B-1 
and B-2. Here, all three measures of bank capitalization show spread of 
behavior during the GFC followed by convergence in the post-crisis years. 
Measures 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio and 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio are statistically 
significantly different in 2008 (p<0.05), while 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio is 
slightly above the 5% significance level, but within the 10% level. The earlier 
two variables also show their highest F-test values for the entire period in 
2008. Convergence sets in later in the US than in the previous cases, with F-
test values coming closer to 1 in 2011 or 2012. For all three bank capitalization 
variables the F-test value average for 2011 to 2013 is just above 1.6. Also of 
note is that measures 1.1.1 and 1.1.2 show statistically significantly different 
practices between small and large banks shortly after the dot-com crash, in 
2002 and 2003 (p<0.05), suggesting that this earlier crisis may have also 
affected the behavior of American banks. 
The within-group ANOVA results therefore find patterns consistent with 
mimetic isomorphism on bank capitalization during the GFC in all four 
countries, albeit with some caveats for the UK. Initial spread of practices 
followed by convergence on new norms of behavior was observed, supporting 
B-1 and B-2.  
Turning to sectoral differences, bank capitalization by definition does not 
apply to industrial firms, making the issue unsuitable for comparing mimetism 
between finance and industry. That being said, bank capitalization, as shown 
above, was found to show patterns consistent with mimetic isomorphism. 
During the GFC, Swiss, German, and US banks imitated each other’s 
behavior in terms of capitalization, with American banks also exhibiting such 
behavior during the dot-com crash. While data for UK financial firms on the 
issue does not provide a full picture, available data also points to similar 
processes there. This suggests that banks by and large behaved as expected by 
reacting and adjusting to the crisis and the increased issue salience of bank 
regulation (S01) and risk-taking (S02), lending support to proposition B-3.  
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In terms of international role models and hierarchies of dominant economies, 
it could be argued that Switzerland has emerged as a post-GFC role model in 
terms of bank capitalization. While Swiss banks were generally better 
capitalized before the crisis, their peers have coalesced around Swiss levels 
after the crisis, providing support for proposition B-4. 
Regarding the impact of different types of mimetic isomorphism on ‘average’ 
firm behavior, the results find evidence for international-level mimetic 
isomorphism. For all three measures of bank capitalization, the immediate 
pre-GFC years and early parts of the crisis are times of heightened differences 
between countries, with some statistically significant differences between 2006 
and 2008 (p<0.05). The post-crisis years are marked by convergence, as 
indicated by F-test values closer to 1. While between-group mimetism does 
not apply to this bank-only issue, international-level and within-group 
processes of mimetic isomorphism are a plausible explanation for the firm-
level changes observed, supporting proposition B-7 in that cross-border 
mimetism indeed appears to have substantially shifted bank capitalization. 
 
Risk-Taking Behavior 
With regards to risk-taking behavior, trends in the firm-level data point to 
convergence on some measures. Measures 1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio and 
1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage point to distinct differences between Swiss, British 
and American firms on the one hand, and German firms on the other, in the 
first half of the observed period—German companies average roughly 10 
percentage points higher leverage (1.2.2), which is reflected in the country’s 
lower average on the ratio of assets shareholders have a claim to in the event 
of the company’s liquidation (1.2.0.1). This is most likely related to German 
firms’ traditional debt-heavy financing through close ties to banks. From the 
mid-2000s onwards, however, these country differences become less distinct, 
partly due to German firms lessening their reliance on Hausbanken, but also 
due to rising leverage in the UK and US.  
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Figure 19: 1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage 
Measure 1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio does not show such pronounced 
country patterns, but much like the previous two measures, points to the GFC 
as a turning point for leverage and hence risk-taking. The beginning of the 
GFC is a high-water mark of leverage for British and German firms, although 
it marked only a temporary slow-down of increasing leverage in the US. Swiss 
firms’ leveraging behavior is fairly stable throughout the observed period, not 
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Figure 20: 1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio 
Turning to the ANOVA results, the data also provides some support for 
propositions B-1 and B-2, albeit with some caveats. For Swiss financial 
companies, the within-group ANOVA results show statistically significant 
differences between the small and large groups from 2007 onwards for 
variables 1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio and 1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage (p<0.05). 
For both measures, the period from 2007 to 2013 shows much higher average 
F-test values (5.5 and 4.4, respectively) than the 2000 to 2006 period (2.4 and 
1.5, respectively), indicating that a spread of risk-taking practices set in shortly 
before the GFC without subsequent convergence. These results are therefore 
consistent with proposition B-1, but not B-2. Measure 1.2.1 Financial Debt-
Equity Ratio shows patterns consistent with both propositions, however. Here, 
practices diverge in 2008 and 2009, barely missing the 5% cutoff for statistical 
significance. The post-crisis years then show a convergence of behavior as 
expected under proposition B-2. Swiss industrial companies’ risk-taking 
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immediately after the GFC. F-test values for measures 1.2.0.1 and 1.2.1 are 
much closer to 1 in 2010 (0.740 and 0.936, respectively) than in the three years 
prior or following, when average F-test values are around 0.130. Without 
prior spread of practices, this only supports proposition B-2. 
Results for Germany show statistically significant differences in risk-taking 
practice between small and large financials throughout most of the period 
(p<0.05). There is no evidence of immediate reactions to the GFC in terms of 
divergence or convergence. German industrial companies, on the other hand, 
show a fairly distinct divergence-and-convergence pattern. In 2007, all three 
measures (1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio, 1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio, and 
1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage) find statistically significant differences between 
small and large companies (p<0.05) and the highest F-test values for the entire 
period. This is followed by a period of convergence of practices between 2008 
and 2010. These results thus support propositions B-1 and B-2 for German 
industrial companies, but not for financials. 
As with the previous measures of bank capitalization, risk-taking behavior of 
British financials is very heterogeneous throughout the time period, with most 
years showing statistically significant differences between the practices of small 
and large companies on all three measures (p<0.05). In 2008, however, 
1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio and 1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio are not 
statistically significant, indicating convergence of practices in the early parts 
of the GFC, supporting B-2. For British industrial companies, a somewhat 
similar pattern as in Germany can be observed: divergence of practices in 
2007, followed by a period of convergence between 2008 and 2013, primarily 
on measures 1.2.0.1 and 1.2.2. However, unlike in the German case, the 
divergence is not distinct enough to become statistically significant and the 
difference in F-test values is also less pronounced. These results thus lend some 
support to B-1 and B-2, but require caution. 
For American financial companies, the within-group ANOVA results suggest 
fairly homogenous risk-taking behavior throughout the time period, 
particularly for measure 1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio. In contrast to the other 
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countries and particularly the UK, there are no statistically significant 
differences between small and large financial firms. American industrial 
companies’ risk-taking practices are similarly homogenous, but point to 
convergence during the GFC. In 2008, all three measures of risk-taking 
(1.2.0.1, 1.2.1, and 1.2.2) are closer to 1 than at any other point during the 
observed period (0.879, 1.030, and 1.068, respectively). By comparison, the 
average F-test values for the years preceding and following are around 0.200 
on all three measures. We can therefore count these results as supporting B-
2, but not B-1. 
Regarding sectoral differences, risk-taking behavior can be compared 
between finance and industry, as it is measured here in terms of leverage, 
which can be calculated for all companies. Financial companies were found 
to exhibit some mimetic isomorphism in two of the four countries. The within-
group ANOVA results for Swiss and British banks point to patterns of mimetic 
isomorphism on measure 1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio during the GFC, and 
in the British case also on 1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio. German and 
American financials, however, show no obvious signs of mimetism on 
leverage. In both cases, this is surprising, given that excessive risk-taking of 
financial firms was a key issue during the GFC. For the US, it may be 
explained by the much larger size of the American financial industry, resulting 
in a sample that consists of very large, fairly homogenous financial firms. As a 
result, the within-group ANOVA, which splits the sample into the smallest 
and largest 50% of companies, would compare very similar groups in the US 
that may not capture processes of mimetic isomorphism fully.  
Industrial companies are more inclined to mimic each other’s risk-taking 
behavior during the GFC, with such processes evident in all four countries. 
German and American industrial firms were found to imitate risk-taking 
behavior on all three measures used (1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio, 1.2.1 
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio, and 1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage) during the GFC, 
while mimetism was evident on two measures each in Switzerland and the 
UK. Comparing the rather limited extent of evidence for mimetic 
isomorphism among financial firms with the broad evidence for industrial 
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firms, it is clear that proposition B-3 cannot be sustained for the issue of risk-
taking behavior. While this may simply point to B-3 being inaccurate, it also 
raises questions whether the industrial firms in the sample used here are 
indeed more domestically-bound than their financial peers, or whether they 
are also highly internationalized—an issue to be returned to more fully in the 
discussion. 
In terms of international role models, associated with B-4, no clear patterns 
emerge. While it could be argued that companies across the four countries 
converged towards German levels of leverage before the GFC, this 
development was not necessarily driven by emulation of German practices or 
the role of Germany as a role model on leverage and risk-taking—as argued 
above, the German bank-based corporate financing system is quite different 
from the much more equity-based systems in the other three countries. As a 
result, high levels of debt in relation to equity are indicative of higher risk in 
those latter countries, where bank lending to business tends to be short-term 
and to bridge cash flow issues or finance projects, while it is not necessarily 
high-risk in Germany due to long-term, ‘patient’ relationships with banks. 
Hence, the trends in leveraging behavior across the four countries are unlikely 
to indicate role models or changes thereof. 
Turning to the effects of different types of mimetic isomorphism, no evidence 
was found for mimetism between financial and non-financial firms. The 
between-group ANOVA results generally show statistically significant 
differences between the risk-taking behavior or financial and industrial firms, 
indicating very heterogeneous practices. The UK is an exception, with some 
convergence evident in the mid-2000s there. An interpretation for this would 
be increasing financialization of British industrial firms and hence increasing 
mimetism between the finance and industry—the mid-2000s are indeed a 
period of change in leverage for UK companies, with quite pronounced 
increases in leverage on all three measures. For example, 1.2.2 Balance Sheet 
Leverage increased from 55% in 2001 to 65% in 2005.  
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The international-level ANOVA results also concur with the observed firm-
level patterns. Measures 1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio and 1.2.2 Balance Sheet 
Leverage show clear convergence between the four countries after the GFC, 
with 1.2.0.1 ceasing to be statistically significant from 2011 onwards, and 1.2.2 
from 2012. Variable 1.2.1 is more homogenous throughout the period, but 
shows statistically significant differences in 2008 (p<0.05). International-level 
processes of mimetic isomorphism are thus likely drivers of the changes in 
corporate risk-taking behavior and shifting from a trend towards increased 
leverage pre-GFC towards deleveraging after the crisis, lending support for B-
7. 
5.2.2 Executive Pay 
Executive pay was a highly salient issue during or after the GFC in all four 
countries, with the UK and US also showing high salience on the issue around 
the dot-com crash. It is thus an issue for which we may expect to find mimetic 
isomorphism. 
Executive pay is measured using two absolute variables (2.6.0 Total Executive 
Pay and 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay) and one relative variable (2.6.2 CEO 
Pay Ratio). All three measures show an upwards trend overall, somewhat 
broken by the GFC. In the US and UK, the impact of the GFC on executive 
pay appears short-lived, with total executive pay (2.6.0) decreasing from 2007 
to 2008, but regaining those losses within a year in the UK and two in the US. 
In Germany and Switzerland, executive pay remains fairly stable after the 
GFC, indicating a clearer break with pre-crisis trends. Also worth noting for 
the US is the dramatic drop in executive pay from its dot-com bubble peak in 
2000, when average total executive pay (2.6.0) stood at almost 50m USD, to 
just below 20m USD in 2002. This dot-com era peak in the US was only 
exceeded in 2011. By comparison, average total executive pay in the other 
three countries was well below 10m USD in the first half of the 2000s, and 
has since remained below 15m USD in Germany and Switzerland and 23m 
USD in the UK. In other words, despite some common trends and the GFC 
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as a time of reduced pay across the board, executive pay practices appear to 
be rather country-specific without obvious convergence trends. 
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Figure 23: 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio 
The ANOVA results do not find evidence for mimetic isomorphism across the 
board, but there is evidence of it for the US and, in some cases, the UK and 
Switzerland. 
For Swiss financial companies, executive pay data is limited but displays no 
distinct convergence or divergence patterns around the GFC. Industrial 
companies, however, exhibit a divergence of practices between small and 
large Swiss firms from 2007 throughout the GFC, before converging again 
from 2010 on most pay measures. In 2007 and 2009, all three measures of 
executive pay (2.6.0 Total Executive Pay, 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay, and 
2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio) are statistically significantly different (p<0.05). While this 
is consistent with the propositions, the lack of longitudinal pay data for 
Switzerland makes it difficult to ascertain whether this is reasonably related to 
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As in Switzerland, the within-group ANOVA results for German financial 
firms offer no distinct patterns, generally pointing to rather homogenous pay 
practices between small and large financial firms. Small and large German 
industrial firms, however, exhibit very different pay practices, with most data 
points statistically significant (p<0.05), but also without obvious periods of 
divergence of convergence. 
British financials and non-financials show very heterogeneous practices 
overall with the majority of data points statistically significant. Two periods of 
convergence are apparent for financial firms; the first from 2002-2004, the 
second from 2012 until the end of the observed period. Measures 2.6.1 Single 
Highest Executive Pay and 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio cease to be statistically significant 
at those times, and average F-test values are much closer to 1 than at other 
times. Both periods of convergence coincide with peak of public discourse on 
executive pay (S12), suggesting some reactivity of pay practices to issue 
salience. However, no changes during or immediately after the GFC are 
evident. If we accept the two periods of convergence observed as linked to the 
respective crises, the results support B-2, but not B-1 in the absence of prior 
divergence. British industrial companies’ pay practices differ significantly 
between small and large firms, without obvious patterns of divergence or 
convergence around the GFC. 
Financial firms in the US converge in their executive pay practices during the 
GFC. This is most pronounced on variable 2.6.0 Total Executive Pay, where 
2008 and 2009 show no statistically significant difference between small and 
large companies in contrast to the years preceding and following (p<0.05). A 
similar pattern can be observed for 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay, although 
here it is less clear-cut with practices converging and diverging more 
frequently. Measure 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio does not exhibit a similar pattern and 
is more homogenous than the absolute measures of executive pay. American 
industrial companies do not appear to diverge or converge in their executive 
pay practices around the GFC. However, as with US financial firms, 2002 
and 2003 are a time of converging practices on all three measures of executive 
pay. These are the immediate post-dot-com crash years, coinciding with a 
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spike in public discourse on executive pay (S12) that was only eclipsed during 
the GFC. We can count these results as consistent with proposition B-2, but 
again B-1 is not supported due to the absence of clear divergence patterns. 
These results raise the question why American firms were more reactive to 
the dot-com crash than to the GFC in terms of executive pay. One 
interpretation could be that the dot-com era was one of perceived excess 
across the board, i.e. in overvalued tech companies, but also financial and 
financialized companies, while the GFC’s perceived excesses were more 
concentrated in banking and finance. Hence, financial and industrial 
companies would convergence on lower pay after the dot-com crash, while 
convergence after the GFC would have been more limited to financial firms. 
This explanation is also supported by the much more pronounced drop in 
mean total executive pay (2.6.0) from 2000 to 2001-02 (47m USD in 2000 to 
20m USD in 2002) than from 2007 to 2008-09 (43m USD in 2007 to 37m 
USD in 2009). The same pattern is borne out by 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive 
Pay and 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio. 
Turning to sectoral differences, the within-group ANOVA results support 
proposition B-3, i.e. financial firms appear more likely to mimic each other 
than industrial firms. British and American financial firms exhibit patterns 
consistent with mimetic isomorphism during the dot-com crash as well as the 
GFC—both periods in which executive pay was a highly salient issues in the 
two countries. Financials in both countries converge on measure 2.6.1 Single 
Highest Executive Pay, arguably the most visible and exposed indicator of 
executive pay, however British firms also mimic each other in terms of 2.6.2 
CEO Pay Ratio while US financials imitate their peers on 2.6.0 Total Executive 
Pay. By comparison, non-financial firms were only found to exhibit mimetic 
isomorphism on executive pay in the US around the dot-com crash. No 
convincing evidence of mimetic isomorphism for either financial or non-
financial firms was found in Switzerland and Germany. These results 
therefore provide support for proposition B-3, given that in countries where 
mimetic isomorphism on executive pay was found, it occurred mostly among 
financial rather than industrial firms. 
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Concerning country role models, it could be argued that all four countries 
were moving in a similar direction before the GFC—towards higher executive 
pay as in the US. The post-GFC stagnation of pay in Germany and 
Switzerland could be indicative of a move away from the Anglo-Saxon role 
model and associated higher levels of executive remuneration. What speaks 
against this interpretation, however, is the rather stagnant market 
capitalization of German and Swiss firms after the GFC—if pay is tied to stock 
performance, we thus should not expect rising pay in the two countries. That 
being said, the last two years of the observed period to point to rising market 
capitalization, which is not reflected in executive pay. In other words, the 
evidence is rather ambiguous, making it difficult to support B-4. 
 
Figure 24: Market Capitalization 
In terms of the effects of different types of mimetic isomorphism, evidence for 
between-group mimetism, i.e. between financial and industrial companies, is 
sparse. In Germany and the UK, executive pay diverges during the GFC, 
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companies. For the US, convergence between absolute pay in finance and 
industry is evident (2.6.0 Total Executive Pay and 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive 
Pay), but not on 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio. With executive pay in the US showing 
the most pronounced downward adjustment during the GFC of the four 
countries, this provides support for B-6. On the international level, the 
ANOVA results also point to very heterogeneous pay practices, without 
patterns of convergence or mimetism. Taken together, there is little evidence 
of systematic or wide-spread processes of mimetic isomorphism on executive 
pay, suggesting that changes in executive pay practices occur evenly across 
small and large companies, across industries, and within distinct country 
patterns. This would be consistent with executive pay being firm-performance 
bound, as the GFC would affect most companies in a similar way, hence 
shifting pay downward across the board. 
5.2.3 Corporate Governance and Auditing 
Corporate governance and auditing received more public attention during 
and after the dot-com crash than during the GFC. We may therefore expect 
more distinct patterns of mimetic isomorphism around the earlier crisis. 
 
Auditor Change 
Firm-level data suggests two periods of increased numbers of firms changing 
their auditor (1.4.0): the dot-com crash of the early 2000s and the GFC of the 
late 2000s. However, there are two exceptions to this broad trend—British 
companies show no increase during the dot-com crash, while US firms show 
no increase during the GFC. Indeed, American firms appear to have very 
long-lasting ties to their auditors, with usually far less than 5% of firms 
changing auditor in any given year. This is much lower than in the other three 
countries, where an excess of 5% and in some cases, even 10% of firms change 
auditors during crises periods. 
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Figure 25: 1.4.0 Auditor Change 
While no distinct patterns can be observed for Swiss financial companies, 
industrial firms show a divergence-followed-by-convergence pattern in terms 
of auditor change (1.4.0). Practices diverge in 2003 at the tail end of the crisis 
in Switzerland, reaching the highest F-test value (4.978) for the entire 
observed period and in the only year where small and large Swiss industrial 
firms exhibit statistically significant differences on the measure (p<0.05), 
before converging again the year after. 2003 is also the high-water mark for 
Swiss firms changing their auditor, with 10% doing so that year, supporting 
the interpretation of change on this measure as mimetic isomorphism and 
consistent with B-1 and B-2. 
For German firms, the ANOVA results do not show a clear divergence or 
convergence pattern at the time of the dot-com crash, despite a surge of 
German firms changing auditors at the time. During the GFC, on the other 
hand, which coincided with another wave of German companies changing 
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convergence pattern can be observed consistent with B-1 and B-2. Here, small 
and large German industrial firms differed significantly (p<0.01) in terms of 
changing their auditors in 2008, reaching the highest F-test value (11.860) for 
the entire observed period, before contracting in 2009 and 2010 (average F-
test value 0.679). Interestingly, 2011 was another year with statistically 
significant differences between small and large firms’ behavior on this measure 
(F=4.256, p<0.05), despite the share of firms changing auditors in that year 
dropping to half of the 2009 peak. This would suggest a delayed response 
among some companies, e.g. some smaller companies changing auditor after 
the main wave. 
While some missing values and data structure on the categorical measure 
1.4.0 Auditor Change do not offer a full picture for British financial firms, British 
industrial companies diverge on the measure during the GFC before 
converging again from 2011 onwards. This coincides with the highest levels 
of firms changing auditors throughout the period between 2009 and 2011, 
when close to 10% of British firms changed auditors per year. These patterns 
support B-1 and B-2. The dot-com and Enron crises, however, did not lead 
to large scale auditor change or indeed distinct divergence and convergence 
patterns. This is surprising, in a sense, as the issue (S03 Auditor Change) was 
more salient in the UK during the earlier crisis than the latter one (salience 
peaking at 0.6% in 2002 and 0.3% in 2009). In other words, British companies 
resisted public discourse on the issue during the dot-com crash, eschewing 
large-scale auditor change, but were much more reactive during the GFC, 
despite the comparatively lower levels of salience. Keeping in mind that the 
UK avoided recession at the time of the dot-com crash, it stands to reason 
that public discourse alone may not be a sufficient trigger for firm-level change 
and mimetic isomorphism, but may need a severe crisis and the uncertainty it 
engenders to have an effect on corporate practices. 
For US firms, the the very low levels of firms changing auditors mean that no 
conclusions can be drawn for that issue. Despite the Enron auditing scandal 
taking place in the US and auditor change (S03) being by far the most salient 
there (0.3% in 2002 in the US compared to 0.1% in the other three countries), 
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American firms appear to be fairly reluctant to change their auditors (1.4.0). 
In 2000, just over 5% of US firms did so, which represents the highest level 
for the entire observed period, but remains far below the other three countries, 
which peak at various times at around 10% or more. As a result, data variation 
is too low to calculate ANOVAs for most years. 
In terms of sectoral differences, the results fail to substantiate B-3. No evidence 
of mimetism on auditor change among financial firms was found in any of the 
four countries. For industrial firms, the results point to mimetic isomorphism 
in Germany, Switzerland, and the UK, with data structure inhibiting to draw 
conclusions for the US. No patterns relating to changing international 
hierarchies or role models could be found (B-4). 
Turning to the effects of different types of mimetic isomorphism, auditor 
change appears to be driven by within and between-group mimetic 
isomorphism. The within-group results discussed above show processes of 
convergence on 1.4.0 in all countries except the US, where insufficient 
variation in data precludes the calculation of ANOVAs. There is also evidence 
of mimetism between financial and non-financials firms in Germany and the 
US. In Germany, this convergence between sectors occurs during both major 
crises, while evidence for the US suggests convergence during the dot-com 
crash only. On the international level, no evidence for convergence can be 
found. Hence, processes of mimetic isomorphism between small and large 
companies, but also between financial and industrial firms appear at play in 
driving increased rates of auditor change during the dot-com crash and GFC. 
 
Board-Level Governance 
The six measures of board-level governance used here generally show similar 
trends in the four countries, reflecting a move towards a similar understanding 
of what constitutes ‘good’ board governance. 
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Figure 26: 2.5.0 Board Size 
Patterns in board size (2.5.0) are fairly stable over time, but show a slight 
decrease in board size in all four countries of one to two board members on 
average over the observed period. Given these rather stable practices, it is 
unsurprising that evidence for mimetic isomorphism on board size is limited. 
Indeed, the only instance is in Switzerland, where small and large industrials 
are found to differ significantly on measure 2.5.0 Board Size between 2003 and 
2005 (p<0.05), before converging again from 2006. This coincides with a drop 
in the average size of Swiss boards from just below 10 directors in 2001 to 
about 8 directors in 2004, at which level it remained stable for the remainder 
of the observed period. While limited in scope, these results lend support for 
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Figure 27: 2.5.1 CEO on Board 
Presence of the CEO on the board (2.5.1) is the norm in the US, forbidden in 
Germany, overwhelmingly common in the UK, and increasingly rare in 
Switzerland. In the UK, the early 2000s are a period of change, with the share 
of companies where the CEO is on the board increasing from just under 80% 
in 2000 to 85% in 2002, where it has remained since. In Switzerland, the 
share has dropped from over 80% in 2000 to just under 30% in 2012, with 
the years immediately following the dot-com crisis and GFC as periods of 
accelerated change.  
For both countries, the periods of firm-level change correspond with periods 
of convergence between small and large companies on 2.5.1 CEO on Board, 
suggesting that within-group mimetic isomorphism is an important driver of 
these changes. In Switzerland this is evidence for financial and non-financial 
firms, in Britain only the latter, where the measure reaches the closest F-test 
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prior divergence, this supports B-2 only. There are no observed between-
group or international-level processes of mimetism on this measure. 
 
Figure 28: 2.5.2 CEO-Chairman Combined Role 
Combining the role of CEO and Chairman in one person (2.5.2) is generally 
seen as poor corporate governance, as it reduces independent oversight of the 
board and senior management. While the roles are separated by law in 
Germany, they are overwhelmingly separated in the UK, and increasingly 
separated in Switzerland. In the US combining CEO and Chairman in a 
single person is historically the norm, but has declined from over 80% in 2000 
to below 60% in 2012. Change thus occurs mostly in the US, particularly after 
the dot-com crisis and following the GFC, and in Switzerland after the early 
2000s crisis.  
The ANOVA results suggest that the changes in the US following the dot-
com crash are driven by within-group mimetic isomorphism. The data shows 
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when F-test values are closer to 1 than at any other time during the early to 
mid-2000s. The effect is more pronounced for non-financials, where F-test 
values in 2003 and 2004 are closer to 1 than at any other time during the 
decade. Both results support B-2. Changes in Switzerland do not appear to 
have been driven by mimetic isomorphism, as no convergence on the measure 
is evident there. The ANOVA results point to within-group mimetism among 
British industrial companies, which were found to diverge in 2002, reaching 
the highest F-test value for the entire time period (F=4.293, p<0.041), before 
converging in subsequent years. However, this is not reflected in firm-level 
data for 2.5.2, suggesting that smaller and larger UK firms became more 
similar on their approach to combining the role of CEO and Chairman 
without shifting average practice. Nevertheless, the British results are 
consistent with propositions B-1 and B-2. 
 
Figure 29: 2.5.3 Non-Executive Directors 
A higher share of non-executive directors on the board (2.5.3) is generally seen 
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board and its independence from day-to-day operations. While the issue is 
rather moot in Germany due to the mandatory board structure that requires 
the supervisory board to be fully composed of non-executive directors, the 
data shows steady growth in the share of NEDs in the other three countries. 
By the end of the period, Swiss and American firms converged on about 90% 
NEDs (starting from around 70% and 80% in 2000, respectively), while 
British firms had increased their share from just over 50% in 2000 to 70% at 
the end of the period—very close to German levels that remained unchanged 
throughout the period. The largest changes thus took place in Switzerland 
and the UK, in both cases mostly in the early to mid-2000s.  
For Switzerland, the ANOVA results do not find within-group mimetism on 
the measure, but do point to between-group mimetism for the period between 
2003 to 2007. The average F-test value for that period is 0.991 compared to 
3.510 for the prior three years and 5.147 for the following three years. In the 
UK, both within-group and between-group mimetism appears at play. 
Within-group ANOVA results show convergence between smaller and larger 
British industrial firms on the measure in the early 2000s, when measure 2.5.3 
reaches the closest F-test value to 1 for the entire period in 2002 (F=1.051, 
p<0.308). The between-group results point to convergence between financial 
and industrial firms between 2005 and 2008. For those four years, average F-
test values are 1.086, compared to 0.018 for the four years before and 0.087 
for the four years after. Hence, the results suggest convergence among 
industrial firms first, before wider convergence between sectors in Britain, 
supporting proposition B-2. These patterns are also in line with propositions 
B-5 and B-6, as processes of within-group and between-group mimetism 
appear to have driven the firm-level changes observed. 
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Figure 30: 2.5.4 Independent Non-Executive Directors 
In some ways, 2.5.4 Independent Non-Executive Directors shows similar patterns of 
change as the previous measure (2.5.3). An upwards trend towards a higher 
share of independent NEDs, which are seen as providing better, unconnected 
oversight, is evident in all four countries—although at almost microscopic 
levels in Germany. While the share of independent NEDs in British firms 
increased steadily over the time period from 45% in 2000 to just over 60% in 
2012, Swiss and American firms saw larger growth around the dot-com crash, 
rising from 20% in 2000 to 40% in 2004 in Switzerland, and 55% to 80% 
over the same period in the US.  
In both cases, processes of mimetic isomorphism are evident in that time 
period. In the US, within-group mimetism can be observed between small 
and large industrial firms after the dot-com crash, with convergence evident 
on 2.5.4 in 2003-04. Between-group mimetism is also evident between 2002 
and 2004. In that period, average F-test values are 0.670, which is closer to 1 
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(0.153). In Switzerland, there is no evidence for within-group mimetism, but 
for between-group convergence between 2000 and 2004, when average F-test 
values are 1.029, compared to 0.079 for the following four-year period. The 
convergence patterns in both countries support proposition B-2. The results 
therefore suggest that within and between-group mimetism drove the rapid 
increase of independent NEDs on Swiss and American boards, supporting 
propositions B-5 and B-6. 
British financial firms also exhibit ANOVA results consistent with mimetic 
isomorphism on variable 2.5.4, with data indicating statistically significant 
differences between small and large financials in 2002 (F=7.486, p<0.05) 
before converging somewhat in the years following. However, this is not 
reflected by significant significant changes in average firm behavior at the 
time. It is possible, of course, for processes of mimetic isomorphism to occur 
without shifting the overall means of the respective measures; in such a case, 
however, the resulting changes in firm practice would probably be too subtle 
to have much import on bottom-up change. Hence, a cautious interpretation 
of results would not count these results as strong support for propositions B-1 
and B-2. 
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Figure 31: 2.5.5 Female Directors 
The share of female directors on the board (2.5.5) has increased slowly, but 
steadily in the four countries. The US is more progressive on this measure of 
board diversity, with the share of women on the board rising from 13% in 
2000 to 20% by 2012. While the UK has mostly closed the gap with the US, 
increasing from 5% in 2000 to about 18% in 2012, Swiss and German firms 
lag behind on this measure. Here, the share of female directors has increased 
from 5% to just above 10% over the same period.  
Given these rather slow and steady changes, it is not surprising that the 
ANOVA results do not show distinctive patterns of mimetic isomorphism on 
this measure. The exception are British financial firms, which do appear to 
converge on 2.5.5 during the dot-com crash; however, this is not reflected by 
significant changes in the share of female directors at the time. 
From the above results, it is apparent that German firms do not show patterns 
that could be associated with mimetic isomorphism in corporate governance 
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governance system is quite different than that in the other three countries, 
mainly through its mandatory two-tier board structure and its 
consequences—CEO and Chairman are separated by definition, non-
executive directors are a feature of the two-tier board, and supervisory board 
size increases with company size due to mandatory codetermination rules. 
Consequently, many of the corporate governance measures used here either 
do not apply to the German case, or are non-issues of sorts due to the different 
systems. A second explanation for the relative lack of observed mimetism in 
German corporate governance could be that it was a much less salient issue 
during the dot-com crash in Germany than in the other three countries—
discourse for S10 Corporate Governance peaks at about 0.15% in Germany 
during/after the dot-com crash, while it reached 1.12% in the US, 0.45% in 
the UK, and 0.25% in Switzerland at the time. 
Turning to sectoral differences, the results for board-level governance fail to 
substantiate proposition B-3. The within-group ANOVA results find very 
little evidence of mimetic isomorphism among financial companies on these 
issues. Results for German and Swiss financial companies almost exclusively 
fail to find processes of mimetic isomorphism. British financial firms show 
patterns consistent with mimetic isomorphism on measures 2.5.4 Independent 
Non-Executive Directors and 2.5.5 Female Directors, however the lack of 
corresponding changes in the means of the measures casts doubt on to what 
extent the results are indeed indicative of mimetic isomorphism. The evidence 
for US financials is clearer, pointing to mimetic isomorphism on variable 2.5.2 
CEO-Chairman Combined Role.  
A very different picture, however, was found for industrial companies—
patterns of mimetic isomorphism are evident across most measures and 
countries. The results point to industrial firms imitating each other’s behavior 
on 2.5.0 Board Size (Switzerland), 2.5.1 CEO on Board (UK), 2.5.2 CEO-Chairman 
Combined Role (UK), 2.5.3 Non-Executive Directors (UK), and 2.5.4 Independent Non-
Executive Directors (US). Germany is the exception on this, with no evidence for 
mimetic isomorphism on corporate governance among industrial firms. 
Taken together, these findings do not support B-3; if anything they point to 
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the opposite—industrial firms may be more likely to imitate each other’s 
corporate governance practices than financial firms. 
Given the parallel evolution of board-level governance across the four 
countries, no patterns related to country models or international hierarchies, 
associated with proposition B-4, could be identified. 
5.3 Summary 
Overall, the analysis of firm-level patterns of change produced evidence of 
mimetic isomorphism in reaction to major crises and associated spikes in 
public discourse. While all cases of mimetic isomorphism found were 
connected to one of the two major crises and on salient issues, the reverse was 
not found to be true—a situation of crisis and high issue salience may be 
necessary, but not sufficient conditions for mimetic isomorphism to occur. 
The first issue of concern in this chapter was whether processes of mimetic 
isomorphism can be observed in issues that are highly salient during major 
crises, and whether they follow a divergence-followed-by-convergence 
pattern. The results generally support the associated propositions, but suggest 
that convergence may occur without prior divergence, providing more 
support for proposition B-2 than B-1. In other words, defection and associated 
spread of practices may not always take place when convergence is observed. 
Regarding sectoral differences, we expected to find more mimetic 
isomorphism in sectors that are highly exposed to international competition, 
i.e. the financial sector. The results generally failed to substantiate 
propositions B-3. While financials firms were indeed found to be more likely 
to imitate each other’s behavior on executive pay than their industrial peers, 
on risk-taking behavior, corporate governance and auditing the results suggest 
no higher rates of mimetism in finance; if anything the results for this issue 
point to the opposite—industrial firms may be more likely to imitate each 
other’s corporate governance practices than financial firms. 
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In terms of proposition B-4 on the reshuffling of international hierarchies 
during crises, the results did not produce sufficient evidence to conclusively 
support or reject the proposition. While patterns in bank capitalization 
practices show patterns consistent with the Anglo-Saxon model of low 
capitalization being replaced with the Swiss model of high capitalization as an 
international role model during the GFC, this is too isolated a case to provide 
convincing support for B-4. 
Examining the impact of three types of mimetic isomorphism on shifting 
corporate practices, the results generally supported propositions B-5, B-6, and 
B-7: between-group and international-level mimetism were found to be 
associated with more significant shifts in corporate behavior than within-
group mimetism. In terms of risk-taking behavior, international-level 
mimetism was found to drive the significant increases in bank capitalization 
(1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.0) during the GFC, as well as the shift from a trend towards 
increased leverage (1.2.0.1 and 1.2.2) pre-GFC towards deleveraging after the 
crisis. Both cases lend support to B-7. While relatively few instances of mimetic 
isomorphism were found on executive pay, between-group mimetism was 
found among American firms during the GFC, where executive pay declined 
most significantly of the four countries considered, providing support for B-6. 
In other words, the executive pay adjustments among US companies appear 
to have gone beyond evenly distributed, performance-bound change observed 
in the other countries, with financial and non-financial firms converging 
during the GFC on lower pay. Results on corporate governance and auditing 
also suggested that higher-order types of mimetic isomorphism are associated 
with larger changes in corporate practice. The comparatively rapid growth in 
the share of NEDs on the board (2.5.3) of Swiss and British firms following the 
dot-com crash and Enron scandal was found to be driven by within and 
between-group mimetism. Similarly, the high growth rates in the share of 
independent NEDs (2.5.4) on American and Swiss boards in the same period 
was also attributed to within and between-group mimetism. Both cases thus 
support propositions B-5 and B-6: while not radical in the sense of changing 
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the direction of trends, the periods of accelerated change were linked to 
between-group mimetic isomorphism. 
Taken together, these results provide strong support for the argument that 
higher-order forms of mimetic isomorphism, i.e. between-group or 
international-level, drive larger changes in firm behavior than within-group 
mimetism. By implication, we can expect firm-level change driven by 
between-group or cross-border to be more likely to translate into legal or 
regulatory change. For one, it could be argued that such higher-order 
mimetism increases the legitimacy of the new behavior, as it implies that 
behavior has converged across a broader section of the economy or even 
internationally. Secondly, as the results have shown, higher-order mimetism 
tends to produce more significant changes in firm behavior. The potentially 
higher perceived legitimacy and more substantial nature of corporate change 
on these issues should therefore make it more likely that policymakers and 
regulators accept those new behaviors as appropriate forms of compliance. 
Areas of corporate change driven by mimetic isomorphism are prime 
candidates for effecting change on the legal level—as the next chapter will 
explore. 
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6 Corporate Practice and Legal 
Change 
6.1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have shown how public discourse or political 
salience influence firm practices and how processes of mimetic isomorphism 
may induce convergence on new patterns in the behavior of corporations. The 
findings of the previous two chapters are, in other words, antecedents of 
bottom-up change—processes that induce widespread change in corporate 
practices, which may, in turn, bring about legal change or influence processes 
of legal change without direct lobbying of policymakers. Despite the 
literature’s increasing recognition of bottom-up change and fleshing out of the 
mechanisms of such change, it has not fully considered some important 
questions on bottom-up change that are of particular relevance for a time 
period that includes two major crises as events of uncertainty and potential 
triggers for corporate-level change:  
(1) How does political salience and public discourse affect bottom-up 
change?  
(2) How does the nature of severe crises impact bottom-up change?  
(3) How does the structure of the political system mediate bottom-up 
change?  
Fundamentally, these three issues are concerned with the conditions under 
which bottom-up change is more or less likely to affect the law. Drawing on 
insights from top-down change and other parts of the literature, five 
propositions on the questions above are made and discussed in the literature 
review. 
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The first proposition concerns the role of political salience. For top-down 
change, Culpepper (2011) has shown that the power of business to influence 
policymaking declines as an issue rises in public discourse and thus becomes 
more politically salient. As bottom-up change requires implied or explicit 
consent of regulators, courts or policymakers in order to make the changed 
behavior an accepted form of compliance, political salience is likely to play a 
role here too. When salience is low, regulators and policymakers may not pay 
much attention to shifts in how rules are interpreted on the firm level or how 
corporate behavior vis-a-vis those rules is changing. As a result, changed 
practices could become established and institutionalized, making it more 
likely that they become formally accepted as compliant with the rules. 
Corporate scandals, public outrage, or other events that increase issue 
salience, however, could lead to increased scrutiny of corporate practices and 
a clamp-down on deviant behavior. Generally, we may therefore expect the 
power of bottom-up change to decline as salience rises. 
Proposition C-1: Higher issue salience reduces the ability of bottom-up mechanisms to change 
formal institutions. 
The dynamics may be different, however, in times of severe crisis. Crises may 
offer a conducive environment for bottom-up change for two main reasons. 
First, processes of crisis-induced mimetic isomorphism can greatly accelerate 
the formation of ‘critical mass’ on the firm-level, shifting corporate behavior 
from previous norms to new ways of doing things. Especially where such 
mimetism occurs outside of the peer group or even internationally, it may 
change firm practices in significant ways, increasing the possibility that 
corporate practices push at the boundaries of the law. In other words, major 
crises may increase the ‘supply’ of bottom-up change.  
Proposition C-2: Severe crises increase the ‘supply’ of bottom-up change as they trigger change 
in corporate practices and accelerate the formation of new norms of behavior. 
Severe crises may also increase the likelihood of changes in corporate practices 
leading to legal change. This is conceivable for two reasons. First, resource 
and agenda-setting constraints of policymakers may crowd out low-salience 
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issues during a crisis (Kingdon 1995), opening a window of opportunity to 
establish new forms of compliance ‘under the radar,’ i.e. while governments 
are occupied with higher-priority problems. Second, even when issues are 
salient and policymakers have to dedicate resources to those issues, they may 
be more inclined to accept changes in firm behavior as signs of effective self-
regulation. Policymakers, especially those of a pro-business disposition, may 
be more willing to accept such ‘self-regulation’ in lieu of formal regulation in 
times of crisis, as it frees their agendas at a time of competing priorities (Mayer 
2013). As a result of these factors, crises may enhance the influence of 
corporations through bottom-up processes of change—unlike in the political 
arena, where crises tend to lower the power of corporate actors (Culpepper 
2011). 
Proposition C-3: In times of severe crisis, bottom-up change may be more likely to lead to 
legal change than in non-crisis situations, regardless of issue salience. 
The impact of bottom-up change on formal institutions may also be enhanced 
in times of severe crisis due to institutional ‘softening.’ Institutional strength 
can be seen as comprising of two dimensions—enforcement and stability 
(Levitsky & Murillo 2009). Highly developed nations typically feature high 
enforcement and high stability, but crises can chip away at both. Weak 
enforcement of rules can result from ‘symbolic policymaking’ as a way of 
signaling to the public that the government is doing what is morally right, e.g. 
by clamping down on excessive risk-taking, while at the same time putting 
business interests at ease by implementing weak monitoring and enforcement 
mechanisms (Suárez 2014). Instability could arise from quickly-designed 
‘emergency legislation’ that does not give actors enough time to calculate its 
potential impact and how it affects their interests, increasing resistance to the 
new rules. Adopting perceived ‘best practice’ regulation or policies from other 
countries could also undermine institutional stability—while such institutional 
imports may boost confidence among businesses, investors and consumers, 
they may be a poor fit with the domestic institutional context and hence 
vulnerable to further change. 
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Proposition C-4: Institutional softening may enhance the impact of bottom-up modes of 
change in times of crisis. 
The impact of bottom-up change is also likely to be mediated by structural 
features of the political system, which formally defines some aspects of the 
relationship between different actors and their power relations. We can 
differentiate between two main forms of organization of the political system: 
centralized and decentralized, the former with law-making in the legislative 
or executive branches and central enforcement, the latter with law-making 
extending to multiple, including private, agents (Milhaupt & Pistor 2008). The 
UK is considered a typical case of a highly centralized system, allowing a 
government holding a majority in the lower house (House of Commons) 
relatively unencumbered power over the law-making process given the weak 
role of the upper house (House of Lords) and the rubber-stamping process of 
Royal assent. The US is a prime example of a decentralized system, with 
extensive separation of powers and a system of ‘checks and balances.’ 
Germany and Switzerland are somewhat more mixed cases. Although a 
federal republic that requires compromising between the central government 
and states, Germany is best categorized as a centralized system as executive 
and legislative powers are relatively closely intertwined compared to the US 
stronger separation. Switzerland is best described as a decentralized system, 
as a fairly devolved federal republic and strong elements of direct democracy. 
We may expect decentralized systems to be more receptive to bottom-up 
change. In such systems, power is less concentrated and policymaking more 
open to actors outside central government. As a result, policymaking is more 
open to disruption from a variety of actors, increasing the chances that some 
actors recognize firm-level change as sufficient self-regulation or as an 
acceptable form of compliance. Furthermore, the more complex and 
disruption-prone policymaking process in decentralized systems is also likely 
to soak up more governmental resources, hence exacerbating the previously 
discussed resource and agenda-setting constraints that may increase the 
efficacy of bottom-up change. 
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Proposition C-5: Higher decentralization of the political system increases the efficacy of 
bottom-up change. 
This chapter compares major legal changes and important legislative or 
regulatory signals with changes observed on the firm level across the three 
institutional spheres. Changes that only occur on either the legal or the firm 
level are considered, but the main focus is on cases where change takes place 
on both levels in order to explore directionality and type of change, and how 
it is mediated by public discourse, crisis, and the structure of the political 
system.  
The structure of the chapter follows the three main institutional spheres 
included in this study and the sub-issue areas within. Finance and corporate 
governance were chosen as tightly interconnected areas that have taken blame 
as causal factors in creating the GFC. Bank capitalization, corporate risk-
taking behavior, and executive compensation became salient issues during or 
in the wake of the crisis, creating incentives for policymakers to target these 
areas for reform as well as for companies to change their behavior in order to 
signal compliance and proactivity to regulators and the public. 
Generally, each section first provides an overview of major legal and 
regulatory reforms or significant reform proposals across the four countries, 
before delving into the corresponding firm-level data and analyzing 
connections between changes on the legal and firm levels. Findings from the 
previous chapters on public discourse/issue salience and processes of mimetic 
isomorphism are incorporated where relevant. The analysis primarily draws 
on timing of changes, their directionality, and discussion of plausible and likely 
relationships. In order to support proposition C-1, we would expect to find 
bottom-up change more frequently when issues are of low political salience 
than when they are highly salient. Proposition C-2 will be evaluated based on 
the previous empirical chapters’ findings as well as the legal and regulatory 
changes to be discussed here—in order to support this proposition, we would 
expect the cases of bottom-up change found to be primarily rooted in firm-
level change brought about by crisis-induced mimetism. To substantiate C-3, 
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we would expect most cases of bottom-up change found to be rooted, if not 
completed, during a crisis, and these cases to be on high and low-salience 
issues alike. Evidence supporting proposition C-4 could take the shape of 
successful instances of bottom-up change enabled by ‘symbolic policymaking’ 
with high-profile announcements followed by weak attempts to implement 
legal change, or importing of ‘best practice’ regulation from abroad. To 
substantiate C-5, we would expect to find bottom-up change occurring more 
frequently in the decentralized political systems of the US and Switzerland 
than in the UK and Germany’s centralized systems. 
6.2 Results 
Results are discussed on an issue-by-issue basis, beginning with finance and 
accounting, before turning to corporate governance, and ending with labor 
relations. While these institutional spheres and the sub-issues therein were 
chosen for their connection to the GFC and are thus relevant across all four 
countries, in some countries certain issues did not see any meaningful legal or 
regulatory change over the period covered. This is noted where applicable. 
6.2.1 Finance & Accounting 
6.2.1.1 Risk-Taking Behavior 
6.2.1.1.1 The Basel Accords 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) is a banking 
supervision authority founded by the central banks of the G-10 countries in 
1974, including all four countries included in this study. The Committee has 
issued three major sets of recommendations for supervision of the banking 
sector: Basel I, Basel II, and Basel III, collectively referred to as the Basel 
Accords. While the BCBS does not have the power to enforce these rules, the 
BCBS member countries implement the Basel rules—generally with only 
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minor adaptation—and enforce them within their jurisdiction (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2015).  
The Basel I rules were finalized in 1988 and implemented in 1992, placing 
them outside the time period considered here. Nevertheless, it is important to 
note briefly the aims and scope of Basel I, as they provide important context 
for later developments. The first set of Basel rules was created in response to 
Latin American debt crisis of the 1980s, which exposed the inadequacy of 
capital held by international banks and created consensus among BCBS 
members for the need of a common approach to risk management and a level 
playing field in terms of capital requirements (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2015). Hence, Basel I was meant to “provide adequate capital to 
guard against risk in the creditworthiness of a bank’s loan book. It does not 
mandate capital to guard against risks such as fluctuations in a nation’s 
currency, changes in interest rates, and general macroeconomic downturns” 
(Balin 2008, p.2). Guarding against these latter risks was left to national 
regulators. More generally, however, Basel I left plenty of leeway for banks to 
exploit the rigid risk-weighing rules to their advantage and take on more risk: 
“the limited scope and general language of Basel I gives banks excessive 
leeway in their interpretation of its rules, and, in the end, allows financial 
institutions to take improper risks and hold unduly low capital reserves” (Balin 
2008, p.1).  
A new set of capital requirement rules for banks was first proposed by the 
BCBS in June 1999, aimed at replacing the 1988 Basel I Accord and fixing its 
shortcomings. The main purpose of this new set of rules was “to improve the 
way regulatory capital requirements reflect underlying risks and to better 
address the financial innovation that had occurred in recent years” (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2015, p.3). What the BCBS 
diplomatically refers to as ‘financial innovation’ are essentially the techniques 
banks used to skirt the Basel I rules, including sale of securitized assets and 
swapping long-term debt for short-term non-OECD debt (Balin 2008). The 
announcement of new rules to directly address those issues in June 1999 is 
therefore an important signal to banks in the four countries—the specter of 
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further regulation brought on by their own inadequate capitalization. Basel II 
also sought to integrate interest, market, and operational risk, which had been 
left out of Basel I.  
The Basel II rules were finalized in July 2006 after a protracted seven-year 
deliberation period, during which American and British regulators won two 
major concessions (Balin 2008):  
(1) banks would be allowed and actively incentivized to implement their 
own internal risk evaluation methods; and  
(2) the Accord would only apply to major international banks rather than 
all banks.  
Full national-level implementation of Basel II was agreed for the end of 2008. 
Even at the time, some shortcomings became obvious. As Balin (2008) argues, 
Basel II relies too heavily on rating agencies, leading to less diversification of 
the loan portfolio and a ‘race to the bottom’ whereby rating agencies are 
pressured to give favorable ratings, inflating banks’ risk exposure. 
Furthermore, internal risk measurement, based on expectations of future 
returns, incentivizes pro-cyclical lending, which “will tend to amplify 
recessions and perhaps spur inflation during periods of high economic 
growth” (Balin 2008, p.16). 
Two of the three bank capitalization measures used in this study are related 
to Basel II. 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio measures the core capital banks hold 
against risk-weighted assets. Unchanged from Basel I, Basel II requires a 
minimum ratio of 4%. Including tier 1 capital as well as the slightly lower 
quality tier 2 capital, 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio is a wider measure of bank 
capitalization. Basel II requires a minimum of 8% on this measure.  
In stark contrast to Basel II, Basel III went from proposal to final version very 
quickly—unsurprising perhaps given the urgency with which the rules were 
drafted and finalized at the height of the GFC. The subprime mortgage crisis 
of 2007 and the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 were clear 
signs that Basel II was inadequate, and that the “banking sector had entered 
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the financial crisis with too much leverage and inadequate liquidity buffers. 
These defects were accompanied by poor governance and risk management, 
as well as inappropriate incentive structures” (Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 2015, p.4). From this context, Basel III aims to improve bank 
resilience to economic and financial shocks, risk management and 
governance, and enhance transparency and disclosure. Basel III should 
therefore be seen as a direct regulatory response to the GFC. The speed of its 
conception gave banks only a very short window of opportunity to influence 
the rules and win concessions similar to those won during the creation of Basel 
II. From first concrete proposals in July 2009, Basel III was finalized only 18 
months later in December 2010. Implementation was agreed to be completed 
by the end of 2017, with most changes phased-in starting in 2013. 
All three bank capitalization measures used are related to Basel III. A main 
target of the new Accord, requirements on 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio are 
increased from 4% under Basel II to 6% minimum under Basel III. This was 
phased-in over a period of three years, requiring 4.5% from 2013, 5.5% from 
2014, and the full 6.0% from 2015 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 
2011). Although real-world tier 1 capitalization of banks tends to be much 
higher than the regulatory minimums, with investors often requiring 1.5 to 2 
times the regulatory minimum, the increase in the minimum should still result 
in proportional real-world increases. The wider 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio is still 
part of Basel III, but the minimum has not increased from 8% compared to 
Basel II. This highlights the emphasis of the latest Basel rules of increasing 
highest quality capital and thus resilience to unforeseen shocks. Hence, this 
measure does not carry regulatory pressure around the GFC, but banks may 
still seek to increase their total capital ratio as a preemptive measure or signal 
to regulators and investors. A new measure in the Basel III Accord, 1.2.0 Tier 
1 Leverage Ratio is a similar bank capitalization measure to 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio, but uses a different denominator—here, assets are not risk-weighted. 
Basel III mandates a minimum of 3%, but sets higher requirements for 
systemically important banks. As part of the US implementation of the Basel 
accords, the US Federal Reserve mandates 6% for eight systemically 
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important banks, as announced in July 2013. It is implemented on trial basis 
until full implementation in 2018. We may thus expect some anticipatory 
effects on the firm level as banks begin to adjust in advance of the 
implementation date. 
The firm-level results do not find evidence of bottom-up change affecting the 
Basel II rules, but the patterns are consistent with firm practices influencing 
Basel III. 
 
Figure 32: 1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio (annotated) 
While the announcement of Basel II in June 1999 took place shortly before 
the dot-com crash unfolded, the crisis was long over by the time the rules were 
finalized in July 2006. Hence, most Basel II deliberations occurred in times of 
growth rather than crisis and at a time when neither banking regulation (S01) 
nor risk-taking behavior of companies (S02) were salient issues (Germany is an 
exception here and discussed later). These are conditions that should allow 
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(Culpepper 2011). Indeed, this appears to have been the case, as the example 
of American and British regulators winning important pro-business 
concessions in the Basel II negotiations mentioned earlier, illustrates. Bank 
capitalization behavior, meanwhile, changed very little on the two Basel II-
related measures (1.1.1 Tier 1 Capital Ratio and 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio) 
between announcement and finalization of Basel II. Between finalization and 
implementation of Basel II by the end of 2008, banks in the three lower-
capitalized countries (Germany, UK, and US) increased their tier 1 and total 
capitalization upwards. While this coincides with the beginning of the GFC 
and could thus also reflect banks anticipating and preparing for the crisis, 
these patterns are consistent with typical top-down institutional change—rules 
being changed in the political arena with some lobbying by business interests, 
and firm-level adjustments following the new rules. 
As noted, Germany is an outlier in the Basel II period. German banks 
increased their tier 1 capital (1.1.1) and total capital (1.1.2) in the early 2000s, 
which coincided with a period of increased public discourse on risk-taking 
behavior of banks and firms (S02). The most plausible explanation for this is 
Germany’s weak economic performance at the time, coupled with billion 
Euro write-downs in some of Germany’s largest banks (Commerzbank, Hypo 
Vereinsbank) and a wave of corporate insolvencies, leading banks to decrease 
lending and boost capital in anticipation of losses (Die Welt 2002; Eigendorf 
2002). It is therefore likely to be a reflection of the crisis in German banking 
and the wider economy, rather than Basel II. 
Comparing firm-level change in bank capitalization to the introduction of the 
Basel III rules shows patterns consistent with processes of bottom-up change. 
The previous chapter found evidence of mimetic isomorphism on bank 
capitalization during the GFC in all four countries, both within countries and 
between them. Across the different capitalization measures, bank behavior 
spread in 2008 with the onset of the GFC before converging in 2009, when 
the first Basel III proposals were published, on significantly higher 
capitalization levels than before. Hence, the Basel III rules could be seen as 
merely formalizing through international regulation what firms have already 
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done. In fact, the Basel III rules raised core capital requirements by the same 
relative amount (50% increase from 4% under Basel II to 6% under Basel III) 
as banks had already done—ignoring Switzerland, which has higher 
capitalization throughout the period and showed no adjustments around the 
GFC, average tier 1 capitalization (1.1.1) rose from 9.7% in 2006 to 14.9% in 
2009, also a 50% increase. 
 
Figure 33: 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio (annotated) 
The wider capitalization measure 1.1.2 Total Capital Ratio shows similar 
patterns. Between 2006 and 2009, average total capitalization across the four 
countries rose from 15.3% to 19.1%—a 25% increase. On this measure, 
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Figure 34: 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio (annotated) 
Data for 1.2.0 Tier 1 Leverage Ratio also supports the interpretation of Basel III 
being reactive to firm-level changes rather than the other way around. By the 
time Basel III was proposed, banks in the US, UK and Switzerland already 
comfortably exceeded the proposed Basel III minimum of 3%, with average 
tier 1 leverage in the three countries at 8.7% in 2009. Germany’s banks fared 
lower on this measure in 2009 at 4.2%, but significantly adjusted upward 
between the Basel III proposal and its finalization (5.8% in 2010). While the 
German case is thus best seen as reactive to the regulatory proposal, the other 
three countries support the view of Basel III merely formalizing firm-level 
change. 
Taken together, these results support the propositions made as far as they are 
applicable. The Basel II introduction appears to have taken place in a mostly 
top-down way, with no evidence of firm-level change in capitalization or 
mimetic isomorphism taking place. This is unsurprising, given the low-
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at the time. In other words, in the absence of crisis (at least at the later stages 
of the Basel II deliberations) and public discourse, no significant firm-level 
changes took place that could influence policymaking from the bottom-up. 
Instead, organized business interests successfully pushed for concessions in the 
political arena—a typical low-salience top-down process of change 
(Culpepper 2011). With Basel III, on the other hand, the results support a 
bottom-up interpretation. The significant changes on the firm-level during the 
GFC, driven by processes of mimetic isomorphism, are an important 
precursor to bottom-up change and support proposition C-2. Given that 
regulatory change took place after these significant firm-level changes and at 
similar levels, unimpeded by high issue salience during the GFC, the results 
also support proposition C-3. As the Basel III changes took place during a 
severe crisis, proposition C-1 does not apply; neither do C-4 and C-5 as a 
revision to an internationally coordinated regulation that all four countries 
had applied before. 
6.2.1.1.2 Country-Specific Financial Market Reforms 
Further to the Basel Accords, which affect all four countries examined here 
very similarly, there are also more country-specific financial market reforms 
to consider. Related to the GFC are efforts to separate or insulate investment 
from retail banking. This was mooted only in the US and UK, possibly 
because the two countries found themselves at the center of the financial 
meltdown. The issue is considered here due to its direct relevance to bank 
capitalization and risk-taking behavior—universal banking that combines 
investment and retail banking is riskier, as losses sustained in the investment 
side of the business may affect the retail business and hence the savings of 
average bank customers. To put it differently, the mere mention of separating 
investment and retail banking sends a strong signal to financial firms that 
regulators consider their practices to be too risky. Germany has experienced 
a series of financial market reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s, which bear 
discussing. Switzerland has not experienced any significant financial market 
reforms beyond the Basel rules discussed earlier. 
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United States 
The Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA), also known as the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999, repealed the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 that had 
separated investment and retail banking in the US. Universal banking, 
combining commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance was thus 
permitted again. While a landmark legislation without doubt, in many ways 
GLBA was merely the end result of a 20-year period of chipping away at 
Glass-Steagall, through financial firms increasingly finding ways of working 
around the restrictions as well as piecemeal regulatory changes blurring the 
sharp lines drawn by Glass-Steagall (Deeg 2012). 
The primary regulatory response to the GFC in the US was the Dodd–Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010. Passed within a 
year after being proposed, Dodd-Frank introduced several important reforms 
to financial regulation, including the creation of the Financial Stability 
Oversight Council tasked with monitoring and ensuring the stability of the 
overall US financial system. The council has the power to place non-bank 
financial firms under regulation of the Federal Reserve, whose remit was 
expanded to “regulate mega bank holding companies and designated non-
bank financial companies through, inter alia, risk-based capital and leverage 
limits that include off-balance-sheet activities and are countercyclical, 
increasing in times of economic expansion and decreasing during economic 
contractions” (Deeg 2012, p.1264). The Dodd-Frank reforms also include 
what is referred to as the Volcker Rule—banning proprietary trading, i.e. 
banks owning or investing in hedge funds or private equity funds for their own 
profit, thus curbing one form of risk-taking of banks. Among the other changes 
enacted by the law are increased regulation of derivatives, insurance 
companies, and credit rating agencies (Huntington 2010). Non-binding ‘say 
on pay’ rules instituted by Dodd-Frank are discussed below in the 
corresponding section. 
We could therefore reasonably expect banks to reduce risk in an effort to 
signal improved behavior to regulators and head of deeper changes. The firm-
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level data, however, does not show such patterns—at least not on the three 
measures of bank capitalization used here (1.1.1, 1.1.2, and 1.2.0). American 
banks slightly decreased capitalization on all three measures in the year-long 
run-up to the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010. While banking 
regulation (S01) and risk-taking behavior (S02) were still salient issues in 2010, 
the regulatory threat did apparently not induce firm-level adjustments beyond 
the massive increases in capitalization between 2007 and 2009. There are two 
ways of looking at this: First, banks may not have had the ability to further 
increase capitalization after just having made significant increases, or they 
may have deemed their prior adjustments sufficient. In this case, we can 
regard the 2007-2009 capital increase as pre-Dodd-Frank adjustments. 
Second, banks may have adjusted in other ways that are not captured by the 
capitalization measures used here. In either case, the Dodd-Frank Act was 
passed and contained some fairly major reforms—including the ban on 
proprietary trading. From a historic perspective, however, it could well be 
argued that the Dodd-Frank reforms were limited. They did not separate 
commercial and investment banking, as the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 had 
done, nor did they try to contain contagion through a ‘ring-fence’ as the 
British response would go on to do (discussed below). In other words, the firm-
level changes may well have tamed the Dodd-Frank Act to some extent, but 
some ambiguity remains. 
 
United Kingdom 
In reaction to the GFC, the UK government launched an inquiry in 2010 
tasked with reviewing the stability of the British banking sector and issuing 
structural and non-structural reform recommendations. The Independent 
Commission on Banking (ICB), chaired by Sir John Vickers, produced its final 
report in September 2011 (Vickers et al. 2011). The ICB’s headline 
recommendations to the UK government are the creation of a ‘ring-fence’ to 
separate retail from investment banking activities, higher capital 
requirements, giving preference to depositors in case of insolvency, and more 
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competitive retail banking. Most of these recommendations, as well as a 
tougher oversight and certification regime for senior bank staff that makes 
reckless mismanagement a criminal offense, have become law through the 
Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013, albeit only in broad-brush 
terms. Details on the functioning of the ring-fence, for instance, remain to be 
determined through secondary legislation before the target implementation 
date of 2019. The long timeframe and leeway in implementation open the 
door to potential watering down of the legislation’s actual impact. Indeed, this 
appears to be taking place, with banks winning concessions over ring-fencing 
rules that weaken its cost to businesses, but also its potential utility (Dunkley 
& Binham 2015). 
Between the launch of the Vickers inquiry in 2010 and passage of the 
Financial Services Act in 2013, British banks increased their capitalization by 
about one percentage point on all three measures. While certainly not a 
significant increase, a similar argument can be made here as in the US case—
the fact that UK banks did not return to pre-crisis levels of capitalization, even 
on measures that did not see increased minimums under Basel III, is notable 
in its own right and may explain the less-than-radical nature of the reforms 
and the watering down of their actual impact before implementation. 
If we accept the banking industry reforms in the US and UK as at least 
partially influenced by the practices of banks in the two countries, the results 
are consistent with the propositions applicable. The US changes that took 
place during and immediately after the GFC support C-2, as the crisis-induced 
processes of mimetic isomorphism had changed bank capitalization 
significantly, as well as C-3 accepting that the Dodd-Frank Act was less radical 
than historic or contemporary equivalents. The UK banking sector overhaul 
was initiated at a later stage of the crisis and more prolonged, thus taking place 
at a time of lower issue salience of banking reform and risk-taking than the 
US equivalent. Keeping in mind that the UK’s ring-fencing is significant, but 
was watered down before implementation, the results support C-1—declining 
salience appeared to increase the impact of bottom-up change, which was 
supplied by firm-level capitalization increases galvanized by the GFC, 
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supporting C-2. As the policies underlying the British reforms were hashed 
out at the tail end of the crisis in the Vickers Report, they are also likely to be 
weaker than reforms worked out during non-crisis situations. This would be 
another explanation for why and how firms were able to reduce the severity 
of the ‘ring-fence’ before implementation, supporting C-4. Comparing the US 
and UK cases, the patterns observed are consistent with British banks 
influencing banking reforms to larger extent than their American 
counterparts. As Britain is a more centralized system than the US, this does 
not support proposition C-5 and indeed finds the opposite. However, given 
the different implementation time frames and circumstances elaborated 




German financial markets were transformed through a series of Financial 
Market Promotion Acts. The first two in 1990 and 1994 took place before the 
time period covered, but essentially lowered taxes on financial transactions, 
established investment funds, and moved from self-regulation of the sector 
towards a single national financial markets regulator. The 1998 and 2002 
reforms enabled a wide-scale shift away from Germany’s traditional debt-
based corporate financing system towards an equity-based system by allowing 
firms to use international accounting standards, restricting share price 
manipulation, and eliminating taxes on long-term equity stakes held by banks 
or companies (Jackson & Sorge 2012). The latter change in particular 
heralded the significant weakening of German cross-shareholdings, allowing 
banks to free up capital to become Anglo-Saxon-style investment banks and 
allowing (or forcing) industrial firms to raise more financing on equity markets 
than before. While these changes have ramifications on German firms’ 
shareholder structure, we may also expect to see changes in German firms’ 
debt-equity ratio, as measured by 1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio and 1.2.2 
Balance Sheet Leverage. 
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Figure 35: 1.2.1 Financial Debt-Equity Ratio (annotated) 
The firm-level data suggests that the financial market reforms in Germany 
unfolded from the top down. As is evident from measure 1.2.1, German firms 
increased their reliance on debt up until the passage of the 2002 Financial 
Market Promotion Act, from which point onwards debt declined somewhat—
the GFC, however, pushed debt levels significantly upwards again, as it did in 
all four countries. These developments are commensurate with the 
significance of the legal reforms discussed above—the 2002 Act was most 
significant on the legal level in incentivizing equity financing, which is 
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Figure 36: 1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage (annotated) 
The conceptually similar, but wider measure 1.2.2 shows the same patterns in 
German firms, albeit at a more compressed level due to the measure also 
including non-financial liabilities. Furthermore, the absence of mimetic 
isomorphism on measures 1.2.0.1., 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 at the time—despite the 
marked rise in salience of corporate risk-taking behavior (S02)—suggests that 
firm-level processes of change are unlikely to have influenced the German 
financial market reforms. 
6.2.1.2 Accountability & Transparency 
Audit Rotation Rules 
Large companies often have long-standing business relationships with their 
auditors, sometimes lasting decades. These relationships have been described 
as ‘too cozy’ and potentially harming the objectivity and thoroughness of 
audits, leading some to blame auditing firms for failing to foresee the bank 
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became a target for regulatory action fairly soon after the GFC. The EU first 
announced its intention to enforce auditor rotation in late 2011 in order to 
improve audit quality (Barker & A. Jones 2011). These early proposals also 
threatened a break-up of the big four auditing firms—a threat that was later 
dropped but that nonetheless sent a strong signal to audit firms and their client 
firms alike that change was needed. In late 2013, the EU’s regulation efforts 
became more concrete, requiring auditor rotation after 10 years. If put out to 
tender, the client may choose the same auditor for a further 10 years, hence 
allowing a total of 20 years with the same auditor (Fleming 2013). The reforms 
were adopted in April 2014 and will come into effect in 2016, affecting British 
and German firms directly. Some firms in those two countries may have 
started changing their behavior in anticipation of these reforms (Fleming & A. 
Smith 2014), perhaps to signal their prudence and accountability to investors 
and regulators, making 1.4.0 Auditor Change a good measure of anticipatory 
and preemptive firm-level change. 
Neither Switzerland nor the US have mandatory audit rotation rules. Large 
Swiss firms are required to change the lead audit partner every seven years, 
however this refers to the personally responsible partner in an audit firm who 
signs the audit report, not the audit firm (Baird & Renz 2014). So far, Swiss 
regulators have not signaled intentions to adopt the EU model or any other 
tightening of auditor rules.  
In the US, mandatory audit rotation was considered for inclusion in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), following the Enron scandal and other 
high-profile corporate auditing failures. However, Congress decided against 
it at the time, commissioning the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) to 
produce a report on the potential effects of mandatory audit rotation rules. 
This report found that audit firms as well as large American corporations are 
strongly rejecting the idea of mandatory audit rotation over cost concerns and 
loss of company-specific expertise gained by long-standing audit relationships. 
Furthermore, the GAO recommended to wait several years to see whether 
some of the SOX-reforms, including mandatory audit partner rotation every 
seven years, auditor independence, and other measures would achieve the 
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same ends with a less interventionist and less costly approach (United States 
General Accounting Office 2003). In this sense, the GAO report represents a 
signal to auditors and their client firms that regulators expect to see 
improvements in practice and are willing to legislate should firm-level change 
not materialize. In 2011, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB), an oversight body created through SOX that regulates the audit 
profession, revived the debate by suggesting that mandatory audit rotation 
could become part of a reform package for the industry (Chasan 2011). Within 
two years, however, Congress passed an amendment to SOX that prohibits 
the PCAOB from requiring companies to use specific auditors or to mandate 
audit rotation. Policymakers justified their ‘preemptive strike’ based on 
concerns that such rules would be detrimental to business and an overreach 
of the PCAOB’s authority, but also directly stated that it was intended as a 
reaction and signal to the EU’s mandatory audit rotation rules (Chasan 2011; 
Chasan 2014). 
British regulators reacted to the high-profile corporate failures in the US and 
the passage of SOX by commissioning an inquiry chaired by Sir Robert Smith 
(2003) on “Audit Committees and Combined Code Guidance.” The Smith 
Report dealt with one of the key areas of failure in the Enron and Arthur 
Andersen debacle: the role of audit committees and auditor independence. 
Smith strongly backed the non-prescriptive ‘comply or explain’ approach of 
the UK corporate governance system and in his guidance emphasized the 
responsibility of audit committees to review the effectiveness of a company’s 
internal audit function, the terms of engagement with the external auditor as 
well as reviewing the auditor’s effectiveness and independence, and to develop 
and implement policy on provision of non-audit services by the auditor. 
These various reforms can be grouped into two periods: 2002-03 following 
the dot-com crash and Enron scandal, and 2011-13 following the GFC. Both 
periods of legal change also correspond with periods of firm-level change on 
measure 1.4.0 Auditor Change, but the data suggests that corporate practices 
may have influenced legal change more after the dot-com crash than 
following the GFC. 
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Figure 37: 1.4.0 Auditor Change (annotated) 
In the US, the three years between 2000 and 2002 show the highest levels of 
companies changing their auditors throughout the observed time period, at 
around 5% of companies doing so per year. These firm-level changes were 
likely driven by mimetic isomorphism, induced by the crisis and high levels of 
public discourse on auditor change (S03) and the big four accounting firms 
(S03Alt), as discussed in the previous chapter. The SOX reforms, passed in 
2002, notably mooted mandatory audit rotation, but did not legislate it, 
instead commissioning the GAO report released the following year, which 
laid the issue to rest for good in the US. Given this sequence of events—
American firms comparatively high levels of auditor change before the 
passage of SOX—it is plausible that at least some of the weakening of SOX 
and the ensuing GAO report are due to bottom-up change influencing 
policymakers. The US case therefore provides support for proposition C-2, as 
the dot-com crisis and mimetic isomorphism galvanized corporate behavior 
around higher rates of auditor change. Taking place during the aftermath of 
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the dot-com crash and Enron collapse, this instance of bottom-up change also 
supports proposition C-3. 
While audit rotation received no regulatory attention in Europe at the time of 
the dot-com crash, the issue became the target of EU proposals after the GFC. 
European companies more frequently changed their auditors during and after 
the GFC, driven at least in Germany and the UK by mimetic isomorphism. 
Yet, despite European companies’ rather pro-active approach to shaking up 
their auditor relationships, the EU introduced their mandatory auditor 
change proposal in 2011 and finalized it in 2013—worth noting, however, is 
the sharp decline in companies changing auditors between these two dates. It 
therefore appears that the crisis initiated a wave of auditor changes, even in 
absence of a pronounced salience increase on related issues (S03, S03Alt), 
while the specific regulatory threat in 2011 did not. This is consistent with the 
findings of the previous chapter, in that the conditions created by a major 
crisis may be necessary for widespread corporate change to occur. In other 
words, despite the wave of auditor change at the height of the GFC creating 
supply of bottom-up change (supporting C-2), it failed to avert the 
introduction of the EU’s reform proposal, by which time the conditions had 
changed enough to preclude further firm-level adjustments. Hence, the 
findings also support C-3, as bottom-up change did not lead to legal change 
(by way of averting it) outside the immediate crisis situation. 
American firms, by comparison, behaved very differently during the GFC 
with the rate of US firms changing auditors close to nil from the mid-2000s 
onwards, showing no reaction to the crisis. In a parallel to the EU, US firms 
were also subject to a regulatory reform proposal in 2011, when the PCAOB, 
the accounting industry regulator, announced their intention to introduce 
mandatory audit rotation. However, this was struck down by Congress 
through essentially banning the PCAOB from ever enacting such 
requirements. Given the complete absence of firm-level change on measure 
1.4.0 in the US, it is clear that this cannot be due to bottom-up change, but 
was most likely a striking victory for business interests directly influencing the 
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policymaking process—as we may expect outside the immediate crisis 
situation and with low political salience on the issue (Culpepper 2011). 
 
6.2.2 Corporate Governance 
This section first provides an overview of the origins and contemporary 
context of corporate governance in the four countries, making reference to 
major legislation and reforms. Specific impacts and comparisons with firm-
level data are drawn in the sub-sections to follow. 
 
United Kingdom 
The UK has been at the forefront of developing the modern understanding 
of corporate governance, introducing a comprehensive code of best practice 
ten years prior to the other three countries. The central piece in the UK’s 
development of corporate governance standards was the Cadbury Report 
published in 1992. Following a string of high-profile governance failures 
(Maxwell Communications, BCCI, Polly Peck), Sir Adrian Cadbury was 
tasked with chairing “a committee whose aims were to investigate the British 
corporate governance system and to suggest improvements restore investor 
confidence in the system” (Arcot & Bruno 2006, p.5). The Cadbury 
Committee was set up in mid-1991 as a joint effort between the Financial 
Reporting Council, London Stock Exchange, and accountancy profession. 
While the FRC is partly government-funded, the Cadbury Committee can 
largely be seen as a private sector initiative. 
The final version of the Cadbury Report (Cadbury 1992) made a number of 
recommendations that would become adopted as a benchmark in numerous 
countries (Arcot & Bruno 2006). The central recommendations were:  
(1) the establishment of three board committees made up of NEDs—an 
audit committee, a remuneration committee, and a nomination 
committee;  
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(2) the appointment of at least 3 independent NEDs as well as striving for 
board balance in order to avoid any dominant person/group; and  
(3) the separation of the role of Chairman of the board and CEO (Mallin 
et al. 2005; Arcot & Bruno 2006; Cadbury 1992).  
A key feature of the Cadbury Report was that it did not suggest that its 
recommendations be turned into prescriptive, mandatory regulation; instead 
it supplied a voluntary Code of Best Practice that companies may adapt to 
their own needs and circumstances, only requiring companies to disclose their 
compliance. Finding widespread acceptance upon publication, the Cadbury 
Report’s recommendations were taken up by the London Stock Exchange, 
making it a listing requirement for companies to “state whether they comply 
with the Code, identify, and give reasons for any areas of non-compliance” 
(Arcot & Bruno 2006, p.6). This flexible “comply-or-explain” approach has 
become a hallmark of the UK corporate governance regime and has also been 
adopted in other countries. 
In 1998, the committee chaired by Sir Ronald Hampel released its report 
reviewing the Cadbury Code and its implementation as well as the Greenbury 
report (discussed in the executive pay section). Satisfied that the goals of the 
Cadbury and Greenbury Codes were being achieved, Hampel did not seek 
changes to the UK’s corporate governance system, but rather sought to 
consolidate and clarify previous codes, resulting in the first Combined Code 
(Hampel 1998). The Hampel Report’s only significant change was the 
suggestion that companies publish a narrative account of their compliance or 
non-compliance with the code, rather than the previous box-ticking 
approach. This was seen as a way of loosening what many corporations felt 
was a prescriptive straightjacket (Arcot & Bruno 2006; Hampel 1998).  
As a reaction to the GFC and related high-profile bank failures, the UK 
government commissioned ‘a review of corporate governance in UK banks 
and other financial industry entities” by Sir David Walker (2009). A long-time 
banker and financial-industry insider, his appointment signaled a willingness 
of the British government to let the industry continue to be overseen and 
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governed by its own interests. The Walker Review suggests strengthening the 
role of NEDs through better selection and training, strengthening the role of 
institutional investors as ‘stewards’ of the company, establishment of a board 
risk committee, and slightly enhanced disclosure of executive pay (Slaughter 
and May LLP 2009). These recommendations received a mixed response 
upon publication, raising questions whether the proposed reforms had any 
real consequence. As Brendan Barber, TUC general secretary, stated, “while 
some of its proposals are an advance, the Walker Review comes across as the 
financial establishment putting forward the minimum proposals they think 




Corporate governance in Switzerland was traditionally dominated by 
insiders, such as founding families and owners more generally, who relied on 
“hidden reserves, restrictions on the transfer of shares (Vinkulierung) and voting 
right distortions” (Schnyder & Widmer 2011, p.106) to assert their power vis-
a-vis outsiders. While the importance of blockholders and universal banks as 
lenders fit the typical CME-system usually associated with Germany (Hall & 
Soskice 2001), other features of the traditional Swiss system do not. 
Switzerland lacks extensive cross-shareholdings, bank ownership of non-
financial firms, and has highly developed and capitalized stock markets. In the 
early to mid-1990s, the Swiss model underwent significant changes towards a 
more shareholder-friendly system. Reforms in 1991 severely limited the use 
of Vinkulierung, one of the control enhancing mechanisms of the traditional 
system, in listed companies and enhanced the rights of minority shareholders 
and owners on non-voting shares. The 1995 Federal Act on Stock Exchanges 
and Securities Trading (SESTA) further strengthened minority shareholder 
protection through new takeover rules and moved listed companies to 
international accounting rules. Schnyder and Widmer (2011) describe these 
changes as institutional layering, as they applied only to listed and thus large 
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Swiss companies; SMEs continued to be able to follow the traditional Swiss 
system and keep insider control. For large, listed companies—the focus of this 
study—these reforms were transformational: “By the late 1990s, ‘shareholder 
primacy’ was largely considered - by practitioners and legal scholars alike - to 
be the dominant paradigm in Swiss company law” (Schnyder & Widmer 
2011, p.111).  
The modern Swiss corporate governance system is in many ways quite similar 
to that in Britain. Both rely substantially on self-regulations through codes of 
best practice, which listed firms are supposed to follow in a ‘comply or explain’ 
approach. Hence, they remain at their core voluntaristic despite wide-spread 
adoption of the respective corporate governance codes. In Switzerland, 
corporate governance reforms took place in 2001-02 after high-profile 
corporate failures (ABB, SwissAir) but also as a Swiss response to the 
international debate on corporate governance at the time and the American 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The Swiss reforms were passed through two avenues: 
First, as part of the listing rules of the Swiss stock exchange, which were 
amended in 2002 to incorporate the EU Directive on Information Relating 
to Corporate Governance (DICG). Emphasizing disclosure rather than setting 
specific standards, DICG required companies to publish information on 
directors’ ties to the company and its stakeholders, activities in other Swiss 
and international firms including board appointments, and internal 
organizational structure—all on a comply or explain basis. Second, through 
a new Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance, published in 
2002 by Economiesuisse, an umbrella interest group organization for Swiss 
business. While not law, “its rules are considered by members of industry to 
be ‘quasi-obliging’” (Speck & Tanega 2005, p.475). The code is also enforced 
as part the SWX listing requirements through a comply-or-explain approach, 
making it de-facto regulation. The specific stipulations of the Swiss code are 
discussed in the corresponding sections. 
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Germany 
The traditional German stakeholder-system of corporate governance is 
distinctly different from the Anglo-Saxon type, by relying on insider-control 
and stakeholder-orientation. Employees, as a central stakeholder group, have 
broad codetermination rights through the supervisory board as well as works 
councils. Shareholders, which often include powerful blockholders from 
founding families or the company’s Hausbank, take a long-term view of the 
business and rely on insider monitoring rather than public information. This 
traditional system, however, has gradually opened up to give shareholder 
interests more power. Two years after the first industry-led initiatives to 
introduce a German Code of Corporate Governance—primarily in order to 
cater to international investors who had little understanding of the German 
corporate governance system—the German government appointed a 
commission to draft the code in 2001. The German Code of Corporate 
Governance, released in 2002 and anchored in the law through the 
Transparenz- und Publizitätsgesetz (TransPuG) of the same year, sought to 
equally explain the German system of corporate governance to international 
investors and bring the German system somewhat more in line with 
international expectations. However, the strong role of German industry 
insiders in the creation of the code meant that the final version did more of 
the former than the latter, ending up “certainly less demanding than the 
Anglo-Saxon ‘best practice’” (Lütz et al. 2011).  
Through the corporate governance code as well as a number of other reforms, 
discussed in the corresponding sections below, the German system was 
opened to international investors and their expectations of corporate 
governance. However, Jackson and Sorge (2012, p.1150) argue that these 
reforms have not transformed German corporate governance wholesale, but 
resulted in institutional layering: “The growing influence of shareholders and 
liberalized use of corporate equity co-exist with a largely unchallenged 
institution of employee codetermination through the supervisory board and 
works councils. New rules have thus been layered onto past rules, creating a 
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The US had no national corporate governance system to speak of before 
passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), with corporate governance 
issues primarily regulated through state legislation, where pro-managerial 
rules dominated in order to attract businesses to the state—Delaware being 
the prime example. One of the most significant pieces of legislation within the 
issue areas and time period covered here, SOX can be seen as a “populist 
political reaction” (Deeg 2012, p.1254) to the dot-com crash and the series of 
high-profile corporate failures including the Enron collapse.  
The passing of SOX is an example of decisive top-down policymaking, 
enabled by the severity of the crisis and public demand for comprehensive 
reforms—Cioffi (2010) argues that these pressures were so strong, they 
essentially eliminated the power of corporate elites and interest group politics 
from the policymaking process. Described as “the most significant reform of 
American securities law since the New Deal” (Cioffi 2010, p.97), the 
importance of SOX rests not only with the actual reforms it enacted, but also 
in signifying a break with previous modes of corporate governance regulation. 
As Cioffi (2010, p.97) argues, SOX “established forms of regulation and 
federalism in American corporate governance. It significantly expanded 
federal regulatory authority over corporate accounting and sought to protect 
shareholders by imposing self-enforcing regulatory mechanisms that 
strengthened the board of directors and internal monitoring of management 
rather than relying on rights-based litigious mechanisms of enforcement.”  
Hence, SOX could be seen as a strong signal from federal legislators to 
corporations that the previous mostly hands-off approach had come to an end 
and corporate behavior would be subject to closer scrutiny and possibly 
further regulatory interventions. The law also made waves beyond the US, 
with many other nations implementing their own versions of SOX with 
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varying degrees of local adaption. Given this international dimension of the 
law and its impact several of the issue areas considered here, specific changes 
enacted by SOX are discussed in the corresponding sections. 
6.2.2.1 Shareholder Orientation 
United States 
In May 2003, not long after the passage of SOX, US regulators signaled their 
intention to give shareholder more rights to nominate and elect directors. The 
SEC’s advances, however, fell on deaf ears in the Bush administration and 
received little Congressional support. As Cioffi (2010, p.127) argues, 
“managers, business groups, and allied organizations attacked the proposed 
rules as destructive of corporate efficiency and as an invitation to public and 
union pension funds to use their vast holdings to pursue special interest 
agendas.” By the end of 2004, the SEC dropped the proposals and the issue 
was laid to rest. While board nomination and election rules are not measured 
for this study, the signal sent by regulators on this issue is concern over board 
composition, which is discussed later, and, on a more fundamental level, 
shareholder rights. 
The issue was revived again in September 2006, when the Committee on 
Capital Markets Regulation (CCMR) was formed under the auspices of the 
Bush administration. The committee consisted of a private group of experts 
that were not only generally opposed to regulation of business activities, but 
in particular skeptical towards the SOX regulations. However, the political 
angle used to reexamine SOX was international competitiveness of the US 
securities market, particularly compared to London’s light-touch regulatory 
environment at the time. In its report released towards the end of 2006, the 
committee rather surprisingly recommended no changes to SOX, but 
recommended pro-shareholder reforms including enhanced voting rights on 
takeover defenses and director nomination and election, but notably not on 
executive pay (Cioffi 2010). This episode is therefore a policymaker signal 
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supporting the status quo in many ways, but also calling for stronger 
shareholder rights on board composition. 
Shortly after, towards the end of 2006, a court decision brought the issue of 
shareholder rights in the director nomination and election process to the fore 
once more. Ruling in a case between a pension fund and AIG, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals (SCCA), covering New York, denied management’s 
right to reject shareholder proposals to modify board nomination procedures. 
After a year, the Republican-dominated SEC reacted to the ruling by issuing 
regulatory changes to uphold managerial power, assuaging business fears that 
“expanded shareholder director nomination rights would politicize the 
corporation as labor and social investment groups took on a formal 
governance role and introduced stakeholder interests and non-economic 
agendas into the board room” (Cioffi 2010, p.136). Essentially, opponents of 
expanded shareholder rights were concerned about widening separation of 
ownership and control. 
Post-GFC corporate governance reforms in the US doubled down on pro-
shareholder orientation, with the SEC in mid-2009 pushing through the 
reforms that had previously failed—giving shareholders enhanced voting 
rights over board nominations and elections (Cioffi 2010). Around the same 
time, legislators also pursued two further important pieces of corporate 
governance reform: the introduction of non-binding shareholder votes on 
executive pay, and a ‘Shareholders’ Bill of Rights’ that included a number of 
provisions on board composition and election. Both were eventually 
subsumed into the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010, the provision of which are discussed where relevant. 
These changes not only dealt a blow to managerial power over the 
boardroom, but also further increased the federalization of corporate 
governance regulation. 
Firm-level measure 2.3.0 Shareholder Rights (1S1V) is highly relevant to these 
policy debates. A proxy measure for overall shareholder orientation, this 
dummy variable indicates whether the company has a unitary share structure 
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or uses any control enhancing mechanisms that distort control and cash flow 
rights. Hence, if companies want to show their commitment to shareholder 
rights, one way to do so is through a unitary share structure. Another related 
measure is the distribution of net value added (NVA), particularly 2.4.2 NVA 
to Shareholders, which measures the share of NVA paid to shareholders as cash 
dividends. Adopting the one-share-one-vote (1S1V) principle and paying 
generous dividends are ways for firms to pacify shareholders and dampen 
their demands for enhanced power. 
 
Figure 38: 2.3.0 Shareholder Rights (1S1V) (annotated) 
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Figure 39: 2.4.2 NVA to Shareholders (annotated) 
While US firms are generally highly shareholder value-oriented, as measured 
by 2.3.0, the data suggests two distinct periods of change: the gradual decline 
from 1995 to 2002-03, when the share of US companies applying the 1S1V 
principle declined from around 93% to just over 80%, and the period of 
growth between 2003-04 and 2007, when the share returned from 80% to 
over 90%. The share of NVA paid to shareholders (2.4.2) did not change in 
the early period (although data limitations pre-2000 apply), but increased 
from 5% to 6% between 2003 and 2007, also emphasizing increasing 
shareholder value-orientation in the later period. 
The former period includes the dot-com boom and bust, but does not show 
elevated levels of public discourse on shareholder rights (S08). Discourse on 
corporate governance (S10) spikes in the last two years of the period due to 
the dot-com crash and Enron scandal, but is otherwise low. The latter period 
between 2003-04 and 2007 is marked by the issue of shareholder rights (S08) 
reaching higher salience than at any other time in the period, while corporate 
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governance (S10) remained highly salient despite starting to fade. It is in this 
period that we see convergence in corporate behavior on measure 2.3.0, as 
the between-group ANOVA results show, driving the return to over 90% of 
American firms adopting 1S1V. 
It therefore appears that the SEC’s pro-shareholder rights proposal in 2003 
served as a wake-up call to companies to prioritize shareholder rights, 
galvanizing firm behavior around higher shareholder-value orientation as 
measured by 2.3.0 and 2.4.2. Although the 2006 report by the Commission 
on Capital Market Regulation and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruling 
of the same year appeared to presage pro-shareholder regulation, the 2007 
SEC regulatory change strengthened management’s rights vis-a-vis 
shareholders. Given the timing and direction of firm-level change in the years 
prior, it is plausible that the SEC’s decision reflected that firms were 
embracing shareholder value to greater extent, allowing regulators to yield to 
business interests despite high issue salience. With this instance of bottom-up 
change taking place between the two major crises, it does not support 
proposition C-1. However, the case may be a good illustration for the 
decentralized political system of the US enabling bottom-up change—with 
high-raking courts, an important committee, and the SEC at odds over the 
issue within a single year, the changes on the firm-level merely had to ‘impress’ 
one policymaking agency to result in bottom-up change, supporting 
proposition C-5.  
However, the story did not quite end there; the SEC reversed its decision only 
two years later to grant shareholders further rights in nominating and electing 
board members. Why policymakers chose to revisit the issue again at that time 
is not entirely clear—public discourse on shareholder rights (S08) and 
corporate governance (S10) had declined from two years prior, and firm 
behavior had not changed either—but the GFC appears to have allowed 
regulators to push against business interests to enforce top-down change. 
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Germany 
The German corporate governance system was significantly revamped 
through the Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich 
(KonTraG), which came into effect in May 1998. While KonTraG also 
increased auditor independence and introduced disclosure requirements for 
ownership stakes above 5%, it also significantly strengthened the role of 
shareholders by “eliminating multiple voting rights and voting rights 
restrictions, barring banks from using proxy votes in conjunction with direct 
shareholding exceeding 5 per cent, requiring banks to solicit proxy 
instructions from shareholders, and giving the supervisory board greater 
duties of financial oversight” (Jackson & Sorge 2012, p.1148). By eliminating 
some forms of voting right distortions and incentivizing shareholder value 
orientation of German firms, KonTraG is an important reform directly 
connected to measure 2.3.0 Shareholder Rights (1S1V). 
The GFC, however, marks a turning point for Germany’s corporate 
governance system, with post-crisis reforms dialing back some of the previous 
pro-shareholder reforms and reemphasizing Germany’s stakeholder-based 
system. In August 2008, legislators passed the Risikobegrenzungsgesetz, “to 
strengthen disclosure rules and regulatory constraints on investors ‘acting in 
concert’ in takeovers” (Cioffi 2010, p.220). The German government also 
bound companies to the principles of the social market economy, by explicitly 
anchoring the traditional stakeholder-oriented model in the revised German 
Corporate Governance Code. Finally, the role of the supervisory board and, 
by extension, board-level codetermination was strengthened by the Gesetz zur 
Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) in mid-2009. This law 
required the entire supervisory board to approve executive pay rather than a 
board committee, creates personal liability of supervisory board members for 
setting appropriate levels, structure, and incentives of executive pay, and 
generally emphasized long-term decision-making and reward structures 
(Cioffi 2010). In other words, the post-GFC reforms in Germany signify at 
least a partial return to German corporate governance values of yore, 
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emphasizing coordination, long-term thinking, and a stakeholder rather than 
shareholder orientation. 
On the firm-level, however, it appears that there was no turning back after 
the 1998 KonTraG reforms increased shareholder value orientation (2.3.0) in 
German firms. Between 1998 and 2008, the share of German companies 
applying the 1S1V principle increased from just over 60% to almost 80%. 
Similarly, the share of NVA paid to shareholders (2.4.2) increased from 
around 6% in 2000 (the earliest available data point) to just below 10% in 
2008. The 2008 Risikobegrenzungsgesetz and 2009 VorstAG reforms, which 
sought to reemphasize traditional stakeholder orientation, by comparison, 
had no discernible firm-level effect on 2.3.0 Shareholder Rights (1S1V) and only 
a temporary reduction in 2.4.2 NVA to Shareholders. While these patterns 
suggest a top-down mode of change, with firm-level change following legal 
change, looking at German firms’ behavior in context of the other countries 
raises the question whether the reforms are even responsible for increasing 
shareholder value. On 2.3.0, German firms followed the same trends as firms 
in the other European countries, while the move towards increasing dividends 
(2.4.2) is also evident in other countries. In other words, it may well be that 
the large German firms captured by the sample used here have always been 
much more globally-oriented, following international expectations on 
shareholder value rather than domestic ones. Smaller German firms may 
therefore show more pronounced patterns of change commensurate with the 
legal changes. 
6.2.2.2 Board of Directors 
Board Composition 
While the board-level corporate governance reforms contained in SOX are 
mostly concerned with enhancing the role and power of the audit committee, 
there are broader implications on board composition. For one, SOX brought 
rules that were previously part of stock exchange listing rules under federal 
law, including those on board independence and committee requirements. 
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Until 2002, the US had no federal or otherwise far-reaching requirements 
regarding the independence of board members. Although a majority 
independent board had been regarded as best practice from at least 1992, 
when the American Law Institute made that recommendation in its 
‘Principles of Corporate Governance,’ this was not a requirement until 2002, 
when the NYSE included a majority independent board in its overhaul of 
stock exchange listing requirements (Gordon 2007). Regarding audit 
committee independence, rules prior to 1999 were fairly weak with poor 
definitions of what constitutes independence. In 1999, NYSE listing rules 
tightened the definition of independence and required the audit committee to 
consist of at least three independent directors (Gordon 2007). SOX imposed 
no stricter rules on board independence than the 2002 NYSE listing rules, but 
brought them under federal law. On audit committee independence, 
however, SOX did impose tougher rules, requiring audit committees to be 
composed fully of independent directors. Furthermore, SOX mandates a 
fully-independent compensation committee (Cioffi 2010). 
As part of the UK government’s response to the high-profile corporate 
scandals in the US and the passage of SOX, the Higgs Report (2003) reviewed 
the role of non-executive directors and made recommendations to improve 
their effectiveness. Most importantly, Higgs recommended the board to 
consist of at least 50% independent NEDs, separation of CEO and Chairman, 
a nomination committee of majority independent NEDS, an audit committee 
as recommended by the Smith Review, a remuneration committee of at least 
three members who are all independent NEDs, and tenure limits of two three-
year terms for NEDs. Higgs supported the UK’s ‘comply-or-explain’ 
approach, but did move towards setting the bar higher in many regards and 
removing some discretion. It could therefore be argued that Higgs started 
moving the Combined Code towards a more prescriptive approach. The 
Higgs recommendations were implemented through the 2003 revision of the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance. 
Released in its first version in 2002, the Swiss Code of Best Practice for 
Corporate Governance only mandated that a majority of the board consists 
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of non-executive directors, but included no general requirement of 
independence despite recommending a fully independent audit committee 
and majority independent compensation committee (Economiesuisse 2002). 
The 2014 revision of the Swiss Corporate Governance Code includes for the 
first time a requirement for a majority independent board. However, it uses a 
fairly weak definition of independence that boils down to not currently or 
within the last three years occupying an executive role in the company 
(Economiesuisse 2014). This is a significantly weaker definition of 
independence than the UK’s, for instance, where the executive role cut-off 
period is 5 years and which also includes other criteria that do not apply in 
the Swiss case. 
The 2002 version of the German Code of Corporate Governance set rather 
weak standards of board independence. It merely limited the number of 
former executive board members to two and required the audit committee to 
be chaired by an independent director—defined as not being a former 
executive. Yielding to pressure from EU legislators but insisting that Anglo-
Saxon-style corporate governance measures are unsuitable for the German 
two-tier board structure and codetermination law, the 2005 revision of the 
German code included a requirement for an ‘adequate’ number of 
independent NEDs but remained otherwise largely unchanged (Lütz et al. 
2011). 
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Figure 40: 2.5.4 Independent Non-Executive Directors (annotated) 
In the US, UK and Switzerland, the early 2000s are a period of rapid growth 
in the share of independent NEDs (2.5.4). Between 2000 and 2004, the share 
increased from 55% to almost 80% in the US, 20% to 40% in Switzerland, 
and to lesser extent from 45% to 52% in the UK. In the US, NYSE listing 
rules were changed in 2002 to require a majority independent board, which 
was incorporated into SOX the same year. At that point in time, US firms 
already averaged 66% independent NEDs—easily above the new regulatory 
minimum. Nevertheless, the NYSE and SOX changes, paired with high 
salience of corporate governance (S10), initiated convergence among 
American firms between 2002 and 2004, driving 2.5.4 further upwards. 
Hence, the US case can be argued to be bottom-up change to some extent, as 
it merely formalized what large American firms were already doing; but at the 
same time it initiated a wave of further firm-level change, thus clearly having 
a top-down element as well. The crucial factor may be that mimetic 
NYSE listing rules & SOX (US)
Higgs Report & Combined Code (UK)
German Corporate Governance Code
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isomorphism only occurred after passage of SOX—a cautious interpretation 
should therefore regard this as mostly top-down change. 
Interestingly, Swiss firm-level patterns are very similar to those in the US, with 
rapid growth in independent NEDs in the early 2000s, driven by mimetic 
isomorphism between 2002 and 2004. However, these firm-level changes 
occurred without regulatory threat and lower levels of issue salience (S10 
Corporate Governance) than in the US or even UK at the time. An explanation 
for this behavior could be the international orientation of large Swiss 
companies, which requires them to conform to global expectations on ‘good’ 
corporate governance rather than domestic rules that set lower standards. Of 
course, it could be argued that the global orientation of Swiss firms is enabled 
by the very liberal Swiss corporate governance system, which in turn remains 
permissive because Swiss companies are proactive on implementing ‘best 
practice.’ To put it differently, the rapid adoption of independent NEDs at a 
time when the issue is highly salient in the US and other global markets may 
well be responsible for keeping the issue off the regulatory agenda in 
Switzerland. As such, we could see it as an instance of bottom-up change, 
whereby firm-level change preempted legal change, although it is difficult to 
support this interpretation in the absence of struck-down reform proposals or 
similar regulatory signals. If we do accept it as bottom-up change, the results 
support C-2 as a groundswell of firm-level change driven by mimetic 
isomorphism, and with caveats, C-3 by preempting legal change. Although 
outside the observed time period, the 2014 revision of the Swiss Corporate 
Governance Code, which finally implemented a majority independent board 
rule, is also consistent with this line of reasoning, given that the share of 
independent NEDs in Swiss firms has remained stagnant at around 45% since 
the late 2000s. Failure to catch up to international standards through self-
regulation may have pushed regulators towards a more prescriptive approach.  
The British case has some parallels to the US, but leans more clearly towards 
bottom-up change. In 2003, when the Higgs Report and Combined Code 
implemented a majority independent board requirement, British firms had 
just crossed 50% share of independent NEDs. It is thus similar to the US in 
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the sense that the regulatory changes formalized what companies were 
already, albeit barely, doing. Unlike in the US, however, the British legal 
changes did not lead to convergence of firm practices or a wave of adoption; 
the gradual year-over-year increase in the share of independent NEDs 
continued unabated at a very similar rate of growth as before. Absent clear 
top-down effects, interpreting this case as regulation formalizing pre-existing 
corporate practices is more fitting. As the previous chapter found no clear 
evidence of crisis-induced mimetic isomorphism on this issue for British firms, 
adoption of independent NEDs may have occurred through more gradual 
processes. This case therefore does not provide support for C-2. With the 
changes taking place during the dot-com crash, however, it does support C-3. 
 
Board Diversity 
The share of women on company boards has been part of the post-GFC 
discourse on how to reduce excessive risk-taking, with more gender-balanced 
boards seen as making ‘better’ and less risky decisions (Vinnicombe et al. 
2015). This issue is therefore a relevant current facet of the corporate 
governance debate and a best practice signal to stakeholders. 
UK regulators have sent some important and effective regulatory signals on 
board diversity. In 2010, the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
commissioned Lord Davies to produce a report on Women on Boards and 
make policy recommendations. The Davies Report, published in 2011, 
strongly supported the call for more diverse boards, but stopped short of 
recommending quotas, instead calling on businesses to self-regulate and 
improve board diversity (Davies 2011). However, it also threw down the 
gauntlet to businesses that quotas need to be considered failing effective self-
regulation: Davies set a target of 25% female directors by 2015 in the FTSE 
100. 
The European Commission made similar efforts around the same time, 
publishing a proposal for EU-wide board quotas in 2012 (European 
Commission 2012). The proposal suggested a 40% minimum quota for each 
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gender among non-executive directors, lamenting slow progress on board 
diversity among member states and apparently ineffective self-regulation. 
This represents a warning shot to businesses across the EU that regulation 
may be impending, should they fail to boost board diversity. 
Swiss regulators made a gesture towards board diversity in the 2014 revision 
of the Swiss Corporate Governance Code. It states that boards should include 
men and women, and “appropriate diversity of board members” 
(Economiesuisse 2014, p.10), the first revision of the Code to include such 
rules. In 2015, Germany passed a law requiring a minimum 30% of female 
supervisory board members in large companies (Smale & Cain Miller 2015), 
reacting to the European Commission’s regulatory threat and preempting 
EU-level regulation on the issue. The US has not set any quotas for women 
on corporate boards, with such efforts meeting widespread resistance there 
(Smale & Cain Miller 2015). 
 







Davies Report target (25%)
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While the EU’s proposal and Germany’s introduction of a 30% quota 
occurred too late or even outside the observed period to make observations 
on their firm-level effect or whether they formalize existing practices, the UK’s 
regulatory proposals offer some interesting insights. Up until 2010, when the 
UK Government announced an enquiry into women on company boards, 
British firms had slowly increased their share of female directors (2.5.5) year-
over-year. Starting from a 5% share of female directors in 2000, very much 
in line with other European countries but almost 10 percentage points below 
US firms, British companies increased the share to 11% in 2010, slightly 
above their European counterparts whose share of female directors stood at 
around 9% that year. The very specific regulatory threats of 2010-11, which 
essentially told British businesses to increase the representation of women on 
their boards to 25% by 2015 or face mandatory quotas, appeared to initiate 
a step change in year-over-year growth. Between 2010 and 2012, the latest 
year for which data is available in this study, the share of female directors 
increased from 11% to 18%, almost closing the gap with US companies. The 
ANOVA results discussed in the previous chapter suggest, however, that this 
increase did not lead to clear convergence between small and large British 
companies on the issue. In other terms, some companies remained proactive 
on appointing women, while others remained laggards on doing so, not 
closing the gap between them. 
These changes in Britain point to a very interesting dynamic we could term 
top-down enforced bottom-up change. In 2010-11, British policymakers 
could have chosen to simply implement a 25% quota to become effective in 
2015. Instead, they made a very explicit and specific regulatory threat that led 
to very similar outcomes on the firm-level as ‘hard’ law likely would have—in 
March 2015, the share of women among the FTSE 100 was 23.5% 
(Vinnicombe et al. 2015), very close to reaching the 25% target by the end of 
the year. If the UK Government indeed accepts firms to have met the target 
and does not pursue mandatory quotas, this would be not only an example of 
firm-level change affecting legal change by averting formal regulation, but 
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also a case where regulators provided a very explicit incentive for firm-level 
change: the promise not to formally regulate.  
While it is too early to draw conclusions on this case, absent the Government’s 
decision on whether to pursue quotas or not, it does point to some important 
implications. First, it is strong evidence of the power of regulatory signals, 
particularly when tied to explicit goals and promises not to formally regulate 
if those targets are met. Second, it also points to the power of centralized 
political systems to make such signals and promises—as several previous 
examples of infighting among regulatory agencies and legislators in the US 
have shown, decentralized systems would find it much harder to make 
credible commitments of this sort. In other words, while decentralized systems 
may be more open to bottom-up change derailing legal change that are under 
way, centralized systems may be more open to bottom-up change that is 
incentivized or demanded by policymakers. It is therefore an important 
counterpoint to proposition C-5.  
6.2.2.3 Executive Pay 
Executive pay received considerable regulatory attention in the UK in 1995, 
following public outrage over excessive pay. Set up on the initiative of the 
Confederation of Business and Industry (CBI), “Britain’s biggest business 
lobby group” (Groom & Parker 2014), the committee headed by Sir Richard 
Greenbury examined executive remuneration practices of large UK 
companies and developed a code of best practice. In doing so, it responded to 
public and shareholder concern over the pay of British company directors, 
especially in recently privatized utility industries (Greenbury 1995). Much like 
the Cadbury Report (1992) before it, the Greenbury Report made the case 
against statutory controls, advocating a code of best practice paired with 
strengthened accountability to shareholders. The report recommended:  
(1) full disclosure of executive remuneration;  
(2) remuneration committees made up of NEDs;  
(3) tying executive pay to individual and company performance; and  
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(4) a new code of best practice that LSE-listed companies are required 
follow as far as possible and disclose their compliance (comply-or-
explain) (Greenbury 1995). 
The GFC brought the issue back into the spotlight. Despite considerable 
public debate on executive remuneration, regulators in the four countries 
have not implemented caps on executive pay. The perhaps most high-profile 
case of such efforts was in Switzerland, where a popular initiative on a 
proposed CEO pay cap of 12 times the lowest employee salary was rejected 
by two-thirds of voters (Gemperli 2013). Instead, legislators have focused on 
using market means to control executive pay by giving shareholders more 
power to influence pay practices. The UK has been leading on this issue, 
where non-binding votes on executive pay (“say on pay”) were made 
mandatory through the Directors Remuneration Report Regulations 2002. 
These shareholder votes became binding in October 2013 through the 
Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and The Large and Medium-
sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2013, implementing the recommendations made by the Kay 
Review of 2012. Henceforth, companies are required to produce a director’s 
remuneration policy that needs to be AGM-approved every three years.  
Swiss regulators implemented ‘say on pay’ rules in 2013 through the 
Verordnung gegen übermässige Vergütungen bei börsenkotierten 
Aktiengesellschaften (VegüV), after a public referendum found broad support 
for such rules. VegüV introduced not only binding votes on executive and 
director pay, but also mandatory annual reelection of directors 
(Schweizerischer Bundesrat 2013). In the US, ‘say on pay’ rules were 
introduced through the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010, 
requiring non-binding shareholder votes on executive compensation as well 
as non-binding votes on ‘golden parachutes’ in the event of a merger or 
acquisition (Huntington 2010). German ‘say on pay’ rules are somewhat 
weaker still. Here, shareholder votes are not mandatory and are non-binding. 
These were introduced in 2009 through the Gesetz zur Angemessenheit der 
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Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) and consequently incorporated into the 
German Corporate Governance Code (Thomas & Van der Elst 2015). 
On the EU-level, bonus caps in the banking industry were instituted through 
the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), which came into effect on 1 
January 2014. The EC stated that it began reforms in the banking sector as it 
suffered the biggest corporate governance defects during the financial crisis, 
but signaled its intentions to review the regulations covering other sectors and 
bring them in line if necessary. The CRD IV bonus cap sets the variable 
(bonus) component of executive pay at a maximum of 100% of the fixed 
(salary) component. A shareholder vote can increase the cap to 200%. CRD 
IV also includes further transparency requirements for executives earning 
more than €1 million per year. Sanctions are left to member states to set and 
define. Previously, CRD III required that “material risk takers,” such as senior 
management, receive at least 50% of their variable pay component through 
equity-linked or other non-cash instruments, and at least 40% of the variable 
pay component are deferred over at least 3 years. Firms also had to disclose 
their pay policies and practices of “material risk takers.” These rules continue 
to apply in CRD IV (European Commission 2013). In the UK, several large 
banks including Barclays, Lloyds, and HSBC announced to pay their CEOs 
larger salaries or share awards, in order to side-step the bonus cap. While this 
should be unsurprising as CRD IV does not place restrictions on the fixed pay 
component, EU policymakers nevertheless accused the UK of disregarding 
EU law (Rankin & Treanor 2014). 
Comparing these legal changes in the four countries to firm-level change in 
executive pay measures 2.6.0 Total Executive Pay, 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive 
Pay, and 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio shows few points of direct connection. As found 
in the previous chapter, executive pay appears strongly tied to firm 
performance and thus bound by macroeconomic conditions. The firm-level 
data reflects this with two periods of lower executive pay—the dot-com crash 
in the US and the GFC in all four countries—interrupting the general 
upwards trend. While executive pay shows some reactivity to public discourse, 
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evidence of mimetic isomorphism is limited to financial firms during the 
GFC—those most affected by the crisis and criticized for their pay practices. 
 
Figure 42: 2.6.0 Total Executive Pay (annotated) 
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Figure 43: 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay (annotated) 
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Figure 44: 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio (annotated) 
While the Greenbury Report of 1995 in the UK and the 2013 reforms in 
Switzerland and the UK, which introduced mandatory and binding 
shareholder votes on executive pay, fall outside the range of available 
executive pay data (2000 to 2012), three major reforms are within the period. 
The introduction of mandatory non-binding votes in the UK in 2002 shows 
no discernible effect on any measure of executive pay practices, with pay 
relatively stable in the early 2000s in the UK.  
Similarly, the introduction of mandatory non-binding votes in the US in 2010 
appears to have had no dampening effect on executive pay. The slight decline 
in total (2.6.0) and single highest (2.6.1) executive pay between 2011 and 2012 
in the US is also unlikely to be related to the 2010 reforms, as it can be linked 
to a slight decline in the market capitalization of US firms between 2010 and 
2011. Consequently, with executive pay tied to stock price performance, the 
decline in pay is to be expected.  
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At first glance, Germany’s VorstAG law of 2009, which introduced non-
mandatory, non-binding shareholder votes on pay, appears to have halted the 
growth of executive pay in the country in the post-crisis years, when British 
and American executive pay continued pre-crisis growth. However, German 
firms’ market capitalization has also grown much less in the post-crisis years 
than their British and American counterparts, casting doubt on the effect of 
the VorstAg reforms. 
Taken together, the data fails to show any obvious connections between 
executive pay practices and regulation. To be sure, this may be due to 
limitations of the measures used here. After all, the reforms discussed are 
mostly on ‘say on pay’ rules, aimed at enhancing shareholder rights in setting 
pay through votes—something that is not directly measured in this study. 
However, if the ultimate goal of such rules is for pay to conform to market 
expectations and, at least to some extent, public expectations of justified 
executive pay, examining pay levels is nevertheless useful. Indeed, it could be 
argued that the approach policymakers have chosen to regulate executive pay 
and answer public outrage over excessive pay does not appear to be effective. 
6.2.3 Labor Relations 
Of the four countries included in this study, the US has the most flexible labor 
market, allowing employment-at-will with very low worker protection 
(Pontusson 2005). The weak role of labor in the US is rooted in the country’s 
historically weak labor movement, which was further weakened by anti-union 
laws and dismantling of normative barriers, such as President Reagan’s firing 
of striking air traffic controllers in 1981 (Deeg 2012). The US has a federal 
minimum wage, but unlike in the UK it is not annually adjusted, resulting in 
extended periods of declining purchasing power of minimum wage workers. 
The labor relations system of the US has not experienced any significant 
reforms over the period covered. 
The UK’s labor market is also very flexible, allowing ‘zero hour contracts’ and 
fairly easy hiring and firing. However, compared to the US, it is somewhat 
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stricter, for example through longer statutory notice periods (at least one week 
in the UK, none in the US), and more costly for employers, for instance due 
to longer statutory paid holiday and sick leave. While many significant labor 
and industrial relations reforms in the UK occurred before the beginning of 
the period covered—the dismantling of union rights under the Thatcher 
government—the period of the New Labour government from 1997 also 
brought about some changes, albeit through gradual transformation rather 
than major turning points (Gospel & Edwards 2012). Unions were 
strengthened by new recognition rights and employee’s information and 
consultation rights were enhanced; both, however, had little impact, Gospel 
and Edwards (2012) argue. As one of the key policies of Labour’s 1997 election 
campaign, the introduction of the national minimum wage in April 1999 
marked a much more important change in British labor relations, particularly 
in light of the weakened labor movement and dismantling of collective 
bargaining. The national minimum wage is adjusted annually by the Low Pay 
Commission.  
Germany’s traditional employment system is based on employment security 
and cooperative industrial relations. However, these features of the core 
sectors of the economy are not only slowly eroding, but also apply to an ever-
shrinking proportion of the German labor market. Erosion in the core 
sectors—manufacturing—is mainly a result of employers leaving employer 
associations and decentralization of collective bargaining, while the declining 
coverage is due to employment shifting from the manufacturing to the service 
sector, which has never been brought under the traditional system (Jackson & 
Sorge 2012). A number of important reforms to employment and pay 
regulations have introduced more flexibility in the German labor market. Use 
of agency workers, which large manufacturing companies like to use in order 
to adjust their workforce more flexibly to changes in demand, was made easier 
in 1997 and fully liberalized in 2003. Similarly, use of fixed-term contracts has 
been liberalized in multiple steps in 1996, and the early and mid-2000s 
(Eichhorst & Tobsch 2013). In 2003, restrictions on marginal part-time 
work—a form of employment that is “not liable for income taxes and 
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employee social insurance contributions while at same time not providing full 
social protection” (Eichhorst & Tobsch 2013, p.22)— were lowered, making 
it easier for workers to take on second jobs, but also significantly changing 
employment patterns in the retail sector and hospitality industry. At the same 
time, “these trends were reinforced by reforms in the social insurance system 
and growth in active labor market policies” (Jackson & Sorge 2012, p.1151). 
While these Hartz reforms are beyond the scope of this study, they are 
important drivers of change in German employment and pay practices.  
Despite these extensive pro-flexibility reforms, there have also been some 
counter-developments aimed at extending employment protection across the 
entire labor market, possibly in acknowledgement of the dualization of the 
German labor market. Works councils were modernized in 2001, in order to 
make them more inclusive of temporary and agency workers, and to make 
their use less bureaucratic. Towards the end of the observed period, the 
introduction of the national minimum wage marked a significant reform of 
the German labor market. The first statutory minimum wage in Germany was 
introduced for the construction industry as part of the Arbeitnehmer-
Entsendegesetz 1996, “as a way of preventing social dumping, given the vast 
increase of migrant labour in the industry” (Jackson & Sorge 2012, p.1151). 
In 2013, the introduction of a national minimum wage became a campaign 
promise for the Social Democratic Party (SPD) as well as other left-leaning 
parties, and was included in the coalition agreement of the newly-formed 
CDU/CSU/SPD government—despite opposition from business 
organizations, who warned of job losses and decreased competitiveness. 
Passed in 2014 and effective from 2015, the Mindestlohngesetz (MiLoG) 
applies to all employees across all sectors, even in atypical employment 
contracts, and will be adjusted biannually through a minimum wage 
commission (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund 2015). 
As is the case in other institutional spheres, Swiss labor relations are 
characterized by their hybrid nature, combined elements usually associated 
with liberal countries with those associated with coordinated economies. Legal 
provisions on working time and hiring and firing are weak, but supplemented 
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by stricter rules in collective agreements. Over recent decades, Swiss labor 
markets were further deregulated following the demands of businesses for 
increased international competitiveness, but at the same time experienced 
increasing labor protection on some issues as a result of coordination with EU 
laws (Emmenegger 2011). However, these reforms took place in the early 
1990s before the beginning of the period observed here, with a very stable 
system since. Switzerland has relatively few restrictions on hiring and firing, 
especially compared with Germany and is only slightly more restrictive than 
the UK, as the OECD’s labor protection index highlights. On temporary 
forms of employment, such as temporary agency work or fixed-term contracts, 
Switzerland places higher labor protections than the UK and US, where these 
forms of employment are pretty much unregulated, and is at a similar level as 
Germany after the latter’s series of labor market reforms. The following 
graphs illustrate the four countries’ relative positions on labor protection, 
using the OECD’s labor protection index for regular employment and for 
temporary employment (OECD 2015). 
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Figure 46: Employment Protection (Temporary Contracts) 
Aside from the UK’s introduction of the national minimum wage in 1999, the 
employment and pay systems of the UK, US, and Switzerland have been 
stable over the observed period. Germany, on the other hand, has seen a series 
of reforms that have liberalized employment and pay in non-core sectors, i.e. 
mainly services and retail. However, neither the British nor German reforms 
have clear effects on the high-level corporate practice measures 3.1.0 
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Figure 47: 3.1.0 Employment Level (annotated) 
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Figure 48: 3.2.0 Average Wage (annotated) 
In general, both measures follow macroeconomic trends and firm 
performance, showing decreases in wages and employment during the dot-
com crash and the GFC. The timing of firm-level adjustments also highlights 
the relative flexibility of the national labor markets. While firm performance, 
as measured by market capitalization and return on assets, was affected by the 
two crises across all four countries in 2002 and 2008-09, respectively, British 
and American companies adjusted their workforces and wages down sooner 
than their German and Swiss counterparts, in some cases even making 
anticipatory adjustments. 




Full liberalization of agency 
work & lower restrictions on 
part-time work (DE)
National minimum wage 
election promise (DE)
Corporate Practice and Legal Change 
270 
 







































1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year
CH DE UK US
Market Capitalization
Corporate Practice and Legal Change 
271 
 
Figure 50: Return on Assets 
Therefore, the downward adjustments in employment (3.1.0) and wages 
(3.2.0) in Germany in the early 2000s are most likely related to the economic 
downturn at the time, rather than the series of labor market reforms. This is 
not to say that the reforms had no impact on employment and pay practices, 
but the measures used may be too high-level to reveal it. 
6.3 Summary 
This chapter discussed several instances of bottom-up change, mostly in the 
spheres of finance and, to lesser extent, corporate governance, and analyzed 
them for the conditions under which bottom-up change is more or less likely 
to affect law or regulation. To this end, three questions were considered:  
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(2) How does the nature of severe crises impact bottom-up change?  
(3) How does the structure of the political system mediate bottom-up 
change? 
Regarding the first question, the results paint a mixed picture regarding 
proposition C-1, which suggests that higher issue salience reduces the impact 
of firm behavior on legal change, as it does for the power of business interests 
in top-down processes of change. Only two instances of bottom-up change 
taking place outside the two major crises were found. The first instance, 
supporting C-1, was UK banks’ behavior weakening the impact of the Vickers 
Report and ring-fencing rules, which occurred after the GFC and under 
declining salience. The second instance, which did not support C-1, was the 
SEC’s pro-managerial rule change of 2007, which appeared to recognize 
American firms’ increasing shareholder orientation, as it occurred despite 
high issue salience. In light of the small number of non-crisis instances of 
bottom-up change and the contradictory results, we cannot conclusively 
support or reject proposition C-1. 
On the second question, the results strongly support propositions C-2 and C-
3, which suggest that major crises increase the ‘supply’ of bottom-up change 
and that firm practices are more likely to affect legal rules in times of crisis, 
but fail to find much evidence relating to C-4 on the effects of ‘institutional 
softening.’ Six instances of bottom-up change, originating in times of crisis 
and mostly driven by mimetic isomorphism, were found. These were 
primarily in the issue areas of risk-taking behavior and accountability & 
transparency, but also on board-level corporate governance. In one case of 
bottom-up change in times of crisis, relating to the introduction in 2003 of 
minimum quotas for independent NEDs on British boards, firm practices 
were not galvanized by the crisis and high issue salience. Six of the 
aforementioned seven cases of bottom-up change supported C-3 as they 
brought about legal or regulatory change during major crises. The seventh 
case, the weakening of the Vickers Report and associated ring-fence for British 
banks, originated during the GFC, but was so drawn out it completed well 
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after the crisis. It was hence not counted as support for C-3, but the only 
instance of bottom-up change providing evidence related to C-4. It was found 
that the haste and pressure under which the Vickers Report was produced 
softened its ultimate impact by opening it up to watering down. In the absence 
of other instances of cases to support or contradict C-4, however, no firm 
conclusions can be drawn. 
In terms of question three, the results only allow limited evaluation of C-5, 
given the small number of directly comparable cases of bottom-up change, 
but in the two instances where conclusions could be drawn the proposition 
was rejected. First, comparing the US and UK cases of financial market 
reform in reaction to the GFC found that British banks’ behavior had 
influenced legal change more extensively than was the case in the US, 
rejecting C-5. Second, the case of ‘top-down enforced bottom-up change’ on 
UK board diversity provided an important counterpoint to C-5, suggesting 
that centralized systems may be more open to bottom-up change that is 
incentivized or demanded by policymakers, as they can make credible signals 
and promises in centralized systems. Taking a broader view of the findings in 
this chapter, most cases of bottom-up change found were in the UK and US, 
the former with a centralized, the latter with a decentralized political system. 
This suggests that organization of the political system may not be a 
differentiating factor for bottom-up change or that it matters in unexpected 
ways, as the UK example has pointed out. Possible explanations will be 





In pursuit of its overarching goal to further our understanding of bottom-up 
change, i.e. institutional change arising from or being shaped by corporate 
practices, this study focuses on a number of related issues that can be 
conceptualized within a triangle between the cornerstones of public discourse, 
corporate practices, and the law. While the literature has addressed some 
relationships on this triangle—the relationships between public discourse and 
the law, and some aspects of the relationship between corporations and the 
law—this study focuses on the lesser explored aspects of this triangle:  
(1) the relationship between public discourse and corporate practices, as 
changing discourse may drive changes in corporate behavior;  
(2) the cornerstone of corporate practices to explore how change gains 
‘critical mass’ and establishes new norms of firm behavior; and  
(3) the relationship between corporate practices and the law, in terms of 
how widespread changes in corporate behavior may translate into 
changes in formal institutions.  
The preceding empirical chapters explored the three focus areas in the order 
mentioned above. A comparative, mixed-methods research design was used, 
combining macro-level analysis of legal and regulatory change, micro-level 
analysis of changes in corporate practice, and change in public discourse in 
three institutional spheres (finance & accounting, corporate governance, labor 
relations) across four countries (Switzerland, Germany, United Kingdom, 
United States) over a 19-year time frame (1995 to 2013). This discussion 
chapter first reviews the findings of the three empirical chapters and what they 
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reveal about the respective relationships along the triangle. The last section 
pulls those strands together to discuss how they inform an understanding of 
institutional change that incorporates the role of corporations and their 
practices more fully. 
7.2 Corporate Practice and Public 
Discourse 
The first empirical chapter examined the relationship between public 
discourse and corporate practice. While this link has not been an area of 
intense focus in the institutional change literature, the literature offered some 
points of departure around two issues:  
(1) the role of corporate practices as signaling devices; and  
(2) the institutional mediation of external pressures.  
7.2.1 Expectations 
On the first point, the literature has shown that corporations sometimes adopt 
practices symbolically, but subvert them substantively, in order to respond to 
institutional pressures and signal compliance to other actors (Börsch 2007). 
Such corporate decoupling highlights the signaling power of symbolic 
corporate practices even when actual practices differ (Westphal & Zajac 1994; 
Westphal & Zajac 2001). The basis for this line of thought is Meyer and 
Rowan’s (1977) concept of the ‘loosely coupled organization,’ which refers to 
organizations formally adopting certain institutionalized practices as a way to 
signal compliance and increase their legitimacy—even if they internally follow 
different behavior that may be more appropriate for their specific needs. 
Corporate decoupling offers a basic rationale for why companies would be 
reactive to public debate: although the law defines boundaries for what 
constitutes compliance and legitimate behavior, acceptable behavior within 
those boundaries is socially constructed. As a public expression of ideas, 
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discourse reflects changing perceptions of what constitutes acceptable 
compliance and legitimate behavior. We may therefore expect companies to 
generally react to public discourse and adjust their behavior in order to signal 
continued compliance and legitimacy. 
However, we expected the extent to which companies yield to public debate 
and pressure to be mediated by the ability of companies to decouple their 
practices on the issue in question. It was argued that the ability to decouple 
practices is related to an issue’s strategic or operational embeddedness within 
the firm, which can be conceptualized as the extent to which an issue 
structures the company’s relationships with its stakeholders and thus 
influences its strategic and operational capabilities. This conception draws on 
the literature on the ‘dynamic capabilities’ of corporations (Teece et al. 1997; 
Dosi et al. 2001; Whitley 2007). In essence, dynamic capabilities are thus 
concerned with a company’s ability to harness its relationships with financiers, 
owners, suppliers, employees, and other stakeholder groups to adapt to 
changing circumstances and realize new opportunities. Consequently, 
practices that structure these relationships can be seen as deeply strategically 
or operationally embedded—such as providing shareholder value in order to 
secure continued access to capital and finance new projects, or reliance on 
short-term or zero-hour contracts in order to gain staffing flexibility and react 
to changes in demand.  
Proposition A-1: Higher levels of public discourse are more likely to lead to corporations 
reducing associated controversial practices the less operationally embedded these practices are. 
On the second issue regarding the institutional mediation of public pressure, 
we expected higher levels of institutionalized coordination to result in public 
discourse being less likely to impact corporate behavior. Firm-level 
mechanisms of coordination provide institutionalized avenues for 
stakeholders to influence corporate behavior. Board-level codetermination 
and works councils, for instance, allow employees to voice their concerns and 
work out compromises with management. Blockholder ownership structures 
and network reputational monitoring, to use a further example, are means for 
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insider owners to wield enhanced control over management. In other words, 
these well-institutionalized ways for corporations to take the demands of the 
‘affected public’ into account are alternatives to reacting to public discourse. 
Drawing on Hall and Soskice’s (2001) Varieties of Capitalism framework, we 
thus expected companies in CMEs to display less reactivity to public discourse 
than their counterparts in LMEs, where we expected the lack of coordinating 
institutions to result in firms being more likely to react to public discourse to 
do what is expected of them. To be sure, stakeholder pressure in CMEs should 
still result in shifts in corporate practice—and the changes in firm-level 
behavior of German firms suggest that they probably do—but the non-public 
expression and enforcement of those demands means that they are not 
captured by the methods adopted in this study. 
Proposition A-2: Higher levels of public discourse are more likely to lead to corporations 
reducing associated controversial practices in LME countries. 
7.2.2 Findings 
The results generally supported proposition A-1, with firms adjusting their 
behavior in reaction to public discourse mainly on issues with strong signaling 
power that are less operationally embedded. Board-level corporate 
governance was found to be reactive to public debate (S10 Corporate Governance 
and S11 Board of Directors) in terms of the share of NEDs on the board (2.5.3), 
the share of independent NEDs (2.5.4), and the share of female directors 
(2.5.5). The results also found executive pay (2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay 
and 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio) to be reactive to public discourse, albeit in country-
specific ways that suggest direct pressure (S12 Executive Pay) to have more sway 
in liberal economies and wider social concerns (S09 Income Inequality) to 
influence pay in coordinated economies. Issue areas with few or no statistically 
significant relationships between discourse and firm practice are shareholder 
value orientation and labor relations. With shareholder value orientation 
linked to future access to capital, and labor relations a core strategic concern 
for many companies, these issue areas tend to be more deeply embedded in 
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corporations’ strategy and operations, which may explain their low levels of 
‘reactivity’ to public discourse.  
However, closer examination of the results shows some unexpected findings, 
either because they failed to find a relationship between discourse and practice 
where we expected one, or because they found evidence of discourse shaping 
firm behavior on rather deeply embedded issues.  
First, no evidence was found of discourse on auditor change specifically (S03) 
or accounting firms more generally (S03Alt) shaping firm practices related to 
auditing (1.4.0 Auditor Change). Given that the choice of auditor is not deeply 
embedded in a company’s operations and has strong signaling power by 
showing that the company takes auditor independence seriously, this is quite 
surprising. A possible explanation could be that firms do have deep 
relationships with their auditors that they are reluctant to sever for signaling 
purposes. Findings from the third empirical chapter on legal chapter support 
this view, with American businesses fighting mandatory audit rotation rules 
arguing that the trust and knowledge developed between a company and their 
auditor is crucial for successful audits, and that changing auditors is costly, 
fraught with friction, and difficult in a market place of only four major 
auditing firms. In other words, auditing may be a more deeply embedded issue 
than anticipated, in which case this result conforms to our expectations. 
Second, in some cases banks were found to be reactive to discourse on risk-
taking (S02) and banking regulation (S01) by increasing their capitalization 
levels (1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.0). As capitalization is reflective of banks’ lending 
behavior and risk exposure, it is a rather deeply strategically and operationally 
embedded issue, with knock-on effects on profitability, customer relations, etc. 
It is thus not an issue where we expected to find practices to vary with public 
discourse. However, examining the results more closely suggests some 
plausible interpretations. Swiss banks were found to increase capitalization in 
reaction to discourse on risk-taking rather than banking regulation. Given 
their comparatively high levels of capitalization, discourse on banking 
regulation may not pressure Swiss banks as they comfortably exceed 
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regulatory minimums and their international counterparts. Discourse on risk-
taking on the other hand may lead to more prudent practices among Swiss 
banks in order to protect their reputation as safe havens for international 
investment—a public perception of reckless risk-taking would be 
counterproductive to that goal. Adjusting capitalization, despite its deep 
embeddedness, may thus be important to Swiss banks, as the perception of 
prudence and safety is a core part of their business. Swiss banks may also have 
been pressured to adapt to public discourse due to the depth of the crisis, 
which affected Swiss banks despite their comparatively high capitalization and 
necessitated a public bailout of UBS. Furthermore, Swiss banks’ sheer size in 
relation to the Swiss economy could also increase their exposure to public 
pressure. British banks, on the other hand, were found to increase 
capitalization when discourse on banking regulation gains currency. With UK 
banks the least well-capitalized of the four countries included here, they are 
more exposed to the threat of tighter banking regulation, which may explain 
their proclivity to signal proactivity and compliance by increasing 
capitalization under public pressure. 
Third, US companies at large were found to take higher risks by increasing 
leverage (1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio, 1.2.1. Financial Debt-Equity Ratio) as 
discourse on risk-taking of corporations grows (S02). Leverage reflects not only 
a company’s financing choices, but also impacts its profitability through 
gearing, in turn affecting its relationship to shareholders and access to capital 
markets. It is therefore also a deeply embedded issue where we did not expect 
firms to change in reaction to discourse. Even more puzzling, perhaps, is that 
companies increased risk-taking when, in all likelihood, public discourse at the 
time warned of the dangers of excessive risk-taking. An explanation for this 
behavior could be the country’s strong expectation of shareholder value 
orientation. Higher leverage promises higher short-term returns, which is why 
investors may prefer risk over prudence. Moving along with increasing risk-
taking among US companies may therefore actually be a form of providing 
shareholder value and securing continued access to capital in the country’s 
short-term orientated investment environment. More importantly, this also 
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suggests that, even in the most severe crisis in decades, companies still choose 
to follow shareholder interests rather than more prudential claims. 
Taken together, the results therefore provide support for proposition A-1 and 
suggest that companies are less likely to adjust to public discourse the deeper 
embedded an issue is in their operations or strategy. However, the dampening 
effect of embeddedness may be overcome in certain circumstances, making 
companies more likely to react to discourse even on such issues: First, where 
public perceptions are particularly relevant to companies’ success or strategy, 
such as the case of Swiss banks relying on a risk-averse perception, or US 
companies providing high short-term returns and shareholder value. Second, 
where companies operate close to the margins of acceptable or compliant 
behavior, as in the case of British banks’ low capitalization that made them 
more exposed to regulatory threats and likely to change in response to 
discourse.  
In many ways, these findings are congruent with the ‘loosely coupled 
organization’ (Meyer & Rowan 1977). Companies were found to adapt their 
behavior to changing expectations and pressures, for example by reducing 
CEO pay in reaction to public outrage, even when they substantively subvert 
them, for instance by not adjusting the less visible total executive pay. This is 
very much in line with research on corporate decoupling, which has shown 
that companies engage in such symbolic behavior in order to show 
compliance and legitimacy (Börsch 2007; Westphal & Zajac 2001; Westphal 
& Zajac 1994). However, this study has shown that companies do not react to 
public discourse and pressure across the board, but tend to do so more 
frequently on issues that are arguably less deeply embedded in the 
corporations’ strategy and operations. This suggests that operational 
embeddedness may inhibit decoupling, making it more difficult for companies 
to signal compliance without significantly altering their core parts of their 
behavior. On such issues, companies were found to adapt their practices only 
when it is central to their strategy, or when operating close to the boundaries 
of acceptable behavior. Further research on this issue could make a valuable 
contribution to the literature on corporate decoupling.  
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On the second issue regarding the institutional mediation of the relationship 
between public discourse and corporate practice, the results support 
proposition A-2 and also show some interesting examples of institutional 
boundedness on certain issues. At a high level, discourse was found to impact 
the behavior of Swiss and German firms in significantly fewer cases than that 
of British and American firms: only four such instances were found in 
Switzerland and one in Germany, while six emerged in Britain and 10 in the 
US. The Swiss and German cases of reactivity to public discourse showed little 
commonality—while Swiss firms were found to react to issue salience on bank 
capitalization and some isolated aspects of corporate governance, German 
firms were only found to react to discourse on one measure of corporate 
governance.  
In their domestic institutional contexts, however, these patterns make sense. 
As discussed earlier, Swiss banks rely on a public perception of being safe and 
prudent, making it important to react to discourse on risk-taking behavior of 
banks and adjust capitalization accordingly. Of the four countries included 
here, Germany is closest to being a ‘pure’ CME (Hall & Soskice 2001; Hall & 
Gingerich 2009), so the very low incidence of firms being reactive to public 
discourse falls in line with expectations. 
7.3 Firm-Level Processes of Change 
The second empirical chapter focused on firm-level processes of change, 
analyzing how processes of mimetic isomorphism translate triggers, such as 
major crises and public discourse, into changes in corporate behavior that 
may coalesce into new norms. Formation of such ’critical mass’ is an 
important precursor for bottom-up change to occur, as it depends on some 
large and powerful firms or a large number of firms to change their behavior, 
pushing at the boundaries of the law and establishing new forms of 
compliance. Even where these changes in practice do not push at the 
boundaries of the law, but represent a significant shift in ‘average’ behavior 
Discussion 
282 
within legal boundaries, it could act as an important signal towards 
policymakers and regulators that companies are reacting to a crisis and are 
‘righting the wrongs.’ The chapter examined three areas of interest with 
regards to firm-level processes of mimetic isomorphism:  
(1) where and how mimetic isomorphism occurs, i.e. whether it leads to 
initial spread of behavior and subsequent convergence;  
(2) how sectoral differences affect mimetic isomorphism, i.e. whether 
highly internationalized sectors are more likely to exhibit such 
behavior; and  
(3) whether different types of mimetic isomorphism are associated with 
different modes of change in firm practices.  
7.3.1 Expectations 
On the first question, the literature suggests that crises spread a ‘great 
confusion’ of sorts, leaving actors without their usual compass directing them 
on what behaviors are appropriate or even in their interest (Blyth 2002). One 
important way firms regain their footing is through following the lead of large, 
successful companies—role models that are seen as ‘best practice’ examples 
of how to cope with the crisis and the uncertainty surrounding it. This 
process—mimetic isomorphism—reduces uncertainty among actors by 
blending in with others, especially those seen as superior (Scott 1995). While 
companies have been shown to imitate each other’s behavior for legitimacy, 
reduction of uncertainty and taken-for-granted practices even in ‘normal’ 
circumstances (Meyer & Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Westphal et 
al. 1997), major crises are likely to accelerate the process due to the heightened 
levels of uncertainty and pressure to change behaviors made untenable or 
undesirable through the crisis. We therefore expected firm behavior on issues 
rising in public discourse during the crisis to show a pattern of initial spread 
and increased heterogeneity, followed by convergence on the practices of a 
small number of new role models. 
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Proposition B-1: Institutions and practices discredited due to crisis become a source of 
uncertainty, initially leading to larger variation of practices. 
Proposition B-2: Once new role models emerge, corporations start to mimic their behavior in 
order to blend in with perceived best practice. This leads to a convergence of corporate 
practices. 
Regarding the second question on sectoral differences, the literature pointed 
to ’dominance effects’ (C. Smith & Meiksins 1995), whereby imitation of 
dominant economies and associated best practices among MNCs is intensified 
with increasing global economic integration. Mimetic isomorphism in 
reaction to a crisis should thus be more likely in highly internationalized 
sectors, leading us to expect the highly internationalized financial sector to 
exhibit more pronounced patterns of mimetic isomorphism than the more 
domestically bound non-financial firms. While dominance effects exist at all 
times, severe crises may create a new hierarchy of economies. As some 
economies suffer more than others, the previously dominant model may 
become discredited and replaced by an economic model that fared better 
throughout the crisis. 
Proposition B-3: Mimetic isomorphism is stronger in highly internationalized sectors, such 
as the financial industry. 
Proposition B-4: Crises may establish a new hierarchy of dominant economies, creating new 
role models both in terms of economic policy and associated corporate practices. 
Finally, regarding the third question, three types of mimetic isomorphism 
were conceptualized along with expectations for their effects on firm practices. 
Within-group mimetism, whereby companies copy the behavior of their 
immediate peers, is similar to Abrahamson’s (1991) innovation and 
reputation-based fad perspective. We expected this type of mimetism to yield 
relatively limited shifts in corporate practice. Drawing on Abrahamson’s 
(1991) fashion perspective, outside-of-group (or between-group) mimetism is 
operationalized as mimetic isomorphism between sectors, i.e. between the 
financial and industrial sectors. As financial and industrial firms are likely to 
differ in some of their practices, this type of mimetism was expected to bear a 
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larger potential for shifting firm practices in a substantial way than within-
group mimetism. International-level mimetism, whereby companies copy the 
behavior of global peers, was expected to be rare, but able to shift firm 
practices most radically. 
Proposition B-5: Changes in firm behavior induced by within-group mimetism are likely 
incremental, as firms within the same group are already relatively similar. 
Proposition B-6: Outside-of-group mimetism has the potential to shift firm practices in a 
more radical way than within-group mimetism. 
Proposition B-7: Cross-border mimetism has the largest potential for radically changing firm 
practices. 
7.3.2 Findings 
Overall, the analysis of firm-level patterns of change produced evidence of 
mimetic isomorphism in reaction to major crises and associated spikes in 
public discourse. The results suggest that a crisis and high issue salience may 
be necessary, but not sufficient conditions for mimetic isomorphism to occur. 
Where mimetic isomorphism was found, it tended to show a divergence-
followed-by-convergence pattern; in some cases, however, convergence was 
found to occur without prior divergence, on balance providing stronger 
support for proposition B-2 than B-1.  
Bank capitalization in response to the GFC was found to follow a divergence-
and-convergence pattern across the four countries on measure 1.2.0 Tier 1 
Capital Ratio, while American banks showed such behavior on all three 
measures of bank capitalization during the GFC and on some measures even 
in response to the dot-com crash. The risk-taking behavior of industrial 
companies as measured by leverage (1.2.0.1 Shareholder Equity Ratio, 1.2.1 
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio, and 1.2.2 Balance Sheet Leverage) across the four 
countries exhibited patterns consistent with isomorphism in reaction to the 
GFC. For Swiss and American firms, however, practices converged without 
prior divergence.  
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Executive pay practices were found to be subject to mimetic isomorphism only 
to limited extent and primarily through convergence without prior 
divergence. Extensive evidence was found of mimetic isomorphism on 
executive pay among American firms. Immediately following the dot-com 
crash, convergence of pay practices was evident both among financial and 
non-financial firms across all three measures of executive pay used (2.6.0 Total 
Executive Pay, 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay, and 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio). During 
the GFC, only American financial firms were found to converge—on measure 
2.6.0 and, to lesser extent, 2.6.1. British financial firms were found to converge 
on measures 2.6.1 Single Highest Executive Pay and 2.6.2 CEO Pay Ratio following 
the dot-com crash, but no clear patterns were found during or immediately 
after the GFC there. British non-financial companies exhibited no patterns of 
mimetism on executive pay. No convincing evidence for mimetic behavior 
was found for Swiss and German companies. 
Auditor change (1.4.0) exhibited a divergence-followed-by-convergence 
pattern among Swiss non-financial companies immediately after the dot-com 
crash, as well as for German and British industrial firms following the GFC. 
Lack of variation in the US data precluded analysis there. In terms of 
corporate governance more broadly, evidence of mimetic isomorphism was 
rather limited. Swiss industrials were found to diverge and converge on 2.5.0 
Board Size following the dot-com crash. No evidence of German firms showing 
mimetic isomorphism on corporate governance issues was found, which is 
possibly related to the country’s idiosyncratic corporate governance system 
that renders many of the issues moot there. The results for British companies, 
while pointing to convergence on several board-level measure of corporate 
governance, were not found to convincingly point to mimetic isomorphism as 
they did not appear to shift behavior in significant ways. American firms were 
found to show mimetic isomorphism on 2.5.2 CEO-Chairman Combined Role and 
2.5.4 Independent Non-Executive Directors immediately following the dot-com 
crash, however without prior divergence. 
Taken together, these results found more support for proposition B-2 than B-
1, i.e. mimetic isomorphism does not necessarily follow an initial spread of 
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practices, but may lead to ‘smoother’ shifts from previous to new norms of 
behavior. The expectation of initial spread of firm practices after a severe crisis 
was based on Blyth’s (2002) argument that major crises spread great confusion 
among actors of what is expected of them, what constitutes legitimate 
behavior, and what their interests are. Examining the results of this study 
more closely suggests that such confusion may indeed have occurred on some 
issues, but not on others. The absence of confusion could be the result of an 
issue not being deeply enough affected by the crisis, or because what 
constitutes new appropriate behavior is abundantly clear. It may also indicate 
that confusion does not translate into action right away—companies may be 
confused about how to react to a crisis situation, but only change their 
behavior once alternatives start to emerge. In other words, the absence of 
divergence does not necessarily imply absence of confusion. 
Banking capitalization was certainly a deeply affected issue during the GFC, 
with the risk-taking behavior of firms at the heart of the crisis. At first glance, 
however, what constitutes ‘better’ or more appropriate behavior following the 
crisis should be clear: higher capitalization. In practice, however, the issue is 
much more complex. At the height of the crisis, banks have very limited ability 
to raise capital as issuing new shares during a crisis is difficult and retail 
customers are inclined to withdraw rather than deposit funds. Public bailouts 
of banks provided an injected of fresh capital, of course, but otherwise the only 
avenue open to banks during the crisis is to curtail lending. While this is 
beneficial to the banks’ own survival and thus also reduces the risk of further 
fall-out from the financial crisis, it also chokes off economic recovery as 
businesses and the public find it harder to access capital. It is therefore a 
delicate balancing act of competing pressures and a ‘best practice’ approach 
was probably not immediately clear. Hence, the initial spread of practices 
found on bank capitalization would be explained by the issue being deeply 
impacted by the crisis as well as uncertainty about what constitutes new 
appropriate behavior. 
Risk-taking of non-financial firms, on the other hand, was a more peripheral 
issue during the GFC. The direction of travel on leverage was likely also much 
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clearer—companies may have needed to increase leverage to bridge shortfalls 
in demand and increase their chances of surviving the crisis, regardless of 
public debate criticizing corporate risk taking. The absence of initial 
divergence of practices would thus be a result of the issue being less deeply 
affected and new behavior, whether deemed appropriate or not, emerging 
right away. Executive pay and board-level corporate governance also did not 
show initial divergence. Here, we can rule out that the issues were not deeply 
affected by crises—the former was subject of extensive outrage during the 
GFC, and failings of the latter were attributed to bringing about the Enron 
scandal and contributing to the dot-com crash. However, on both issues what 
constitutes new appropriate behavior is fairly obvious: lower executive pay 
and improved board governance through a larger share of independent NEDs 
and independent audit committees. 
Regarding sectoral differences and international influences on patterns of 
mimetic isomorphism, the results generally failed to substantiate propositions 
B-3 and B-4. In terms of risk-taking behavior, only limited cases of financial 
firms engaging in mimetic isomorphism were found, while industrial firms 
across all four countries imitated each other’s risk-taking approach on a 
number of measures, thereby contradicting B-3. Results for executive pay did 
support B-3 as most cases of mimetic isomorphism on this issue were found 
among financial firms rather than industrial firms. However, given the 
relatively limited occurrence of mimetism on executive pay, this should not be 
seen as very strong support. Corporate governance and auditing, where a fair 
number of instances of mimetic isomorphism were found, also did not support 
B-3; if anything the results for this issue point to the opposite—industrial firms 
may be more likely to imitate each other’s corporate governance practices 
than financial firms. Regarding proposition B-4 on the reshuffling of 
international hierarchies during crises, the results did not produce sufficient 
evidence to conclusively support or reject the proposition. While patterns in 
bank capitalization practices show patterns consistent with the Anglo-Saxon 
model of low capitalization being replaced with the Swiss model of high 
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capitalization as an international role model during the GFC, this is too 
isolated a case to provide convincing support for B-4.  
While the failure to substantiate B-4 is thus mostly due to the absence of clear 
empirical evidence on the issue, the findings with regards to B-3 are more 
puzzling. Assuming that the comparison drawn here—between financial and 
industrial firms—is appropriate to capture a more internationally-oriented 
sector and one that is more domestically-bound, the results would suggest that 
Smith and Meiksins’ (1995) argument of intensified borrowing of best practice 
with rising global economic integration does not apply to mimetic 
isomorphism. It would be consistent with a VoC-based (Hall & Soskice 2001) 
explanation, though, which would argue that increasing internationalization 
of markets and hence competition leads to more diversity, as companies focus 
on the institutional competitive advantages offered by their home countries. 
However, we also need to consider the limitations of how patterns related to 
internationalization were examined here. It could be argued that the entire 
sample of companies used in this study, i.e. all 130-odd financial and non-
financial companies per country, are highly globally integrated and thus not 
suitable for testing B-3. Given their status as the largest listed firms of three of 
the world’s largest economies, plus those of a smaller country that, for its size, 
has very large and internationally-oriented firms, it is a reasonable line of 
argument. Future research, using a sample composition tailored to testing this 
question, may be able to provide answers. 
Regarding the impact of three types of mimetic isomorphism on shifting 
corporate practices, the results generally supported propositions B-5, B-6, and 
B-7: between-group and international-level mimetism were found to be 
associated with more significant shifts in corporate behavior than within-
group mimetism.  
In terms of risk-taking behavior, international-level mimetism was found to 
drive the significant increases in bank capitalization (1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.2.0) during 
the GFC, as well as the shift from a trend towards increased leverage (1.2.0.1 
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and 1.2.2) pre-GFC towards deleveraging after the crisis. Both cases thus 
support B-7. 
On executive pay, relatively few instances of mimetic isomorphism were 
found, making evaluation of the propositions difficult on this issue. Overall, 
the results suggested that changes in executive pay practices occur evenly 
across small and large companies, across industries, and within distinct 
country patterns. This would be consistent with executive pay being firm-
performance bound, as the GFC would affect most companies in a similar 
way, hence shifting pay downward across the board. However, between-
group mimetism found among American firms during the GFC, where 
executive pay declined most significantly of the four countries considered, did 
provide support for B-6. In other words, the executive pay adjustments among 
US companies appear to have gone beyond evenly distributed, performance-
bound change, with financial and non-financial firms converging during the 
GFC on lower pay. 
Results on corporate governance and auditing also suggested that higher-
order types of mimetic isomorphism are associated with larger changes in 
corporate practice. The comparatively rapid growth in the share of NEDs on 
the board (2.5.3) of Swiss and British firms following the dot-com crash and 
Enron scandal was found to be driven by within and between-group 
mimetism. Similarly, the high growth rates in the share of independent NEDs 
(2.5.4) on American and Swiss boards in the same period was also attributed 
to within and between-group mimetism. Both cases thus support propositions 
B-5 and B-6: while not radical in the sense of changing the direction of trends, 
the periods of accelerated change were linked to between-group mimetic 
isomorphism. 
Taken together, these results provide strong support for the argument that 
higher-order forms of mimetic isomorphism, i.e. between-group or 
international-level, drive larger changes in firm behavior than within-group 
mimetism. By implication, we can expect firm-level change driven by 
between-group or cross-border to be more likely to translate into legal or 
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regulatory change. For one, it could be argued that such higher-order 
mimetism increases the legitimacy of the new behavior, as it implies that 
behavior has converged across a broader section of the economy or even 
internationally. Secondly, as the results have shown, higher-order mimetism 
tends to produce more significant changes in firm behavior. The potentially 
higher perceived legitimacy and more substantial nature of corporate change 
on these issues should therefore make it more likely that policymakers and 
regulators accept those new behaviors as appropriate forms of compliance.  
Tying together the results of the first two empirical chapters, also raises the 
question whether public discourse and mimetic isomorphism are competing, 
alternative, or complementary drivers of firm-level change. A close reading of 
the results shows that in almost all cases, both a situation of crisis and high 
issue salience were present when mimetic isomorphism was observed. 
However, the reverse is not true—high salience and crisis did not always lead 
to mimetic isomorphism. In other words, high salience and a major crisis 
appear to be necessary, but not sufficient conditions for mimetic isomorphism.  
This raises the question though why the presence of both conditions does not 
always lead to mimetic isomorphism, i.e. why do companies resist public 
pressure in the face of crisis-induced uncertainty on some issues, but not 
others? After all, if major crises indeed produce uncertainty on appropriate 
behavior (Blyth 2002), imitating the behavior of others on issues that are 
linked to the crisis through public discourse should reduce uncertainty and 
increase legitimacy (Scott 1995; Westphal et al. 1997; Meyer & Rowan 1977; 
Powell & DiMaggio 1991). Linking back to the first empirical chapter’s insight 
on operational embeddedness provides a plausible explanation. As shown 
there, companies tend to be more reactive to public discourse and pressure 
the less deeply embedded an issue is in their strategy and operations. 
However, as the results in the second empirical chapter have shown, mimetic 
isomorphism during major crisis and high issue salience occurred primarily 
on risk-taking behavior and auditing, i.e. issues that are fairly embedded, 
while corporate governance and executive pay, i.e. less deeply embedded and 
more signal-heavy issues, showed mixed results with fewer cases of mimetic 
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isomorphism. This suggests that firms tend to be generally reactive to public 
discourse and pressure on less deeply embedded issues, but can become 
reactive to those pressures also on deeply embedded issues in times of severe 
crisis and uncertainty through mechanisms of mimetic isomorphism. 
7.4 Corporate Practice and Legal Change 
Turning from the antecedents of widespread changes in corporate behavior 
to how they translate into legal and regulatory change, the third empirical 
chapter focused on a number of issues neglected in the literature that are of 
particular relevance for a time period that includes two major crises as events 
of uncertainty and potential triggers for corporate-level change:  
(1) How does political salience and public discourse affect bottom-up 
change?  
(2) How does the nature of severe crises impact bottom-up change?  
(3) How does the structure of the political system mediate bottom-up 
change? 
Fundamentally, these three issues are concerned with the conditions under 
which bottom-up change is more or less likely to take place. Drawing on 
insights from top-down change and other parts of the literature, a number of 
propositions was formulated.  
7.4.1 Expectations 
On the first question, the literature has shown from a top-down perspective of 
change that the power of business to influence policymaking declines as an 
issue rises in public discourse and thus becomes more politically salient 
(Culpepper 2011). As mechanisms of bottom-up change require implied or 
explicit consent of regulators, courts or policymakers in order to make the 
changed behavior an accepted form of compliance, we expected political 
salience to play a role in bottom-up change too. When salience is low, we 
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expected firm-level change to exert influence on laws and regulations more 
easily as policymakers and regulators are under less pressure to intervene. In 
high-salience situations, however, we expected increased scrutiny of corporate 
practices and a clamp-down on deviant behavior to lead to declining impact 
of firm behavior on the law. 
Proposition C-1: Higher issue salience reduces the ability of bottom-up mechanisms to change 
formal institutions. 
In times of severe crisis, however, different dynamics were hypothesized. 
Crises were expected to offer a conducive environment for bottom-up change 
for three main reasons. First, crisis-induced mimetic isomorphism may 
accelerate the formation of ‘critical mass’ on the firm-level, shifting corporate 
behavior from previous norms to new ways of doing things, thereby increasing 
the ‘supply’ of bottom-up change. Second, policymakers and regulators may 
accept changes in firm behavior as acceptable forms of compliance more 
easily, either due to agenda and resource constraints crowding out low-
salience issues (Kingdon 1995), or because accepting firm changes as ‘self-
regulation’ on high salience issues frees their agendas at a time of competing 
priorities (Mayer 2013). Third, based on the concept of institutional strength 
(Levitsky & Murillo 2009), we expected symbolic policymaking (Suárez 2014) 
and hastily-designed emergency legislation to soften institutions in times of 
major crisis, also enhancing the impact of corporate practices on the law. As 
a result of these factors, we expected crises to enhance the influence of 
corporations through bottom-up processes of change—unlike in the political 
arena, where crises tend to lower the power of corporate actors (Culpepper 
2011). 
Proposition C-2: Severe crises increase the ‘supply’ of bottom-up change as they trigger change 
in corporate practices and accelerate the formation of new norms of behavior. 
Proposition C-3: In times of severe crisis, bottom-up change may be more likely to lead to 
legal change than in non-crisis situations, regardless of issue salience. 
Proposition C-4: Institutional softening may enhance the impact of bottom-up modes of 
change in times of crisis. 
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On the third question, we expected the impact of bottom-up change to be 
mediated by degree of centralization or decentralization of the political 
system. In the former, law-making is concentrated in the legislative or 
executive branches and central enforcement, in the latter it extends to 
multiple, including private, agents (Milhaupt & Pistor 2008). The UK can be 
considered a typical case of a highly centralized system, while the US is a 
prime example of a decentralized system. Switzerland and the Germany are 
somewhat more mixed cases, but the former is closer to a decentralized system 
while the latter is closer to a centralized system. We expected decentralized 
systems to be more receptive to bottom-up change, as policymaking is more 
open to disruption from a variety of actors, increasing the likelihood that some 
actors recognize firm-level change as sufficient self-regulation or as an 
acceptable form of compliance. Furthermore, the more complex and 
resource-intensive policymaking process in decentralized systems was argued 
to exacerbate resource and agenda-setting constraints on policymakers, 
increasing the influence of corporate practices on legal change. 
Proposition C-5: Higher decentralization of the political system increases the efficacy of 
bottom-up change. 
7.4.2 Findings 
The empirical results found ambiguous evidence on question one, generally 
confirmed the expectations outlined for question two, and rejected the 
proposition made on question three. Regarding the first question, the results 
provide a mixed picture on proposition C-1, which suggested that higher issue 
salience should reduce the impact of firm behavior on legal change, as it does 
for the power of business interests in top-down processes of change. Only two 
instances of bottom-up change taking place outside the two major crises were 
found, one of which supported C-1, while the other did not. The former was 
UK banks’ behavior weakening the impact of the Vickers Report and ring-
fencing rules, which occurred after the GFC and under declining salience. 
The non-crisis instance of bottom-up change that did not support C-1 was the 
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SEC’s pro-managerial rule change of 2007, which appeared to recognize 
American firms’ increasing shareholder orientation, as it occurred despite 
high issue salience. Hence, we do not have sufficient evidence to conclusively 
accept or reject proposition C-1.  
On the second question, the results strongly supported propositions C-2 and 
C-3, which suggest that major crises increase the ‘supply’ of bottom-up change 
and that firm practices are more likely to affect legal rules in times of crisis, 
but fail to find much evidence relating to C-4 on the effects of ‘institutional 
softening.’ Six instances of bottom-up change, originating in times of crisis 
and mostly driven by mimetic isomorphism, were found. These were 
primarily in the issue areas of risk-taking behavior and accountability & 
transparency, but also on board-level corporate governance. In one case of 
bottom-up change in times of crisis, relating to the introduction in 2003 of 
minimum quotas for independent NEDs on British boards, firm practices 
were not galvanized by the crisis and high issue salience. Six of the 
aforementioned seven cases of bottom-up change supported C-3 as they 
brought about legal or regulatory change during major crises. The seventh 
case, the weakening of the Vickers Report and associated ring-fence for British 
banks, originated during the GFC, but was so drawn out it completed well 
after the crisis. It was hence not counted as support for C-3, but the only 
instance of bottom-up change providing evidence related to C-4. It was found 
that the haste and pressure under which the Vickers Report was produced 
softened its ultimate impact by opening it up to watering down. In the absence 
of other instances of cases to support or contradict C-4, however, no firm 
conclusions could be drawn. 
In terms of question three, the results only allowed limited evaluation of C-5, 
given the small number of directly comparable cases of bottom-up change, 
but in the two instances where conclusions could be drawn the proposition 
was rejected. First, comparing the US and UK cases of financial market 
reform in reaction to the GFC found that British banks’ behavior had 
influenced legal change more extensively than was the case in the US, 
rejecting C-5. Second, the case of ‘top-down enforced bottom-up change’ on 
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UK board diversity provided an important counterpoint to C-5, suggesting 
that centralized systems are not necessarily more closed to bottom-up change 
than decentralized systems, but may be open to it in different ways than 
decentralized systems.  
Comparing cases of bottom-up change found in the third empirical chapter 
suggests that different dynamics are at play in decentralized and centralized 
systems. As hypothesized, decentralized systems were found to be receptive to 
change originating on the firm level by being more susceptible to disruption. 
A good illustration for this point is the infighting between regulatory agencies, 
Congress, and the executive branch in the US, which opened the door to 
disruption from the firm level on several of the bottom-up cases of change 
found there, such as the drawn-out battle over expanded shareholder board 
nomination and voting rights, whereby various actors defended managerial 
rights at different points in time. Centralized systems, on the other hand, 
appear to be open to bottom-up change in a different way: by being able to 
encourage, incentivize, and enforce bottom-up change from the top. 
Centralized systems do not suffer from the same levels of infighting among 
regulators and policymakers, allowing them to not only make more credible 
regulatory and legislative threats, but also enabling them to make credible 
commitments and promises to businesses. As the aforementioned case of UK 
board diversity rules aptly illustrates, regulators in such systems can encourage 
bottom-up change by setting clear goals for change in corporate practice while 
making a credible commitment not to formally regulate if targets are met. 
Hence, a national system’s openness to bottom-up change does not appear to 
hinge on the organization of its political system; rather, the type of 
organization appears to influence in what ways the system is open to such 
change. 
Taking a broader view of the findings in this chapter, most cases of bottom-
up change found were in the UK and US, while very few cases were found for 
Switzerland and Germany. The lower incidence of bottom-up change arises 
not only from fewer cases of firm-level change translating into legal change, 
but also the lower ‘supply’ of bottom-up change that can be traced back 
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through the antecedents examined in the first two empirical chapters. 
Germany and Switzerland show fewer instances of crisis-induced mimetic 
isomorphism and fewer cases of firms being generally reactive to public 
discourse, as was found in relation to proposition A-2. The constellation of 
countries along the LME-CME divide (Hall & Soskice 2001), i.e. most cases 
of bottom-up change occurring in the LME countries, suggests that the mode 
of coordination may be an explanatory factor not only for the extent of firms 
being reactive to public discourse, but also for the likelihood of changes in 
firm behavior affecting legal change.  
National-level coordination mechanisms, such as employer and employee-
representation peak organizations, enable bi-partite or tri-partite wage setting, 
brokering of grand compromises, and consultation and inclusion on legal and 
regulatory change. For instance, it is difficult to imagine how Germany’s wage 
restraint policies, which are often credited with returning the country’s 
economy to growth (Jackson & Sorge 2012), or government-funded short-
term work arrangements during the GFC (Schnyder & Jackson 2013), could 
have been worked out without these coordinating institutions on the national 
level. As a result, accommodation between business and public/governmental 
interests is likely to take place through these institutionalized channels rather 
than mechanisms of bottom-up change in CMEs. To look at it differently, 
these deeply institutionalized channels of coordination may not close off in 
times of crisis the way corporate influence on policymaking through lobbying 
and interest groups does in LMEs. 
7.5 The Triangle of Institutional Change 
The relationships examined in this study were conceptualized as constituting 
part of a triangle between the cornerstones of public discourse, corporate 
practice, and legal change. While some aspects of this triangle—the 
relationship between discourse and legal change, and the top-down aspects of 
the relationship between legal change and corporate practice—have been 
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studied extensively in the institutional change literature, the focal areas of this 
study (marked red in the graphic below) have received much less attention, 
but are important building blocks for a fuller understanding of institutional 
change. 
 
Figure 51: The Triangle of Institutional Change 
The results of this study provide insights into processes of bottom-up change 
as well as their antecedents on the firm level. Corporate practices were found 
to be more reactive to public discourse in LMEs, where there are fewer 
institutionalized channels for coordination and accommodation between 
management and stakeholders. Even in LMEs, however, firms tend to be 
reactive to public discourse only on weakly embedded issues, i.e. those not 
central to a firm’s strategy or operations, but with strong signaling power. 
While such general reactivity to public discourse is thus relatively rare, the 
twin forces of uncertainty brought about by major crises and political salience 
arising from public discourse appear to have a much larger impact on firm 









follow a divergence-followed-by-convergence pattern, indicating initial 
defection from previous norms of behavior before processes of mimetic 
isomorphism galvanize corporate practices into new norms. The extent to 
which mimetic isomorphism shifts corporate behavior appears to increase 
when firms imitate the practices of others beyond their immediate peer group 
in other sectors or countries. Corporate practices are able to influence law and 
regulation through mechanisms of bottom-up change at any time, but the 
aforementioned processes of mimetic isomorphism greatly increase the 
‘supply’ of bottom-up change in times of major crisis. While high issue salience 
may reduce the likelihood of firm practices influencing legal change in 
‘normal’ times, salience does not appear to have this effect in times of crisis. 
Consequently, bottom-up change features more frequently under such 
circumstances. 
A key contribution of this study is therefore to contextualize the existing 
literature on bottom-up change, which has been focused on conceptualizing 
and empirically testing the specific mechanisms of such change (Streeck & 
Thelen 2005b; Mahoney & Thelen 2010a). While the existing literature has 
focused on this mode of change as a driver of incremental change in absence 
of major shock events, the evidence presented here shows them to be 
important in times of major crisis as well. The increased supply and impact of 
bottom-up change under such circumstances shows the importance of taking 
context into account, as the dynamics of change may differ greatly between 
‘normal’ and ‘crisis’ times. The institutional environment was also found to 
play a role in bottom-up change processes, with LMEs appearing more 
receptive to this type of institutional change than CMEs. These findings 
contribute to the literature by shifting the focus from mechanisms of bottom-
up change to embedding it in the wider institutional and socio-economic 
context. Furthermore, this study extends Streeck and Thelen’s (2005b) and 
Mahoney and Thelen’s (2010b) work by exploring the antecedents of bottom-
up change in terms of public discourse and the formation of critical mass 
through mimetic isomorphism. 
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In light of the GFC, the literature has asked why the crisis, despite its 
magnitude, failed to translate into major changes to the neoliberal model of 
capitalism (Mayntz 2012; Schmidt & Thatcher 2013). A common refrain in 
this literature is that corporations have been underestimated as vastly 
powerful forces in modern capitalism, pointing to flaws in classic neo-liberal 
accounts that see markets as the dominant force. Instead, the sheer size of 
modern corporations has resulted, to use Crouch’s (2011) conception, in the 
balance of power between markets, the state, and corporations heavily leaning 
towards the latter, giving them vast influence on the polity and on setting the 
rules of the marketplace. However, this literature is constrained by its narrow 
conception of corporate power exerting itself primarily through purposive 
intervention in the policymaking process. While it points to the crisis 
accentuating the “series of comfortable accommodations” (Crouch 2011) 
between corporations, markets, and the state, this top-down focused literature 
ultimately struggles to explain why more radical change failed to materialize. 
After all, the GFC and ensuing political salience should have weakened the 
power of businesses to influence policymaking and created a window of 
opportunity for policymakers emboldened by public outrage and demand for 
change to enact radical reforms (Culpepper 2011), tipping the balance back 
in favor of other forces. Hence, the net needs to be cast wider to consider 
forms of corporate influence beyond top-down change.  
Placing the model of bottom-up institutional change elucidated here in this 
context of established top-down focused models of change shows that it does 
not compete with, but extends and complements them. Corporations usually 
hold extensive power to influence legal change by intervening directly in the 
policymaking process through lobbying and interest group pressure. 
However, their ability to shape top-down legal change declines as issues 
become more politically salient due to crises or scandals (Culpepper 2011). 
While these direct channels of influence close down in such circumstances, 
bottom-up change opens up. Here, major crises and scandals increase salience 
and spur relatively rapid and wide-scale change in corporate practice through 
processes of mimetic isomorphism. In turn, these shifts in corporate practice 
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may be seen as ‘self-regulation’ by policymakers, who cannot risk to 
antagonize or endanger the survival of those huge corporations due to their 
central role in financial markets, as employers, donors, and taxpayers. In other 
words, the power of business perpetuates itself also through bottom-up 
change, not only top-down. To be sure, such bottom-up change is not 
necessarily the result of purposive action, but may arise from normative and 
cognitive aspects of behavior among firms. Mimetic isomorphism reduces 
uncertainty and increases legitimacy through a logic of appropriateness 
(March & Olsen 1989), allowing firms to blend in with ‘best practices’ of 
perceived leaders in times of crisis, before they gain critical mass and become 
inevitable and taken-for-granted (Scott 1995). However, even without 
purposive action, bottom-up change enables accommodation between 
corporations and public/governmental interests when other channels, i.e. 
lobbying and interest group politics, close down. 
Top-down and bottom-up modes of institutional change are not mutually 
exclusive or indeed neatly separable in many cases. Several instances of legal 
and regulatory change analyzed here mixed elements of bottom-up and top-
down change, often involving regulatory signals or threats that further 
galvanize firm behavior before being formalized as acceptable forms of 
compliance. This may well be intentional on part of regulators, allowing them 
to straddle competing pressures from the public to ‘do what’s right’ and 
expected, while assuaging businesses fears of regulation and accommodating 
business interests by accepting firm-level change as sufficient ‘self-regulation.’ 
As a result, however, bottom-up change moderates institutional change in 
times of crisis—accepting and formalizing corporate change in law and 
regulation comes necessarily at the expense of deeper reforms that would set 
the bar higher and would require firms to change in more substantial ways. 
By extending existing conceptions of institutional change through an 
emphasis on corporate practices, the findings of this study show that 
heretofore neglected aspects of corporate power are important pieces of the 
puzzle. Bottom-up change may be rare and inconsequential under ‘normal’ 
circumstances; in times of crisis, however, it represents an important 
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alternative dynamic of institutional change. While corporate influence in the 
policymaking process declines during crises, it is enhanced through the power 
of their practices influencing legal change. Although bottom-up change does 
not constitute purposive action, it nevertheless enables the continuation of 
“comfortable accommodations” (Crouch 2011) between corporations, 
markets, and the state—at the expense of rebalancing the model of capitalism 




Processes of bottom-up institutional change warrant close attention and 
consideration. While they may be limited in scope under ‘normal’ 
circumstances, they take on a central role in change processes during major 
crises. Direct and purposive channels of corporate influence on legal change 
become less effective in such circumstances, but the indirect and not 
necessarily purposive channels of bottom-up change appear to open up and 
enable the perpetuation of corporate power throughout such events. Crises 
and uncertainty act as stimulants for firm-level change, driving adoption of 
new or changed practices through processes of mimetic isomorphism, 
building critical mass. During major crises it is not only the ‘supply’ of bottom-
up change that is increased, however, it is also more likely to be accepted and 
legitimated by policymakers. Facing resource and agenda-setting constraints, 
accepting change in corporate practice as self-regulation or redrawing 
regulatory boundaries to legitimate changed practices as new norms allows 
policymakers to focus on more pressing issues, such as macroeconomic 
stability. In other words, bottom-up change offers an explanation for the 
continued “comfortable accommodations” (Crouch 2011) between 
corporations, state, and markets throughout major crises. 
The findings of this study have two overarching implications for theory. First, 
theories of institutional change need to consider the role of corporate practices 
and associated bottom-up processes of change more fully, as they are an 
important way for corporate power to assert itself—even in the absence of 
purposive action. Second, theory needs to become more sensitive to context. 
As this study has shown, major crises and public discourse may alter the 
dynamics of institutional change, closing down some avenues for change while 
opening up others. One way of taking both issues into consideration is through 
the conceptual framework elucidated here—the ‘triangle of institutional 
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change’ that incorporates public discourse, corporate practice, and legal 
change. This study focused on three relationships along this triangle, offering 
more specific contributions to the literature. 
On the first relationship between public discourse and corporate practice, 
discourse tends to shape practice more extensively in LMEs, with companies 
relying on public channels to meet expectations of affected groups, while their 
CME peers can use institutionalized channels for coordination and 
accommodation between management and stakeholders. Even in LMEs, 
however, firms tend to be reactive to public discourse only on weakly 
embedded issues, i.e. those not central to a firm’s strategic or operational 
capabilities, which carry strong signaling power. With public discourse an 
expression of underlying ideas, these findings contribute to the constructivist 
institutionalism literature (Blyth 2002; Hay 2004; Schmidt 2010). Ideas, 
operationalized as public discourse, were drawn on in this study as an 
extraneous variable that can explain change in preferences and thus provide 
a solution to the circularity problem of classic conceptions that see preferences 
and institutions as mutually constitutive. By showing how the institutional 
setup mediates the relationship between ideas/discourse and corporate 
behavior, the above findings help address one of the key criticisms of the 
constructivist approach—an overt focus on agency at the expensive of 
institutional factors (Bell 2011). 
The second focus area was the cornerstone of corporate practice, to explore 
how processes of mimetic isomorphism accelerate the formation of ‘critical 
mass’ and establish new norms of firm behavior. Here, the findings show that 
the twin forces of uncertainty brought about by major crises and political 
salience arising from public discourse are able to induce mimetic 
isomorphism, shifting firm practices and building ‘critical mass’ that may 
ultimately shape formal institutions. During major crises, firm practices on 
highly salient issues tend to follow a divergence-followed-by-convergence 
pattern, indicating initial defection from previous norms of behavior before 
processes of mimetic isomorphism galvanize corporate practices into new 
norms. The extent to which mimetic isomorphism shifts corporate behavior 
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tends to be higher when firms imitate the practices of others beyond their 
immediate peer group in other sectors or countries. These findings make a 
contribution to the literature on organizational isomorphism (Meyer & 
Rowan 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Scott 1995; Westphal et al. 1997) by 
expanding on the notion of crises and uncertainty as triggers for mimetic 
isomorphism. The empirical evidence presented here confirms this premise, 
but also shows that uncertainty may initially cause divergence of practices 
before mimetism leads to convergence on new norms and the differential 
impact of different types of mimetic isomorphism on average firm behavior. 
Related to the third relationship of interest between corporate practice and 
legal change, the findings contribute to two parts of the literature on 
institutional change. First, they contextualize the existing literature on 
bottom-up change, which has been focused on conceptualizing and 
empirically testing the specific mechanisms of such change (Streeck & Thelen 
2005b; Mahoney & Thelen 2010a). The evidence presented here shows that 
major crises may greatly increase the ‘supply’ of bottom-up change, and 
illustrates how policymakers tend to be more inclined to accept bottom-up 
change as sufficient self-regulation under such circumstances—making it 
more likely to occur. The institutional environment was also found to play a 
role in bottom-up change processes, with LMEs appearing more receptive to 
this type of institutional change than CMEs. These findings are an important 
contribution to the literature, by shifting the focus from mechanisms of 
bottom-up change to embedding it in the wider institutional and socio-
economic context. The second part of the institutional change literature these 
findings contribute to are political salience-based models of change 
(Culpepper 2011). While these models advanced our understanding of 
institutional change by showing the role of political salience as a mediator in 
the power relationship between corporations and policymakers, they did so 
only from a top-down perspective of change. Unlike in top-down modes of 
institutional change, rising salience does not appear to reduce the influence of 
corporations in bottom-up modes of change. Indeed, taking the increased 
supply of bottom-up change in times of crisis into account suggests that this 
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channel of change opens up in such circumstances, while direct and purposive 
channels of corporate influence close down. In other words, this study extends 
political salience models of change by incorporating the role of corporate 
practice-based change. 
While implications for practitioners may be limited, two points can be made. 
For policymakers, the findings highlight the need to set the regulatory bar 
much higher than just a notch above current firm practices, including where 
firms have moved towards self-regulation, if they seek to rebalance the 
capitalist system to be less dominated by corporations. For firms themselves, 
the findings highlight their power but also their responsibility. The behavior 
of large and well-respected firms may take on ‘best practice’ status in times of 
crisis and thus cascade down to smaller firms. Corporate behavior thus has 
implications far beyond the boundaries of the firm. Relatedly and more 
generally, the findings also highlight once again that firms do not stand apart 
from their institutional environment—they are constituted by it as much as 
they constitute it. 
This study and its findings are not without limitations. First, it has to contend 
with a common problem in this type of comparative political economy 
research: we do not know what the key actors of interest—corporations and 
policymakers—actually think and what precisely motivates their actions, 
requiring us to make inferences and assumptions in order to find plausible and 
likely explanations of their behavior. Second, and related to the first point, the 
comparative, macro-pattern focus of this study does not reveal extensive 
micro-level reasons or causes of the dynamics of institutional change on any 
one specific issue. This is mitigated, however, by the existing literature’s 
emphasis on the mechanisms of bottom-up change, enabling this study to 
focus on the socio-economic and institutional contexts. Third, the public 
discourse measures used here are fairly coarse as they only measure the 
volume, but not shifts in the content of discourse. Consequently, we cannot 
be sure on the precise causal mechanisms that may lead firms to yield to public 
debate and pressure on some issues, but not others. 
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Future research may seek to address some of these limitations. Connected to 
the last point mentioned above, future research could employ more fine-
grained measures of public discourse, going beyond volume to actually 
measure content. A promising approach could be to use textual analysis and 
appropriate dictionaries to measure positivity and negativity in press coverage 
(Tetlock 2007; Tetlock et al. 2008; Kuhnen & Niessen 2012; Loughran & 
McDonald 2011). This could show whether firm reactivity to public debate 
hinges on the tone of discourse, thus moving beyond the one-dimensional 
analysis based on issue salience. More generally, and connected to the first 
two limitations raised earlier, future research may seek to focus on specific 
case studies of bottom-up change, comparing detailed evidence of signals, 
statements, and actions on the policymaker level with more fine-grained 
measures of corporate practice in an effort to open the ‘black box’ of firm 





Abrahamson, E., 1991. Managerial Fads and Fashions: the Diffusion and 
Rejection of Innovations. Academy of Management Review, 16(3), pp.586–
612. 
Agresti, A. & Finlay, B., 2009. Comparing Groups: Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) Methods. In Statistical Methods for the Social Sciences. Pearson. 
Aguilera, R.V. & Jackson, G., 2003. The Cross-National Diversity of Corpo-
rate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants. Academy of Management 
Review, 28(3), pp.447–465. 
Alves, P., Beekes, W. & Young, S., 2007. A Comparison of UK Firms' Fi-
nancial Statement Data From Six Sources. Working paper. 
Amable, B. & Palombarini, S., 2009. A neorealist approach to institutional 
change and the diversity of capitalism. Socio-Economic Review, 7(1), 
pp.123–143. 
Aoki, M., 1988. Information, Incentives, and Bargaining in the Japanese Economy, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Arcot, S.R. & Bruno, V.G., 2006. In Letter but not in Spirit: An Analysis of 
Corporate Governance in the UK. Working paper. 
Armour, J. et al., 2009. How Do Legal Rules Evolve? European Corporate Gov-
ernance Institute Law Working Paper. 
Baehr, P., 2001. The "Iron Cage" and the “Shell as Hard as Steel”: Parsons, 
Weber, and the Stahlhartes Gehäuse Metaphor in the Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism. History and Theory, 40(2), pp.153–169. 
Baird, J. & Renz, R., 2014. Häufiger Wechsel hat Folgen. Handelszeitung, (7), 
p.44. 
Balin, B.J., 2008. Basel I, Basel II, and Emerging Markets: A Nontechnical 




Barker, A. & Jones, A., 2011. “Big Four” accountants face audit reform - 
FT.com. Financial Times. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2015. A brief history of the Basel 
Committee, 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011. Basel III: A global regulatory 
framework for more resilient banks and banking systems, Bank for International 
Settlements. 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2006. International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards. A Revised Framework (Comprehensive 
Version), Bank for International Settlements. 
Baumgartner, F.R. & Jones, B.D., 1993. Agendas and Instability in American Poli-
tics, University Of Chicago Press. 
Bell, S., 2011. Do We Really Need a New “Constructivist Institutionalism” 
to Explain Institutional Change? British Journal of Political Science, 41(04), 
pp.883–906. 
Bertrand, M. et al., 2014. Breaking the Glass Ceiling? The Effect of Board 
Quotas on Female Labor Market Outcomes in Norway. National Bureau 
of Economic Research Working Paper. 
Beyer, J. & Hassel, A., 2002. The effects of convergence: internationalization 
and the changing distribution of net value added in large German firms. 
Economy and Society, 31(3), pp.309–332. 
Blyth, M., 2002. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in 
the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press. 
Börsch, A., 2007. Global Pressure, National System, Cornell University Press. 
Cadbury, S.A., 1992. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance, London: Gee & Co. 
Callaghan, H. & Höpner, M., 2012. Changing Ideas: Organised Capitalism 
and the German Left. West European Politics, 35(3), pp.551–573. 
Campbell, J.L., 2002. Ideas, Politics, and Public Policy. Annual Review of Soci-
ology, 28(1), pp.21–38. 
Bibliography 
309 
Campbell, J.L., 2004. Institutional Change and Globalization, Princeton Univer-
sity Press. 
Cascio, W.F., 2015. Corporate Downsizing. In J. Ciment, ed. Social Issues in 
America: An Encyclopedia. Routledge. 
Chasan, E., 2011. Auditor Rotation Mandate Rears Its Head Again. The 
Wall Street Journal. 
Chasan, E., 2014. PCAOB’s Auditor Rotation Project is Essentially Dead. 
The Wall Street Journal. 
Cheffins, B.R., 2000. Corporate Governance Reform. Britain as an Ex-
porter. Corporate Governance and the Reform of Company Law, Hume Papers on 
Public Policy, 8(1). 
Choi, I., 2001. Unit root tests for panel data. Journal of international money and 
Finance, 20(2), pp.249–272. 
Cioffi, J.W., 2010. Public Law and Private Power, Cornell University Press. 
Coase, R.H., 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), pp.386–405. 
Coase, R.H., 1960. The Problem of Social Cost. The Journal of Law and Eco-
nomics, 3(1), pp.1–44. 
Coffee, J.C., 2001. The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law 
and the State in the Separation of Ownership and Control. The Yale Law 
Journal, 111(1), pp.1–82. 
Crouch, C., 2011. The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism, John Wiley & Sons. 
Crouch, C., 2009. Typologies of Capitalism. In B. Hancké, ed. Debating Vari-
eties of Capitalism: A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Culpepper, P.D., 2007. Eppure, non si muove: Legal change, institutional 
stability and Italian corporate governance. West European Politics, 30(4), 
pp.784–802. 
Culpepper, P.D., 2005. Institutional Change in Contemporary Capitalism. 
World Politics, 57(02), pp.173–199. 




Cuomo, F., Zattoni, A. & Valentini, G., 2013. The Effects of legal reforms 
on the ownership structure of listed companies. Industrial and Corporate 
Change, 22(2), pp.427–458. 
Cyert, R.M. & March, J.G., 1992. Behavioral Theory of the Firm, Wiley-Black-
well. 
Davies, M., 2011. Women on Boards, Department for Business, Innovation 
and Skills. 
De Hoyos, R.E. & Sarafidis, V., 2006. Testing for cross-sectional depend-
ence in panel-data models. The Stata Journal, 6(4), pp.482–496. 
De Jong, H.W., 1997. The Governance Structure and Performance of Large 
European Corporations. The Journal of Management and Governance, 1, 
pp.5–27. 
Deeg, R., 2012. The limits of Liberalization? American capitalism at the 
crossroads. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(8), pp.1249–1268. 
Deeg, R. & Jackson, G., 2007. Towards a more dynamic theory of capitalist 
variety. Socio-Economic Review, 5(1), pp.149–179. 
Deutsche Bundesbank, 2014. Swiss Franc and US Dollar Are “Safe Haven” Cur-
rencies, Deutsche Bundesbank. 
Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, 2015. The New German Minimum Wage 
Law: the Most Important Questions and Answers. dgb.de. 
Dewberry, C., 2004. Statistical Methods for Organizational Research: Theory and 
Practice, Routledge. 
Die Welt, 2002. Deutschland ist Pleiten-Spitzenreiter in Europa; Zahl der 
Insolvenzen drastisch gestiegen - Banken: Wirtschaft kommt auch 2003 
nicht in Fahrt - Zinssenkung bringt keine Wende. Die Welt. 
DiMaggio, P.J. & Powell, W.W., 1991. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institu-
tional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields. 
In The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. University of Chicago 
Press. 
Dosi, G., Nelson, R.R. & Winter, S., 2001. Introduction: The Nature and 
Dynamics of Organizational Capabilities. In G. Dosi, R. R. Nelson, & 
Bibliography 
311 
S. Winter, eds. The Nature and Dynamics of Organizational Capabilities. Ox-
ford University Press. 
Driscoll, J.C. & Kraay, A.C., 1998. Consistent Covariance Matrix Estima-
tion with Spatially Dependent Panel Data. The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 80(4), pp.549–560. 
Dunkley, E. & Binham, C., 2015. Banks Hail Concession on Ringfencing. 
Financial Times. 
Eberhardt, M., 2011. XTCD: Stata module to investigate Variable/Resid-
ual Cross-Section Dependence. Statistical Software Components. 
Economiesuisse, 2002. Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance, 
Economiesuisse, 2014. Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance, 
Edelman, L.B. et al., 2011. When Organizations Rule: Judicial Deference to 
Institutionalized Employment Structures. American Journal of Sociology, 
117(3), pp.888–954. 
Eichhorst, W. & Tobsch, V., 2013. Has Atypical Work Become Typical in Ger-
many? ILO. 
Eigendorf, J., 2002. “Die Risikovorsorge wird weiter steigen;” Branchenex-
perten geben keine Entwarnung für Großbanken - Weiterer Kosten-
abbau erforderlich. Die Welt. 
Eilders, C., 2002. Conflict and Consonance in Media Opinion: Political Po-
sitions of Five German Quality Newspapers. European Journal of Communi-
cation, 17(1), pp.25–63. 
Emmenegger, P., 2011. Ever More Liberal? The Regulation of Job Security 
and Working Time in Switzerland. In C. Trampusch & A. Mach, eds. 
Switzerland in Europe. Routledge. 
Epstein, L. & Segal, J.A., 2000. Measuring Issue Salience. 44(1), p.66. 
Etienne, J. & Schnyder, G., 2014. Logics of action and models of capitalism: 
Explaining bottom‐up non‐liberal change. Swiss Political Science Review, 
20(3), pp.365–387. 
European Commission, 2013. Capital Requirements - CRD IV/CRR – Frequently 
Asked Questions, European Commission. 
Bibliography 
312 
European Commission, 2012. Women on Boards: Commission Proposes 
40% Objective. pp.1–8. 
Eversheds LLP, 2013. The Eversheds Board Report: The Effective Board, Eversheds 
LLP. 
Faccio, M. & Lang, L.H.P., 2002. The ultimate ownership of Western Euro-
pean corporations. Journal of Financial Economics, 65(3), pp.365–395. 
Field, A., 2013. Discovering Statistics using IBM SPSS Statistics Fourth Edition, 
SAGE. 
Financial Reporting Council, 2012. The UK Corporate Governance Code, 
Fleming, S., 2013. EU deal marks big step in auditor rotation reforms - 
FT.com. Financial Times. 
Fleming, S. & Smith, A., 2014. Big Four keep their grip on company audits. 
Financial Times. 
Funk, R.J. & Hirschman, D., 2012. Rethinking Endogenous Legal Change: 
How Organizations Re-Shaped Glass-Steagall. Working paper, pp.1–64. 
Gamble, A., 2009. The Spectre at the Feast, Palgrave Macmillan. 
Gemperli, S., 2013. Interpretationen der 1:12-Niederlage: Der Lohndeckel 
ist vom Tisch. Neue Zürcher Zeitung. 
Gericke, D., Lambert, C. & Müller, A., 2014. Corporate Governance and 
Directors' Duties in Switzerland: Overview. In Corporate Governance and 
Directors Duties Multi-Jurisdictional Guide 2014/15. Thomson Reuters. 
Gompers, P.A., Ishii, J. & Metrick, A., 2010. Extreme Governance: An 
Analysis of Dual-Class Firms in the United States. Review of Financial 
Studies, 23(3), pp.1051–1088. 
Gordon, J.N., 2007. Independent Directors and Stock Market Prices. UVa 
Conference on Law and Finance. 
Gospel, H. & Edwards, T., 2012. Strategic transformation and muddling 
through: industrial relations and industrial training in the UK. Journal of 
European Public Policy, 19(8), pp.1229–1248. 
Gospel, H. & Pendleton, A., 2003. Finance, Corporate Governance and the 
Bibliography 
313 
Management of Labour: A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis. Brit-
ish Journal of Industrial Relations, 41(3), pp.557–582. 
Gourevitch, P.A. & Shinn, J., 2005. Political Power and Corporate Control: The 
New Global Politics of Corporate Governance, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
Goyer, M., 2002. The Transformation of Corporate Governance in France 
and Germany: The Role of Workplace Institutions. MPIfG Working Pa-
per, pp.1–35. 
Greenbury, S.R., 1995. Directors' Remuneration: Report of a Study Group chaired by 
Sir Richard Greenbury, London: Gee & Co. 
Groom, B., 2013. They all want to be German now. Financial Times. Availa-
ble at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/26ceffbe-a5b8-11e2-9b77-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2X40PAw1X. 
Groom, B. & Parker, G., 2014. CBI warns politicians not to rock the boat. 
Financial Times. 
Hage, J. & Mote, J., 2008. Transformational organizations and institutional 
change: the case of the Institut Pasteur and French science. Socio-Eco-
nomic Review, 6(2), pp.313–336. 
Hahn, F. & Solow, R.M., 1997. A Critical Essay on Modern Macroeconomic The-
ory, MIT Press. 
Hall, P.A., 1986. Governing the Economy: The Politics of State Intervention in Britain 
and France, Oxford University Press. 
Hall, P.A. & Gingerich, D.W., 2004. Varieties of Capitalism and Institu-
tional Complementarities in the Macroeconomy. An Empirical Analysis. 
MPIfG Discussion Paper, 04/5. 
Hall, P.A. & Gingerich, D.W., 2009. Varieties of Capitalism and Institu-
tional Complementarities in the Political Economy: An Empirical Anal-
ysis. British Journal of Political Science, 39(03), pp.449–482. 
Hall, P.A. & Soskice, D.W. eds., 2001. Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional 
Foundations of Comparative Advantage, Oxford University Press. 
Hall, P.A. & Taylor, R.C.R., 1996. Political Science and the Three New In-
stitutionalisms. Political Studies, 44(5), pp.936–957. 
Bibliography 
314 
Hall, P.A. & Thelen, K., 2009. Institutional change in varieties of capitalism. 
Socio-Economic Review, 7(1), pp.7–34. 
Hampel, S.R., 1998. Committee on Corporate Governance: Final Report, London: 
Gee & Co. 
Han, S.-K., 1994. Mimetic Isomorphism and Its Effect on the Audit Services 
Market. Social Forces, 73(2), pp.637–664. 
Hay, C., 2004. Ideas, interests and institutions in the comparative political 
economy of great transformations. Review of International Political Economy, 
11(1), pp.204–226. 
Hellerstein, J.M., 2008. Quantitative Data Cleaning for Large Databases, United 
Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE). 
Higgs, D., 2003. Review of the role and effectiveness of non-executive directors, HM 
Government (Department of Trade and Industry). 
Hoechle, D., 2007. Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-
sectional dependence. Stata Journal, 7(3), pp.281–312. 
Höpner, M., 2007. Coordination and Organization: The Two Dimensions 
of Nonliberal Capitalism. MPIfG Discussion Paper. 
Höpner, M., 2003. Wer beherrscht die Unternehmen? Campus Verlag. 
Huntington, D.S., 2010. Summary of Dodd-Frank Financial Regulation 
Legislation. Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance and Financial 
Regulation. 
Im, K.S., Pesaran, M.H. & Shin, Y., 2003. Testing for unit roots in hetero-
geneous panels. Journal of Econometrics, 115(1), pp.53–74. 
Immergut, E.M., 2008. Institutional Constraints on Policy. In R. E. Goodin, 
M. Moran, & M. Rein, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. Oxford 
University Press. 
Immergut, E.M., 1990. Institutions, Veto Points, and Policy Results: A 
Comparative Analysis of Health Care. Journal of Public Policy, 10(4), 
pp.391–416. 
Ingram, P. & Clay, K., 2000. The Choice-Within-Constraints New Institu-




Jackson, G., 2010. Actors and Institutions. In G. Morgan et al., eds. The Ox-
ford Handbook of Comparative Institutional Analysis. Oxford University Press. 
Jackson, G. & Sorge, A., 2012. The trajectory of institutional change in Ger-
many, 1979–2009. Journal of European Public Policy, 19(8), pp.1146–1167. 
Jacoby, S.M., 2004. The Embedded Corporation: Corporate Governance and Employ-
ment Relations in Japan and the United States, Princeton University Press. 
Jones, B.D. & Baumgartner, F.R., 2005. The Politics of Attention, University of 
Chicago Press. 
Katz, H.C. & Darbishire, O., 2002. Converging Divergences, Cornell University 
Press. 
Katznelson, I. & Weingast, B.R., 2005. Intersections Between Historical and 
Rational Choice Institutionalism. In I. Katznelson & B. R. Weingast, 
eds. Preferences and Situations. Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 1–24. 
Kinderman, D., 2014. Challenging Varieties of Capitalism“s Account of 
Business Interests: The New Social Market Initiative and German Em-
ployers” Quest for Liberalization, 2000-2014. MPIfG Discussion Paper. 
Kingdon, J.W., 1995. Agendas, alternatives, and public policies Second Edition, 
New York: HarperCollins College Publishers. 
Kohler, U. & Kreuter, F., 2005. Data Analysis Using Stata, Stata Press. 
Kostova, T. & Roth, K., 2002. Adoption of an Organizational Practice by 
Subsidiaries of Multinational Corporations: Institutional and Relational 
Effects. The Academy of Management Journal, 45(1), pp.215–233. 
Krasner, S.D., 1984. Approaches to the State. Comparative Politics, 16(2), 
pp.223–246. 
Kriesi, H., 2008. West European Politics in the Age of Globalization, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kubo, K., 2003. The Determinants of Executive Compensation in Japan 
and the UK: Agency Hypothesis or Joint Determination hypothesis? In 
J. Fan, J. Teranishi, & M. Hanazaki, eds. Designing Financial Systems in 
East Asia & Japan. London: Routledge. 
Bibliography 
316 
Kuhnen, C. & Niessen, A., 2012. Public Opinion and Executive Compensa-
tion. Management Science, 58(7), pp.1249–1272. 
La Porta, R. et al., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal of Political Economy, 
106(6), pp.1–43. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. & Shleifer, A., 1999. Corporate Owner-
ship Around the World. The Journal of Finance, 54(2), pp.471–517. 
Langley, A., 1999. Strategies for Theorizing from Process Data. Academy of 
Management Review, 24(4), pp.691–710. 
Lara, J.M.G., Osma, B.G. & Noguer, B.G. de A., 2006. Effects of database 
choice on international accounting research. Abacus, 42(3-4), pp.426–
454. 
Leijphart, A., 1999. Patterns of Democracy, Yale University Press. 
Leone, A.J., Minutti-Meza, M. & Wasley, C.E., 2014. Influential Observa-
tions and Inference in Accounting Research. The Bradley Policy Research 
Center Financial Research and Policy Working Paper. 
Levitsky, S. & Murillo, M.V., 2009. Variation in Institutional Strength. An-
nual Review of Political Science, 12(1), pp.115–133. 
Lewandowski, P., 2006. PESCADF: Stata module to perform Pesaran's 
CADF panel unit root test in presence of cross section dependence. Sta-
tistical Software Components. 
Linklaters LLP, 2010. UK Corporate Governance: New Code Published, Linklaters 
LLP. 
Lipton, M. & Lorsch, J.W., 1992. A modest proposal for improved corpo-
rate governance. The Business Lawyer. 
Loughran, T. & McDonald, B., 2011. When Is a Liability Not a Liability? 
Textual Analysis, Dictionaries, and 10‐Ks. The Journal of Finance, 66(1), 
pp.35–65. 
Lütz, S., Eberle, D. & Lauter, D., 2011. Varieties of private self-regulation in 
European capitalism: corporate governance codes in the UK and Ger-
many. Socio-Economic Review, 9(2), pp.315–338. 
Mahoney, J. & Thelen, K., 2010a. A Theory of Gradual Institutional 
Bibliography 
317 
Change. In J. Mahoney & K. Thelen, eds. Explaining Institutional Change: 
Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Ambiguity, Agency, and Power. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–37. 
Mahoney, J. & Thelen, K. eds., 2010b. Explaining Institutional Change: Ambigu-
ity, Agency, and Power, Cambridge University Press. 
Mallin, C., Mullineux, A. & Wihlborg, C., 2005. The Financial Sector and 
Corporate Governance: the UK case. Corporate Governance, 13(4), pp.532–
540. 
March, J.G. & Olsen, J.P., 1989. Rediscovering Institutions, Simon and Schus-
ter. 
Mayer, C., 2013. Firm Commitment: Why the corporation is failing us and how to re-
store trust in it, Oxford University Press. 
Mayntz, R., 2012. Crisis and Control: Institutional Change in Financial Market Reg-
ulation, Campus Verlag. 
Mayntz, R. & Scharpf, F.W., 1995. Der Ansatz des akteurzentrierten Insti-
tutionalismus. In R. Mayntz & F. W. Scharpf, eds. Gesellschaftliche 
Selbstregelung und politische Steuerung. Campus Verlag. 
Meyer, J.M. & Rowan, B., 1977. Institutionalized Organizations: Formal 
Structure as Myth and Ceremony. The American Journal of Sociology, 83(2), 
pp.340–363. 
Milhaupt, C.J. & Pistor, K., 2008. Law & Capitalism, University of Chicago 
Press. 
Mizruchi, M.S. & Fein, L.C., 1999. The Social Construction of Organiza-
tional Knowledge: A Study of the Uses of Coercive, Mimetic, and Nor-
mative Isomorphism. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44(4), pp.653–683. 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2012. US Business Cycle Expan-
sions and Contractions. National Bureau of Economic Resarch. Available at: 
http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html [Accessed August 28, 
2015]. 
North, D.C., 1984. Government and the Cost of Exchange in History. The 
Journal of Economic History, 44(2), pp.255–264. 
North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Bibliography 
318 
Cambridge University Press. 
North, D.C., 1981. Structure and Change in Economic History, W. W. Norton. 
North, D.C., 1986. The New Institutional Economics. Journal of Institutional 
and Theoretical Economics (JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, 
142(1), pp.230–237. 
North, D.C., 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton Uni-
versity Press. 
OECD, 2015. OECD Indicators of Employment Protection. Available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploy-
mentprotection.htm. 
OECD ed., 2012. OECD StatExtracts, Available at: http://stats.oecd.org/ 
[Accessed June 2012]. 
Office for National Statistics, 2013. United Kingdom National Accounts, The Blue 
Book C. Marks & D. Sweet, eds., Office for National Statistics. 
Oliver, C., 1991. Strategic Responses to Institutional Processes. Academy of 
Management Review, 16(1), pp.145–179. 
Oliver, C., 1992. The Antecedents of Deinstitutionalization. Organization 
Studies, 13(4), pp.563–588. 
Pesaran, M.H., 2004. General Diagnostic Tests for Cross Section Depend-
ence in Panels. IZA Discussion Paper, pp.1–42. 
Pontusson, J., 2005. Inequality and Prosperity, Cornell University Press. 
Powell, W.W. & DiMaggio, P.J., 1991. The New Institutionalism in Organiza-
tional Analysis, University of Chicago Press. 
Rankin, J. & Treanor, J., 2014. Bankers' bonus cap architect says EU must 
sue UK government. The Guardian. 
Scharpf, F.W., 1997. Games Real Actors Play, Westview Press. 
Schattschneider, E.E., 1960. The Semisovereign People, Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston. 
Schmidt, V.A., 2012. A Curious Constructivism: A Response to Professor 
Bibliography 
319 
Bell. British Journal of Political Science, 42(03), pp.705–713. 
Schmidt, V.A., 2010. Taking ideas and discourse seriously: explaining 
change through discursive institutionalism as the fourth “new institu-
tionalism.” European Political Science Review, 2(01), p.1. 
Schmidt, V.A. & Thatcher, M. eds., 2013. Resilient Liberalism in Europe's Politi-
cal Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Schnyder, G., 2010. How Political Institutions Determine Corporate Gov-
ernance Reforms: The Polity, Law and Corporate Practices in the Case 
of Switzerland. New Political Economy, 15(4), pp.565–596. 
Schnyder, G., 2012a. Patterns of Change: Interactions between Corporate 
Governance Law and Practices. Working paper. 
Schnyder, G., 2012b. Varieties of insider corporate governance: the deter-
minants of business preferences and corporate governance reform in the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. Journal of European Public Policy, 
19(9), pp.1–18. 
Schnyder, G. & Jackson, G., 2013. Germany and Sweden in the crisis: Re-
coordination or resilient liberalism? In V. A. Schmidt & M. Thatcher, 
eds. Resilient Liberalism in Europe's Political Economy. Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, pp. 313–345. 
Schnyder, G. & Kern, P., 2015. Law and Agency: The Micro-Foundations 
of Institutional Change in National Corporate Governance Systems 
[Dataset]. 
Schnyder, G. & Widmer, F., 2011. Swiss Corporate Governance: Institu-
tional Change in the Law and Corporate Practices. In C. Trampusch & 
A. Mach, eds. Switzerland in Europe. Routledge. 
Schweizerischer Bundesrat, 2013. SR 221.331: Verordnung gegen übermässige 
Vergütungen bei börsenkotierten Aktiengesellschaften (VegüV), 
Scott, W.R., 1995. Institutions and Organizations, Thousand Oaks: Sage. 
Shepsle, K.A., 1986. Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions. 
In H. Weisburg, ed. Political Science: The Science of Politics. New York: Aga-
thon. 
Shepsle, K.A., 2006. Rational Choice Institutionalism. In R. A. W. Rhodes, 
Bibliography 
320 
S. A. Binder, & B. A. Rockman, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Political Insti-
tutions. Oxford University Press. 
Shepsle, K.A. & Weingast, B.R., 1987. The Institutional Foundations of 
Committee Power. The American Political Science Review, 81(1), pp.85–104. 
Siems, M. & Deakin, S., 2010. Comparative Law and Finance: Past, Pre-
sent, and Future Research. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
JITE, 166(1), pp.120–140. 
Simon, H.A., 1985. Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology 
with Political Science. The American Political Science Review, 79(2), pp.293–
304. 
Slaughter and May LLP, 2009. The Walker Review Final Recommendations – As 
you were, but manage it better, Slaughter and May LLP. 
Smale, A. & Cain Miller, C., 2015. Germany Sets Gender Quota in Board-
rooms. The New York Times. 
Smith, C. & Meiksins, P., 1995. System, Society and Dominance Effects in 
Cross-National Organisational Analysis. Work, Employment & Society, 9(2), 
pp.241–267. 
Smith, M.A., 2000. American Business and Political Power, University of Chicago 
Press. 
Smith, R., 2003. Audit Committees: Combined Code Guidance, Financial Report-
ing Council. 
Speck, B. & Tanega, J.A., 2005. UK and Swiss Corporate Governance: 
Comparing the Role of Independent Non-Executive Directors. Interna-
tional Company and Commercial Law Review, (12). 
Statistisches Bundesamt, 2014. National Accounts: Gross value added by in-
dustries. Available at: https://www.destatis.de/EN/FactsFigures/Natio-
nalEconomyEnvironment/NationalAccounts/DomesticProduct/Ta-
bles/GrossValueAddedIndustries_BWS.html [Accessed March 31, 
2014]. 
Steinmo, S., Thelen, K. & Longstreth, F. eds., 1992. Structuring Politics: Histor-




Stock, J.H. & Watson, M.W., 2011. Introduction to Econometrics 3rd ed., Pear-
son Education. 
Streeck, W. & Thelen, K., 2005a. Introduction: Institutional Change in Ad-
vanced Political Economies. In W. Streeck & K. Thelen, eds. Beyond 
Continuity. Oxford University Press. 
Streeck, W. & Thelen, K. eds., 2005b. Beyond Continuity, Oxford University 
Press. 
Suárez, S.L., 2014. Symbolic Politics and the Regulation of Executive Com-
pensation A Comparison of the Great Depression and the Great Reces-
sion. Politics & Society, 42(1), pp.73–105. 
Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 2015. Production Account by Institutional Sectors, 
Neuchatel: Swiss Federal Statistical Office. 
Taylor, M.Z., 2009. Empirical Evidence Against Varieties of Capitalism's 
Theory of Technological Innovation. In B. Hancké, ed. Debating Varieties 
of Capitalism: A Reader. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Teece, D.J., Pisano, G. & Shuen, A., 1997. Dynamic Capabilities and Stra-
tegic Management. Strategic Management Journal, 18(7), pp.509–533. 
Tetlock, P.C., 2007. Giving Content to Investor Sentiment: The Role of 
Media in the Stock Market. The Journal of Finance, 62(3), pp.1139–1168. 
Tetlock, P.C., Saar Tsechansky, M. & Macskassy, S., 2008. More Than 
Words: Quantifying Language to Measure Firms' Fundamentals. The 
Journal of Finance, 63(3), pp.1437–1467. 
Tharenou, P., Donohue, R. & Cooper, B., 2007. Management Research Meth-
ods, Cambridge University Press. 
The Economist, 2010. Regulating Swiss Banks: First Mover. The Economist. 
Thelen, K. & Steinmo, S., 1992. Historical Institutionalism in Comparative 
Politics. In S. Steinmo, K. Thelen, & F. Longstreth, eds. Structuring Poli-
tics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis. Historical Institutional-
ism in Comparative Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Thomas, R.S. & Van der Elst, C., 2015. Say on Pay Around the World. 
Vanderbilt University Law School Law Economics Working Paper. 
Bibliography 
322 
Tsebelis, G., 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in 
Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. 
British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), pp.289–325. 
Tsebelis, G., 2000. Veto Players and Institutional Analysis. Governance: An In-
ternational Journal of Policy and Administration, 13(4), pp.441–474. 
TUC, 2009. Walker Review shows the City want to get back to business as 
usual. pp.1–1. 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2014. Widespread Growth Across Industries in 
2012: Revised Statistics of Gross Domestic Product by Industry for 1997-2012, 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce. 
United States General Accounting Office, 2003. Public Accounting Firms: Re-
quired Study on the Potential Effects of Mandatory Audit Firm Rotation, United 
States General Accounting Office. 
Vickers, J. et al., 2011. Final Report: Recommendations, London: Independent 
Commission on Banking. 
Vinnicombe, S. et al., 2015. The Female FTSE Board Report 2015: Putting the 
UK Progress into a Global Perspective, Cranfield International Centre for 
Women Leaders. 




Walker, D., 2009. A review of corporate governance in UK banks and other 
financial industry entities. Final recommendations. W. Sun, J. Stewart, 
& D. Pollard, eds. Corporate Governance and the Global Financial Crisis, (7), 
pp.134–143. 
Walker, J.L., 1969. The Diffusion of Innovations among the American 
States. The American Political Science Review, 63(3), pp.880–899. 
Weber, M., 2002. The Protestant Ethic and the “Spirit” of Capitalism and Other 
Writings, Penguin. 
Welch, I., 2010. Common Problems in Capital Structure Research: The Fi-
nancial-Debt-To-Asset Ratio, and Issuing Activity vs. Leverage 
Changes. AFA 2008 New Orleans Meetings Paper. 
Bibliography 
323 
Welch, I., 2011. Two Common Problems in Capital Structure Research: 
The Financial‐Debt‐To‐Asset Ratio and Issuing Activity Versus Lever-
age Changes. International Review of Finance, 11(1), pp.1–17. 
Westphal, J.D. & Zajac, E.J., 2001. Decoupling Policy from Practice: The 
Case of Stock Repurchase Programs. Administrative Science Quarterly, 46(2), 
pp.202–228. 
Westphal, J.D. & Zajac, E.J., 1994. Substance and Symbolism in CEOs' 
Long-term Incentive Plans. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(3), pp.367–
390. 
Westphal, J.D., Gulati, R. & Shortell, S.M., 1997. Customization or Con-
formity? An Institutional and Network Perspective on the Content and 
Consequences of TQM Adoption. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(2), 
pp.366–394. 
Whitley, R., 2007. Business Systems and Organizational Capabilities: The Institu-
tional Structuring of Competitive Competences, Oxford University Press. 
Williamson, O.E., 1975. Markets and Hierarchies, New York: Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism, New York: 
Free Press. 
Williamson, O.E., 1981. The Economics of Organizations: The Transaction 
Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology, 87(3), pp.548–577. 
Wilson, J., John DiIulio, J. & Bose, M., 2010. American Government: Institutions 
and Policies, Cengage Learning. 
Zucker, L.G., 1987. Institutional Theories of Organization. Annual Review of 




This appendix includes the following: 
(1) Full panel regression result tables, estimating the relationship 
between public discourse and corporate practice. 
(2) Full ANOVA result tables, testing for mimetic isomorphism
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        Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 325
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D.1.1.1 D.1.1.2 D.1.2.0 1.2.0.1 1.2.1 1.2.2 1.4.0













Hausman Test (Prob>chi2) 0.9997 1.0000 0.9870 0.3219
Model RE RE RE FE FE FE RE
D.S01_DE_L1 -2.6998*** -3.3600*** -0.2641 2.5906 -1.7694 -1.7444
Banking Regulation (0.5079) (0.7718) (0.2759) (2.4071) (2.7309) (2.0435)
D.S02_DE_L1 4.5614*** 5.2605*** 0.7163 -5.2427 4.7867 4.3239

















ROA -0.1520 -1.4263** 0.1869 0.3727*** -0.4458*** -0.3083*** -0.0004
(0.5684) (0.6493) (0.6278) (0.1045) (0.1575) (0.0813) (0.0007)
D.Mcap_Ln 0.5695 2.6895* 0.5746 0.8930 -2.4565* -0.9694 0.0428**
(1.7147) (1.4625) (0.4829) (1.1110) (1.4163) (0.8925) (0.0212)
Year Dummies no no no yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.3071 0.8073 -0.2128 36.0943*** 48.7632*** 63.5063*** 0.1012***
(0.4356) (0.5472) (0.4612) (1.1596) (1.4690) (0.9875) (0.0359)
F 155.72*** 96.22*** 5.91 5.18*** 5.48*** 5.01*** 63.19***
R-squared 0.0526 0.1664 0.0365 0.8639 0.8601 0.8891 0.0224
Observations 127 112 137 1,239 1,240 1,238 1,195
Panel Size 14 14 16 104 104 104 99
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(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
D.2.3.0 2.4.2 2.4.3 D.2.4.5 2.4.6 2.4.7 2.5.0
Shareholder 
Rights (1S1V)
Pct of NVA to 
Shareholders
Pct of NVA to 
Employees
Pct of NVA to the 
State
Pct of NVA to 
Creditors
Pct of NVA to the 
Company
Board Size
0.8087 0.0000 0.2932 1.0000 0.0131
RE FE RE RE FE FE FE
-0.0099 -9.0948 -14.2018 13.5636** 26.9424* -36.1764
(0.0709) (8.3147) (14.1640) (6.6929) (15.9346) (35.1204)
-4.9070 4.6611 -11.1949*** 0.0076 5.3617
(7.4715) (13.0897) (3.7813) (8.3452) (27.2483)
-0.0081 -1.8952 4.8282 -0.2017 -6.1332 -0.0842 0.0727
(0.0376) (1.4098) (5.4057) (0.9329) (5.4972) (6.0951) (1.3717)
-0.0926
(0.0934)
-0.0001 0.0894** -0.8619*** 0.0055 -0.1592*** -0.7489*** -0.0009
(0.0001) (0.0440) (0.1090) (0.0223) (0.0417) (0.1818) (0.0109)
0.0081* -1.6064*** -1.9280** 0.1087 0.6463 2.5915 -0.1608
(0.0045) (0.4494) (0.9397) (0.3067) (1.0858) (1.6300) (0.1469)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.0247 6.5383*** 57.9553*** 0.0971 13.9676*** 30.3564*** 10.0367***
(0.0155) (0.8583) (2.7296) (0.4177) (1.1383) (3.0420) (0.6731)
16.65 8.89*** 313.32*** 90.80*** 7.06*** 2.87*** 1.64
0.0110 0.4574 0.0200 0.0263 0.8905 0.2609 0.7758
1,209 1,222 1,144 1,034 1,167 1,240 699
102 104 102 102 100 104 70
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(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
D.2.5.1 2.5.2 2.5.3 D.2.5.4 D.2.5.5 2.6.0_Ln D.2.6.1_Ln















1.0000 0.8930 0.9980 1.0000 0.9999 0.7782 0.9999
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE
0.1862 -0.3081
(0.7997) (1.2576)
0.0251 -0.1133 -0.1432* -0.0931 0.0455
(0.1974) (0.2365) (0.0773) (0.1604) (0.0484)
-0.0041 0.0130 0.0159*** 0.0077 -0.0022
(0.0101) (0.0140) (0.0049) (0.0108) (0.0027)
0.9580 0.1029
(1.0181) (1.3967)
0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0007 0.0002 -0.0060 -0.0037
(0.0011) (0.0021) (0.0005) (0.0008) (0.0001) (0.0055) (0.0093)
0.0653 -0.0170 0.0143 -0.0085 0.0034 0.0227 0.1937
(0.0489) (0.0259) (0.0112) (0.0180) (0.0038) (0.1065) (0.2073)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.0352 0.0984 0.6461*** -0.0060 0.0092 6.0091*** 1.5393**
(0.0393) (0.0689) (0.0450) (0.0382) (0.0115) (0.2937) (0.7764)
40.62*** 11.57 93.10*** 65.39*** 29.13** 90917.78*** NA
0.0232 0.0005 0.1837 0.1260 0.0302 0.1022 0.1658
669 696 522 480 457 311 252
68 70 54 53 53 43 48
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        Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 329
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D.1.1.1 D.1.1.2 D.1.2.0 D.1.2.0.1 D.1.2.1 D.1.2.2 D.1.4.0













Hausman Test (Prob>chi2) 0.9998 0.9999 0.9590 0.9534 0.8869 1.0000
Model RE RE FE RE RE RE RE
D.S01_DE_L1 0.1486 1.3459 0.6922 1.1115 0.6082 -2.3182
Banking Regulation (1.9345) (1.4782) (0.5871) (2.3539) (2.5600) (2.5741)
S02_DE_L1 1.5511 0.5011 0.0924 0.0090 0.0364 -0.0761

















D.ROA 0.3648 -0.0640 -0.0403 0.3054*** -0.5124*** -0.3183*** -0.0034
(0.3583) (0.2091) (0.0564) (0.0710) (0.1044) (0.0680) (0.0022)
D.Mcap_Ln -3.3081 -1.2725 -0.0910 2.6258*** -3.0689*** -2.6326*** 0.0403
(2.5538) (1.1928) (0.2488) (0.6914) (0.9445) (0.6177) (0.0357)
Year Dummies no no no yes yes yes yes
Constant -0.2865 0.3582 -0.2260 0.7253 1.0618 -0.4318 0.0733
(0.8581) (0.5758) (0.2041) (0.4502) (0.7747) (0.4189) (0.0480)
F 7.34 13.77*** 0.73 59.52*** 93.28*** 60.85*** 37.74***
R-squared 0.0706 0.0123 0.3237 0.1554 0.1921 0.1753 0.0207
Observations 95 92 87 1,408 1,410 1,410 1,252
Panel Size 10 10 10 122 122 122 104
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(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
D.2.3.0 D.2.4.2 2.4.3 2.4.5 2.4.6 2.4.7 2.5.0
Shareholder 
Rights (1S1V)
Pct of NVA to 
Shareholders
Pct of NVA to 
Employees
Pct of NVA to the 
State
Pct of NVA to 
Creditors




RE RE FE FE FE RE FE
0.1127 -1.0800 -4.2142 1.2269 15.1839 -2.0427
(0.0719) (2.6628) (9.7934) (4.5202) (9.3873) (12.2222)
-10.2648 17.9262* -5.3310 -23.3721 7.7278
(7.1650) (10.7846) (4.2106) (18.0273) (33.9782)
-0.0861 2.1501 1.8683 -3.5306 -10.7896 13.7020 0.6636
(0.0657) (3.7243) (9.2334) (3.5432) (6.5981) (14.7085) (1.3236)
0.0011
(0.0358)
0.0004 -0.2983*** -0.3513*** 0.0929 -0.0034 -0.0068 -0.0094*
(0.0010) (0.0861) (0.0686) (0.0579) (0.0268) (0.1628) (0.0053)
0.0043 0.2811 -0.2736 -0.3229 -0.0938 -1.2260 -0.0805
(0.0126) (0.8061) (1.2879) (0.5390) (0.5472) (2.2627) (0.1610)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.6967*** 0.4335 55.7429*** 7.7998*** 10.6278*** 22.9131*** 19.8882***
(0.0453) (0.8528) (1.1186) (0.7016) (0.7684) (2.1930) (0.2772)
11.74 75.12*** 5.43*** 3.11*** 3.33*** 23.5 11.82***
0.0031 0.0704 0.0147 0.4585 0.9062 0.0079 0.9197
1,306 1,350 1,331 1,268 1,319 1,409 1,110
116 122 119 122 115 122 101
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(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)














CEO Pay Ratio Employment 
Level
1.0000 0.9989 0.9999 0.9984 0.7220 0.9793
RE FE RE RE RE RE RE
-0.9102 -5.3872** -94.3699 -1.6164









0.0003** 0.0001 -0.0001 0.0089* 0.0120** 0.4153* -0.0037***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0052) (0.0061) (0.2462) (0.0013)
0.0024 0.0008 0.0048 0.2042** 0.1575 0.4147 0.0167
(0.0045) (0.0043) (0.0045) (0.0992) (0.1258) (4.3119) (0.0241)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.7101*** 0.0015 0.0643*** 0.6464*** 0.1500 1.1825 0.0430***
(0.0093) (0.0021) (0.0089) (0.0200) (0.1428) (1.1494) (0.0147)
1136.64*** 8.45*** 70.45*** 2261.88*** 128.98*** 53.87*** 49.17***
0.1751 0.4261 0.0544 0.1204 0.1285 0.0194 0.0302
1,110 999 816 563 600 1,086 1,407
101 100 99 85 88 101 122
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        Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 333
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D.1.1.1 D.1.1.2 D.1.2.0 1.2.0.1 D.1.2.1 D.1.2.2 D.1.4.0













Hausman Test (Prob>chi2) 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 0.8220 0.0516 0.0003 1.0000
Model RE RE RE RE RE FE RE
D.S01_DE_L1 0.3670** 0.4627* 0.2989*** -2.0163* -0.2727 0.7270
Banking Regulation (0.1863) (0.2726) (0.0686) (1.0535) (1.9876) (1.2002)
D.S02_DE_L1 -1.7043 -4.3991* -2.5162** 21.7161* 5.7260 -5.6868

















ROA -0.4300*** -0.5604*** -0.0247** 0.1863*** -0.1027*** -0.2656*** 0.0001
(0.0347) (0.0225) (0.0101) (0.0708) (0.0378) (0.0419) (0.0005)
D.Mcap_Ln 0.6609 0.5661* 0.8158*** 1.8754*** -3.7351*** -1.4381** 0.0416*
(0.4384) (0.3216) (0.1899) (0.5916) (0.9815) (0.7225) (0.0245)
Year Dummies no no no yes yes yes yes
Constant 0.7915*** 0.7952*** 0.0628** 37.9542*** 2.7502** 2.9403*** -0.0016
(0.0704) (0.0714) (0.0263) (2.1619) (1.0878) (0.6747) (0.0105)
F 171.93*** 634.04*** 224.81*** 101.72*** 146.12*** 10.60*** 38.01***
R-squared 0.3282 0.3884 0.2201 0.0526 0.1011 0.1233 0.0128
Observations 52 52 57 1,215 1,152 1,144 1,103
Panel Size 5 5 5 111 110 110 93
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(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
D.2.3.0 2.4.2 D.2.4.3 D.2.4.5 D.2.4.6 2.4.7 D.2.5.0
Shareholder 
Rights (1S1V)
Pct of NVA to 
Shareholders
Pct of NVA to 
Employees
Pct of NVA to the 
State
Pct of NVA to 
Creditors
Pct of NVA to the 
Company
Board Size
1.0000 0.9937 0.0049 1.0000 0.0869 1.0000
RE RE FE RE RE FE RE
0.0671 -10.0092 34.5992** -0.0254 11.4962* -47.1155**
(0.2556) (7.2754) (14.9713) (6.4307) (6.3005) (19.1114)
4.2164 -25.1100*** -1.9486 -3.0300 6.5128
(4.4753) (8.0610) (4.6468) (2.6508) (8.2431)
-0.0773 -2.8579* -3.9422 -0.3915 -2.5259* 4.2650 1.4241
(0.0969) (1.7321) (4.7619) (0.7858) (1.5069) (7.0175) (1.8957)
-0.6704
(0.8312)
0.0014 -0.0772 -0.5554*** 0.0279 -0.0680** -0.0047 0.0034
(0.0012) (0.0675) (0.1113) (0.0203) (0.0292) (0.1468) (0.0036)
0.0013 -2.9816*** -3.7340*** 2.3108** -0.9591 2.6834* 0.2185
(0.0085) (0.7509) (1.3447) (0.8981) (0.6543) (1.5687) (0.1511)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.7756*** 12.9528*** 5.6999** 0.0894 -0.1894 19.4942*** 0.2532
(0.0471) (1.1023) (2.2683) (0.4500) (1.4325) (1.9791) (0.2902)
12.85 61.84*** 6.18*** 38.74*** 49.05*** 2.55*** 23.60*
0.0249 0.0281 0.0486 0.0259 0.0425 0.3311 0.0151
1,188 1,206 1,096 1,019 1,091 1,238 1,233
109 109 109 108 104 109 111
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(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
D.2.5.1 D.2.5.2 2.5.3 2.5.4 D.2.5.5 D.2.6.0_Ln D.2.6.1_Ln















0.9999 0.9229 0.9932 0.0669 0.9289 1.0000 1.0000
RE RE RE RE RE RE RE
-0.1430 -0.1465
(0.5208) (0.4489)
-0.0168 0.0562 -0.2208*** -0.0482 0.1661**
(0.1452) (0.3477) (0.0758) (0.0767) (0.0668)
0.0071 -0.0277 0.1096*** 0.0420 -0.0705**
(0.0551) (0.1516) (0.0309) (0.0318) (0.0286)
0.1032 0.4060
(0.2719) (0.2743)
-0.0000 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0006 0.0000 0.0019 0.0010
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0013) (0.0014)
0.0263** 0.0199 -0.0053 -0.0036 -0.0020 0.3778*** 0.4784***
(0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0058) (0.0066) (0.0046) (0.0608) (0.0553)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.0125 -0.0110 0.5024*** 0.4323*** 0.0262** 0.1185 0.0755
(0.0459) (0.0402) (0.0224) (0.0228) (0.0112) (0.0743) (0.0881)
29.07** 13.88 188.86*** 125.18*** 61.83*** 143.17*** 217.72***
0.0337 0.0161 0.1659 0.1739 0.0536 0.0769 0.0990
1,233 1,233 1,230 1,228 923 1,218 1,217
111 111 111 111 111 111 111
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        Robust standard error in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 337
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
D.1.1.1 D.1.1.2 D.1.2.0 D.1.2.0.1 D.1.2.1 D.1.2.2 1.4.0













Hausman Test (Prob>chi2) 0.9707 0.9970 0.9883 0.0005 0.0956 0.0006 1.0000
Model RE RE RE FE RE FE RE
D.S01_DE_L1 -0.1434 -0.1357 -0.0176 0.2870** -0.1410 -0.1397
Banking Regulation (0.0999) (0.1082) (0.0333) (0.1396) (0.1794) (0.1195)
D.S02_DE_L1 1.1761 1.2828 0.1180 -4.8388** 4.2155** 2.9616*

















ROA -0.4952*** -0.5023*** -0.1283*** 0.1952*** -0.0889*** -0.2015*** -0.0000
(0.0892) (0.0820) (0.0236) (0.0421) (0.0333) (0.0371) (0.0002)
D.Mcap_Ln -0.6550 -0.7261 0.0296 3.0416*** -3.3537*** -2.3309*** 0.0159
(0.8888) (0.8173) (0.3166) (0.6756) (0.9436) (0.7111) (0.0100)
Year Dummies no no no yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.0938*** 1.1013*** 0.3224*** -0.8906 1.5595** 0.7745 0.0479**
(0.1595) (0.1443) (0.0460) (0.5835) (0.6694) (0.5789) (0.0195)
F 133.69*** 157.04*** 55.15*** 9.82*** 67.76*** 8.10*** 24.28
R-squared 0.2140 0.2211 0.0899 0.0923 0.0698 0.0796 0.0232
Observations 153 153 156 1,674 1,672 1,672 1,713
Panel Size 15 15 15 134 134 134 134
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(8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
2.3.0 D.2.4.2 2.4.3 D.2.4.5 D.2.4.6 2.4.7 2.5.0
Shareholder 
Rights (1S1V)
Pct of NVA to 
Shareholders
Pct of NVA to 
Employees
Pct of NVA to the 
State
Pct of NVA to 
Creditors
Pct of NVA to the 
Company
Board Size
0.7996 0.7785 0.0008 0.5024 0.8612 0.0000
RE RE FE FE RE RE FE
-0.0658 -3.1424*** 10.4800** 5.4294** -8.1063** -1.2927
(0.1110) (1.1190) (4.7968) (2.4418) (3.2515) (5.5654)
0.7989 -4.5558 -1.8562 1.3702 0.2969
(0.8684) (3.2222) (1.6571) (2.0410) (3.8648)
-0.0129 0.6978** -1.2834* 0.2687 1.5319** -0.3079 0.2186
(0.0325) (0.2916) (0.7095) (0.3590) (0.7031) (1.0020) (0.2006)
-0.4083
(0.3403)
-0.0007 0.0054 -0.6396*** 0.1529*** -0.0179 0.0585 0.0143
(0.0011) (0.0109) (0.0837) (0.0458) (0.0169) (0.1187) (0.0111)
-0.0180 -0.2713 0.3713 0.4630 -3.1407*** -0.8162 0.4325***
(0.0125) (0.4794) (0.9150) (0.6816) (1.0625) (1.3632) (0.1566)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
0.9468*** 0.7252 44.4286*** -4.7280*** 1.9940* 40.8868*** 12.8258***
(0.0632) (0.5017) (1.2992) (1.2437) (1.0394) (2.1559) (0.3071)
NA 61.77*** 7.91*** 2.17*** 47.07*** 22.17 2.23***
0.0225 0.0180 0.6627 0.0044 0.0699 0.0145 0.7140
1,533 1,681 1,519 1,530 1,387 1,713 1,650
134 134 127 133 121 134 134
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(15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21)
D.2.5.1 2.5.2 2.5.3 2.5.4 D.2.5.5 2.6.0_Ln 2.6.1_Ln















0.9917 0.9830 0.9990 0.9687 0.9999 0.0001 0.0392
RE RE RE RE RE FE FE
-0.0550 -0.1579
(0.2587) (0.2283)
-0.0002 0.0339 -0.0079 -0.0180** -0.0018
(0.0039) (0.0361) (0.0060) (0.0074) (0.0031)
0.0020 -0.0627 0.0100 0.0235** 0.0009
(0.0040) (0.0479) (0.0070) (0.0094) (0.0030)
-0.0680 -0.0674
(0.0473) (0.0446)
0.0006 0.0017 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0123*** 0.0150***
(0.0004) (0.0020) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0038) (0.0040)
-0.0074 -0.0668** 0.0093** 0.0068 -0.0023 0.0343 0.0234
(0.0091) (0.0338) (0.0046) (0.0073) (0.0036) (0.0714) (0.0705)
yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
-0.0061* 0.8131*** 0.8162*** 0.5942*** 0.0064 9.7162*** 9.4112***
(0.0035) (0.0473) (0.0091) (0.0165) (0.0052) (0.0918) (0.0833)
11.24 30.58** 97.32*** 477.40*** 18.54 28.14*** 13.17***
0.0076 0.0234 0.0812 0.2466 0.0116 0.5296 0.4596
1,635 1,650 1,648 1,650 1,273 1,642 1,644
134 134 134 134 127 134 134
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ANOVA Results: Within-Group (Switzerland, Financial Companies)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 1.972 1.934 3.796 3.245 2.853 2.851 2.699 2.813 2.824 3.183 3.246 2.879 3.087 2.757
Prob>F 0.178 0.182 0.067 0.089 0.107 0.107 0.116 0.109 0.108 0.090 0.086 0.105 0.094 0.128
ShareholdersFunds F-test 2.110 2.092 4.032 3.879 3.712 3.655 3.614 3.602 3.813 3.852 3.957 3.631 3.971 2.991
Prob>F 0.165 0.166 0.060 0.065 0.068 0.070 0.072 0.072 0.065 0.064 0.060 0.071 0.060 0.114
NetIncome F-test 1.971 1.638 0.167 2.029 3.098 2.632 3.381 0.416 1.918 0.820 3.386 3.322 0.092 3.126
Prob>F 0.178 0.218 0.688 0.172 0.094 0.120 0.081 0.526 0.181 0.376 0.080 0.083 0.764 0.107
ROE F-test 0.613 0.025 3.213 6.930 2.367 3.876 30.890 6.468 0.000 3.907 5.609 3.065 2.129 12.220
Prob>F 0.445 0.875 0.090 0.018 0.140 0.063 0.000 0.019 0.985 0.062 0.028 0.095 0.160 0.006
ROA F-test 0.010 0.001 1.029 3.639 0.127 0.069 6.348 1.108 1.146 3.673 1.929 1.793 2.160 3.110
Prob>F 0.921 0.973 0.324 0.074 0.725 0.796 0.020 0.305 0.297 0.070 0.179 0.196 0.157 0.108
OperatingRevenue F-test 2.054 2.014 3.848 3.540 4.169 4.065 3.615 4.162 8.887 4.603 5.242 4.561 4.742 2.775
Prob>F 0.170 0.174 0.066 0.077 0.055 0.057 0.073 0.056 0.007 0.044 0.033 0.045 0.042 0.127
Mcap_Ln F-test 35.780 27.980 20.050 21.760 21.240 30.100 34.290 37.600 29.610 33.740 35.480 23.860 23.590 29.540
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1.1 F-test 0.463 NA 0.648 1.396 2.298 3.527 4.171 1.260 0.506 3.280 3.753 0.574 9.811 0.000
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F 0.545 NA 0.457 0.282 0.173 0.102 0.080 0.291 0.493 0.098 0.077 0.463 0.008 0.994
1.1.2 F-test 2.537 NA NA NA NA NA NA 1.040 1.709 4.261 4.502 0.908 6.186 0.233
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F 0.252 NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.338 0.224 0.066 0.057 0.361 0.027 0.637
1.2.0 F-test 0.008 0.429 0.061 0.097 0.116 0.068 0.196 0.224 3.458 0.708 1.023 0.020 1.593 1.218
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F 0.938 0.548 0.814 0.766 0.742 0.801 0.668 0.647 0.086 0.415 0.330 0.889 0.226 0.288
1.2.0.1 F-test 1.791 1.279 2.010 2.019 2.744 3.418 3.745 4.488 5.687 5.316 6.028 6.314 6.292 4.583
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.195 0.271 0.171 0.170 0.112 0.079 0.067 0.046 0.027 0.031 0.023 0.021 0.021 0.046
1.2.1 F-test 0.636 0.648 1.086 0.405 1.968 2.763 2.382 2.604 4.183 4.264 2.271 1.683 1.441 0.397
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.436 0.432 0.311 0.533 0.176 0.112 0.138 0.122 0.054 0.052 0.147 0.209 0.244 0.543
1.2.2 F-test 0.832 0.448 0.497 0.427 2.094 2.938 3.583 4.569 4.573 4.526 5.862 5.369 5.537 0.616
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.374 0.512 0.490 0.522 0.163 0.102 0.073 0.045 0.045 0.046 0.025 0.031 0.029 0.451
1.4.0 F-test 1.000 0.269 NA NA 1.096 NA 0.913 0.913 2.435 0.913 NA 1.000 1.000 NA
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.329 0.610 NA NA 0.307 NA 0.350 0.350 0.134 0.350 NA 0.329 0.329 NA
2.3.0 F-test 0.039 0.411 0.411 0.411 1.242 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.492 0.277 0.277 0.410
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.845 0.529 0.529 0.529 0.279 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.491 0.605 0.605 0.531
2.4.1 F-test 2.074 2.011 3.458 3.352 2.599 2.589 2.639 2.895 4.782 2.782 2.671 2.388 2.480 2.738
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.168 0.174 0.079 0.085 0.123 0.124 0.121 0.105 0.042 0.112 0.118 0.139 0.132 0.129
2.4.2 F-test 3.949 3.047 1.863 0.049 1.600 0.573 4.735 8.378 6.924 0.721 4.390 4.737 3.413 1.318
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.063 0.099 0.189 0.828 0.221 0.458 0.042 0.009 0.018 0.407 0.049 0.043 0.080 0.284
2.4.3 F-test 1.420 3.511 11.750 7.392 6.533 3.503 8.254 3.609 0.690 1.985 15.260 3.129 4.885 0.258
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.250 0.078 0.004 0.015 0.021 0.079 0.011 0.075 0.420 0.177 0.001 0.096 0.041 0.623
2.4.5 F-test 0.367 3.149 0.205 1.160 3.379 1.957 3.052 3.169 5.301 3.152 1.476 1.130 1.004 0.033
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.553 0.096 0.657 0.299 0.082 0.178 0.097 0.091 0.035 0.093 0.239 0.302 0.329 0.860
2.4.6 F-test 0.069 0.436 1.343 4.827 8.285 7.174 4.358 1.771 1.268 4.456 4.703 0.584 3.929 1.840
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.796 0.519 0.265 0.044 0.011 0.017 0.053 0.202 0.281 0.051 0.046 0.456 0.066 0.208
2.4.7 F-test 0.020 2.943 0.001 2.012 3.028 4.130 0.722 0.092 0.516 2.838 0.003 0.123 0.460 1.579
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.888 0.104 0.975 0.174 0.098 0.056 0.406 0.765 0.481 0.108 0.960 0.730 0.506 0.237
2.5.0 F-test 0.033 0.010 2.045 1.069 1.806 1.023 0.004 0.252 0.120 0.485 0.450 0.074 0.090 NA
Board Size Prob>F 0.860 0.920 0.176 0.322 0.200 0.329 0.950 0.624 0.734 0.497 0.512 0.793 0.772 NA
2.5.1 F-test 0.312 0.964 1.300 1.469 0.385 0.385 0.008 0.021 0.645 1.524 0.817 NA NA NA
CEO on Board Prob>F 0.588 0.345 0.275 0.249 0.545 0.545 0.930 0.887 0.434 0.237 0.380 NA NA NA
2.5.2 F-test 0.185 0.571 0.347 0.257 0.438 0.438 0.257 0.347 0.529 NA NA NA NA NA
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.676 0.464 0.566 0.621 0.519 0.519 0.621 0.566 0.478 NA NA NA NA NA
2.5.3 F-test NA NA NA NA 0.798 0.890 0.841 0.714 0.572 0.229 0.351 NA NA NA
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F NA NA NA NA 0.413 0.389 0.401 0.426 0.474 0.645 0.568 NA NA NA
2.5.4 F-test NA NA NA NA 0.959 0.966 0.957 2.278 2.417 4.600 2.186 1.973 2.841 NA
Independent NEDs Prob>F NA NA NA NA 0.372 0.371 0.373 0.175 0.164 0.064 0.173 0.198 0.130 NA
2.5.5 F-test NA NA NA NA 1.494 1.454 2.388 2.015 0.693 0.903 0.563 3.043 0.574 NA
Female Directors Prob>F NA NA NA NA 0.289 0.314 0.262 0.229 0.443 0.374 0.475 0.132 0.471 NA
2.6.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.6.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 31.540 9.626 18.840 15.790 24.720 NA NA
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.002 0.027 0.005 0.007 0.003 NA NA
2.6.2 F-test NA NA NA NA 0.393 0.674 0.567 0.990 0.521 0.764 3.203 3.533 1.584 NA
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA 0.558 0.449 0.486 0.358 0.498 0.411 0.111 0.102 0.249 NA
3.1.0 F-test 15.800 19.440 22.300 20.360 22.920 22.070 23.340 21.980 26.120 26.750 27.090 17.120 24.350 14.270
Employment Level Prob>F 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.002
3.2.0 F-test 6.675 2.997 2.122 0.349 4.006 5.302 5.125 3.169 0.445 0.000 0.393 0.320 0.022 0.069
Average Wage Prob>F 0.017 0.098 0.161 0.562 0.059 0.032 0.035 0.090 0.513 0.983 0.538 0.578 0.883 0.796
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ANOVA Results: Within-Group (Switzerland, Industrial Companies)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 8.944 6.819 6.411 6.283 7.022 7.121 8.540 8.410 7.947 7.571 7.746 8.400 7.214 2.094
Prob>F 0.004 0.011 0.013 0.014 0.010 0.009 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.005 0.009 0.156
ShareholdersFunds F-test 8.811 7.338 5.982 6.127 6.389 6.357 7.479 7.958 7.105 8.135 6.792 8.071 7.246 1.978
Prob>F 0.004 0.008 0.017 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.006 0.011 0.006 0.009 0.168
NetIncome F-test 7.378 2.187 2.288 3.665 6.004 5.967 7.948 7.879 2.897 5.136 2.037 5.169 5.527 2.010
Prob>F 0.008 0.143 0.134 0.059 0.017 0.017 0.006 0.006 0.093 0.026 0.158 0.026 0.021 0.165
ROE F-test 8.938 0.412 8.160 0.031 1.143 2.270 7.433 7.426 2.790 7.848 7.053 6.635 2.523 7.076
Prob>F 0.004 0.523 0.006 0.860 0.288 0.136 0.008 0.008 0.099 0.006 0.010 0.012 0.117 0.012
ROA F-test 7.730 0.910 14.860 10.360 8.645 7.713 9.854 7.358 6.542 12.740 4.805 9.769 4.805 9.188
Prob>F 0.007 0.343 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.007 0.002 0.008 0.013 0.001 0.031 0.003 0.032 0.004
OperatingRevenue F-test 6.734 6.593 5.583 5.320 6.119 6.741 7.288 7.206 5.970 5.734 4.873 7.708 7.360 1.985
Prob>F 0.011 0.012 0.021 0.024 0.016 0.011 0.008 0.009 0.017 0.019 0.030 0.007 0.008 0.167
Mcap_Ln F-test 131.700 119.000 132.500 124.000 132.300 129.500 137.500 131.700 133.100 138.000 134.500 122.500 114.800 116.700
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.1.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0.1 F-test 0.040 0.342 1.061 0.113 0.038 0.309 0.061 0.037 0.102 0.109 0.740 0.234 0.150 0.180
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.842 0.560 0.306 0.738 0.846 0.580 0.805 0.848 0.751 0.743 0.393 0.630 0.700 0.673
1.2.1 F-test 0.036 0.915 3.732 1.314 0.259 0.011 0.000 0.005 0.244 0.196 0.936 0.040 0.189 0.080
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.850 0.342 0.057 0.255 0.612 0.917 1.000 0.945 0.622 0.659 0.336 0.843 0.665 0.779
1.2.2 F-test 0.006 0.515 1.043 0.031 0.065 0.168 0.005 0.052 0.342 0.262 0.328 0.582 0.588 0.019
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.941 0.475 0.311 0.861 0.799 0.683 0.944 0.821 0.561 0.610 0.568 0.448 0.446 0.893
1.4.0 F-test 1.179 1.042 0.004 4.978 1.000 0.004 2.170 1.027 2.114 0.182 0.367 0.001 0.000 0.775
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.281 0.311 0.947 0.029 0.321 0.947 0.145 0.314 0.150 0.671 0.546 0.973 0.985 0.382
2.3.0 F-test 0.835 0.002 0.138 0.021 0.006 0.027 0.021 0.408 0.408 0.320 0.034 0.004 0.359 0.074
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.364 0.968 0.712 0.884 0.938 0.871 0.885 0.525 0.525 0.573 0.854 0.947 0.551 0.786
2.4.1 F-test 8.456 7.447 6.138 11.520 11.680 3.487 8.381 8.340 6.354 6.906 4.568 8.611 7.997 2.643
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.005 0.008 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.066 0.005 0.005 0.014 0.010 0.036 0.004 0.006 0.112
2.4.2 F-test 0.267 2.122 0.461 7.588 9.208 7.381 7.247 3.624 5.171 3.652 1.564 10.450 1.544 6.881
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.607 0.149 0.499 0.007 0.003 0.008 0.009 0.061 0.026 0.060 0.215 0.002 0.218 0.013
2.4.3 F-test 12.160 14.430 4.004 8.796 16.470 15.550 20.500 17.010 20.140 11.590 15.500 18.030 12.330 8.279
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.001 0.000 0.050 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007
2.4.5 F-test 3.576 9.085 4.028 3.855 4.499 16.570 9.728 0.121 0.451 1.053 11.390 11.070 7.457 12.540
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.063 0.004 0.049 0.054 0.037 0.000 0.003 0.729 0.504 0.309 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.001
2.4.6 F-test 3.241 0.131 2.115 1.291 0.137 0.003 0.145 0.003 1.091 1.186 0.072 0.002 0.041 2.369
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.076 0.718 0.150 0.259 0.713 0.956 0.705 0.957 0.300 0.280 0.790 0.964 0.840 0.133
2.4.7 F-test 10.570 5.253 1.915 0.772 1.064 0.031 0.164 0.002 1.061 0.380 0.576 0.118 1.437 0.003
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.002 0.025 0.170 0.382 0.305 0.861 0.686 0.969 0.306 0.539 0.450 0.732 0.235 0.960
2.5.0 F-test 0.511 0.245 3.469 4.594 4.271 4.160 2.785 1.412 2.002 3.774 3.504 5.321 3.520 NA
Board Size Prob>F 0.479 0.624 0.071 0.039 0.045 0.047 0.102 0.241 0.164 0.058 0.068 0.026 0.068 NA
2.5.1 F-test 0.125 0.367 0.379 0.949 0.540 0.746 0.117 0.000 0.306 0.167 1.816 0.147 0.005 NA
CEO on Board Prob>F 0.725 0.548 0.542 0.336 0.467 0.393 0.734 1.000 0.583 0.685 0.185 0.704 0.944 NA
2.5.2 F-test 0.057 0.523 0.588 0.687 0.052 1.199 1.193 0.376 0.287 0.287 0.579 1.184 0.901 NA
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.813 0.474 0.448 0.413 0.821 0.279 0.281 0.543 0.595 0.595 0.451 0.283 0.348 NA
2.5.3 F-test 0.304 NA NA NA 0.055 2.058 6.099 3.712 2.144 0.949 1.527 0.060 0.122 NA
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.587 NA NA NA 0.816 0.160 0.018 0.062 0.152 0.336 0.224 0.807 0.729 NA
2.5.4 F-test 0.390 NA NA NA 0.069 0.124 1.171 0.124 0.146 0.082 0.014 0.233 0.052 NA
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.539 NA NA NA 0.794 0.727 0.286 0.727 0.704 0.777 0.908 0.632 0.820 NA
2.5.5 F-test 0.347 NA NA NA 0.224 0.836 4.700 1.775 3.877 1.601 4.659 7.748 9.037 NA
Female Directors Prob>F 0.562 NA NA NA 0.640 0.367 0.037 0.192 0.057 0.214 0.037 0.008 0.005 NA
2.6.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.275 11.600 2.739 17.560 1.461 2.956 3.765 NA
Total Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.608 0.002 0.108 0.000 0.237 0.098 0.063 NA
2.6.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA 3.272 16.080 9.637 9.755 2.463 5.756 0.009 NA
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.094 0.000 0.004 0.003 0.128 0.025 0.927 NA
2.6.2 F-test NA NA NA NA 0.985 0.725 1.074 4.428 3.191 6.777 7.263 7.443 2.694 NA
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA 0.329 0.400 0.307 0.043 0.084 0.013 0.010 0.010 0.109 NA
3.1.0 F-test 37.650 29.920 32.440 29.840 38.460 43.680 44.930 46.950 35.580 37.480 43.570 39.050 50.390 36.370
Employment Level Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.2.0 F-test 0.017 0.358 0.008 0.038 1.230 1.224 0.006 0.525 0.027 0.383 0.257 0.018 0.344 0.337
Average Wage Prob>F 0.896 0.551 0.930 0.847 0.271 0.272 0.937 0.471 0.870 0.538 0.614 0.895 0.559 0.564
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ANOVA Results: Within-Group (Germany, Financial Companies)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 7.257 7.432 6.543 6.497 6.396 6.115 4.076 3.780 3.003 3.578 2.982 3.012 2.533 NA
Prob>F 0.015 0.014 0.020 0.021 0.020 0.023 0.057 0.067 0.100 0.077 0.103 0.103 0.134 NA
ShareholdersFunds F-test 5.335 6.567 5.407 5.842 6.720 6.530 7.141 7.341 7.031 5.283 4.641 5.141 4.698 NA
Prob>F 0.034 0.020 0.033 0.027 0.017 0.019 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.035 0.047 0.039 0.048 NA
NetIncome F-test 1.862 6.070 0.513 1.160 0.860 5.680 7.016 6.681 0.164 0.517 7.170 3.649 2.636 NA
Prob>F 0.190 0.025 0.484 0.296 0.365 0.027 0.015 0.018 0.690 0.482 0.017 0.075 0.127 NA
ROE F-test 0.599 0.071 0.247 0.003 0.795 0.172 3.948 0.129 0.335 1.763 0.371 0.622 0.034 NA
Prob>F 0.450 0.794 0.626 0.960 0.383 0.683 0.061 0.723 0.570 0.203 0.551 0.442 0.857 NA
ROA F-test 2.580 1.276 7.730 6.800 3.193 6.666 1.555 1.547 0.647 0.452 1.403 0.236 0.844 NA
Prob>F 0.127 0.274 0.013 0.018 0.089 0.018 0.227 0.229 0.432 0.511 0.254 0.634 0.374 NA
OperatingRevenue F-test 7.452 8.449 5.583 5.842 6.791 7.714 9.064 9.359 4.457 5.469 5.549 6.498 5.164 NA
Prob>F 0.014 0.010 0.030 0.027 0.017 0.012 0.007 0.006 0.049 0.033 0.032 0.022 0.039 NA
Mcap_Ln F-test 29.060 26.170 33.460 31.240 29.630 30.200 34.600 32.230 34.550 33.780 32.130 32.120 36.050 18.940
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
1.1.1 F-test 0.360 1.706 5.309 1.801 4.211 1.740 0.496 0.000 2.339 2.199 2.896 2.141 1.900 1.283
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F 0.574 0.239 0.061 0.228 0.086 0.235 0.507 0.984 0.170 0.189 0.140 0.203 0.227 0.321
1.1.2 F-test 0.142 0.001 4.842 0.387 3.453 1.798 0.516 0.023 2.301 1.993 2.693 1.768 1.727 1.397
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F 0.722 0.974 0.079 0.561 0.112 0.229 0.499 0.885 0.173 0.208 0.152 0.241 0.246 0.303
1.2.0 F-test 2.628 1.517 0.011 0.414 7.403 6.801 2.197 6.643 3.798 5.655 2.468 1.101 0.574 0.023
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F 0.180 0.285 0.918 0.548 0.035 0.035 0.182 0.042 0.099 0.063 0.167 0.342 0.483 0.887
1.2.0.1 F-test 3.538 4.628 4.353 4.228 3.966 6.670 3.133 3.166 3.138 4.415 4.409 3.846 1.662 1.356
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.075 0.044 0.050 0.053 0.060 0.018 0.092 0.091 0.093 0.052 0.052 0.069 0.217 0.267
1.2.1 F-test 3.909 5.898 8.522 8.616 7.007 7.207 3.980 5.514 5.310 5.497 5.356 5.058 3.174 NA
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.065 0.027 0.010 0.009 0.016 0.014 0.060 0.030 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.040 0.097 NA
1.2.2 F-test 3.559 5.595 7.595 7.280 6.451 6.532 4.072 4.737 4.689 5.054 5.074 4.566 2.729 NA
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.076 0.030 0.014 0.015 0.020 0.019 0.057 0.042 0.044 0.039 0.039 0.050 0.121 NA
1.4.0 F-test 1.134 0.007 NA NA 1.312 1.000 3.529 0.882 3.062 2.333 NA NA 1.000 1.185
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.304 0.935 NA NA 0.271 0.334 0.080 0.362 0.102 0.149 NA NA 0.334 0.300
2.3.0 F-test 1.642 0.980 0.133 0.133 0.133 2.043 0.562 0.562 2.647 3.529 3.529 3.062 3.062 3.086
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.218 0.337 0.720 0.720 0.720 0.171 0.464 0.464 0.125 0.080 0.080 0.102 0.102 0.104
2.4.1 F-test 4.281 3.966 3.473 3.233 3.846 2.783 2.648 3.129 3.614 3.108 2.997 2.787 2.865 NA
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.054 0.063 0.080 0.090 0.064 0.111 0.119 0.093 0.073 0.097 0.103 0.116 0.113 NA
2.4.2 F-test 1.851 0.060 1.627 1.059 1.562 0.222 0.050 0.013 1.403 0.261 0.445 0.001 0.248 NA
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.191 0.811 0.222 0.319 0.226 0.643 0.825 0.912 0.255 0.617 0.514 0.975 0.627 NA
2.4.3 F-test 2.696 0.102 0.597 3.812 2.847 1.956 2.565 1.479 1.109 3.774 3.683 3.599 0.936 NA
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.123 0.754 0.453 0.071 0.112 0.181 0.128 0.242 0.310 0.072 0.077 0.082 0.352 NA
2.4.5 F-test 0.760 0.344 0.182 1.637 0.001 0.004 2.010 0.540 0.296 1.371 0.023 0.280 1.352 NA
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.398 0.567 0.677 0.223 0.980 0.949 0.173 0.474 0.599 0.261 0.883 0.607 0.264 NA
2.4.6 F-test 1.329 2.313 4.177 3.347 1.864 4.959 2.225 4.040 7.118 0.311 0.189 0.520 0.043 NA
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.270 0.152 0.062 0.090 0.197 0.044 0.160 0.070 0.026 0.588 0.672 0.494 0.840 NA
2.4.7 F-test 0.031 2.518 0.902 1.874 0.169 0.357 0.256 1.815 1.796 0.435 0.111 0.552 0.344 NA
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.862 0.131 0.356 0.189 0.686 0.557 0.619 0.194 0.197 0.519 0.744 0.469 0.567 NA
2.5.0 F-test 3.977 10.400 9.442 4.281 8.982 8.919 2.677 8.661 6.321 12.750 16.480 18.630 4.017 NA
Board Size Prob>F 0.066 0.006 0.008 0.058 0.010 0.010 0.126 0.011 0.026 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.068 NA
2.5.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
CEO on Board Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.5.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.5.3 F-test 0.033 0.436 1.407 1.643 2.019 1.233 0.074 0.467 1.583 2.533 0.663 0.848 0.460 NA
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.859 0.520 0.255 0.221 0.177 0.285 0.790 0.505 0.230 0.138 0.431 0.375 0.510 NA
2.5.4 F-test NA NA 0.583 NA 0.583 0.583 0.650 0.766 0.411 0.735 0.735 0.846 1.405 NA
Independent NEDs Prob>F NA NA 0.458 NA 0.458 0.458 0.435 0.396 0.533 0.408 0.408 0.377 0.259 NA
2.5.5 F-test 2.037 0.011 0.712 0.810 4.686 3.548 0.966 6.474 8.483 7.177 3.483 1.631 0.542 NA
Female Directors Prob>F 0.187 0.918 0.423 0.389 0.051 0.084 0.347 0.025 0.012 0.025 0.095 0.230 0.476 NA
2.6.0 F-test NA NA NA NA 4.513 9.049 4.677 0.202 11.470 2.511 5.508 5.226 1.356 NA
Total Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA NA NA 0.101 0.020 0.063 0.664 0.012 0.157 0.101 0.106 0.309 NA
2.6.1 F-test NA NA NA 1.344 0.489 1.493 0.789 0.359 0.337 0.333 1.854 1.285 1.194 NA
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA NA 0.366 0.507 0.261 0.395 0.561 0.576 0.578 0.267 0.339 0.336 NA
2.6.2 F-test NA NA 0.600 0.625 0.113 2.100 3.265 3.903 2.099 0.823 2.289 2.562 3.939 NA
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F NA NA 0.451 0.442 0.742 0.169 0.094 0.068 0.171 0.382 0.156 0.135 0.071 NA
3.1.0 F-test 12.390 12.490 8.764 13.250 9.163 10.780 9.943 8.781 8.355 4.183 7.755 11.850 6.124 5.568
Employment Level Prob>F 0.002 0.002 0.008 0.002 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.008 0.010 0.058 0.013 0.004 0.026 0.040
3.2.0 F-test 0.066 0.478 1.043 0.602 2.315 0.007 0.972 1.277 0.247 2.164 0.961 1.115 0.451 0.451
Average Wage Prob>F 0.800 0.497 0.319 0.447 0.145 0.933 0.336 0.272 0.625 0.161 0.342 0.308 0.512 0.512
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ANOVA Results: Within-Group (Germany, Industrial Companies)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 15.770 16.250 17.040 18.150 18.780 18.670 19.160 22.670 22.270 22.550 24.820 22.010 19.250 6.988
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.011
ShareholdersFunds F-test 15.920 15.490 20.840 21.150 20.510 20.950 23.050 26.250 29.790 28.670 29.250 29.250 22.770 7.276
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.010
NetIncome F-test 12.570 5.922 0.000 7.033 20.070 19.350 32.890 29.090 12.410 2.382 24.160 9.793 6.777 5.062
Prob>F 0.001 0.017 0.993 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.126 0.000 0.002 0.011 0.030
ROE F-test 3.605 0.079 0.209 0.224 0.247 0.763 0.451 0.091 0.037 0.409 9.103 4.383 2.723 2.005
Prob>F 0.061 0.779 0.649 0.637 0.620 0.385 0.503 0.764 0.848 0.524 0.003 0.039 0.103 0.164
ROA F-test 0.796 0.018 0.005 0.635 0.897 0.276 0.007 2.666 0.464 0.000 1.355 0.463 4.566 5.233
Prob>F 0.375 0.892 0.944 0.427 0.346 0.600 0.936 0.106 0.497 0.993 0.248 0.498 0.036 0.027
OperatingRevenue F-test 18.270 20.390 21.050 23.140 22.530 23.300 23.890 28.020 29.910 27.120 26.010 22.520 20.670 7.362
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009
Mcap_Ln F-test 250.300 240.000 251.900 234.200 218.400 231.500 262.100 232.500 198.900 181.500 185.600 199.000 181.800 188.100
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.1.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0.1 F-test 1.149 0.117 1.754 2.883 5.879 2.402 1.311 7.921 2.664 0.908 2.115 3.160 1.218 1.724
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.286 0.733 0.188 0.093 0.017 0.124 0.255 0.006 0.106 0.343 0.149 0.079 0.273 0.193
1.2.1 F-test 0.058 0.036 0.347 2.597 2.354 0.387 1.059 5.729 1.213 0.805 1.924 3.893 3.256 2.700
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.810 0.851 0.557 0.110 0.128 0.535 0.306 0.019 0.274 0.372 0.169 0.052 0.075 0.107
1.2.2 F-test 1.707 0.366 2.297 3.406 6.085 2.498 1.566 9.017 2.452 0.933 2.426 3.451 1.626 0.557
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.194 0.547 0.133 0.068 0.015 0.117 0.214 0.003 0.121 0.337 0.123 0.067 0.206 0.460
1.4.0 F-test 0.320 0.561 0.005 0.895 1.863 0.142 0.497 2.535 11.860 0.591 0.766 4.256 0.002 NA
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.573 0.456 0.943 0.347 0.176 0.707 0.483 0.115 0.001 0.444 0.384 0.042 0.963 NA
2.3.0 F-test 2.299 1.500 0.545 0.001 0.632 0.082 0.097 0.097 0.136 0.366 0.732 0.040 0.021 0.000
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.134 0.224 0.463 0.975 0.429 0.776 0.756 0.756 0.714 0.547 0.395 0.842 0.886 0.984
2.4.1 F-test 17.760 16.980 21.450 19.290 23.080 25.120 28.480 29.870 29.210 28.090 27.880 25.540 23.430 8.845
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
2.4.2 F-test 0.000 0.742 0.002 1.668 0.944 2.381 0.811 0.440 1.284 0.097 0.733 0.748 0.008 1.447
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.985 0.391 0.962 0.200 0.334 0.126 0.370 0.509 0.260 0.756 0.394 0.390 0.929 0.236
2.4.3 F-test 18.730 10.640 2.462 7.359 5.369 6.939 13.840 5.987 6.275 0.602 5.362 3.255 5.491 1.418
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.000 0.002 0.120 0.008 0.023 0.010 0.000 0.016 0.014 0.440 0.023 0.075 0.022 0.241
2.4.5 F-test 1.924 1.228 5.243 0.199 0.997 1.848 0.501 0.017 3.006 0.037 4.944 6.312 0.396 0.017
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.169 0.271 0.024 0.657 0.321 0.177 0.481 0.898 0.087 0.848 0.029 0.014 0.531 0.898
2.4.6 F-test 3.993 0.688 2.508 0.513 1.771 0.580 2.815 9.493 2.016 3.584 2.198 2.837 1.019 1.225
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.049 0.409 0.117 0.476 0.186 0.448 0.097 0.003 0.159 0.062 0.142 0.096 0.316 0.274
2.4.7 F-test 9.124 11.680 0.024 7.380 1.413 2.549 12.400 6.103 6.468 1.672 1.338 0.251 0.955 0.358
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.003 0.001 0.876 0.008 0.237 0.114 0.001 0.015 0.013 0.199 0.250 0.617 0.331 0.552
2.5.0 F-test 5.491 10.270 15.060 14.750 18.240 37.660 45.440 44.070 47.060 38.640 20.580 30.990 21.350 0.058
Board Size Prob>F 0.022 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.811
2.5.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
CEO on Board Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.5.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.5.3 F-test 1.689 3.550 1.389 0.007 0.033 0.020 0.488 1.681 3.116 1.107 0.007 0.061 0.865 0.134
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.198 0.064 0.242 0.934 0.856 0.887 0.487 0.198 0.081 0.296 0.933 0.806 0.355 0.717
2.5.4 F-test 0.179 0.268 0.130 1.366 1.282 0.523 0.623 0.240 0.658 0.753 1.052 1.627 2.009 NA
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.674 0.607 0.720 0.247 0.262 0.472 0.433 0.626 0.420 0.388 0.309 0.206 0.161 NA
2.5.5 F-test 1.937 2.389 0.350 0.155 0.235 0.144 0.172 0.873 0.042 0.094 1.199 0.021 0.006 0.381
Female Directors Prob>F 0.171 0.129 0.557 0.696 0.630 0.706 0.680 0.354 0.839 0.761 0.279 0.886 0.941 0.542
2.6.0 F-test NA 0.653 7.785 13.420 15.900 27.700 72.270 58.910 40.370 57.060 21.800 19.030 18.280 2.751
Total Executive Pay Prob>F NA 0.504 0.012 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.108
2.6.1 F-test 0.196 0.063 0.040 4.327 7.089 7.326 12.120 15.780 14.760 16.360 8.455 7.887 31.210 2.753
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F 0.681 0.809 0.844 0.046 0.011 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.007 0.000 0.110
2.6.2 F-test 0.968 0.819 0.016 6.513 6.098 11.060 10.790 12.640 16.850 2.567 16.050 10.810 8.491 0.272
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F 0.329 0.369 0.901 0.013 0.016 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.608
3.1.0 F-test 43.200 46.090 45.990 51.990 57.040 61.360 78.360 78.760 51.930 57.310 36.490 36.540 31.040 35.980
Employment Level Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.2.0 F-test 2.361 3.474 3.854 4.061 2.834 4.979 1.625 1.526 1.998 0.400 6.376 6.689 6.204 1.947
Average Wage Prob>F 0.128 0.065 0.052 0.047 0.096 0.028 0.205 0.220 0.161 0.529 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.167
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ANOVA Results: Within-Group (United Kingdom, Financial Companies)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 12.550 7.257 7.257 13.900 8.179 9.500 9.758 6.779 5.825 9.419 10.440 9.904 10.540 15.650
Prob>F 0.005 0.021 0.021 0.003 0.011 0.006 0.006 0.018 0.027 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.007
ShareholdersFunds F-test 9.223 7.070 6.578 10.030 4.963 6.689 8.680 5.722 5.421 6.381 7.839 7.686 7.161 6.841
Prob>F 0.011 0.022 0.026 0.008 0.040 0.018 0.008 0.028 0.032 0.022 0.012 0.013 0.016 0.040
NetIncome F-test 9.205 7.312 7.135 12.460 5.032 7.723 12.450 4.360 0.530 2.183 3.738 3.248 0.389 0.049
Prob>F 0.011 0.021 0.022 0.004 0.039 0.012 0.002 0.051 0.476 0.158 0.070 0.089 0.541 0.832
ROE F-test 5.049 9.133 5.227 0.912 0.057 2.457 0.070 0.117 0.269 0.081 1.210 0.285 0.262 2.534
Prob>F 0.046 0.012 0.043 0.358 0.815 0.133 0.795 0.736 0.611 0.779 0.287 0.601 0.615 0.163
ROA F-test 5.051 0.238 0.749 1.436 12.100 2.927 5.954 2.862 0.719 1.355 5.542 0.293 1.852 6.695
Prob>F 0.046 0.635 0.405 0.254 0.003 0.103 0.025 0.108 0.407 0.261 0.031 0.595 0.191 0.041
OperatingRevenue F-test 11.390 7.136 7.420 13.480 10.800 11.780 12.040 12.060 8.480 14.050 15.960 15.650 15.660 10.330
Prob>F 0.006 0.022 0.020 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.009 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.018
Mcap_Ln F-test 47.790 48.840 35.820 29.890 30.540 32.960 36.890 42.120 30.670 28.230 29.070 33.070 38.270 41.700
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 431.100 290.700 NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.000 0.000 NA NA NA NA NA
1.1.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 218.900 144.100 NA NA NA NA NA
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.001 0.001 NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 132.300 160.700 216.300 88.900 104.400 1.877 244.800
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.243 0.001
1.2.0.1 F-test 6.412 1.755 4.730 8.657 9.307 9.483 8.399 6.419 3.793 14.300 6.808 6.382 5.925 20.020
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.020 0.201 0.043 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.009 0.021 0.067 0.001 0.018 0.022 0.026 0.000
1.2.1 F-test 13.910 5.210 6.476 9.921 6.981 13.470 14.480 13.240 2.611 20.710 14.590 13.790 14.470 4.378
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.003 0.043 0.027 0.008 0.017 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.124 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.081
1.2.2 F-test 12.040 4.834 5.895 8.373 6.257 8.198 7.881 6.505 4.704 16.130 6.618 6.278 7.207 4.316
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.005 0.050 0.034 0.014 0.023 0.010 0.011 0.020 0.044 0.001 0.020 0.023 0.016 0.083
1.4.0 F-test 1.486 NA NA NA NA NA 0.583 0.135 NA 0.061 1.486 0.650 1.560 NA
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.245 NA NA NA NA NA 0.458 0.719 NA 0.810 0.245 0.435 0.234 NA
2.3.0 F-test 3.049 0.380 4.235 4.235 4.886 4.886 4.886 4.235 0.900 17.890 3.060 3.060 3.060 11.180
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.103 0.547 0.054 0.054 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.054 0.355 0.001 0.098 0.098 0.098 0.004
2.4.1 F-test 10.140 6.966 7.506 12.900 4.195 5.378 5.270 4.403 3.376 5.672 5.963 5.717 5.476 6.095
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.009 0.023 0.019 0.004 0.056 0.032 0.034 0.050 0.083 0.029 0.026 0.029 0.032 0.049
2.4.2 F-test 10.980 3.330 3.371 5.286 1.864 1.382 0.069 0.956 4.955 3.635 0.882 1.438 0.166 0.673
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.007 0.098 0.096 0.040 0.190 0.255 0.796 0.345 0.068 0.076 0.361 0.252 0.690 0.443
2.4.3 F-test 0.647 0.000 0.050 0.070 3.899 0.769 0.936 1.139 0.538 0.417 1.931 0.641 0.156 9.244
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.438 0.990 0.828 0.796 0.065 0.392 0.346 0.305 0.496 0.531 0.184 0.439 0.699 0.023
2.4.5 F-test 1.006 0.067 0.061 0.538 1.348 0.876 0.404 0.048 2.913 0.073 0.361 2.849 0.228 0.416
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.338 0.802 0.810 0.477 0.263 0.362 0.537 0.830 0.114 0.792 0.558 0.122 0.642 0.547
2.4.6 F-test 1.044 1.619 2.231 0.010 0.276 10.210 17.410 8.025 3.578 6.666 1.341 0.198 0.444 0.816
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.329 0.235 0.169 0.921 0.610 0.007 0.001 0.022 0.117 0.030 0.269 0.666 0.519 0.417
2.4.7 F-test 0.014 0.122 0.416 0.020 7.108 5.357 5.264 0.360 6.267 0.134 1.549 0.402 0.005 1.338
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.910 0.733 0.532 0.891 0.016 0.033 0.034 0.556 0.022 0.719 0.230 0.534 0.947 0.291
2.5.0 F-test 8.556 3.950 4.331 4.579 4.890 7.736 8.212 6.366 5.584 7.112 11.080 7.616 8.589 8.068
Board Size Prob>F 0.009 0.062 0.052 0.046 0.040 0.012 0.010 0.021 0.030 0.016 0.004 0.013 0.009 0.014
2.5.1 F-test 0.000 0.360 0.360 0.000 0.472 1.106 1.106 1.000 0.000 0.490 1.512 1.512 1.512 NA
CEO on Board Prob>F 1.000 0.556 0.556 1.000 0.500 0.306 0.306 0.331 1.000 0.493 0.236 0.236 0.236 NA
2.5.2 F-test 2.250 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.905 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.151 0.331 0.331 0.331 0.353 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.5.3 F-test 4.166 0.125 0.629 0.416 0.020 0.523 0.270 2.264 0.617 0.803 2.699 1.706 0.779 1.656
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.056 0.728 0.438 0.527 0.890 0.478 0.609 0.150 0.442 0.383 0.119 0.209 0.390 0.221
2.5.4 F-test 2.290 3.697 7.486 3.060 2.159 3.309 1.878 5.440 6.634 1.847 8.599 7.539 16.070 2.059
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.148 0.071 0.014 0.097 0.158 0.085 0.187 0.032 0.019 0.192 0.009 0.014 0.001 0.177
2.5.5 F-test 5.282 0.373 0.972 5.974 2.929 0.753 0.154 0.060 0.171 0.558 0.011 0.141 0.056 0.243
Female Directors Prob>F 0.035 0.553 0.342 0.027 0.109 0.399 0.700 0.811 0.685 0.468 0.920 0.714 0.817 0.631
2.6.0 F-test 13.960 28.110 3.836 5.146 6.033 7.118 9.533 2.661 5.036 37.370 8.905 8.951 10.320 17.870
Total Executive Pay Prob>F 0.002 0.000 0.066 0.036 0.024 0.015 0.006 0.120 0.038 0.000 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.001
2.6.1 F-test 8.518 14.700 1.291 5.458 2.504 1.977 5.640 3.870 9.439 10.910 8.047 5.708 1.782 1.872
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F 0.009 0.001 0.271 0.031 0.131 0.177 0.028 0.065 0.007 0.004 0.011 0.029 0.199 0.201
2.6.2 F-test 15.060 4.651 0.780 0.739 0.229 11.780 15.020 11.330 10.820 6.879 9.789 10.040 4.211 3.024
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F 0.001 0.045 0.389 0.401 0.638 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.018 0.006 0.006 0.056 0.116
3.1.0 F-test 31.290 13.750 21.140 34.610 19.980 21.300 22.890 25.000 12.760 52.110 22.600 31.210 30.430 44.090
Employment Level Prob>F 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.2.0 F-test 1.063 0.102 0.051 0.110 0.054 6.746 6.777 9.628 1.628 5.165 3.288 6.261 5.296 5.411
Average Wage Prob>F 0.315 0.753 0.825 0.743 0.819 0.018 0.018 0.006 0.218 0.036 0.088 0.023 0.034 0.034
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ANOVA Results: Within-Group (United Kingdom, Industrial Companies)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 7.975 7.968 10.080 12.360 14.050 12.460 15.230 15.380 14.000 16.170 14.590 15.950 14.670 8.700
Prob>F 0.007 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
ShareholdersFunds F-test 4.905 4.973 6.264 8.663 8.612 10.070 12.370 11.160 8.522 10.490 11.790 11.640 9.984 5.118
Prob>F 0.031 0.029 0.014 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.028
NetIncome F-test 4.885 4.837 6.932 10.510 11.280 10.050 13.120 11.540 8.242 18.210 13.130 12.260 10.140 10.440
Prob>F 0.031 0.031 0.010 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
ROE F-test 0.018 0.578 3.522 1.812 3.138 3.322 0.849 0.011 2.638 0.003 0.382 0.398 1.516 3.960
Prob>F 0.894 0.450 0.065 0.182 0.080 0.072 0.359 0.917 0.109 0.956 0.538 0.530 0.222 0.052
ROA F-test 0.532 0.500 0.032 4.866 1.811 8.969 5.232 4.933 7.008 5.445 2.531 3.784 1.706 1.982
Prob>F 0.469 0.482 0.858 0.030 0.182 0.004 0.025 0.029 0.010 0.022 0.116 0.056 0.195 0.165
OperatingRevenue F-test 5.442 6.092 8.182 9.483 8.633 6.639 8.657 7.675 5.674 10.120 8.578 7.518 7.647 4.183
Prob>F 0.023 0.016 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.012 0.004 0.007 0.020 0.002 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.046
Mcap_Ln F-test 130.800 124.500 146.500 126.900 136.800 142.500 156.100 173.400 155.200 154.600 137.800 157.400 156.500 152.900
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.1.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0.1 F-test 1.026 1.424 0.164 0.028 0.140 2.517 0.485 0.033 0.416 0.657 2.428 1.562 0.163 0.000
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.314 0.236 0.687 0.867 0.709 0.116 0.488 0.856 0.521 0.420 0.123 0.215 0.687 0.995
1.2.1 F-test 0.142 0.169 2.260 0.819 0.891 1.168 0.171 0.114 0.632 0.051 0.169 0.018 0.217 1.313
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.708 0.683 0.137 0.368 0.348 0.283 0.680 0.736 0.429 0.822 0.683 0.895 0.643 0.257
1.2.2 F-test 1.727 0.381 2.477 0.358 0.020 2.450 0.350 0.000 0.125 1.036 1.359 0.622 0.052 1.275
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.194 0.539 0.120 0.551 0.888 0.121 0.556 0.998 0.724 0.312 0.247 0.433 0.820 0.264
1.4.0 F-test 0.973 NA 2.114 0.241 1.897 0.924 0.974 0.988 1.097 0.183 0.001 1.236 2.056 1.027
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.327 NA 0.150 0.625 0.173 0.339 0.327 0.323 0.298 0.670 0.970 0.270 0.156 0.314
2.3.0 F-test 0.843 0.554 1.068 0.000 0.042 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.103 0.133 0.076 0.002 0.002 0.188
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.363 0.460 0.305 1.000 0.839 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.750 0.717 0.783 0.965 0.965 0.666
2.4.1 F-test 9.396 9.595 14.960 15.540 16.050 13.490 17.260 15.610 12.770 23.130 22.830 16.970 17.830 13.640
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.003 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
2.4.2 F-test 0.049 1.337 3.295 1.801 7.411 5.084 4.413 0.105 13.660 12.290 17.700 14.980 12.740 8.707
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.825 0.252 0.074 0.183 0.008 0.027 0.039 0.747 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.005
2.4.3 F-test 0.045 1.007 0.509 1.676 5.361 18.690 13.060 10.600 29.230 23.640 17.320 27.770 6.339 9.527
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.834 0.319 0.478 0.199 0.023 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.014 0.003
2.4.5 F-test 1.342 1.372 0.852 0.255 0.599 9.344 9.881 6.382 9.538 11.840 6.770 11.320 8.378 1.692
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.252 0.246 0.359 0.615 0.441 0.003 0.002 0.014 0.003 0.001 0.011 0.001 0.005 0.200
2.4.6 F-test 0.808 0.684 0.006 0.969 0.264 0.167 0.039 0.764 3.637 1.458 0.328 0.830 0.392 0.900
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.373 0.411 0.939 0.328 0.609 0.684 0.845 0.385 0.060 0.231 0.568 0.365 0.533 0.347
2.4.7 F-test 0.210 1.225 0.574 0.826 1.599 2.379 1.584 3.464 0.214 1.532 2.797 3.064 0.008 0.164
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.648 0.272 0.451 0.366 0.209 0.127 0.212 0.066 0.645 0.220 0.099 0.084 0.931 0.687
2.5.0 F-test 21.270 10.450 13.290 22.540 29.370 33.120 50.020 45.690 43.250 31.540 32.020 34.810 25.080 22.440
Board Size Prob>F 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.5.1 F-test 0.319 0.331 0.710 0.332 0.355 0.054 0.064 0.153 0.383 0.133 0.446 0.076 0.153 NA
CEO on Board Prob>F 0.574 0.566 0.402 0.566 0.553 0.816 0.800 0.697 0.538 0.717 0.506 0.784 0.697 NA
2.5.2 F-test 0.413 1.023 4.293 2.047 2.095 0.001 0.362 2.153 2.051 1.092 3.249 2.110 1.097 0.001
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.522 0.315 0.041 0.156 0.151 0.982 0.549 0.146 0.156 0.299 0.075 0.150 0.298 0.982
2.5.3 F-test 2.787 1.624 1.051 0.544 2.827 0.330 0.373 3.684 1.869 2.692 4.369 7.683 1.080 0.035
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.099 0.206 0.308 0.463 0.096 0.567 0.543 0.058 0.175 0.105 0.040 0.007 0.302 0.852
2.5.4 F-test 0.056 0.056 0.000 0.002 2.436 0.634 2.394 8.496 1.206 2.560 2.576 2.388 1.090 0.398
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.814 0.813 0.991 0.963 0.122 0.428 0.125 0.005 0.275 0.114 0.113 0.127 0.300 0.531
2.5.5 F-test 0.719 1.262 5.282 2.151 5.872 1.518 1.041 7.847 5.598 8.484 7.661 13.740 11.640 16.550
Female Directors Prob>F 0.399 0.265 0.024 0.147 0.018 0.222 0.311 0.007 0.021 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.001 0.000
2.6.0 F-test 44.500 22.860 18.230 20.790 22.130 15.560 16.060 23.510 28.830 27.920 21.250 28.570 33.530 27.220
Total Executive Pay Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.6.1 F-test 44.490 26.420 18.040 17.920 22.880 18.660 11.630 26.650 44.170 32.760 30.660 39.290 12.420 16.990
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
2.6.2 F-test 18.710 6.611 15.010 9.783 7.641 3.720 0.359 5.724 5.578 5.667 6.944 10.140 0.046 5.191
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.057 0.550 0.019 0.021 0.020 0.010 0.002 0.832 0.027
3.1.0 F-test 19.400 27.920 50.210 34.430 41.280 18.210 26.240 33.670 22.210 28.680 24.810 23.240 32.860 38.740
Employment Level Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.2.0 F-test 1.047 2.176 3.363 0.724 0.615 1.174 0.029 1.082 1.636 0.364 0.000 0.171 0.376 0.388
Average Wage Prob>F 0.309 0.144 0.070 0.397 0.435 0.282 0.865 0.301 0.205 0.548 0.992 0.680 0.542 0.535
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ANOVA Results: Within-Group (United States, Financial Companies)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 10.640 10.900 10.920 10.100 11.180 15.620 14.430 13.860 5.021 9.204 10.650 9.819 12.740 13.040
Prob>F 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.037 0.007 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.002
ShareholdersFunds F-test 11.030 10.970 10.850 8.477 10.710 11.740 11.510 11.010 5.313 8.465 9.360 11.890 14.950 15.040
Prob>F 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.009 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.033 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.001
NetIncome F-test 10.610 5.458 7.028 9.658 11.560 11.920 17.270 15.210 0.940 6.201 5.264 11.350 8.127 17.930
Prob>F 0.005 0.032 0.016 0.006 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.345 0.022 0.033 0.003 0.010 0.000
ROE F-test 0.698 0.962 0.006 0.086 1.119 0.013 0.042 0.320 1.757 0.009 0.457 0.066 1.224 0.977
Prob>F 0.416 0.340 0.938 0.773 0.303 0.910 0.840 0.578 0.201 0.927 0.507 0.800 0.282 0.335
ROA F-test 1.321 1.783 1.080 0.537 0.024 0.002 0.011 0.011 1.628 0.343 0.657 0.333 0.168 0.684
Prob>F 0.267 0.199 0.312 0.473 0.878 0.967 0.919 0.919 0.217 0.565 0.427 0.570 0.686 0.418
OperatingRevenue F-test 7.911 7.561 4.956 6.132 11.160 18.550 23.870 27.250 3.878 12.160 14.630 19.300 19.370 19.440
Prob>F 0.013 0.014 0.039 0.023 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.064 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mcap_Ln F-test 36.950 42.850 42.040 47.020 53.430 53.270 60.070 63.180 26.110 33.110 42.470 44.750 38.070 49.220
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1.1 F-test 0.275 2.683 4.549 5.343 4.632 3.342 3.071 1.420 3.959 2.700 3.197 2.728 0.998 1.185
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F 0.614 0.140 0.066 0.050 0.064 0.101 0.114 0.264 0.072 0.126 0.097 0.123 0.338 0.298
1.1.2 F-test 0.198 3.282 7.271 5.640 4.298 3.778 4.607 1.109 5.943 2.868 3.813 2.664 1.033 1.302
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F 0.668 0.108 0.027 0.045 0.072 0.084 0.060 0.320 0.033 0.116 0.073 0.127 0.330 0.276
1.2.0 F-test 0.205 0.373 0.556 0.624 1.481 2.543 3.797 2.025 9.715 2.609 2.998 1.746 1.566 1.526
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F 0.663 0.558 0.475 0.450 0.255 0.145 0.083 0.188 0.010 0.132 0.107 0.209 0.235 0.240
1.2.0.1 F-test 2.039 1.806 1.792 0.809 0.362 0.842 1.025 1.447 0.736 1.239 0.679 0.396 0.723 0.841
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.169 0.194 0.196 0.379 0.554 0.370 0.323 0.243 0.401 0.280 0.420 0.536 0.405 0.370
1.2.1 F-test 2.245 1.970 0.460 0.345 0.431 1.034 0.811 0.658 1.591 0.008 0.002 0.003 0.260 0.287
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.153 0.178 0.506 0.564 0.519 0.322 0.379 0.427 0.222 0.931 0.962 0.959 0.616 0.598
1.2.2 F-test 1.072 1.088 0.505 0.274 0.123 0.044 0.007 0.013 0.345 0.256 0.164 0.248 0.317 0.345
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.316 0.311 0.486 0.607 0.729 0.837 0.934 0.910 0.564 0.619 0.690 0.624 0.580 0.564
1.4.0 F-test 2.222 NA NA 1.000 NA NA 1.000 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.152 NA NA 0.329 NA NA 0.329 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.3.0 F-test NA NA 0.000 1.526 0.238 0.238 0.000 0.000 2.222 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F NA NA 1.000 0.236 0.631 0.631 1.000 1.000 0.152 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.947
2.4.1 F-test 7.804 8.253 5.854 7.151 6.803 14.240 14.590 13.740 7.154 13.530 14.640 11.300 12.710 13.850
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.013 0.011 0.026 0.015 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.015 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001
2.4.2 F-test 1.495 0.309 1.036 3.276 0.016 1.561 1.486 0.158 0.211 2.020 2.896 2.092 3.388 2.549
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.239 0.586 0.324 0.086 0.901 0.227 0.238 0.696 0.652 0.171 0.104 0.164 0.081 0.127
2.4.3 F-test 0.688 2.087 3.040 1.193 0.421 0.062 0.013 0.012 0.763 0.096 0.938 1.110 1.162 1.425
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.426 0.176 0.107 0.295 0.528 0.808 0.910 0.914 0.398 0.762 0.349 0.310 0.301 0.254
2.4.5 F-test 2.184 3.954 3.353 0.392 0.031 0.672 1.992 1.633 0.569 0.701 2.760 0.870 0.664 2.897
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.159 0.064 0.085 0.539 0.862 0.422 0.174 0.218 0.462 0.415 0.112 0.363 0.427 0.105
2.4.6 F-test 1.238 2.014 1.640 0.763 0.901 0.513 0.250 0.232 0.083 0.065 0.001 0.009 0.096 0.000
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.292 0.184 0.227 0.400 0.361 0.487 0.626 0.639 0.779 0.802 0.981 0.924 0.762 0.986
2.4.7 F-test 1.517 2.884 1.730 0.362 0.044 1.223 0.666 0.888 1.949 0.158 4.033 0.216 0.319 0.475
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.236 0.108 0.205 0.554 0.836 0.283 0.425 0.358 0.179 0.695 0.058 0.647 0.579 0.499
2.5.0 F-test 0.075 1.206 1.305 0.165 0.075 0.244 0.000 0.286 0.738 0.083 0.029 0.278 0.000 0.000
Board Size Prob>F 0.787 0.285 0.267 0.689 0.787 0.627 1.000 0.599 0.401 0.777 0.866 0.604 1.000 1.000
2.5.1 F-test NA NA NA NA 1.000 1.000 2.222 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
CEO on Board Prob>F NA NA NA NA 0.329 0.329 0.152 NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.5.2 F-test 0.017 0.357 0.357 0.357 0.238 0.000 0.000 0.192 0.238 0.172 0.690 0.172 0.000 1.429
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.897 0.557 0.557 0.557 0.631 1.000 1.000 0.666 0.631 0.682 0.416 0.682 1.000 0.260
2.5.3 F-test 0.005 0.096 0.500 0.585 0.550 0.367 0.025 0.402 0.224 1.194 0.269 2.189 0.327 0.868
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.947 0.760 0.488 0.453 0.467 0.551 0.876 0.533 0.641 0.287 0.610 0.155 0.574 0.374
2.5.4 F-test 0.869 0.224 0.030 0.033 0.050 0.262 0.160 0.220 0.396 1.826 0.647 1.801 0.260 0.378
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.363 0.641 0.865 0.858 0.826 0.615 0.693 0.644 0.536 0.192 0.431 0.195 0.616 0.552
2.5.5 F-test 2.619 2.102 3.075 1.009 0.039 0.204 0.171 0.087 0.039 1.004 0.897 1.688 3.485 1.201
Female Directors Prob>F 0.128 0.164 0.100 0.330 0.846 0.657 0.684 0.772 0.846 0.328 0.355 0.209 0.077 0.299
2.6.0 F-test 0.922 0.889 5.021 5.381 20.380 5.562 24.920 6.312 3.245 1.832 6.441 11.910 11.960 6.178
Total Executive Pay Prob>F 0.350 0.357 0.037 0.031 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.021 0.087 0.191 0.020 0.003 0.003 0.032
2.6.1 F-test 0.590 0.803 3.619 4.232 7.163 1.561 7.167 1.572 1.251 0.544 5.485 6.301 1.658 0.872
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F 0.452 0.381 0.072 0.053 0.015 0.226 0.015 0.224 0.277 0.469 0.030 0.021 0.213 0.372
2.6.2 F-test 0.000 1.982 0.089 0.489 6.481 0.107 0.574 0.287 3.916 2.757 2.944 3.354 2.860 0.201
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F 0.994 0.183 0.770 0.496 0.023 0.749 0.461 0.601 0.068 0.119 0.108 0.088 0.113 0.666
3.1.0 F-test 15.310 17.660 16.830 15.750 25.720 35.220 30.890 31.450 8.711 21.270 26.040 24.390 24.340 25.040
Employment Level Prob>F 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.2.0 F-test 7.075 3.982 0.409 0.100 0.050 2.980 3.609 3.183 0.034 0.732 0.201 0.085 0.103 0.803
Average Wage Prob>F 0.021 0.067 0.533 0.757 0.827 0.106 0.078 0.096 0.857 0.407 0.661 0.775 0.753 0.387
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ANOVA Results: Within-Group (United States, Industrial Companies)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 15.610 17.200 16.530 14.710 14.900 10.670 13.100 12.280 12.200 16.590 21.130 26.380 25.640 24.720
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ShareholdersFunds F-test 43.300 25.950 44.690 41.380 43.370 38.170 37.150 33.620 29.680 33.370 33.950 36.240 30.890 28.410
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NetIncome F-test 40.290 19.000 0.001 34.260 22.280 30.140 32.190 31.410 13.900 43.270 40.240 31.560 26.840 42.500
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.977 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROE F-test 0.012 0.033 0.667 1.439 0.063 0.762 2.346 0.718 3.731 3.540 2.424 0.054 2.708 1.904
Prob>F 0.912 0.856 0.416 0.233 0.803 0.385 0.129 0.399 0.056 0.063 0.123 0.817 0.103 0.170
ROA F-test 14.960 3.457 1.099 4.010 1.226 4.402 3.519 2.347 2.320 5.425 1.228 0.006 0.665 4.053
Prob>F 0.000 0.066 0.297 0.048 0.271 0.038 0.063 0.128 0.131 0.022 0.270 0.938 0.417 0.047
OperatingRevenue F-test 21.090 24.190 24.610 21.170 21.650 13.600 16.950 16.470 14.430 20.150 21.170 20.000 21.150 20.900
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mcap_Ln F-test 208.800 193.900 192.300 201.900 204.200 212.100 194.000 161.200 159.400 141.700 162.700 157.800 159.900 169.500
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.1.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0.1 F-test 0.059 0.024 0.476 0.164 0.189 0.326 0.243 0.292 0.879 0.047 0.487 0.457 0.099 0.042
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.808 0.878 0.492 0.687 0.664 0.569 0.623 0.590 0.350 0.829 0.487 0.501 0.753 0.837
1.2.1 F-test 0.318 0.504 0.003 0.168 0.130 0.443 0.024 0.028 1.030 0.015 0.300 0.051 0.081 0.006
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.574 0.479 0.954 0.683 0.719 0.507 0.876 0.868 0.312 0.902 0.585 0.821 0.777 0.940
1.2.2 F-test 0.019 0.018 0.297 0.257 0.109 0.270 0.153 0.194 1.068 0.001 0.378 0.679 0.289 0.000
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.890 0.894 0.587 0.613 0.741 0.605 0.697 0.660 0.304 0.972 0.540 0.412 0.592 0.992
1.4.0 F-test 0.000 0.659 2.762 NA 1.000 0.000 NA 1.000 NA NA NA NA NA 2.037
Auditor Change Prob>F 1.000 0.419 0.099 NA 0.320 1.000 NA 0.320 NA NA NA NA NA 0.156
2.3.0 F-test 0.087 NA 1.054 3.096 0.501 0.364 0.322 0.898 0.000 1.078 1.078 1.078 0.433 1.385
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.769 NA 0.307 0.082 0.480 0.548 0.572 0.345 1.000 0.301 0.301 0.301 0.512 0.242
2.4.1 F-test 26.920 26.500 23.790 28.140 28.660 24.330 27.530 24.240 25.800 23.790 29.700 32.630 30.430 26.900
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.4.2 F-test 5.326 6.194 6.145 9.021 0.684 3.925 5.202 5.511 6.598 1.746 1.817 0.127 0.073 1.095
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.023 0.014 0.015 0.003 0.410 0.050 0.025 0.021 0.012 0.189 0.180 0.722 0.787 0.298
2.4.3 F-test 0.023 1.049 0.054 0.557 0.029 1.316 0.884 4.783 0.605 0.000 0.052 0.064 0.187 1.525
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.879 0.308 0.816 0.457 0.864 0.254 0.349 0.031 0.439 0.989 0.820 0.800 0.667 0.220
2.4.5 F-test 0.991 2.162 0.037 0.020 0.027 0.047 0.819 4.123 1.127 3.297 0.138 0.094 0.071 0.033
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.322 0.145 0.849 0.888 0.871 0.829 0.367 0.045 0.291 0.072 0.711 0.759 0.790 0.856
2.4.6 F-test 2.592 2.517 2.042 7.149 5.621 1.609 0.509 0.268 0.621 0.751 0.241 4.430 4.771 8.668
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.111 0.116 0.157 0.009 0.020 0.208 0.477 0.606 0.433 0.388 0.625 0.038 0.031 0.004
2.4.7 F-test 2.241 0.000 0.257 0.891 0.000 1.476 0.335 0.011 4.119 0.249 1.559 0.645 0.197 2.377
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.137 0.992 0.614 0.347 0.986 0.227 0.564 0.916 0.045 0.619 0.215 0.424 0.658 0.126
2.5.0 F-test 16.780 18.270 21.480 18.950 20.690 17.850 23.800 16.470 8.073 7.859 9.318 17.760 7.739 1.059
Board Size Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.006 0.307
2.5.1 F-test NA NA NA 1.000 0.982 3.173 1.000 NA NA 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 NA
CEO on Board Prob>F NA NA NA 0.320 0.324 0.078 0.320 NA NA 0.320 0.320 0.320 0.320 NA
2.5.2 F-test 0.008 0.000 0.012 1.162 0.988 2.751 3.957 2.500 3.873 6.942 2.562 0.602 5.359 1.020
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.930 0.982 0.912 0.283 0.322 0.100 0.049 0.117 0.052 0.010 0.112 0.440 0.023 0.316
2.5.3 F-test 0.664 1.204 0.117 0.063 0.000 0.128 0.846 6.226 4.082 5.132 5.751 0.127 3.661 2.913
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.417 0.275 0.733 0.802 0.990 0.721 0.360 0.014 0.046 0.025 0.018 0.722 0.058 0.093
2.5.4 F-test 0.057 0.173 0.157 0.449 1.328 0.450 1.971 4.890 7.772 2.843 0.968 0.225 0.004 1.469
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.812 0.678 0.692 0.504 0.252 0.504 0.163 0.029 0.006 0.095 0.327 0.637 0.947 0.230
2.5.5 F-test 14.810 20.730 18.460 15.990 14.410 5.192 5.323 5.191 4.626 5.225 3.566 0.586 1.164 2.913
Female Directors Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.025 0.024 0.025 0.034 0.025 0.062 0.446 0.283 0.093
2.6.0 F-test 8.670 9.355 3.606 6.433 18.810 4.557 16.300 19.840 17.910 16.120 32.400 20.840 14.140 3.919
Total Executive Pay Prob>F 0.004 0.003 0.060 0.013 0.000 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052
2.6.1 F-test 5.715 5.680 0.998 2.849 9.086 5.317 23.700 20.800 16.330 16.190 23.190 13.540 13.170 2.313
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F 0.019 0.019 0.320 0.094 0.003 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.133
2.6.2 F-test 0.487 0.882 0.216 0.189 1.605 1.803 2.757 2.071 0.050 0.002 3.083 0.418 0.478 0.002
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F 0.487 0.350 0.643 0.664 0.208 0.182 0.100 0.153 0.824 0.965 0.082 0.519 0.491 0.961
3.1.0 F-test 52.170 61.770 60.600 52.590 50.820 38.830 42.030 28.640 21.160 20.410 31.610 27.730 31.280 20.350
Employment Level Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.2.0 F-test 0.358 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.010 0.084 0.241 0.296 3.297 2.961 0.001 1.103 0.508 1.417
Average Wage Prob>F 0.551 0.935 0.942 0.938 0.920 0.773 0.624 0.588 0.072 0.088 0.971 0.296 0.478 0.237
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ANOVA Results: Between-Group (Switzerland)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 5.102 4.931 9.353 9.264 8.422 8.318 7.992 8.044 8.173 9.120 9.846 9.989 10.380 8.329
Prob>F 0.026 0.029 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.006
ShareholdersFunds F-test 1.319 1.250 4.013 4.036 3.780 3.345 3.329 2.296 2.401 2.703 2.262 2.639 2.421 2.514
Prob>F 0.253 0.266 0.048 0.047 0.055 0.070 0.071 0.133 0.124 0.103 0.136 0.107 0.123 0.119
NetIncome F-test 0.647 0.309 0.784 1.298 3.730 3.546 3.461 0.126 5.640 0.000 0.015 0.268 0.942 0.187
Prob>F 0.423 0.580 0.378 0.257 0.056 0.062 0.066 0.723 0.019 0.983 0.903 0.606 0.334 0.667
ROE F-test 1.219 0.050 0.012 0.234 2.086 0.021 0.494 0.575 0.175 0.725 6.420 1.711 4.240 4.827
Prob>F 0.272 0.824 0.914 0.630 0.152 0.887 0.484 0.450 0.677 0.397 0.013 0.194 0.042 0.032
ROA F-test 9.736 1.766 0.065 0.940 13.640 21.810 5.845 4.387 13.460 0.719 19.650 2.348 11.980 15.830
Prob>F 0.002 0.187 0.799 0.335 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.039 0.000 0.398 0.000 0.129 0.001 0.000
OperatingRevenue F-test 0.215 0.166 0.004 0.013 0.045 0.031 0.091 0.020 1.120 0.009 0.018 0.082 0.070 0.001
Prob>F 0.644 0.685 0.951 0.909 0.833 0.861 0.764 0.887 0.292 0.926 0.893 0.775 0.792 0.972
Mcap_Ln F-test 0.048 0.677 1.896 1.294 0.935 2.142 1.604 1.088 2.628 2.602 1.409 1.388 0.739 1.031
Prob>F 0.827 0.412 0.172 0.258 0.336 0.146 0.208 0.299 0.108 0.110 0.238 0.242 0.392 0.312
1.1.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.1.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0.1 F-test 78.520 67.880 46.520 56.820 87.890 113.200 116.300 113.700 93.210 99.210 125.200 128.100 126.600 124.100
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2.1 F-test 128.000 101.100 74.820 128.700 167.400 228.300 186.500 182.800 186.700 177.300 251.600 235.200 203.100 147.600
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2.2 F-test 57.410 52.650 57.230 66.710 80.180 100.500 106.100 110.000 90.800 94.800 129.600 127.900 110.100 63.510
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.4.0 F-test 0.850 1.649 1.909 3.753 0.823 1.909 0.180 0.180 1.694 0.145 0.917 0.321 0.162 0.259
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.359 0.202 0.170 0.056 0.366 0.170 0.672 0.672 0.196 0.704 0.341 0.572 0.688 0.612
2.3.0 F-test 0.976 0.508 0.668 0.293 0.226 0.037 0.113 0.113 0.113 0.138 0.230 0.404 0.701 0.858
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.326 0.478 0.416 0.589 0.636 0.848 0.738 0.738 0.738 0.711 0.632 0.527 0.404 0.357
2.4.1 F-test 0.583 0.842 1.758 3.470 3.846 0.709 3.295 2.119 0.525 1.577 0.602 0.867 0.604 1.791
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.447 0.361 0.188 0.065 0.053 0.402 0.072 0.148 0.471 0.212 0.440 0.354 0.439 0.187
2.4.2 F-test 2.473 3.591 18.980 1.105 3.756 30.830 20.030 6.680 7.464 10.470 8.653 11.170 12.520 1.660
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.119 0.061 0.000 0.296 0.055 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.001 0.204
2.4.3 F-test 47.220 33.380 53.640 33.280 34.210 44.030 54.900 41.320 30.790 26.570 41.900 28.890 18.520 29.540
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.4.5 F-test 0.708 0.415 0.732 0.920 0.311 3.185 2.433 0.554 1.280 6.090 5.029 7.693 1.227 1.407
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.402 0.521 0.395 0.340 0.578 0.078 0.122 0.459 0.261 0.016 0.027 0.007 0.271 0.241
2.4.6 F-test 143.600 278.300 214.800 187.000 110.700 243.500 333.100 329.600 289.600 160.600 116.100 182.600 138.900 155.300
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.4.7 F-test 2.971 12.060 1.292 3.615 1.201 0.994 1.105 3.478 0.004 5.736 0.160 1.358 4.406 0.045
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.088 0.001 0.258 0.060 0.276 0.321 0.296 0.065 0.948 0.018 0.690 0.247 0.038 0.832
2.5.0 F-test 5.652 3.043 1.315 2.704 5.593 7.907 5.725 4.568 3.800 4.480 3.132 0.768 1.860 2.453
Board Size Prob>F 0.021 0.087 0.257 0.106 0.021 0.007 0.020 0.037 0.056 0.038 0.082 0.385 0.179 0.131
2.5.1 F-test 0.546 0.193 0.091 0.101 0.202 1.932 0.968 0.081 0.032 0.965 0.897 7.198 6.769 3.500
CEO on Board Prob>F 0.463 0.662 0.765 0.752 0.655 0.170 0.329 0.777 0.859 0.330 0.347 0.010 0.012 0.075
2.5.2 F-test 0.626 0.316 2.700 1.012 0.669 1.267 0.632 1.062 0.939 2.747 2.494 2.117 2.564 1.971
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.432 0.576 0.106 0.319 0.417 0.265 0.430 0.307 0.336 0.102 0.119 0.152 0.116 0.174
2.5.3 F-test 4.443 3.078 3.008 1.832 0.493 0.551 0.509 1.571 2.957 6.583 5.900 6.820 6.737 0.466
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.044 0.090 0.093 0.186 0.487 0.462 0.479 0.216 0.092 0.013 0.019 0.012 0.012 0.502
2.5.4 F-test 1.831 1.304 0.592 0.388 0.018 0.011 0.007 0.280 0.276 0.193 0.156 0.127 0.002 0.000
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.187 0.263 0.448 0.538 0.896 0.917 0.932 0.599 0.602 0.662 0.695 0.723 0.968 0.997
2.5.5 F-test 0.014 0.826 0.061 0.027 1.909 1.529 1.330 2.654 6.108 6.055 5.657 7.262 6.536 0.727
Female Directors Prob>F 0.908 0.372 0.807 0.870 0.176 0.224 0.256 0.111 0.018 0.018 0.022 0.010 0.014 0.403
2.6.0 F-test NA NA 0.000 0.207 0.286 1.334 1.371 1.945 1.190 2.896 1.865 0.223 0.266 1.229
Total Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA 0.986 0.655 0.601 0.262 0.256 0.172 0.283 0.097 0.181 0.640 0.609 0.280
2.6.1 F-test NA NA 1.081 0.000 1.813 5.025 4.297 0.054 0.086 0.020 0.507 2.606 0.299 0.000
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA 0.326 0.997 0.205 0.043 0.054 0.818 0.771 0.889 0.481 0.116 0.589 0.984
2.6.2 F-test NA 0.353 0.149 0.017 0.020 0.355 0.027 1.074 0.791 1.263 1.484 1.394 0.659 1.945
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F NA 0.557 0.703 0.897 0.888 0.554 0.871 0.306 0.379 0.267 0.229 0.244 0.421 0.187
3.1.0 F-test 5.891 6.540 5.318 5.087 6.037 6.500 7.002 6.551 6.405 5.050 5.003 4.936 4.622 5.272
Employment Level Prob>F 0.017 0.012 0.023 0.026 0.016 0.012 0.009 0.012 0.013 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.034 0.024
3.2.0 F-test 20.280 38.290 51.520 35.400 61.410 64.090 73.710 68.450 87.620 58.890 46.810 49.580 56.510 48.220
Average Wage Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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ANOVA Results: Between-Group (Germany)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 25.410 24.840 25.920 25.350 21.680 20.270 16.000 13.870 12.320 15.520 13.700 11.860 12.640 0.388
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.537
ShareholdersFunds F-test 3.452 1.794 0.597 0.865 0.264 0.230 0.289 0.411 0.365 0.742 0.608 0.323 0.514 0.404
Prob>F 0.066 0.183 0.441 0.354 0.609 0.632 0.592 0.523 0.547 0.391 0.437 0.571 0.475 0.528
NetIncome F-test 1.108 0.344 0.000 4.798 0.647 0.000 0.927 0.803 4.464 0.039 0.171 0.342 0.339 0.244
Prob>F 0.295 0.559 0.985 0.031 0.423 0.984 0.338 0.372 0.037 0.843 0.680 0.560 0.562 0.624
ROE F-test 16.030 10.230 7.623 1.112 1.215 1.089 0.908 3.804 10.780 0.448 2.469 8.874 0.138 0.012
Prob>F 0.000 0.002 0.007 0.294 0.273 0.299 0.342 0.054 0.001 0.505 0.119 0.004 0.711 0.912
ROA F-test 12.950 6.394 3.740 5.030 10.040 8.752 6.068 10.780 7.452 1.416 8.580 14.220 4.059 2.343
Prob>F 0.000 0.013 0.056 0.027 0.002 0.004 0.015 0.001 0.007 0.237 0.004 0.000 0.047 0.133
OperatingRevenue F-test 0.646 0.775 0.759 0.819 1.014 1.279 1.485 1.802 2.768 1.639 1.504 1.689 1.477 0.476
Prob>F 0.423 0.380 0.385 0.367 0.316 0.260 0.225 0.182 0.099 0.203 0.223 0.196 0.227 0.494
Mcap_Ln F-test 1.268 0.834 0.235 0.027 0.000 0.066 0.081 0.087 0.222 0.807 1.454 1.612 1.826 4.287
Prob>F 0.262 0.363 0.629 0.869 0.997 0.798 0.777 0.768 0.639 0.371 0.231 0.207 0.180 0.041
1.1.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.237 0.278 0.016 0.051
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.639 0.612 0.901 0.827
1.1.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.000 0.001 0.105 0.000
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.985 0.973 0.754 0.998
1.2.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 101.800 122.900 70.680 34.000
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2.0.1 F-test 28.120 26.920 27.350 28.500 32.290 26.640 27.790 33.590 25.120 22.370 27.100 30.090 28.550 21.040
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2.1 F-test 56.070 53.390 47.900 53.090 84.150 99.900 99.390 113.100 77.170 73.860 99.330 106.600 88.030 2.586
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.115
1.2.2 F-test 15.660 15.350 13.720 14.680 28.320 30.140 28.590 42.370 31.800 32.540 40.220 42.570 32.990 10.500
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002
1.4.0 F-test 0.000 0.065 0.774 1.609 0.737 0.006 0.485 0.194 0.078 0.217 1.710 1.477 0.046 5.793
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.991 0.799 0.381 0.208 0.393 0.938 0.488 0.661 0.780 0.643 0.194 0.227 0.831 0.018
2.3.0 F-test 0.506 0.377 0.078 0.033 0.005 0.060 0.059 0.059 0.314 0.314 0.338 0.091 0.091 0.057
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.479 0.541 0.781 0.856 0.946 0.807 0.809 0.809 0.577 0.577 0.562 0.764 0.764 0.812
2.4.1 F-test 1.943 2.722 1.537 0.210 0.060 0.264 0.515 0.838 0.099 0.009 0.169 0.342 0.475 0.502
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.166 0.102 0.218 0.647 0.806 0.609 0.474 0.362 0.754 0.924 0.682 0.560 0.492 0.482
2.4.2 F-test 21.670 6.367 11.580 2.823 29.000 7.670 7.233 12.050 5.917 1.475 13.370 4.364 6.350 NA
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.096 0.000 0.007 0.008 0.001 0.017 0.227 0.000 0.039 0.013 NA
2.4.3 F-test 83.940 105.700 68.860 77.010 68.250 50.670 53.230 50.390 49.540 47.700 41.480 38.920 31.480 7.756
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008
2.4.5 F-test 0.607 0.613 0.330 13.230 16.240 9.215 1.988 1.899 9.555 7.233 12.810 1.168 8.874 0.902
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.438 0.436 0.567 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.161 0.171 0.003 0.009 0.001 0.282 0.004 0.348
2.4.6 F-test 225.800 232.600 200.800 164.100 224.800 177.400 175.600 184.500 157.300 147.700 144.800 86.780 106.600 0.443
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.509
2.4.7 F-test 3.386 0.413 0.007 0.873 5.136 0.562 0.619 0.164 1.479 1.836 0.044 14.190 0.712 13.070
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.068 0.522 0.935 0.352 0.025 0.455 0.433 0.687 0.227 0.178 0.835 0.000 0.401 0.001
2.5.0 F-test 0.628 1.202 0.932 0.538 0.647 1.351 1.256 1.566 0.187 0.168 0.074 0.244 0.227 0.741
Board Size Prob>F 0.431 0.276 0.337 0.465 0.423 0.248 0.265 0.214 0.666 0.683 0.786 0.622 0.635 0.396
2.5.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
CEO on Board Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.5.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
2.5.3 F-test 1.032 6.095 1.481 0.270 0.265 0.617 0.873 0.987 0.410 1.611 1.032 1.979 1.675 0.029
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.313 0.016 0.227 0.605 0.608 0.434 0.352 0.323 0.523 0.208 0.312 0.163 0.199 0.865
2.5.4 F-test 1.129 1.096 0.849 1.255 0.695 0.983 0.761 1.280 0.652 0.784 0.684 0.706 1.037 NA
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.291 0.298 0.359 0.266 0.407 0.324 0.385 0.261 0.422 0.378 0.411 0.403 0.311 NA
2.5.5 F-test 0.291 0.023 0.428 0.543 1.149 1.436 1.033 0.021 0.079 0.061 0.559 0.439 0.830 4.943
Female Directors Prob>F 0.592 0.881 0.515 0.464 0.288 0.235 0.313 0.884 0.779 0.805 0.457 0.510 0.365 0.034
2.6.0 F-test NA NA 0.570 4.156 0.306 0.017 0.586 1.877 0.861 1.511 0.383 2.154 1.953 1.614
Total Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA 0.459 0.052 0.583 0.896 0.446 0.175 0.356 0.223 0.538 0.148 0.168 0.214
2.6.1 F-test NA NA 0.167 0.182 0.005 2.018 0.630 3.504 6.579 8.757 2.626 3.472 1.822 1.470
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F NA NA 0.686 0.672 0.946 0.160 0.430 0.065 0.012 0.004 0.111 0.068 0.183 0.237
2.6.2 F-test 0.495 0.622 0.459 0.273 0.058 0.006 1.880 3.002 4.368 1.027 6.693 5.677 2.988 0.031
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F 0.484 0.432 0.500 0.602 0.811 0.940 0.174 0.086 0.039 0.314 0.011 0.019 0.087 0.862
3.1.0 F-test 11.770 12.710 14.060 16.320 11.330 12.550 13.850 15.600 19.080 19.500 13.620 13.570 10.370 4.495
Employment Level Prob>F 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.037
3.2.0 F-test 16.890 21.720 26.720 27.530 22.980 33.960 13.750 13.770 16.250 15.840 9.431 9.464 8.395 0.166
Average Wage Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.684
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ANOVA Results: Between-Group (United Kingdom)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 14.980 19.000 22.390 22.170 29.440 26.240 28.490 22.560 20.440 23.210 24.550 23.030 23.050 38.980
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ShareholdersFunds F-test 0.212 0.543 0.823 1.538 1.892 3.112 6.021 6.453 3.491 4.772 4.298 3.698 3.699 12.180
Prob>F 0.646 0.463 0.367 0.218 0.172 0.081 0.016 0.013 0.065 0.031 0.041 0.057 0.057 0.001
NetIncome F-test 1.026 0.945 1.871 2.590 1.997 1.868 4.935 0.500 7.525 0.038 0.161 0.146 0.393 0.004
Prob>F 0.314 0.334 0.175 0.111 0.160 0.174 0.028 0.481 0.007 0.846 0.689 0.703 0.532 0.948
ROE F-test 0.530 0.016 4.613 1.343 0.888 1.276 1.608 6.462 24.230 3.015 2.345 4.927 5.026 0.510
Prob>F 0.469 0.901 0.035 0.249 0.348 0.261 0.208 0.013 0.000 0.086 0.129 0.029 0.027 0.478
ROA F-test 2.011 6.665 4.730 2.227 7.773 1.953 8.813 27.720 42.550 10.130 11.990 35.780 12.310 4.636
Prob>F 0.160 0.012 0.032 0.139 0.006 0.165 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.035
OperatingRevenue F-test 0.756 0.559 0.527 0.380 0.058 0.103 0.070 0.096 0.393 0.138 0.304 0.548 0.491 0.000
Prob>F 0.387 0.457 0.470 0.539 0.810 0.749 0.792 0.757 0.532 0.711 0.583 0.461 0.485 0.986
Mcap_Ln F-test 1.867 1.378 0.981 1.073 1.676 1.327 3.053 0.823 0.427 0.914 0.514 0.119 0.436 0.352
Prob>F 0.175 0.243 0.324 0.303 0.198 0.252 0.083 0.366 0.515 0.341 0.475 0.731 0.511 0.554
1.1.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.1.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0.1 F-test 5.686 4.610 4.073 3.056 1.705 2.103 2.876 3.298 7.481 8.943 5.608 7.313 8.311 7.055
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.019 0.034 0.046 0.083 0.194 0.150 0.093 0.072 0.007 0.004 0.020 0.008 0.005 0.009
1.2.1 F-test 5.252 6.501 10.100 7.003 19.570 14.770 13.800 18.710 25.510 25.000 22.670 26.010 27.260 33.260
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.025 0.013 0.002 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2.2 F-test 0.170 0.004 0.059 0.005 2.598 2.283 1.716 3.872 9.214 5.470 4.724 6.396 5.887 10.590
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.682 0.949 0.810 0.942 0.110 0.134 0.193 0.052 0.003 0.022 0.032 0.013 0.017 0.002
1.4.0 F-test 5.824 NA 0.423 0.635 0.412 0.203 1.566 1.197 0.793 2.987 0.122 0.193 0.649 0.191
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.018 NA 0.517 0.428 0.523 0.653 0.214 0.277 0.375 0.087 0.728 0.661 0.422 0.663
2.3.0 F-test 0.384 0.384 0.708 0.708 1.256 2.483 1.631 2.018 2.507 2.809 1.235 1.235 1.179 3.025
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.537 0.537 0.402 0.402 0.265 0.118 0.204 0.158 0.116 0.097 0.269 0.269 0.280 0.085
2.4.1 F-test 2.201 3.606 2.957 3.298 1.868 3.244 4.900 3.833 0.798 2.504 1.591 0.513 0.671 4.632
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.142 0.061 0.089 0.072 0.175 0.075 0.029 0.053 0.374 0.117 0.210 0.476 0.415 0.036
2.4.2 F-test 7.027 9.887 13.320 15.400 10.280 0.002 0.084 7.659 4.000 10.710 10.790 11.870 20.670 2.544
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.010 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.968 0.772 0.007 0.049 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.116
2.4.3 F-test 26.780 18.840 20.160 26.710 12.550 18.110 17.340 3.358 1.534 5.150 9.492 5.501 12.220 4.178
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.070 0.219 0.026 0.003 0.021 0.001 0.046
2.4.5 F-test 2.478 1.704 0.183 0.754 22.230 23.460 10.290 0.716 3.857 19.890 4.023 0.125 2.702 5.566
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.120 0.196 0.670 0.387 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.400 0.053 0.000 0.048 0.724 0.104 0.022
2.4.6 F-test 29.890 113.300 188.700 160.000 23.990 10.400 14.670 35.280 17.620 12.230 18.540 33.270 48.550 126.200
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.4.7 F-test 1.386 0.228 0.229 1.446 1.004 0.154 2.414 0.415 23.610 0.871 1.283 3.037 0.534 4.967
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.243 0.634 0.634 0.232 0.319 0.696 0.123 0.521 0.000 0.353 0.260 0.085 0.467 0.030
2.5.0 F-test 7.311 9.802 11.800 6.903 9.270 11.170 8.318 5.849 5.366 3.885 5.152 5.523 1.606 2.116
Board Size Prob>F 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.001 0.005 0.017 0.022 0.052 0.025 0.021 0.208 0.150
2.5.1 F-test 0.102 0.221 0.015 0.341 0.103 1.872 1.375 1.693 0.367 0.041 0.399 0.515 1.073 NA
CEO on Board Prob>F 0.750 0.639 0.901 0.561 0.748 0.174 0.243 0.196 0.546 0.840 0.529 0.475 0.303 NA
2.5.2 F-test 1.671 1.427 0.019 0.510 0.450 0.938 0.695 0.711 0.474 0.993 0.726 0.754 1.032 0.472
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.199 0.235 0.892 0.477 0.504 0.335 0.406 0.401 0.493 0.321 0.396 0.387 0.312 0.494
2.5.3 F-test 0.043 0.001 0.023 0.021 0.030 0.560 2.599 0.812 0.372 0.229 0.019 0.003 0.098 0.285
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.837 0.978 0.881 0.886 0.864 0.456 0.110 0.369 0.543 0.633 0.889 0.960 0.756 0.595
2.5.4 F-test 0.045 0.007 0.271 0.201 0.076 0.105 0.505 0.137 0.012 0.021 0.811 0.492 0.110 0.094
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.833 0.935 0.604 0.655 0.783 0.746 0.479 0.712 0.915 0.884 0.370 0.484 0.741 0.760
2.5.5 F-test 0.051 0.358 0.746 0.050 0.001 0.007 0.108 0.988 1.697 0.618 1.070 1.456 0.902 0.686
Female Directors Prob>F 0.821 0.551 0.390 0.823 0.979 0.932 0.744 0.323 0.196 0.434 0.304 0.231 0.345 0.410
2.6.0 F-test 3.043 3.165 0.406 1.078 0.221 1.543 0.861 3.885 2.459 2.668 5.075 2.999 2.347 1.344
Total Executive Pay Prob>F 0.084 0.078 0.525 0.301 0.639 0.217 0.356 0.051 0.120 0.105 0.027 0.087 0.129 0.250
2.6.1 F-test 0.810 1.586 0.197 0.550 0.282 0.435 0.123 1.529 0.005 0.133 1.540 0.308 1.194 1.201
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F 0.370 0.211 0.658 0.460 0.596 0.511 0.727 0.219 0.945 0.716 0.218 0.580 0.277 0.277
2.6.2 F-test 2.187 0.504 2.381 3.033 0.136 2.116 1.515 0.937 1.965 0.710 1.505 2.147 0.931 2.683
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F 0.142 0.479 0.126 0.084 0.713 0.149 0.221 0.335 0.164 0.402 0.223 0.146 0.337 0.106
3.1.0 F-test 19.210 18.440 17.830 18.580 18.010 16.760 15.480 14.670 17.110 18.020 14.600 13.450 14.050 17.560
Employment Level Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.2.0 F-test 21.800 19.130 8.456 10.190 9.980 20.930 22.170 23.550 27.240 24.640 23.890 16.260 15.610 28.640
Average Wage Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
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ANOVA Results: Between-Group (United States)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 63.550 55.800 60.530 56.490 57.860 63.720 61.780 61.650 62.830 56.480 58.520 57.960 54.810 54.410
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ShareholdersFunds F-test 9.614 3.532 7.037 4.812 8.564 9.778 10.460 10.130 18.730 17.570 18.420 16.960 16.400 14.680
Prob>F 0.002 0.062 0.009 0.030 0.004 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NetIncome F-test 3.858 2.987 1.416 5.341 4.174 4.386 5.912 0.897 7.898 0.790 0.176 0.469 0.183 0.881
Prob>F 0.052 0.086 0.236 0.022 0.043 0.038 0.016 0.345 0.006 0.376 0.675 0.495 0.669 0.350
ROE F-test 0.301 0.272 0.142 0.328 0.391 0.203 0.014 2.489 8.732 7.727 7.196 5.588 4.068 3.536
Prob>F 0.584 0.603 0.707 0.568 0.533 0.653 0.906 0.117 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.020 0.046 0.062
ROA F-test 11.370 7.562 4.673 14.230 21.340 29.950 23.640 30.530 11.560 14.260 31.950 31.250 20.090 23.420
Prob>F 0.001 0.007 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
OperatingRevenue F-test 0.034 0.124 0.044 0.137 0.117 0.117 0.025 0.161 0.542 0.003 0.009 0.214 0.323 0.324
Prob>F 0.854 0.725 0.835 0.712 0.733 0.732 0.876 0.689 0.463 0.959 0.924 0.645 0.571 0.570
Mcap_Ln F-test 1.115 0.706 0.850 0.631 1.111 1.961 1.706 0.013 1.220 0.883 0.587 1.381 0.220 0.044
Prob>F 0.293 0.402 0.358 0.428 0.294 0.164 0.194 0.911 0.271 0.349 0.445 0.242 0.640 0.834
1.1.1 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.1.2 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0 F-test NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
1.2.0.1 F-test 54.900 52.380 51.360 58.360 61.540 60.760 65.840 62.500 51.060 49.400 59.680 50.830 47.790 54.790
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2.1 F-test 146.000 126.900 106.800 131.400 186.800 198.100 222.700 196.900 168.400 136.400 145.100 109.600 104.100 123.600
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.2.2 F-test 71.600 66.650 67.850 81.460 93.830 95.950 108.600 106.300 82.640 70.060 78.700 65.460 58.040 68.520
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.4.0 F-test 0.483 1.204 1.204 5.349 0.192 0.387 5.349 0.192 NA NA NA NA NA 0.586
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.488 0.274 0.274 0.022 0.662 0.535 0.022 0.662 NA NA NA NA NA 0.445
2.3.0 F-test 2.791 NA 0.059 1.219 0.435 1.297 0.553 0.007 0.002 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.002 0.084
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.097 NA 0.809 0.272 0.511 0.257 0.458 0.936 0.962 0.852 0.852 0.852 0.962 0.772
2.4.1 F-test 4.835 2.757 1.847 1.180 1.585 3.011 6.163 5.875 0.318 3.852 3.019 1.470 0.863 0.968
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.030 0.099 0.176 0.279 0.210 0.085 0.014 0.017 0.574 0.052 0.085 0.227 0.355 0.327
2.4.2 F-test 0.907 2.432 1.177 7.561 1.821 0.776 0.000 0.128 0.170 0.118 0.469 0.129 2.472 2.854
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.343 0.121 0.280 0.007 0.180 0.380 0.994 0.722 0.681 0.732 0.495 0.720 0.118 0.094
2.4.3 F-test 1.136 1.033 12.040 10.940 22.000 14.570 4.850 3.895 7.715 13.220 38.280 55.050 30.090 19.690
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.289 0.312 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.051 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.4.5 F-test 0.649 0.466 3.825 7.711 7.650 4.095 8.130 3.839 2.328 2.152 1.762 1.074 2.541 2.823
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.422 0.496 0.053 0.006 0.007 0.045 0.005 0.052 0.130 0.145 0.187 0.302 0.113 0.095
2.4.6 F-test 75.820 21.890 7.637 21.660 57.060 171.700 241.400 269.100 168.400 42.420 87.140 83.220 46.900 32.430
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.4.7 F-test 7.565 7.235 7.685 22.380 31.840 44.040 48.830 51.820 29.510 5.504 15.210 22.020 8.935 5.080
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.026
2.5.0 F-test 12.810 22.020 17.880 19.040 19.220 18.680 22.980 24.750 10.150 13.760 5.280 8.369 4.592 4.208
Board Size Prob>F 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.023 0.004 0.034 0.044
2.5.1 F-test NA NA NA 0.195 1.687 0.226 5.934 NA NA 0.192 0.192 0.192 0.192 NA
CEO on Board Prob>F NA NA NA 0.659 0.196 0.635 0.016 NA NA 0.662 0.662 0.662 0.662 NA
2.5.2 F-test 1.841 0.845 1.514 1.514 0.206 0.535 0.610 0.086 1.812 0.268 1.004 0.078 0.521 0.313
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.177 0.360 0.221 0.221 0.651 0.466 0.436 0.770 0.180 0.606 0.318 0.780 0.472 0.577
2.5.3 F-test 0.091 0.820 0.157 0.634 1.683 2.410 1.749 1.821 0.721 1.741 0.752 1.341 1.087 0.225
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.763 0.367 0.693 0.427 0.197 0.123 0.188 0.179 0.397 0.189 0.387 0.249 0.299 0.637
2.5.4 F-test 0.135 0.188 0.570 0.272 1.167 0.179 0.100 0.180 1.113 0.986 0.071 0.471 0.015 1.359
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.714 0.665 0.452 0.603 0.282 0.673 0.752 0.672 0.293 0.322 0.790 0.494 0.902 0.247
2.5.5 F-test 0.091 0.863 0.562 0.190 1.765 3.356 1.746 0.119 0.255 0.125 0.001 0.720 0.017 1.061
Female Directors Prob>F 0.764 0.355 0.455 0.664 0.187 0.070 0.189 0.731 0.614 0.724 0.970 0.398 0.896 0.306
2.6.0 F-test 2.706 3.983 2.994 4.971 6.349 7.503 8.190 4.854 0.351 0.220 0.019 0.762 0.143 4.672
Total Executive Pay Prob>F 0.103 0.048 0.086 0.028 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.029 0.555 0.640 0.891 0.384 0.706 0.034
2.6.1 F-test 2.066 4.143 6.585 7.180 8.191 4.007 7.858 1.800 0.003 0.491 0.295 0.015 0.157 0.001
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F 0.153 0.044 0.011 0.008 0.005 0.047 0.006 0.182 0.956 0.485 0.588 0.902 0.692 0.977
2.6.2 F-test 0.203 1.668 0.033 1.969 1.964 1.816 2.603 4.281 3.238 4.491 5.168 5.085 4.825 3.226
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F 0.653 0.199 0.856 0.163 0.164 0.180 0.109 0.041 0.074 0.036 0.025 0.026 0.030 0.077
3.1.0 F-test 0.078 0.007 0.013 0.061 0.016 0.001 0.047 0.039 0.000 0.001 0.003 0.013 0.015 0.022
Employment Level Prob>F 0.781 0.932 0.910 0.805 0.899 0.979 0.829 0.844 0.992 0.971 0.954 0.911 0.903 0.883
3.2.0 F-test 7.899 8.118 10.910 12.330 10.990 9.323 9.985 9.831 6.998 12.050 13.440 11.540 8.203 9.914
Average Wage Prob>F 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.009 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.005 0.002
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ANOVA Results: International-Level
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
TotalAssets F-test 4.294 4.788 4.004 3.160 2.799 2.897 2.281 1.891 1.880 2.782 2.835 2.785 2.927 1.830
Prob>F 0.005 0.003 0.008 0.025 0.040 0.035 0.079 0.130 0.132 0.041 0.038 0.040 0.034 0.142
ShareholdersFunds F-test 12.510 14.090 15.840 17.240 18.490 22.500 21.680 17.330 18.470 18.100 19.430 20.120 19.600 9.941
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
NetIncome F-test 17.390 11.260 0.629 22.620 19.210 16.070 19.750 18.540 1.067 20.960 22.140 25.070 20.100 17.910
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.597 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ROE F-test 4.465 4.853 9.532 1.574 6.164 11.650 9.104 8.781 2.943 11.120 10.410 11.290 11.150 5.937
Prob>F 0.004 0.002 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
ROA F-test 3.177 5.137 5.454 6.047 6.867 9.347 7.058 5.839 4.058 9.661 9.366 12.130 8.659 5.934
Prob>F 0.024 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001
OperatingRevenue F-test 14.180 15.320 13.910 14.520 14.330 14.530 13.900 13.170 12.290 15.340 14.220 12.790 12.780 8.029
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mcap_Ln F-test 135.500 167.500 178.300 182.000 178.700 176.500 156.100 142.100 128.600 143.900 136.900 147.800 143.800 140.700
Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1.1.1 F-test 7.944 0.537 0.454 0.644 0.685 1.134 1.532 3.105 0.681 0.144 0.190 0.292 0.409 0.351
Tier 1 Capital Ratio Prob>F 0.001 0.661 0.717 0.594 0.569 0.352 0.228 0.040 0.570 0.933 0.902 0.831 0.747 0.789
1.1.2 F-test 5.339 3.447 1.701 3.369 0.506 0.749 1.347 2.108 0.591 0.228 0.393 0.327 0.628 0.663
Total Capital Ratio Prob>F 0.007 0.035 0.193 0.035 0.682 0.533 0.280 0.119 0.625 0.876 0.759 0.806 0.601 0.579
1.2.0 F-test 2.954 2.348 3.236 3.399 1.071 2.020 5.005 1.828 3.285 1.527 0.985 1.179 0.986 1.049
Tier 1 Leverage Ratio Prob>F 0.057 0.100 0.038 0.033 0.377 0.132 0.006 0.163 0.031 0.223 0.409 0.329 0.408 0.381
1.2.0.1 F-test 7.774 6.220 5.404 5.182 4.421 4.259 3.888 3.983 4.267 4.849 4.151 1.821 2.069 2.045
Shareholder Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.143 0.104 0.107
1.2.1 F-test 0.399 0.586 1.088 0.181 1.245 2.088 1.275 1.586 3.028 2.248 2.045 1.225 1.066 1.579
Financial Debt-Equity Ratio Prob>F 0.754 0.624 0.354 0.910 0.293 0.101 0.282 0.192 0.029 0.082 0.107 0.300 0.363 0.195
1.2.2 F-test 5.502 5.053 5.385 3.890 3.972 4.614 3.829 4.450 6.316 5.547 5.135 3.393 2.401 1.240
Balance Sheet Leverage Prob>F 0.001 0.002 0.001 0.009 0.008 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.018 0.067 0.295
1.4.0 F-test 0.946 5.757 0.537 4.622 0.540 2.235 7.865 3.518 9.998 7.915 5.783 4.147 2.020 0.250
Auditor Change Prob>F 0.418 0.001 0.657 0.003 0.655 0.084 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.006 0.110 0.862
2.3.0 F-test 12.060 1.620 7.286 9.265 4.354 5.348 5.090 7.530 8.256 8.631 8.231 7.226 5.781 5.375
Shareholder Rights (1S1V) Prob>F 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001
2.4.1 F-test 20.550 23.000 22.980 26.440 26.580 28.380 26.750 25.210 24.600 25.840 31.700 31.740 31.890 14.710
Net Value Added Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.4.2 F-test 12.680 13.070 10.380 15.940 6.963 5.199 7.292 9.730 2.338 2.261 1.351 3.584 3.411 3.770
NVA to Shareholders Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.073 0.081 0.257 0.014 0.018 0.011
2.4.3 F-test 16.010 11.560 15.940 16.910 18.470 25.330 18.720 15.980 13.890 18.200 18.510 18.970 20.500 14.170
NVA to Employees Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.4.5 F-test 13.690 11.090 16.430 7.673 4.425 9.807 6.721 6.004 6.227 7.711 8.996 12.830 11.200 10.320
NVA to the State Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.4.6 F-test 2.495 0.916 0.594 1.840 2.615 2.427 2.052 1.248 2.204 5.142 6.241 5.611 4.606 4.156
NVA to Creditors Prob>F 0.060 0.433 0.619 0.139 0.051 0.065 0.106 0.292 0.087 0.002 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.007
2.4.7 F-test 21.950 21.950 22.500 27.940 37.230 33.310 22.950 21.390 17.910 22.200 29.760 23.950 30.600 14.460
NVA to the Company Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.5.0 F-test 80.540 90.930 118.100 132.800 147.200 131.200 121.200 123.900 123.500 110.900 115.600 99.510 95.310 31.130
Board Size Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.5.1 F-test 243.200 297.600 335.500 307.500 239.900 241.400 269.400 304.700 292.900 274.200 256.600 320.600 357.500 389.200
CEO on Board Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.5.2 F-test 176.500 196.600 151.200 175.600 164.000 111.100 115.300 113.900 117.000 103.200 109.600 91.240 69.420 44.070
CEO-Chairman Combined Role Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.5.3 F-test 94.330 101.800 95.440 97.230 114.100 109.400 103.700 116.000 120.200 140.100 137.800 129.400 128.800 142.300
Non-Executive Directors Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.5.4 F-test 230.100 280.400 261.800 341.100 356.500 387.900 371.300 364.500 379.800 345.200 357.500 373.500 374.500 53.130
Independent NEDs Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.5.5 F-test 22.580 29.460 28.360 18.760 18.410 21.550 24.770 24.600 24.390 20.960 23.040 19.200 18.570 2.036
Female Directors Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.110
2.6.0 F-test 55.500 40.330 25.820 27.220 25.910 37.540 52.170 40.750 42.980 46.890 39.190 35.870 51.170 16.740
Total Executive Pay Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.6.1 F-test 142.700 109.600 72.440 88.110 62.840 61.300 89.640 100.600 101.800 88.120 103.400 102.700 87.280 49.970
Single Highest Executive Pay Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2.6.2 F-test 44.990 33.760 18.180 21.540 17.350 20.470 24.180 23.690 14.010 14.230 21.320 20.220 14.710 6.897
CEO Pay Ratio Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.1.0 F-test 59.740 63.850 64.920 69.400 76.040 78.390 77.530 78.040 76.170 74.550 75.000 72.990 74.510 56.990
Employment Level Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3.2.0 F-test 17.870 22.740 16.510 10.580 11.960 14.470 6.688 7.482 22.620 10.440 12.120 14.390 12.890 8.730
Average Wage Prob>F 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
